Richard Dawkins: The Enemies of Reason

[Severian]

You can call it what you want, but it is still a belief in something which you cannot prove. It is even a belief in something for which you have no evidence (since past events only become evidence on acceptance of the thing you are trying to prove).

[gcol]

"You can call it what you want,"

Thanks very much.

 

"but it is still a belief in something which you cannot prove."

But at least it is based on hard factual evidence.

 

"It is even a belief in something for which you have no evidence (since past events only become evidence on acceptance of the thing you are trying to prove).

Codswallop. If that is really true, the logic of the entire scientific method goes out of the window.

 

You seem to be suggesting that nothing that has happened in the past has any bearing on what may happen in the future. So no cause and effect then? Hmmm....interesting.

[YT2095]

the reason I used the seeds and the car ride was based on personal experience, i`ve planted seeds in good "Faith" and non of them made it, in fact the entire batch was faulty/sterile.

 

I`ve also been on a route time and time again, and then one day I got totally mashed up by some idiot in a white van.

had I have KNOWN and not acted on faith, I would Not have taken that route but have chose another (I think anyone in their right mind would have done so).

[ParanoiA]

That is not true. You cannot extrapolate past events into predictions about future events without making an assumption about how the extrapolation should be made. Your belief that the conditions for germination will remain the same as they have always been is based on faith.

 

Then maybe we should draw a distinction between reasonable faith and unreasonable faith. More fertile ground of interpretation and manipulation but we should distinguish faith that is reasonable, like expecting gravity to act on the ball the next time I throw it up in the air, versus expecting fairies to appear in Cuthber's garden. There is a difference. One is substantiated with some kind of objective observation and explanation, and the other is not.

 

Seems to me like these discussions always get muddied to the point that all words are meaningless, thereby benefiting those who's words always were meaningless.

[YT2095]

where is the line drawn between what is and is Not "Reasonable"?

 

what parameters must be satisfied to distinguish one from the other?

[ParanoiA]

I would draw the line between reasonable and not reasonable by analysis of past evidence. That's a broad statement with quite a subjective interpretation, I admit. But there are things that aren't as subjective. Such as the 9/11 conspiracy. Sure it's possible. How many times has someone tried to convince you of ghosts or something and they say "Don't you think it's possible....blah blah blah"

 

Sure it's possible. But where do you make the leap to belief? I would call that unreasonable faith. If you could measure and show some kind of evidence, then at least it wouldn't be unreasonable faith, and I could understand.

 

Granted our very own existence, or the belief in it, is faith. And it's reasonable to believe it, even if it turns out to be false. But it was never reasonable to believe in fairies in Cuthber's garden. Which really just comes back to substantiated versus unsubstantiated belief. I guess I just don't see what's so difficult about it.

[Severian]

Then maybe we should draw a distinction between reasonable faith and unreasonable faith.

 

No - that's the point, and it seems that you and gcol are missing it entirely. It only becomes reasonable when you are willing to assume that there should be a corelation between events in the past and events in the future. You have absolutely no evidence (reasonable or otherwise) that this is the case.

 

gcol's claim that this cannot be true because "the logic of the entire scientific method goes out of the window" is clearly nonsense. He simply doesn't understand the scientific method. Built into your scientific theory is a statement that the theory governs events in the future too, and you can test this statement, so science is perfectly valid. You cannot, however, prove that a theory correctly predicts all events in the future (but I would have thought this was obvious).

[ParanoiA]

No - that's the point, and it seems that you and gcol are missing it entirely. It only becomes reasonable when you are willing to assume that there should be a corelation between events in the past and events in the future. You have absolutely no evidence (reasonable or otherwise) that this is the case.

 

And shouldn't there be a corrolation between past and future events? If something has happened before, over and over again, without deviation or exception that cannot be explained, it would be unreasonable to believe that this next time it won't happen.

 

So far, we have reason to believe there is a corrollation between past and future events.

 

This is the muddying I was talking about. It seems you're muddying up the idea of proof, evidence, past, future - exploiting the unprovable nature of the future to make a point that nothing is provable. Then, that makes your unprovable position equal.

 

I just take issue with not distinguishing between faith guided by repetitious observation of past events with faith that isn't.

[YT2095]

you flip a simple coin, and on the 1`st go it`s heads do it again and it`s also heads, this happens 10x in a row, on the 11`th time will it be heads?

 

or will the chance still be 50/50 uncertain?

 

I think (and I could be wrong) that that is what he`s trying to say.

[iNow]

The issue is not the distinction in reasonable and unreasonable faith.

 

The issue is choosing an explanation for phenomena that has zero grounding in reality.

 

 

How do you accurately explain rocket science, or immunology, or compton scattering, or photovoltaics, or anything that makes up our reality if you attribute it all to magical unicorns?

 

 

There IS a difference, and (to be somewhat harsh) faith is nothing more than adults holding on to childish notions and fairy tales. There is no Zeus, there is no Krishna, there is no Poseidon, there is no Ra, there is no plethora of gods which align with our perspective on the stars... There is simply human insecurity and axiety with the feeling of not knowing, and the comfort which is brought by having false explanations instead of none at all.

[ParanoiA]

you flip a simple coin, and on the 1`st go it`s heads do it again and it`s also heads, this happens 10x in a row, on the 11`th time will it be heads?

 

or will the chance still be 50/50 uncertain?

 

I think (and I could be wrong) that that is what he`s trying to say.

 

And that's unreasonable. First, example specific, we don't believe it will always be heads, we believe it will always be heads, or tails or land on its edge or roll off the table etc...

 

Expanding on the metaphor...you're expecting me to accept that there's a possibility it could land on tails when tails has never presented itself as an option. Therefore, the possibility exists and has to be accepted, no doubt, but it wouldn't be reasonable to believe in that possibility, to have faith in it. If it had been an option - even once - then it would be reasonable to expect it again.

 

That means there's a chance the sun won't be burning tomorrow. I could actually wake up mexican. Maybe gravity decides not to work. But none of these things as ever happened, so while they are possible, they are not reasonable to believe in, nor have faith in. My belief the sun will come up, I will still be caucasian and gravity will keep my cheerios in my bowl is faith - faith created from repetitious observation, not the mere existence of possibility.

[Severian]

And that's unreasonable. First, example specific, we don't believe it will always be heads, we believe it will always be heads, or tails or land on its edge or roll off the table etc...

 

No - it is not unreasonable. Given the 'evidence' presented by YT (and only that) and assuming predictivity, you would not expect it would ever come up tails. You would have no evidence that it even could come up tails!

 

What you are doing is using your implicit sense of predictivity to decide what is reasonable and what is not. You are use to things being predictable, and you transfer that 'usual' scenario onto your newest observations. That is fine for proving pretty much everything you like, as long as you recognise that predictivity is an assumption of your proof.

 

If you had grown up in a universe where physical laws generally didn't apply (I am not sure that is possible, since I don't think life would form, but this is a thought experiment) then you would not expect past events to be correlated with future ones, and you would not make this assumption. I agree that in our universe it is a reasonable assumption for most things (like the sun coming up tomorrow) but it is important to realise that it is an assumption.

[gcol]

I agree that in our universe it is a reasonable assumption for most things (like the sun coming up tomorrow) but it is important to realise that it is an assumption.

.

 

I presume your use of the phrase "most things" Is your get-out for squaring the circle of things theological against things scientific? A lot of semantic twisting and turning required. Your verbal gymnastics indicate enviable suppleness

[ParanoiA]

No - it is not unreasonable. Given the 'evidence' presented by YT (and only that) and assuming predictivity, you would not expect it would ever come up tails. You would have no evidence that it even could come up tails!

 

But that's what I said in the second paragraph - accepting his example as a metaphor and assuming tails is not known:

 

Expanding on the metaphor...you're expecting me to accept that there's a possibility it could land on tails when tails has never presented itself as an option[/i']. Therefore, the possibility exists and has to be accepted, no doubt, but it wouldn't be reasonable to believe in that possibility, to have faith in it. If it had been an option - even once - then it would be reasonable to expect it again.

 

We're saying basically the same thing. We both realize that predictivity is faith. To say gravity will work tomorrow is a statement of faith. I accept that.

 

What I'm differing with you about is what kinds of predictive faith is reasonable and what is not. Some kinds of faith is the result of previous observation of the phenomena. Some kinds of faith is no observation of anything, rather supposition of possibilities. In my opinion, the former is reasonable, the latter is not. Ie..anything is possible and nothing is impossible, so conclude with what is. It's only reasonable to go with what you've observed rather than to unreasonably believe in all possibilities.

 

What you are doing is using your implicit sense of predictivity to decide what is reasonable and what is not. You are use to things being predictable, and you transfer that 'usual' scenario onto your newest observations. That is fine for proving pretty much everything you like, as long as you recognise that predictivity is an assumption of your proof.

 

Could you expand on this or throw in an example? I think I get what you're saying, but I'm not sure. I mean I agree with that last line, but I suspect the heart of your reasoning is in the first part of that paragraph and I'm not quite getting you...

[Glider]

That is not true. You cannot extrapolate past events into predictions about future events without making an assumption about how the extrapolation should be made. Your belief that the conditions for germination will remain the same as they have always been is based on faith.

I disagree.

 

I accept the principle that nothing is certain. However I do think you are drastically overstretching that priciple to say (if I understand you correctly) that 'nothing is certain, therefore everything is faith'. This would be a false dichotomy as the key factor is the balance of probability and that is always an estimate based on known things.

 

With the seed example, I have seeds from an acer palmatum, so I know they need cold stratifying in damp sand for 6 - 10 weeks before they germinate. I know that a period of warmth after cold stratification is the trigger for germination.

 

Whether I bought the seed or harvested them from one of my trees, I have a reason to beleive they are viable. I accept that nothing is certain, but the balance of probability suggests they are (seed vendors check for viability, I do my own 'rule of thumb' tests). I also know that the damping off fungus exists and is a risk to seeds and seedlings, and I accept the possibility that this may kill them. But knowing this, I can provide prophylactic treatment.

 

Given these known things, I have reason to believe that if I carry out these steps, most will germinate (I also accept that some may not). It is the reason to believe that denies faith, which is belief without a reason (i.e. evidence to suggest or in support of...).

 

Knowing a little about evolution, I have absolutely no reason to suppose that the conditions required for the germination of acer palmatum seeds would suddenly change.

 

To put it another way: everytime you throw a ball in the air it comes down. Everytime anyone else has documented throwing a ball in the air, they report that it has come down. So you form a theory of gravity based on past events. But it could be that that theory is only applicable to these past events - you cannot prove that it will be applicable to future events - you take it on faith that it is. If you threw a ball in the air tomorrow and it didn't come down, your observation would still be consistant with your past observations - they just wouldn't be consistant with the theory you formed to make predictions.

 

This is the point that the scientist I quoted was making.

The same thing applies. The consistent observation of the phenomenon that wherever one is on the planet, a ball thrown in the air comes down, provides a reason to believe that if I throw a ball in the air, it will come down. Thus I have a reason to accept the rule that balls thrown in the air will come down. I have absolutely no reason to suppose that priciple is false until one fails to do so, even though I accept that nothing is certain.

[Severian]

Could you expand on this or throw in an example? I think I get what you're saying, but I'm not sure. I mean I agree with that last line, but I suspect the heart of your reasoning is in the first part of that paragraph and I'm not quite getting you...

 

Imagine the universe as just being a series of events in space-time. In principle, it could be that there is no governing laws which link together these events - they just are. Then you could never make any predictions about future events based on past events, since there would be no causal connection.

 

Now, we have observed connections between events. In fact, we have gotten so good at finding patterns between these events that we can use the patterns to predict events that we haven't even observed yet. This is very useful and I am not trying to downplay that at all (it is what I do for a living after all).

 

But, there could well be different regions of space-time (ie. groupings of events) where the patterns that we have observed are not valid, and either there is no useful pattern or it is a pattern which is very different from the one we know. That may sound far fetched, and I agree that for most events we see in our everyday lives we don't need to consider it, but it is a possibility. In fact, this is actually predicted by String Theory (for example the 'landscape', which has 'bubbles' of space-time where different vacua are manifest, giving very different physical laws).

 

In actuality there is no reason to expect that a future event will obey the same patterns that we have observed. YT's analogy is a good one: if we had observed a coin only coming up heads, we would not be expecting it to come up tails and would have built a false theory about the possible outcomes of the coin flip. In order to build physics theories, we do have to assume that future events are corellated by past events, but this is something we take on faith.

 

However I do think you are drastically overstretching that priciple to say (if I understand you correctly) that 'nothing is certain' date=' therefore everything is faith'. This would be a false dichotomy as the key factor is the [i']balance of probability[/i] and that is always an estimate based on known things.

 

Two points:

 

1. I am not saying 'nothing is certain, therefore everything is faith'. As long as you preface your scientific statements with things like 'If predictivity holds for all space-time events...' or something similar, then you can make absolute statements. These are not based on faith since your statement declares itself void in the eventuality that the conditional fails.

 

2. Since you only have one universe to test you can make no statement about the 'balance of probability'. You cannot quantify the probability that all space-time events are corellated. What you can do, is look at the number of space-time events which you have observed, and ask what proportion of them are corelated with one another. In scientifically tested subjects, this is a very high number (~100%) so you can then claim that your next event probably will also be corelated (again, this is what I do for a living). However, you need to be careful extrapolating to areas where you have not tested this - we cannot, for example, predict the actions of individuals, so we cannot claim that conciousness is linked to physical law. We cannot predict (other than statistically) quantum mechanical decays, since they are based on random numbers. Furthermore, there is a tendancy not to count events which appear uncorelated claiming that we just don't understand the corelation yet.

 

Finally, there is no such thing as 'reasonable faith'. Either it is belief in something which can be proven or it is not. You are simply tacking the word 'reasonable' onto your beliefs to give them false legitimacy.

[Glider]

Two points:

 

1. I am not saying 'nothing is certain, therefore everything is faith'. As long as you preface your scientific statements with things like 'If predictivity holds for all space-time events...' or something similar, then you can make absolute statements. These are not based on faith since your statement declares itself void in the eventuality that the conditional fails.

 

2. Since you only have one universe to test you can make no statement about the 'balance of probability'. You cannot quantify the probability that all space-time events are corellated. What you can do, is look at the number of space-time events which you have observed, and ask what proportion of them are corelated with one another. In scientifically tested subjects, this is a very high number (~100%) so you can then claim that your next event probably will also be corelated (again, this is what I do for a living). However, you need to be careful extrapolating to areas where you have not tested this - we cannot, for example, predict the actions of individuals, so we cannot claim that conciousness is linked to physical law. We cannot predict (other than statistically) quantum mechanical decays, since they are based on random numbers. Furthermore, there is a tendancy not to count events which appear uncorelated claiming that we just don't understand the corelation yet.

I'm getting the feeling that we're talking about entirely different things.

 

Finally, there is no such thing as 'reasonable faith'. Either it is belief in something which can be proven or it is not. You are simply tacking the word 'reasonable' onto your beliefs to give them false legitimacy.

I have never used the term 'reasonable faith' (as far as I'm concerned, that's an oxymoron anyway). I used the word 'reason' (in reason to believe) in its dictionary sense of 'a cause or explanation' i.e. 'a good cause to do something', as opposed to 'reasonable]', which means 'fair or sensible'.