Ethical Implications of 'Many Worlds'

[CDarwin]

Obviously this isn't my area of expertise, but I've been reading a bit about "multiverses" lately in my science magazines, and of course I'd heard of this rather famous prediction of quantum theory in general sketches before. What struck me somewhat was some of the ethical questions that a multiverse of the type Everett proposes might bring up. Is anything really right or wrong if what ever action 'you' don't take some other 'you' does in some other universe? Am I making difficulties? I don't suppose it's a terribly pressing question, just a bit of a mind game.

[Mr Skeptic]

That seems kind of irrelevant. You are judged by your actions, whatever they may be, in whatever world you may be. The "other you" in some other world is irrelevant to this world, and in fact he is not the same as you but similar.

 

The above assuming that alternate worlds exist, of course.

[bascule]

The brain seems to be a classical system.

 

Intuitively my suspicion is that the brain's structure mitigates whatever random effects individual waveform collapse events may have on its higher level function as best it can.

[CDarwin]

The brain seems to be a classical system.

 

Intuitively my suspicion is that the brain's structure mitigates whatever random effects individual waveform collapse events may have on its higher level function as best it can.

 

Alright, I was under the impression that Everett's Many Worlds thingamajig says that the wave function doesn't collapse. Different outcomes just happen in different universes. Again, this isn't my forte at all.

[SkepticLance]

To CDarwin

 

You are quite correct. Everetts rather alarming interpretation says just what you think.

 

In terms of ethics, I don't think it makes the slightest bit of difference. Whatever worlds we are in, we operate as if there were just the single world.

 

One interesting interpretation is that I will live forever. (and so will you). At every turn, there is an almost infinite range of things that will happen to you. In some of them, you will die. In others, you will not. In some, medical science will progress slowly. In others at breakneck speed. The sheer enormous number of possibilities that will be played out mean that some versions of you will be treated with very advanced medical science and stop ageing. Every time something happens to kill you, some versions of yourself will survive.

 

Of course, most versions of you will never read this message.

[bascule]

Alright, I was under the impression that Everett's Many Worlds thingamajig says that the wave function doesn't collapse. Different outcomes just happen in different universes.

 

But we're classical structures that resist being impacted by quantum indeterminacy

[BenTheMan]

What struck me somewhat was some of the ethical questions that a multiverse of the type Everett proposes might bring up. Is anything really right or wrong if what ever action 'you' don't take some other 'you' does in some other universe?

 

I think that you're making difficulties Consider this---in THIS universe, some people obey the law and some people do not. Does the fact that people exhibit a range of compliance with the law mean that the law is unjust?

 

But we're classical structures that resist being impacted by quantum indeterminacy

 

I don't want to have to read fifty pages in the other thread to get caught up, but there is simply no way to know this without knowing the details of how the brain works.

[bascule]

I don't want to have to read fifty pages in the other thread to get caught up, but there is simply no way to know this without knowing the details of how the brain works.

 

Then just read the abstract:

 

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907009

 

The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes

Authors: Max Tegmark

(Submitted on 5 Jul 1999 (v1), last revised 10 Nov 1999 (this version, v2))

 

Abstract: Based on a calculation of neural decoherence rates, we argue that that the degrees of freedom of the human brain that relate to cognitive processes should be thought of as a classical rather than quantum system, i.e., that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the current classical approach to neural network simulations. We find that the decoherence timescales ~10^{-13}-10^{-20} seconds are typically much shorter than the relevant dynamical timescales (~0.001-0.1 seconds), both for regular neuron firing and for kink-like polarization excitations in microtubules. This conclusion disagrees with suggestions by Penrose and others that the brain acts as a quantum computer, and that quantum coherence is related to consciousness in a fundamental way.

[SkepticLance]

To Bascule

 

I am not sure that this relates to the topic. The thing that is indeterminate, under Everett's interpretation, is not the human brain. It is the entire damn universe. Each quantum instant, about 10 to the power of 100 new universes split off each existing one. That is how many new Bascules are made each time an electron has to 'decide' whether to go left or right.

[bascule]

I am not sure that this relates to the topic. The thing that is indeterminate, under Everett's interpretation, is not the human brain. It is the entire damn universe. Each quantum instant, about 10 to the power of 100 new universes split off each existing one. That is how many new Bascules are made each time an electron has to 'decide' whether to go left or right.

 

I'm not saying it isn't possible that some of those Bascules will deviate greatly from each other, but by in large the chaotic effects at the quantum level will fold back on the attractor (if I'm using that correctly), so that while behavior may be markedly different at small scales, we'll see little effect at larger scales.

 

Our lives are not determined by the outcomes of individual waveform collapse events.

[BenTheMan]

I'm not saying it isn't possible that some of those Bascules will deviate greatly from each other, but by in large the chaotic effects at the quantum level will fold back on the attractor (if I'm using that correctly), so that while behavior may be markedly different at small scales, we'll see little effect at larger scales.

 

What do you consider a ``little effect''? It is possible that we live in a metastable vacuum, for example. This means that our universe is sitting on the edge of a canyon. There is a finite chance that we could tunnel to another vacuum at any instant, which means that there are universes where this happens, and there are universes that are VASTLY different from ours---i.e. we no longer exist. Because it is unlikely, the number of universes that tunnel to another vacuum are few. But this is a quantum event, so I don't know how you can claim that there will be little effects at large scales.

 

Another (canonical) example is Schroedinger's cat: half of the universes find it dead. So in half of the cases, the cat has ceased to be (did anyone catch the monty python ref?)---this is a pretty radical difference if you're the cat.

[bascule]

Humans are large classical systems. Individual waveform collapse events generally don't concern us unless we're studying them explicitly.

[Spyman]

Obviously this isn't my area of expertise, but I've been reading a bit about "multiverses" lately in my science magazines, and of course I'd heard of this rather famous prediction of quantum theory in general sketches before. What struck me somewhat was some of the ethical questions that a multiverse of the type Everett proposes might bring up. Is anything really right or wrong if what ever action 'you' don't take some other 'you' does in some other universe? Am I making difficulties? I don't suppose it's a terribly pressing question, just a bit of a mind game.

I can view the question in two different ways:

 

A quantum theory allowing every possible outcome does not imply that the other 'you' is exactly 'you', nor that it's even possible to have the other choice of action. There might be a lot of possible 'you's that performs a lot of actions, but every action must still be possible. So either the other 'you' is very different from 'you', if able to choose differently in a important ethical choice, or the other choice is not a possible outcome, so it doesn't happen in any of the other worlds either.

 

Also there is a big difference between quantum events and human actions, even with every different possible outcome of all quantum events, there is only one world where exactly that choice is to be made. Small differences in circumstances won't change your choise of action, and with large enough differances I would say that the situation is different. With different situations you might choose different, even inside a single world.

 

In both cases "what ever action 'you' don't take some other 'you' does in some other universe" seems to be false.

 

My answer: You can't motivate/defend your choice/action ethically with the difference in another world.

[foodchain]

I can view the question in two different ways:

 

A quantum theory allowing every possible outcome does not imply that the other 'you' is exactly 'you', nor that it's even possible to have the other choice of action. There might be a lot of possible 'you's that performs a lot of actions, but every action must still be possible. So either the other 'you' is very different from 'you', if able to choose differently in a important ethical choice, or the other choice is not a possible outcome, so it doesn't happen in any of the other worlds either.

 

Also there is a big difference between quantum events and human actions, even with every different possible outcome of all quantum events, there is only one world where exactly that choice is to be made. Small differences in circumstances won't change your choise of action, and with large enough differances I would say that the situation is different. With different situations you might choose different, even inside a single world.

 

In both cases "what ever action 'you' don't take some other 'you' does in some other universe" seems to be false.

 

My answer: You can't motivate/defend your choice/action ethically with the difference in another world.

 

Is it implicit that even another quantum universe have anything in common with say the one we live in, which I think the concept implies our universe is then a quantum system or event or events. I don’t see why an alternate or even how many ever alternates that exist need to be anything like our own. If unless QM itself is not bottom layer and something is producing QM on its own, then I would see QM having to satisfy whatever laws such produces within the behavior put forth by QM. Then again it would seem that our universe does interact with QM, so the curveball to me is that whatever is below or producing QM manifesting through a possible QM function, or if QM is standalone does it have to have similar to exact properties such as actions event in any alternate form.

[BenTheMan]

Humans are large classical systems. Individual waveform collapse events generally don't concern us unless we're studying them explicitly.

 

Unless there are macroscopic phenomena based on quantum measurements. Like (perhaps) in the brain. There is simply no way to make a general statement like this---I gave you two examples... In the first case, nuclei past hydrogen cease to exist, which is a pretty radical difference.

[SkepticLance]

To foodchain

 

This thread was about the Everett multi-universe theory. There are lots of multi-universe theories in which your comment is valid. However, in the Everett interpretation, the many universes essentially 'peel off' earlier universes by varying quantum outcomes. That means each new universe is almost identical to the one it came from, and changes will only become significant with time. In effect, all the universes that came from 'ours' over the past 100 years will still be quite similar.

[Spyman]

I don’t see why an alternate or even how many ever alternates that exist need to be anything like our own.

Well, I don't know much of quantum theories, but like I said, if it's not anything like our own, then the ethical question is moot.

 

EDIT: Because then there wouldn't be another 'you' facing the same choice of action, in the same situation.

[pioneer]

A quantum theory allowing every possible outcome does not imply that the other 'you' is exactly 'you', nor that it's even possible to have the other choice of action.

 

From the point of the view of the human mind, a quantum theory allowing every possible outcome, sort of describes the human imagination. In my imagination, I can make pigs fly, since the imagination is not confined to the laws of causuality. In the imagination we can throw out cause and affect as well as the known laws of physics and add whatever you like.

 

On the other hand, the laws of physics are more in touch with cause and affect and place a different set of limits of what is possible. In causual reality, we can try to make a pig fly, but it continues to crash. We can even use a catapult to give is a little more lift, but it still crashes.

 

What I am trying to say is a quantum theory allowing every possible outcome is more appropriate for describing the human imagination. It may not be appropriate in the lab where reality sets different constraints.

 

One may argue that random and unexpected affects occur all the time, even in light of the causual relationships that define reality. Another way to look at that is maybe these relationships need to be modernized.

 

Let me give an example, before Newton got hit in the head with an apple and defined the laws of gravity, the observation of falling objects was very random. There was not yet any causual way to explain it, so a quantum theory allowing every possible outcome could have come in handy. But once the causual law was defined, then this was no longer valid. The causual law got rid of the imagination and cleared the mind with reason.

 

If we go back to many worlds, one can also add a color contrast to the various worlds, since this is also possible in the imagination and would hold up with a quantum theory that allows every possible outcome.

 

A better way to look at other worlds is to consider quantum percentages. For example, electron tunneling is possible, but if we take an average chunk of rock, it is a very minor event. There are unique situations in nature where this is a much more common event. If for the sake or argument, this was the tunnel to another world, that other world would have a few dense spots and a lot of very thin spots. It would not be a duplicate but a rarified image, that may only contain one electron out of each kg of granite, for example, but 1 billion for a kg of semi-conductor. This would make the other worlds sort of shadowry images of this world. The causual stuff may not move well since all outcomes are not possible.

[bascule]

Unless there are macroscopic phenomena based on quantum measurements. Like (perhaps) in the brain.

 

All I have is the Tegmark paper to go on. Here it is again:

 

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907009

 

There's no evidence of non-classical quantum behavior in the brain. To the best of our knowledge the brain behaves as a classical system.

 

While there remains the possibility that non-classical quantum behavior have an impact on the brain's operation it is this far so insignificant and undetectable that it has gone unnoticed.

 

There is simply no way to make a general statement like this---I gave you two examples... In the first case, nuclei past hydrogen cease to exist, which is a pretty radical difference.

 

I didn't see your examples... do you have any reason to speculate why they would have an impact on the brain's behavior and if so, why they have gone unnoticed by the neuroscientist and quantum physics communities, particularly physicists like Penrose who are grasping for straws trying to find a way to scientifically substantiate the quantum mind hypothesis?

[Spyman]

In my imagination, I can make pigs fly...

Well, maybe you should try to suppress your imagination a little and focus on the discussion instead...

 

Actually, I am not even able to interpret wether you agree or argue the quoted part of my post.

(That could of course depend on my skills in the English language.)

 

Let me give an example, before Newton got hit in the head with an apple and defined the laws of gravity, the observation of falling objects was very random.

I seriously doubt that the observations of falling object was random before Newton's theory of gravitation.

(People knew that something dropped would fall to Earth before 1666, even animals like my dogs know it.)

[bascule]

Let me give an example, before Newton got hit in the head with an apple and defined the laws of gravity, the observation of falling objects was very random.

 

No, wrong.

 

Galileo made meticulous observations of how gravity operates, by rolling balls down inclines and timing how long it took using water droplets.

 

Newton didn't get hit on the head with an apple: the falling apple inspired him to think about how gravity is universal, specifically that the same force that was holding the moon in a stable orbit was the one acting on the apple.