Jump to content

Recommended Posts

Posted
These three cases are considered Patriot Act successes. That's the only way I would have known about them. :)

 

So in other words, you don't really know. Do you mind providing details on how any of this is a direct result of the Patriot Act; that is, that these successes would have been impossible without it?

  • Replies 53
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

Top Posters In This Topic

Posted

I see the SFN Politically Correct Talking Points Memo* has been written on this issue, but I don't think this question has been answered either way. One thing that might help is if some of you people accusing agentchange of not drawing a link were to go out and find another way in which some of those cases could have been prosecuted under existing law. That's not a case of proving a negative -- if what you say is true then it should be possible to show how some of those cases could have been handled differently. Just a suggestion.

 

But I think part of the problem here is that the press doesn't know either. It's one of the things that (justifiably, IMO) irks critics of the Patriot Act -- the way the press just repeats what it is told on this subject, because they simply don't have the resources or motivation or just plain intelligence to dig any deeper. That should annoy everyone, regardless of ideology or opinion.

 

* © 2007, Best-of-all-worlds Enterprises, Inc.

Posted

A lot of that is here in General Ashcroft's Patriot Act Report. These are primarily the successes of the information-sharing capabilities that the Patriot Act provided. There are plenty of other examples in the report on how other sections of the Patriot Act led to convictions.

 

http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/patriot_report_from_the_field0704.pdf

 

The USA PATRIOT Act, however, took down the “wall” separating these two

investigations by making clear that the sharing of case-sensitive information between these two

groups was allowed. As a result of key information shared by intelligence investigators, law

enforcement agents were able to learn that an individual mentioned in the anonymous letter was

an agent of al Qaeda. Further information shared between intelligence and law enforcement

personnel then dramatically expedited the investigation of the Lackawanna Six and allowed

charges to be filed against these individuals.

 

Before the USA PATRIOT Act, prosecutors would have faced a dilemma in

deciding whether to arrest Battle immediately. If prosecutors had failed to act,

lives could have been lost through a domestic terrorist attack. But if prosecutors

had arrested Battle in order to prevent a potential attack, the other suspects in the

investigation would have undoubtedly scattered or attempted to cover up their

crimes. Because of sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, it

was clear that the FBI agents could conduct FISA surveillance of Battle to detect

whether he had received orders from an international terrorist group to reinstate

the domestic attack plan on Jewish targets and keep prosecutors informed as to

what they were learning. This gave prosecutors the confidence not to arrest Battle

prematurely while they continued to gather evidence on the other members of the

cell. Ultimately, prosecutors were able to collect sufficient evidence to charge

seven defendants and then to secure convictions and prison sentences ranging

from three to eighteen years for the six defendants taken into custody. Charges

against the seventh defendant were dismissed after he was killed in Pakistan by

Pakistani troops on October 3, 2003. Without sections 218 and 504 of the USA

PATRIOT Act, however, this case likely would have been referred to as the

“Portland One” rather than the “Portland Seven.”

 

In this case, sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act enabled prosecutors

to consider all evidence against Al- Arian and his co-conspirators, including

evidence obtained pursuant to FISA that provided the necessary factual support

for the criminal case. By considering the intelligence and law enforcement

information together, prosecutors were able to create a complete history for the

case and put each piece of evidence in its proper context. This comprehensive

approach was essential in enabling prosecutors to build their case and pursue the

proper charges.

 

Prosecutors and investigators also used information shared pursuant to sections

218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act in investigating the defendants in the so-

called “Virginia Jihad” case. This prosecution involved members of the Dar al-

Arqam Islamic Center, who trained for jihad in Northern Virginia by participating

in paintball and paramilitary training, including eight individuals who traveled to

terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001.

These individuals are associates of a violent Islamic extremist group known as

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which primarily operates in Pakistan and Kashmir and

has ties to the al Qaeda terrorist network. As the result of an investigation that

included the use of information obtained through FISA, prosecutors were able to

bring charges against these individuals. Six of the defendants have pleaded

guilty, and three were convicted at trial in March 2004 of charges including

conspiracy to levy war against the United States and conspiracy to provide

material support to the Taliban.

 

The Department used sections 218 and 504 to gain access to intelligence, which

facilitated the indictment of Enaam Arnaout, the Executive Director of the

Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). Arnaout conspired to

obtain charitable donations fraudulently in order to provide financial assistance to

Chechen rebels and organizations engaged in violence and terrorism. Arnaout

had a long-standing relationship with Usama Bin Laden and used his charity

organization both to obtain funds illicitly from unsuspecting Americans for

terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, and to serve as a channel for people to

contribute money knowingly to such groups. Arnaout ultimately pleaded guilty to

a racketeering charge, admitting that he diverted thousands of dollars from BIF to

support Islamic militant groups in Bosnia and Chechnya. He was sentenced to

over 11 years in prison.

Posted

Agentchange, I wish to give you a lot of credit for your research efforts. You really have put a lot of effort into this, and you've found some good articles. All I can say is, "well done."

 

My feelings on this issue are strong, and I must admit that you didn't not convince me to switch my position, nor specifically address how this "could not" have been done without the act, but again, I credit you for finding several pieces of information which add support to your premise.

 

 

Looking above, I noticed that nearly all sections referencing both section 218 and section 504 of the act. I have shared the text of those sections below so each reader can decide for themselves how to consider this information.

 

From the full US Patriot Act is available below from The Library of Congress:

 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:4:./temp/~c107qria0A::

 

 

 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c107:4:./temp/~c107qria0A:e66342:

SEC. 218. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

 

Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking `the purpose' and inserting `a significant purpose'.

 

...and...

 

 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c107:4:./temp/~c107qria0A:e302020:

SEC. 504. COORDINATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT.

 

(a) INFORMATION ACQUIRED FROM AN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE- Section 106 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806), is amended by adding at the end the following:

 

`(k)(1) Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against--

 

`(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

 

`(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or

 

`© clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.

 

`(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification required by section 104(a)(7)(B) or the entry of an order under section 105.'.

 

(b) INFORMATION ACQUIRED FROM A PHYSICAL SEARCH- Section 305 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1825) is amended by adding at the end the following:

 

`(k)(1) Federal officers who conduct physical searches to acquire foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against--

 

`(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

 

`(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or

 

`© clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.

`(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification required by section 303(a)(7) or the entry of an order under section 304.'.

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now

×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

We have placed cookies on your device to help make this website better. You can adjust your cookie settings, otherwise we'll assume you're okay to continue.