War2Peace

[kleinwolf]

Some people say that if U-Bomb would not have been discovered, ww2 would have last maybe 20 years more ??

[CaptainPanic]

I agree that some people say that.

 

Some people also say that it was unavoidable that the bomb would be discovered, since many countries were working on it, and were trying to be the first. So, that's all a bit irrelevant.

 

However, Germany was defeated before the first bomb was dropped.

[CharonY]

I honestly cannot see how it could have lasted 20 more years. Germany was already defeated and Japan was essentially on its knees (and entering peace negotiations). It has been argued that by the end of the year Japan would have surrendered anyway. But even if they hadn't there was not sufficient military power left in Japan to last 20 years. Especially as they were also sustaining heavy losses from the Soviets.

[A Tripolation]

Japan would've never surrendered without knowing of the devastion that we could cause with a weapon we had and they didnt.

 

Of course it wouldnt have lasted 20 years, but we would have had to literally fight every inch for that island, just like we did all the other Japan-controlled islands in the Pacific.

 

And also, the War Council was deadlocked 3-3 on whether or not to surrender. The emperor broke the deadlock and voted for surrender (and MANY historians attribute this to him knowing that they could never fight the Allies' new weapon.)

[Mr Skeptic]

As I understand it, Japan hoped to destroy a large part of our navy and take the islands and hope we'd be too busy to fight back. One of their major attacks backfired, so they lost lots of ships instead of us, and they were losing lots of ground. What with the Soviets against them by that point, they knew they couldn't win. Of course, they could have made it very painful for us to take Japan, but they weren't going to win.

[CharonY]

Japan would've never surrendered without knowing of the devastion that we could cause with a weapon we had and they didnt.

 

This is a bit of a stretch. Japan was already involved in peace talks with the Soviets. The one point were they were undecided on was the unconditional surrender. With emphasis on unconditional. Another aspect on the US side that led to the decision to drop the bomb was the desire to end it quickly rather than engage in lengthy talks (and deterrents to the the Soviets). However there is not enough evidence to project that they would have never surrendered and that the bomb was the only way.

 

 

In August 1945, the Japanese situation was desperate. The major cities were devastated by atomic or conventional attack, and the casualties numbered in the millions. Millions more were refugees, and the average consumption was below 1200 calories a day. The fleet was lost, and the merchant shipping could not leave home waters or sail from the few possessions still held without braving submarine or mine attack. Oil stocks were gone, rubber and steel were in short supply, and the Soviets were moving against the only sizable forces the Japanese had left, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. They were a starving and undersupplied force. Many divisions had transferred to the Pacific, where they died in the island battles.

 

Clearly the time to surrender had come. Incredibly, many in the military wanted to fight on, preferring death to capitulation. The cabinet, made up of elder statesmen, tried to send out peace feelers through neutral Sweden, Soviet Union, and Switzerland as early as June 1945. The only condition was the continued existence of the of Imperial Throne. Unwilling or unclear of the Japanese offer, the Allies refused and issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26th.

 

The Emperor was sympathetic to the peacemakers. The Army members of the cabinet were not willing to give up, and Prime Minister Suzuki had to move carefully. If there was a perceived weakness in the cabinet, even the Emperor might be assassinated. The idea that the Emperor would support surrender was inconceivable to many in both the Army and the Navy. Suzuki cautiously sought out others on the cabinet, finding all but two generals in support. On July 28, the government issued a carefully worded response to the Potsdam Declaration, which unfortunately used a word with a double meaning. English-language broadcasts used the word "ignore" and the Western press picked up that sentiment.

 

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/japansurrender.htm

[The Bear's Key]

Japan would've never surrendered without knowing of the devastion that we could cause with a weapon we had and they didnt.

Evidence please.

 

This is a bit of a stretch. Japan was already involved in peace talks with the Soviets. The one point were they were undecided on was the unconditional surrender. With emphasis on unconditional.

The advertised goal of dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: to preserve lives. A few options were available for this.

• 1) The cleaner way (i.e. fewest lives taken): accept Japan's probable surrender, even if not unconditionally. But instead, the powers that be chose option 2 and 3...
  
• 2) Nuke Japan
  
• 3) Ditto
  

 

Kind of hints someone had a really itchy trigger finger?

 

(behind the scenes of a freshly -- and unexpectedly soon -- sworn-in President)

[CaptainPanic]

Obviously, there was also the desire to simply test the Bomb (which was a new weapon) on the enemy.

It saved a lot of lives on the side of the Americans, but I never heard of any general that didn't want to test new weaponry... This bomb had an impact larger than the 100,000 lives it saved on the side of the Americans. (Apologies for totally ignoring the civilians killed by the blasts - I'm trying to make a point about military stuff).

 

The US government knew very well that the commies were strong, and it was not inconvenient to show off some military power to them.

[CharonY]

Well, to be fair some American generals objected to the bombing. From Wikipedia:

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in his memoir The White House Years:

 

In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.Other U.S. military officers who disagreed with the necessity of the bombings include General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,[73][74] Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President), Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials),[72] and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[75]

 

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.[65]

 

"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion , and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.[76]

[Sisyphus]

Also, remember that Little Boy and Fat Man were really no more destructive than large-scale firebombing missions. The Japanese already knew the Allies were willing and able to level cities. That they had apparently discovered mysterious new ways of doing so wouldn't have fundamentally changed the situation, although I imagine it made the need to surrender, even unconditionally, seem more urgent. But twenty years is implausible. For the Japanese, the war was already lost.

[kleinwolf]

Maybe an analogy with petroleum derrick-fire : to stop it they sometimes use high-power dynamites (wind away the fire).

 

 

Does anyone know if the bomb possibility was1 1st experimental (by chemists making heaps with all possible elements, and saw that reactions happened), or theoretically (but then, E=mc2, why do oceans not explode ??)

[JohnB]

Japan was already involved in peace talks with the Soviets.

Link please. All that I've read implies nothing more than overtures to maybe have peace talks on "Conditional" surrender.

 

There were two conditions;

1: The continuation of the role of the Emperor

2: No war crimes trials.

 

The second was totally unacceptable to the Allies.

Another aspect on the US side that led to the decision to drop the bomb was the desire to end it quickly rather than engage in lengthy talks

 

You don't think the prospect of avoiding the invasion of the Japanese homeland with the huge toll in lives on both sides might have had something to do with it? House to house guerilla warfare in the streets of Tokyo was not high on the list of "Fun things I want to do in Japan" either.

 

The advertised goal of dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: to preserve lives. A few options were available for this.

1) The cleaner way (i.e. fewest lives taken): accept Japan's probable surrender' date=' even if not unconditionally. But instead, the powers that be chose option 2 and 3...

2) Nuke Japan

3) Ditto [/quote']

 

There were 4 options, not three.

1. Negotiate a conditional surrender. With the Japanese wanting no war crimes trials, this was not an option. There was no way in hell that those responsible for the Rape of Nanking, the Burma Railways and the assorted Death Marches could be allowed to get away with it. (Funny that someone from a nation that routinely executes people for 1 or 2 murders should agrue that that those responsible for 100,000 should not have been prosecuted.)

 

2. Continue the blockade. Japan was virtually sealed off and rations were down to 1,200 calories per day. Of course, starving a nation to death is a slow way to end a war. Not really an option.

 

3. Invasion and occupation of the Japanese Homeland. (Operations Olympic and Coronet) Plans were drawn up, most of the 2,902 ships were in the area. Forces from Europe were en route but would not be available for Olympic, only Coronet. This would have been a bloodbath, but still an option.

 

4. Drop the bomb. Hopefully ending the war quickly with minimal losses to both sides. In what I call "The Mathematics of Human Misery", this was, unfortunately, the best option.

 

CaptainPanic, I have no idea where you get your "100,000 lives saved" from as it is far from the truth. Roughly 500,000 Purple Hearts were manufactured before the invasion.

 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated;

Olympic Wounded: 347,000

Olympic Dead/Missing: 109,000

Coronet Wounded: 744,000

Coronet Dead/Missing: 158,000

TOTAL: 1,200,000 Allied Casualties.

 

They did not estimate the Japanese casualties.

 

William Shockley thought it would be higher;

Wounded: 1,300,000 to 3,200,000

Dead: 400,000 to 800,000

Total: 1,700,000 to 4,000,000 Allied Casualties

 

Between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000 Japanese casualties.

 

This is not unreasonable since according to the Marine Corps Gazette of 1965, the Japanese defences consisted of;

By August 1945, the Japanese armed forces had 2,350,000 officers and men under arms in the homeland, organized into 53 infantry divisions (apart from 5 divisions in Hokkaido and the Northeast Islands) and 25 brigades. Additionally there were two tank divisions and seven brigades, plus four AAA divisions. The 55 divisions were deployed as follows: Honshu-35 infantry, 2 tank; Shikoku-4 infantry, Kyushu-14 infantry. Behind the combat troops were 2,250,000 Army workers, 1,300,000 Navy workers, 250,000 Special Garrison Force personnel, and a National Volunteer Force of militia officially put at 28 million.

 

While fuel and ammunition were in short supply, the defence plan "Ketsu-Go" was for an all out attack on the invasion fleet and the men and machines were available for that. The Japanese knew where we would invade and roughly when. The plan called for attacks on the troopships only, not the warships. The idea being that if enough ships were lost, the Allies would negotiate rather than try again.

 

To that end, the Japanese had available for the defence;

10,000 Kamikaze aircraft

700 Army and 5,200 Navy suicide attack boats

100 Kōryū-class midget submarines

250 smaller Kairyū-class midget submarines

1,000 Kaiten manned torpedoes

 

I will add that the invasion of Japan would in reality, never have happened. Okinawa was to be the build up staging area for the invasion, but on the 9th October 1945 was hit by Typhoon "Louise". A total of 12 ships and craft were sunk, 222 grounded, and 32 severely damaged. Many of those grounded were written off. Full listing and report here.

 

Had the war not ended, the invasion fleet would have been at Okinawa that day and in all likelihood have been smashed with tremendous loss of life.

 

To generally respond to the OP. The war would have lasted maybe another year or so but the butchers bill would have been huge.

[The Bear's Key]

Does anyone know if the bomb possibility was1 1st experimental (by chemists making heaps with all possible elements, and saw that reactions happened), or theoretically (but then, E=mc2, why do oceans not explode ??)

They were looking for something that would produce a runaway chain reaction of fission. The link has good info on it.

[CharonY]

Link please. All that I've read implies nothing more than overtures to maybe have peace talks on "Conditional" surrender.

I could dig them up, but I stated:

The one point were they were undecided on was the unconditional surrender.

. In other word I only talked about conditional surrender to begin with.

 

You don't think the prospect of avoiding the invasion of the Japanese homeland with the huge toll in lives on both sides might have had something to do with it?

I assumed that my statement implied this. Note, however that MacArthur and Nimitz apparently saw not big military role in the use of the bomb.

 

But while we are at it, some more estimations for completeness sake (Wikipedia again this time):

 

Casualty estimates were based on the experience of the preceding campaigns, drawing different lessons:

 

* In a study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, the figures of 7.45 casualties/1,000 man-days and 1.78 fatalities/1,000 man-days were developed. This implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties, including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities.[37]

* A study done by Adm. Nimitz's staff in May estimated 49,000 casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.[38] A study done by General MacArthur's staff in June estimated 23,000 in the first 30 days and 125,000 after 120 days.[39] When these figures were questioned by General Marshall, MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting wounded men able to return to duty.[40]

* In a conference with President Truman on June 18, Marshall, taking the Battle of Luzon as the best model for Olympic, thought the Americans would suffer 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days (and ultimately 20% of Japanese casualties, which implied a total of 70,000 casualties).[41] Adm. Leahy, more impressed by the Battle of Okinawa, thought the American forces would suffer a 35% casualty rate (implying an ultimate toll of 268,000).[42] Admiral King thought that casualties in the first 30 days would fall between Luzon and Okinawa, i.e., between 31,000 and 41,000.[42]

 

Of these estimates, only Nimitz's included losses of the forces at sea, though kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities per kamikaze pilot in the Battle of Okinawa,[43] and troop transports off Kyūshū would have been much more exposed.

 

* A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.[1]

 

Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses. Kyle Palmer, war correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, said half a million to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. Herbert Hoover, in memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities, and were believed to be conservative estimates; but it is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings with Truman. The chief of the Army Operations division thought them "entirely too high" under "our present plan of campaign."[44]

 

A link to the Soviet factor:

http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0803-26.htm

 

Why was the bomb used? The conventional view, of course, is that it was to save as many lives as possible. But if this is so, several historians now ask, why did President Truman and his chief adviser Secretary of State James Byrnes make it harder for Japan to surrender? Specifically, why did they remove assurances for the Japanese emperor from the July 1945 Potsdam Proclamation warning Japan to surrender? The assurances were strongly recommended by U.S. and British military leaders, and removing them, they knew, would make it all but impossible for Japan to end the war.

 

A traditional theory has been that the President feared political criticism if he provided assurances to the emperor. But, other historians note, leading Republicans were for–not against–clarifying the terms to achieve a surrender, and were calling for this publicly. Moreover, American leaders always knew the emperor would be needed to order a surrender–and, of course, in the end they did agree to an understanding which allowed such assurances: Japan still has an emperor.

 

Hasegawa believes the assurances were taken out of the Potsdam Proclamation precisely because American leaders wanted to have the warning rejected so as to justify the bombing–and, further, that they saw the bomb as a way to end the war before Russia could join the fighting. There is other evidence suggesting that policy makers, especially Secretary of State Byrnes, wanted to use the bomb to “make the Russians more manageable in Europe”--as he told one scientist.

[The Bear's Key]

There were two conditions;

1: The continuation of the role of the Emperor

2: No war crimes trials.

 

The second was totally unacceptable to the Allies.

Sure, that's why a top priority by the Allies seemed to be for the emperor and other princes (of his family) who'd been implicated to be exonerated from all war crimes

 

You don't think the prospect of avoiding the invasion of the Japanese homeland with the huge toll in lives on both sides might have had something to do with it?

Certainly, as the excuse that best fit the parameters of an official explanation and naturally believable. We lack sufficient evidence that what occurred behind the scenes matches their excuse.

 

So asking ourselves questions from every conceivable angle is how I tackle it.

 

For instance, the plan for the bomb resembles the Iraq war. The stated rationale given changed -- and how many people gave it a deeper thought?

 

The bomb's purpose was to acquire it before Germany did.

 

However, ask yourself. If Germany, without its own bomb, had ignored Russia and kept on fighting -- do you think we'd have nuked Germany twice?

 

Moot point. The rationale changed...from getting to the atom bomb first, to its use for reducing casualties. Nevermind they didn't give Japan a bit longer to surrender before dropping the next one.

 

And I'm sure video copies of the first atomic detonation tests could've been supplied to the emperor for his witness, as a visual threat of what's to occur fairly soon if he didn't comply.

 

 

There were 4 options, not three.

.....

(Funny that someone from a nation that routinely executes people for 1 or 2 murders should agrue that that those responsible for 100,000 should not have been prosecuted.)

First, I'm against government-led executions, as many here are. Second, like I mentioned the emperor and princes responsible for those atrocities were spared. Option #1 is thus partly false.

 

The rest is valid if the content were examined in a vaccuum, perhaps. I'm just not convinced the atom bombings were the most intelligent solutions available -- or even on the table.

[JohnB]

CharonY, there could be a misunderstanding here. I can't find anything that shows that the Japanese were involved with peace talks with anyone. The best I can find is that they had made overtures through the Swiss and Soviets that they might be interested in starting them.

 

But there were no peace talks actually going on.

 

You appear to operating from the idea that talks had started, they hadn't.

 

Also the Potsdam Declaration was a continuance of the Cairo Declaration of 1943 where Truman, Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek which said;

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Mr. Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

 

The following general statement was issued:

 

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

 

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

 

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

 

Given that "Unconditional Surrender" was specifically required by the Cairo Communique, the suggestion by Gar Alperovitz in his oped piece that assurances for the Emperor were "removed" from the Potsdam Declaration are factually wrong. Clause 8 clearly states;

8.The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

 

I also quote President Truman in his initial address to Congress, 16th April 1945.

"Tokyo rocks under the weight of our bombs...I want the entire world to know that this direction must and will remain - unchanged and unhampered, Our demand has been and it remains - unconditional surrender."

 

Assurances for the Emperor were not "removed" from the Potsdam Declaration because they were never there in the first place.

 

Concerning war crimes trials.

 

The Emperor neither ordered or committed war crimes. In this respect he was only in danger of possible prosecution as Japans "Head of State". Military policy was set by the military. Tojo, not Hirohito was the one we were after.

 

Potsdam Clause 10;

10.We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.

 

Note also Clause 12 which gave the people of Japan the option to retain the Emperor;

12.The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(Emphasis mine.)

 

Bear's Key.

 

You're making a great conspiracy theory out of nothing.

 

The Cairo Communique resolving unconditional surrender was issued on the 1st December 1943. The Potsdam Declaration on 26th July 1945. Potsdam showed that the resolve of the Allies for unconditional surrender remained unchanged.

 

A fact that is often overlooked is that the Manhatten Project was a secret. This means that very few people were actually told about it. Specifically, nobody who didn't "need to know", knew.

 

The fire bombing campaign had been going on for months in Japan with no sign of surrender coming. Operation Downfall was planned and some troops had been sent home for some R&R before the invasion. (My father was one such).

 

Along come some eggheads and say to MacArthur "We've got a new bomb that might make the Japanese surrender". MacArthurs view would have been "Well, the invasions not for a few months, let them try it. If it doesn't work it won't effect the invasion, if it does I won't have to send my men into the meat grinder."

 

You have to remember that;

a) Nobody who hadn't seen Alamagordo had the faintest idea what the bomb could do. and

b) Nobody was certain that the bloody thing would work when dropped from a plane.

 

And I'm sure video copies of the first atomic detonation tests could've been supplied to the emperor for his witness, as a visual threat of what's to occur fairly soon if he didn't comply.

Rubbish. 67 Japanese cities, including Tokyo had already been virtually destroyed by firebombing raids.

 

The Emperor had already seen first hand the destruction of his cities.

 

The rationale changed...from getting to the atom bomb first, to its use for reducing casualties.

Of course it did, but it wasn't a rationale, it was a goal. Once you have acheived the goal of getting the bomb first, why would you keep that as a goal? In 1944 the goals were;

a) The invasion of Europe. and

b) The surrender of Germany.

 

Once Europe had been invaded, did the goal change? Nope, it just moved on to the next one.

 

In the Pacific, the goal was to end the war in accordance with the orders of the Allied governments.

 

The big point you seem to be missing is that the stated policy of the Allies was "The Unconditional surrender of Japan". That policy was set by, among others, the US President. As C in C, the Generals follow his orders. Truman said "Make the Japanese surrender unconditionally", it's up to the Generals to use every means at their disposal to follow that order. Hopefully with an eye to minimising Allied casualties, and if it reduces Japanese casualties, all the better.

 

Perhaps you should read Truman on Trial: Not Guilty.

 

Nevermind they didn't give Japan a bit longer to surrender before dropping the next one.

67 cities destroyed by firebombing, 2 destroyed by nukes. 2 years since they had been told "unconditional surrender or else". How much longer should Japan have been given?

 

Seriously, Ketsu-Go was intended to bleed the Allies with horrific casualties so that we would agree to conditions such that war crimes trials would not occur and that the Japanese military would remain in control of the Japanese government. The military were willing to sacrifice millions of Japanese and Allies if it meant they could retain power.

 

The use of the nukes showed that the Allies could cause millions of Japanese casualties without loss to ourselves. This changed the equation. The hope of bleeding the Allies ended.

 

I find it fascinating that every year at about this time people who have never had the lives of thousands or millions riding on their decisions are quite happy to sit back in a comfy chair and expound to the world how those "on the spot", got it wrong.

[Mr Skeptic]

The use of the nukes showed that the Allies could cause millions of Japanese casualties without loss to ourselves. This changed the equation. The hope of bleeding the Allies ended.

 

That's something I hadn't considered. Even a conventional bombing campaign would have resulted in quite a few casualties for the allies. Whereas the planes dropping the nukes weren't even challenged because Japan thought they were just reconnaissance. I guess this issue will pop up again as robotic fighters get more advanced. No casualties on one side severely limits the prospects of defending until the attackers decide you are not worth the effort as some countries have successfully done against a far more powerful opponent.

[The Bear's Key]

You're making a great conspiracy theory out of nothing.

Show me where.

 

A fact that is often overlooked is that the Manhatten Project was a secret. This means that very few people were actually told about it. Specifically, nobody who didn't "need to know", knew.

However after the first bomb was dropped, they and everyone now "knew". Japan could've been given more time and a video of the U.S. test explosions as a visual confirmation of what just occured in Hiroshima. Then we could've waited.

 

Along come some eggheads and say to MacArthur "We've got a new bomb that might make the Japanese surrender". MacArthurs view would have been "Well, the invasions not for a few months, let them try it...

Well according to CharonY's earlier post, MacArthur disagreed with the necessity of the bombings.

 

The source is from a book I don't have access to, but perhaps others with historical familiarity of WW2 can verify it.

 

b) Nobody was certain that the bloody thing would work when dropped from a plane.

I'm sure the first bomb dropped clarified it. But if saving lives were really paramount, a simple test drop from a plane beforehand solves that.

 

 

The Emperor had already seen first hand the destruction of his cities.

Seen? Or heard about it?

 

A daunting visual of the everything-all-at-once destructive mushroom cloud is far more effective, I'd presume.

 

Of course it did, but it wasn't a rationale, it was a goal. Once you have acheived the goal of getting the bomb first, why would you keep that as a goal? In 1944 the goals were;

a) The invasion of Europe. and

b) The surrender of Germany.

The scientists involved would likely not have volunteered their efforts if anyone remotely suspected the bomb would actually get used. So it's much like the Iraq War, not likely to have received support if the first goal offered was to remove Saddam. Instead it was to reduce casualties (from WMD...except 60 years later it's not ours. Nor theirs, as it's nonexistent)

 

Perhaps you should read Truman on Trial: Not Guilty.

Oh I never thought him guilty, just misled...and a (hurried) freshman -- easy combo.

 

 

67 cities destroyed by firebombing, 2 destroyed by nukes. 2 years since they had been told "unconditional surrender or else". How much longer should Japan have been given?

Note I said: more time between the first and second atom bombings. Give the emperor video footage of the U.S. tests after Hiroshima was bombed, so he could see first hand what occured and how devastatingly quickly/powerful.

 

I find it fascinating that every year at about this time people who have never had the lives of thousands or millions riding on their decisions are quite happy to sit back in a comfy chair and expound to the world how those "on the spot", got it wrong.

Perhaps not quite, JohnB. Drawinging again on CharonY's post, the following who qualify as critical decision makers -- potentially affecting thousands or millions of lives -- seem to also have expressed disagreement with the atom bomb's use...

 

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President)

Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials)

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

 

 

That's something I hadn't considered. Even a conventional bombing campaign would have resulted in quite a few casualties for the allies. Whereas the planes dropping the nukes weren't even challenged because Japan thought they were just reconnaissance.

Doesn't even make sense. Reconnaissance can be of extreme strategic value and yield critical enemy weaknesses. I can't imagine an enemy at war saying, "oh, let them fly, it's only recon". But disregarding that...

 

Even if the first recon didn't get challenged for the quoted reason, I'm sure after the first bomb drop, it'd have automatically made the second recon highly suspect.

[JohnB]

Show me where.

My point being that there is a profound lack of proof.

 

Then we could've waited.

You are aware that fighting was still going on aren't you? Allied and Japanese soldiers were dieing in combat every day. How long would you wait? How would you explain to the families of the fallen that you let them die rather than end the war?

 

Well according to CharonY's earlier post, MacArthur disagreed with the necessity of the bombings.

Perhaps. He was also quite happy to demand authorization to use 30-50 of them in Korea though.

 

I'm sure the first bomb dropped clarified it. But if saving lives were really paramount, a simple test drop from a plane beforehand solves that.

Ending the war was paramount. Stopping the fighting was paramount. The sooner the war ended, the less casualties there would be. This is surely not a hard concept to grasp. If it could be done with reduced casualties, all the better.

 

A number of those who said the bomb wasn't neccessary were of the belief that Japan would have surrendered anyway by 1st November. (X Day) Big bloody woop. That's another 3 months of jungle fighting, another 3 months of bombings, another 3 months of POWs being executed, another 3 months of death and destruction for Japan and another 3 months of Allied casualties.

 

And of course, if those of that opinion were wrong and Downfall went ahead, then wholesale slaughter would have been the result. US dogfaces didn't sign up to shoot Japanese grannies with pointed sticks, but they would have had to.

 

You think the Vietnam vets have mental problems? That would have been a picnic compared to US servicemen coming home after machine gunning Japanese schoolchildren, tens of thousands of them.

 

Seen? Or heard about it?

The Imperial Palace is in Tokyo. He was in residence in May. I suggest that he saw quite well the firebombing destruction of that city.

 

The scientists involved would likely not have volunteered their efforts if anyone remotely suspected the bomb would actually get used.

Riiiiight. They were making a really big bomb that they thought nobody would ever use. Can I sell you a bridge? I've got a nice one in San Francisco going cheap.

 

Clarke was an intelligence officer, not a line commander. As such he did not command those about to die. Both Leahy and Nimitz believed the invasion unneccessary because the Navy could defeat Japan from the sea. Do not underestimate interservice rivalry. Do you think that the propect of the Army ending the war and stealing their thunder might have had something to do with their attitudes?

 

You might be interested in reading this page;

http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/downfall.html

 

The full transcript of "OPERATION DOWNFALL [uS invasion of Japan]: US PLANS AND JAPANESE COUNTER-MEASURES" can be found here. As someone who has had access to the actual documents, his opinion should carry some weight.

Truman and Marshall were intimately familiar with losses in the Pacific during the previous year: over 200,000 casualties from wounds, fatigue and disease, plus 10,000 American dead and missing in the Marianas, 5,500 dead on and around Leyte, 9,000 dead during the Luzon campaign, 6,800 at Iwo Jima, 12,600 at Okinawa, and 2,000 killed in the unexpectedly vicious fighting on Peleliu. Both also knew that, save for some operations around New Guinea, real casualties were routinely outpacing estimates and the gap was widening. They also knew that while America always emerged victorious, operations often were not being completed as rapidly as planned- with all the added cost in blood and treasure that such lengthy campaigns entailed.

 

Leyte is a perfect example. Leyte was to the Luzon campaign what the Kyushu invasion was to the capture of Honshu's Kanto Plain and Tokyo, a preliminary operation to create a huge staging area. Today, we can recall MacArthur wading ashore triumphantly in the Philippines. But what Truman and Marshall knew only too well was that MacArthur was supposed to have retaken Leyte with four divisions and have eight fighter and bomber groups striking from the island within 45 days of the initial landings. However, nine divisions and twice as many days into the battle, only a fraction of that airpower was operational because of unexpected terrain conditions (and this on an island which the United States had occupied for over forty years). The fighting on the ground not gone as planned. The Japanese even briefly isolated Fifth Air Force headquarters and also captured much of the Burauen airfield complex before reinforcements pushed them back into the jungle.

 

On 29 July 1945, there came a stunning change to an earlier report on enemy strength on Kyushu. This update set alarm bells ringing in MacArthur's headquarters as well as Washington because it stated bluntly that the Japanese were rapidly reinforcing southern Kyushu and had increased troop strength from 80,000 to 206,000 men, quote: "with no end in sight." Finally, it warned that Japanese efforts were, quote: "changing the tactical and strategic situation sharply." While the breathless "no end in sight" claim turned out to be somewhat overstated, the confirmed figures were ominous enough for Marshall to ponder scraping the Kyushu operation altogether even though MacArthur maintained that it was still the best option available.

 

Note the date. Three days after the Potsdam Declaration.

 

All guesswork aside, occupation authorities after the war found that the number of military aircraft actually available in the Home Islands was over 12,700.

 

An interesting comment about food on the home islands;

Some today assert, in effect, that it would have been more humane to have just continued the conventional B-29 bombing of Japan, which in six months had killed nearly 300,000 people and displaced or rendered homeless over 8 million more. They also assert that the growing US blockade would have soon forced a surrender because the Japanese faced, quote: "imminent starvation." US Planners at the time, however, weren't nearly so bold, and the whole reason why advocates of tightening the noose around the Home Islands came up with so many different estimates of when blockade and bombardment might force Japan to surrender was because the situation wasn't nearly as cut and dried as it appears today, even when that nation's supply lines were severed. Japan would indeed have become, quote: "a nation without cities," as urban populations suffered grievously under the weight of Allied bombing; but over half the population during the war lived and worked on farms. Back then the system of price supports that has encouraged Japanese farmers today to convert practically every square foot of their land to rice cultivation did not exist. Large vegetable gardens were a standard feature of a family's land and wheat was also widely grown.

 

The idea that the Japanese were about to run out of food any time soon was largely derived from repeated misreadings of the Summary Report of the 104-volume US Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan. Using Survey findings, Craven and Cate, in the multi-volume US Army Air Force history of WWII detailed the successful US mine-laying efforts against Japanese shipping which essentially cut Japanese oil and food imports, and state only that by mid-August, quote: "the calorie count of the average man's fare had shrunk dangerously." Obviously, some historians enthusiasm for the point they are trying to make has gotten the better of them since the reduced nutritional value of meals is somewhat different than "imminent starvation."

 

Bottom line, dropping the bombs ended the war and saved lives on both sides.

[The Bear's Key]

You are aware that fighting was still going on aren't you? Allied and Japanese soldiers were dieing in combat every day. How long would you wait?

An extra week or two beyond the measley 3 days waited. At the very least.

 

How would you explain to the families of the fallen that you let them die rather than end the war?

You really think someone needed an excuse for civilians about several weeks of fighting that no one would've even known to account for?

 

Perhaps. He was also quite happy to demand authorization to use 30-50 of them in Korea though.

Interesting. Guess he finally bought into the hyped rationale.

 

And of course, if those of that opinion were wrong and Downfall went ahead, then wholesale slaughter would have been the result. US dogfaces didn't sign up to shoot Japanese grannies with pointed sticks, but they would have had to.

And that's where it becomes idiocy, as no one "has to" do any such thing -- unless of course, it's really just an unsubstantiated "what if" you're throwing forth.

 

You think the Vietnam vets have mental problems? That would have been a picnic compared to US servicemen coming home after machine gunning Japanese schoolchildren, tens of thousands of them.

I find it a bit unrealistic that servicemen would find a need to gun down so many thousands of schoolschildren. But if you're correct, that speaks volumes about the minds that view such as a necessity of war's progress, being the ones ultimately who decide how to end the war quickly (i.e. atom bombs).

 

The Imperial Palace is in Tokyo. He was in residence in May. I suggest that he saw quite well the firebombing destruction of that city.

Or maybe, the same as it'd be for any other nation's leader, they probably whisked him to safety as the firebombing became clearly imminent -- perhaps in underground or reliable pre-built shelters. And once there, heard updated accounts of it.

 

 

Riiiiight. They were making a really big bomb that they thought nobody would ever use.

Source: The Ascent of Man by Jacob Bronowski, starting at 41:14 minutes in ("Knowledge or Certainty") -- via Wikipedia.

 

As the war continued, Szilárd became increasingly dismayed that scientists were losing control over their research to the military, and argued many times with General Leslie Groves, military director of the project. His resentment towards the U.S. government was exacerbated by his failed attempts to avoid the use of the atomic bomb in war through having

a test organized that could be witnessed by Japanese observers*

who would then have the opportunity to surrender and spare lives.

 

 

Below is foresight by Leahy...

 

(referencing CharonY's post, again )

 

The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion...

 

 

And the petition by 70 scientists to Truman also reveals foresight...

 

The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.

 

If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.

....

Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States -- singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power.

 

The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.

He admitted it might be used in certain instances -- such as if the terms for Japan's surrender were made public in detail and just as important, assured the Japanese they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland....but only if still with all that, Japan refused surrender.

 

 

Bottom line, dropping the bombs ended the war and saved lives on both sides.

I do give recognition to that possibility....

 

The advertised goal of dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: to preserve lives. A few options were available for this.

• 1) The cleaner way (i.e. fewest lives taken): accept Japan's probable surrender, even if not unconditionally...
  .....
  
• 2) Nuke Japan
  
• 3) Ditto
  

...however, no one really has concrete evidence of all the decision making parts that led to the atom bomb droppings.

 

And though it's good habit to offer people the benefit of doubt, lavishing it on can well be a detrimental habit. When a possibility exists involving the lure of power, and secrecy prevents knowing if mechanisms truly exist for proper checks and balances, then I'm not going to dismiss the reasonable possibilities -- especially if history's long filled with the power hungry being able to realize their goals due in part to leadership secrecy¹ and misdirection². And we definitely have one of the two in play.

 

It's my opinion....highlighting that other possibilities may well exist, and secrecy disallows any thorough verification. Unless of course you're able to show us that the only possible behind-the-scenes version of the atomic bombing events is the commonly advertised one.

 

 

*Wow, parallel thinking. Although my scenario differs a bit.

[JohnB]

And that's where it becomes idiocy, as no one "has to" do any such thing

And right there, you lose any credibility. Allied troops would have been faced with a simple choice, shoot the kids and grannies charging at them or die.

 

This was not a new tactic for the Japanese. During the fighting in New Guinea it was quite common for the Japanese to round up natives and use them as human shields in front of their charges. The defending troops were faced with a choice, machine gun unarmed women and children or die. It's not a pleasant choice and there is only one way to choose.

 

They did it, and they hated the Japanese for making them do it.

 

So yes, sometimes soldiers "have to do" such things. Any belief to the contrary is out of some sort of fantasyland.

[The Bear's Key]

And that's where it becomes idiocy, as no one "has to" do any such thing

And right there, you lose any credibility.

How so...

 

Allied troops would have been faced with a simple choice, shoot the kids and grannies charging at them or die.

....when you forgot to mention that one little detail about human shields?...

 

US dogfaces didn't sign up to shoot Japanese grannies with pointed sticks, but they would have had to.

 

You think the Vietnam vets have mental problems? That would have been a picnic compared to US servicemen coming home after machine gunning Japanese schoolchildren, tens of thousands of them.

 

During the fighting in New Guinea it was quite common for the Japanese to round up natives and use them as human shields in front of their charges.

 

 

However I stand by my point because...

This was not a new tactic for the Japanese.

 

The defending troops were faced with a choice, machine gun unarmed women and children or die. It's not a pleasant choice and there is only one way to choose.

No, there is never just one way to choose. That's not the fault of the soldiers, but whoever directly commanded that incompetent kind of warfare.

 

I'm sure the Japanese couldn't move quite as fast when dragging along body shields. It might not even take a fairly superior commander to overcome a recognized/familiar battlefield challenge that actually hurts the enemies' movement.

 

And to use it advantageously vs that enemy. Plus find a way to deal with the body shield problem. With higher mobility than enemy soldiers dragging villagers in front of them, the Allies have a chance for movement and placement to become a major tactical advantage.

 

Especially since it wasn't a new tactic used by the Japanese.

 

So if now I've regained credibility , might you want to address my other points you just skipped by?

[JohnB]

I'm sorry, I wasn't aware that english wasn't you native language.

 

US dogfaces didn't sign up to shoot Japanese grannies with pointed sticks, but they would have had to.

The grannies and schoolchildren were the Japanese back up troops, some 20,000,000 of them. They were not going to be human shields, they were to be active combattants. I thought that was clear. (It would have been if you'd read the links.)

 

So if now I've regained credibility

Not quite because you still think;

there is never just one way to choose.

Semantically you might be correct, but in combat the choice is "Kill or be killed". Do you suggest that the US troops should choose to "be killed"? There is only one choice.

 

The tactic of using human shields in the islands couldn't be adequately counteracted for the simple reason that jungle fighting doesn't allow you to see them coming. You don't know the shields are there until they come out of the jungle 100 yards away, ahead of the attacking troops. The Japanese didn't use human shields as a defensive tactic, but as an offensive one. Obviously, the only way to avoid this tactic is to not have the enemy attack you, but that is rather difficult when he wants your airfield. Wouldn't you agree?

 

I brought the point up because I know how it messed with the minds of the Aussie diggers exposed to it. They still see their faces. The invasion aftermath would have been worse, much worse.

 

Addressing your other points.

He admitted it might be used in certain instances -- such as if the terms for Japan's surrender were made public in detail and just as important, assured the Japanese they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland....but only if still with all that, Japan refused surrender.

Firstly the Potsdam Declaration was broadcast in clear, so the Japanese had no illusions as to the terms. This was 26th July 1945.

 

What were the terms?

9.The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

Sounds to me like they could look forward to a life of peaceful pursuits in their homeland.

 

10.We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

Freedom of speech, religion and thought, not going to be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation.

 

11.Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

Looks like they learned the lessons from the treatment of the Germans by the Treaty of Versailles.

 

12.The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

Occupation to end when a freely chosen peaceful government is established.

 

Note also;

4.The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

A direct appeal to the people of Japan.

 

So the terms of surrender were "made public in detail" and the assurances were given.

 

On the 28th July 1945 the Japanese Prime Minister responded that the Japanese government would ignore the proclamation.

 

So with all that, Japan refused to surrender. The conditions you asked for were met, and exceeded actually.

 

From here;

At noon on August 14 in Washington, President Truman met with the Duke of Windsor and British ambassador John Balfour. He told them that the latest Japanese message indicated no acceptance of the surrender terms, and that (in Balfour's words) "he had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb dropped on Tokyo."

 

The info is from "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. Frank. It can be found at Amazons.

 

Another good one is "Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism" by Robert James Maddox, also at Amazons. The first pages especially concern Gar Alperovitz, the author of the commondreams revisionist piece that charonY linked to. It's interesting to see his truncated quotes compared to the full actual quote.

 

As to the short time span between the bombs, there is actually a good military reason for this. Remember Potsdam;

3.The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(Emphasis mine.)

As Col. Paul Tibbetts is quoted; (from the memoirs of Charles Sweeney, the Nagasaki pilot)

Tibbets said: "It was vital that [the Japanese] believed we had an unlimited supply of atomic bombs and that we would continue to use them. Of course, the truth was that we only had one more bomb on Tinian. Delivery of the third bomb was several weeks away."

 

Note Tibbetts said "we only had one more bomb on Tinian". A common revisionist argument is that the 3 days between the bombs was because the materials weren't on Tinian at the time. In fact, all the parts for both bombs were delivered to Tinian on July 28, 29.

 

The point was to make the Japanese believe that the Allies had a lot of bombs and would make frequent use of them.

 

As to whether the scientists would have worked on the bomb if they thought it would be used. Al Christman's book, "Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb" (Naval Institute 1998), notes that the operational plan in February 1945 "called for the military use in the summer [of 1945] of Little Boy and one or two Fat Man bombs, followed by more if necessary."

Quote from here. (Emphasis mine)

 

It would be an incredibly stupid scientist that believed in July (when the first bomb was tested) that the military didn't intend to use it. Because they had said they would back in February.

 

From the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History. (Here)

Interim Committee Formulates Policy

(April through June 1945)

A committee of scientific, corporate, military and government leaders was formed by Secretary of War Stimson to formulate policy on “the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military and scientific aspects.” The committee’s major function was to determine if the bomb should be used with or without warning. On June 1, 1945, the Interim Committee submitted its report to President Truman after agreeing unanimously:

 

- The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.

- It should be used against a military target.

- It should be used without prior warning.

So that was June.

 

Are you suggesting that everybody except the scientists working on the project thought the bomb would be used?

 

You might want to read this piece. It concerns the unredacted MAJIC intercepts. (And shows where some of the revisionist thinking started.)

When scholars began to examine the archival records in the 1960s, some intuited quite correctly that the accounts of their decision-making that Truman and members of his administration had offered in 1945 were at least incomplete. And if Truman had refused to disclose fully his thinking, these scholars reasoned, it must be because the real basis for his choices would undermine or even delegitimize his decisions. It scarcely seemed plausible to such critics--or to almost anyone else--that there could be any legitimate reason that the U.S. government would have concealed at the time, and would continue to conceal, powerful evidence that supported and explained the president's decisions.

Ah-Ha. Gotcha, you are hiding something!

 

When a complete set of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary for the war years was first made public in 1978, the text contained a large number of redacted (literally whited out) passages. The critics reasonably asked whether the blanks concealed devastating revelations.

See, I told you they were hiding something!

 

Release of a nonredacted complete set in 1995 disclosed that the redacted areas had indeed contained a devastating revelation--but not about the use of the atomic bombs. Instead, the redacted areas concealed the embarrassing fact that Allied radio intelligence was reading the codes not just of the Axis powers, but also of some 30 other governments, including allies like France.

Oops.

 

Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end.

(Emphasis miine.)

So much for being about to surrender.

 

Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

Sooooo, none of the people attempting "peace" talks actually had the authority to do so.

 

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies."

 

On the point of giving some warning. Since we knew from the MAGIC intercepts that in the event of invasion, all POWs were to be executed, it was deemed extremely likely that should a warning be given to a target city, the Japanese would move their people out, and the POWs in. Neat huh, we get to kill our own.

 

I leave the final word to the newly (1945) installed Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, MAGIC intercept 15th September 1945 (That's right, after the surrender);

"Since the Americans have recently been raising an uproar about the question of our mistreatment of prisoners [of war], I think we should make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question in our propaganda."

 

So, how do you like working for the Japanese Foreign Ministry?

Edited September 1, 2009 by JohnB
typos

[The Bear's Key]

Your response is much improved. Still needs a bit of work though

 

I'm sorry, I wasn't aware that english wasn't you native language.

Or it could be that I'm just not buying what you're selling

 

Although, you're partly correct....English is my native language, but only 50% -- as I grew up bilingual. However that's besides the point

 

 

The grannies and schoolchildren were the Japanese back up troops, some 20,000,000 of them. They were not going to be human shields, they were to be active combattants. I thought that was clear. (It would have been if you'd read the links.)

Nope. You didn't mention any of that, and supplied no link in the proper context.

 

The unrelated link you posted...

Do you think that the propect of the

Army

ending the war and stealing their thunder might have had something to do with their attitudes?

 

You might be interested in reading this page;

http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/downfall.html

 

Also no link here...

And of course, if those of that opinion were wrong and Downfall went ahead, then wholesale slaughter would have been the result. US dogfaces didn't sign up to shoot Japanese grannies with pointed sticks, but they would have had to.

 

And none in your clarification...

Allied troops would have been faced with a simple choice, shoot the kids and grannies charging at them or die.

 

This was not a new tactic for the Japanese. During the fighting in New Guinea it was quite common for the Japanese to round up natives and

use them as human shields

in front of their charges. The defending troops were faced with a choice, machine gun unarmed women and children or die. It's not a pleasant choice and there is only one way to choose.

 

They did it, and they hated the Japanese for making them do it.

The bolded red contradicts what you just said a little further up: "They were not going to be human shields, they were to be active combattants. I thought that was clear."

 

So, JohnB...should I wonder if [english] memory isn't your first [language] priority?

 

 

 

Semantically you might be correct, but in combat the choice is "Kill or be killed".

Way before a combat's start, preparations are made (especially vs an old and known tactic) which affect what the choice is likely to be.

1. Kill everthing and spare no one that gets in the way.

2. Be killed.

3. Go by a carefully hatched strategy route which nails the most enemies, for the least casualties to yourselves and forced villagers.

 

I'll leave you to guess how they prioritized it for the body shields...

 

 

 

Drawing upon civilization's outstanding advancements

 

But....if I were a nation looking to model its warfare on battles fought with astounding quality, I'd steer clear of any that "had to" butcher through innocents to reach the enemy just because such innocents were placed in front.

 

As much ingenuity and technological excellence recent warfare might have, ironically the concept seems quite backwards in the problem-solving arena.

 

My opinion is that certain variables in a person's mind affects how useful warfare seems to them.

 

One is point-of-view. For example...

 

If you believe humanity's inclined towards "good" (utility for a better approximation), your goals can be engineered towards having a society with the most cleverly advanced system of protections and exposing those who seek conquering by force and destructive harm. The world's more inclined to respond cutting off all non-edible supplies to them, but only if you've earned such trust by not meddling in world affairs, including by targeted killings as secretive as your foreign policy. Then round it all out with superior military capabilities for defense and swift responses.

 

But if one views humanity as inclined towards "bad" (utter selfisness with power-hungry motives), certain goals will likely be engineerd towards having a society armed to the teeth and continually seeking out enemies where there are none. Plus the concept of the world acting to your beneift is laughable.

 

 

Alternative for Hiroshima/Nagasaki

 

How else could've Japan been dealt with? Obliterate the most critically important of government headquarters and deactivate the central or major nerves of their communications sytem.

 

Then just leave. What's the nation going to do?

 

It takes a vast amount of effort to coordinate industry, and run the nation properly -- especially with insufficient communications. And leave a warning that Japan owes the U.S. for reparations and if they ever attacked us a second time...it'd be a most henious price for Japan's leaders.

 

Especially as...

 

 

The USSR's joining in would've made continuing the war immensely daunting for Japan. (and yes I read your warbirdforum link)

 

How possible are chances that the reason our militaries didn't wait for Russia to join in less than 10 days was because they'd have to share credit for total victory with a rival superpower? Zero chance?

 

I'd give it a feasibility of 20% for a good arbitrary number. More than slight, but certainly not definite. However, it's also not (blind-foldedly) out of the question.

 

Just re-examine your comments below on the Navy's interservice rivalry with the Army; now, imagine that on a grander scale by replacing the bolded with U.S. and USSR.

 

Both Leahy and Nimitz believed the invasion unneccessary because the

Navy

could defeat Japan from the sea. Do not underestimate interservice rivalry. Do you think that the propect of the

Army

ending the war and stealing their thunder might have had something to do with their attitudes?

 

 

So JohnB, how do you reconcile the supposed view that Japan would fight until everyone was dead -- over 70,000,000 million people -- with the view that Japan would give up only if atom bombs killed less than 1% of its people?

 

Contrast that with the number of Japanese soldiers killed in actual warfare: nearly 3% of population (over 2.9% to be exact). It didn't stop Japan. And ironically, even though your argument partly hinges on the firebombing raids being worse than the atom bombs, you still view the atom bombs as more surefire than the firebombing raids in ending the war.

 

So the crazy Japanese would risk 100% of lives for victory or defeat, but not less than 1% from atomic weaponry?

 

Japan had lost 2.9% of their population (not even counting civilians). The U.S. with almost double Japan's population lost 8 times fewer: 0.32%.

 

My argument is that the price of going in with Russia against Japan, and only crippling the government, would've been acceptable compared to the nuclear world's destructive potential the atom bomb droppings created. Far more lives now at stake than in WW2.

 

And a little perpective...

 

Hiroshima had the most deaths: 140,000. Even if you dropped 15 bombs of equal nukage for death-count, you'd only just almost reach the number of Japanese soldiers killed so far.

 

That doesn't sound like a great motivator.

(especially against insane war leaders bent on facing total annihilation/destruction rather than surrendering)

 

 

 

Firstly the Potsdam Declaration was broadcast in clear, so the Japanese had no illusions as to the terms. This was 26th July 1945.

Clear.

 

What were the terms?

9.The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

Sounds to me like they could look forward to a life of peaceful pursuits in their homeland.

Clear...but later foggy with rain (see google books further down), and not the sole option (reread my "Alternative for Hiroshima/Nagasaki" further up).

 

 

10.We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals....

NOT. The Emperor and princes were spared, at much insistence too.

 

Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought...

Not quite. Lots of censorship went on. Video had to be edited out if they even hinted at the presence of Allied soldiers in Japan.

 

http://www.columbia.edu/~hds2/BIB95/02occupation_augustine.htm#04

Consisting of nearly 100 cubic feet of files containing periodical articles and book-length manuscripts submitted for pre-publication censorship, these are items that SCAP disapproved of in their original form. Certain books and articles were suppressed entirely or had extensive passages deleted from them because they extolled militaristic, ultranationalistic, or rightist views. Others were censored because they advocated radical Communism, failed to support programs and policies of SCAP, or were critical in some direct or indirect way of the Allies. The documents have been completely processed and are arranged alphabetically by title of periodical or book.

 

 

http://books.google.com/books?id=Ba5hXsfeyhMC&pg=PA67&dq=severely+gis+censorship&sig=ACfU3U3_7MFOnBKgutBavggHUGIPQw9Vrg

Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severly.

........

Such behavior was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by Occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On 10 September 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of all reports and statistics....

(They cite for reference at the end of the book)

 

 

http://books.google.com/books?id=iIeyCNiD43sC&pg=PA86&dq=criticism+censorship+Germany+allied+occupation&lr=&as_brr=3&sig=ACfU3U3ht1X9rb44TcaJIy7_PKv0Eff4yw

Not only did Occupation censorship forbid criticsim of the United States and othe Allied nations, but the mention of censorship itself was forbidden.

(Bibliography on last page)

 

 

12.The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

Sounds nice and beautiful. Yet with all the censorship (mentioned previosly), how's a freely expressed will possible? Did the Allies take a survey of Japanese citizens?

 

You do realize, talent can be hired to write poetic-sounding versions of reality, topped off with a looming darkness gnawing at the edges waiting to flood us. (Important to bear in mind when making a reality check)

 

So how do you like being an unpaid poem waver for re-editors of history?

 

 

Note also;

4.The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

A direct appeal to the people of Japan.

Oh, I'm sure() everyone in Japan caught that broadcast, or were delivered a pamphlet (by horse....and samurai riders).

 

 

 

 

The point was to make the Japanese believe that the Allies had a lot of bombs and would make frequent use of them.

So the atom bomb tests on videos were perfect for that. The Japanese wouldn't have known it to be the first tests ever, and so could've been told it was arranged specifically for their viewing pleasure.

 

As to whether the scientists would have worked on the bomb if they thought it would be used. Al Christman's book, "Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb" (Naval Institute 1998), notes that the operational plan in February 1945 "called for the military use in the summer [of 1945] of Little Boy and one or two Fat Man bombs, followed by more if necessary."

.....

It would be an incredibly stupid scientist that believed in July (when the first bomb was tested) that the military didn't intend to use it. Because they had said they would back in February.

Yeah, like scientists would've been at the military operational plans Doubtful they were continually updated.

 

flashback...

Szilárd became increasingly dismayed that scientists were losing control over their research to the military

In any case, were the relevant scientists invited to military planning of specific targets, or restricted to just attending the development stages of the weapons?

 

 

 

You might want to read this piece. It concerns the unredacted MAJIC intercepts. (And shows where some of the revisionist thinking started.)

.......

Ah-Ha. Gotcha, you are hiding something!

No idea why you're addressing the *revisionist* stuff to me, as I didn't even present it.

 

 

On the point of giving some warning. Since we knew from the MAGIC intercepts that in the event of invasion, all POWs were to be executed, it was deemed extremely likely that should a warning be given to a target city, the Japanese would move their people out, and the POWs in.

Failure in two ways.

1. no warning of the target city is required in order to make a threat of nuking a city.

2. move hundreds of thousands of people from a city and what -- hide them a little down the road? How to feed, clothe, and water them? Any jobs away from the city for that many people? Sounds like fantasy.

 

 

Note: you're a fair challenge. Don't take it to heart if anything sounds condescending or mocking, those parts are in jest (as humor injections). Which you surely already know You debate well enough given the setting, and so know that I respect the depth in what you say -- obvious as you've drawn the largest reply I've ever given online

Edited September 4, 2009 by The Bear's Key
grammaring

[Mr Skeptic]

Alternative for Hiroshima/Nagasaki

 

How else could've Japan been dealt with? Obliterate the most critically important of government headquarters and deactivate the central or major nerves of their communications sytem.

 

Then just leave. What's the nation going to do?

 

Regroup and continue fighting? Fight a bloody civil war? I think that would have much more casualties than a couple of nukes. And also Russia would have to agree to leave them alone as well. And we don't win, with all the associated benefits.

 

How possible are chances that the reason our militaries didn't wait for Russia to join in less than 10 days was because they'd have to share credit for total victory with a rival superpower? Zero chance?

 

Very likely actually. It is also quite possible that our war strategy against Germany was to let them attack Russia and only help our Russian allies when they started winning.

 

10.We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals....

NOT. The Emperor and princes were spared, at much insistence too.

 

Sadly, that is how it works. There are very few instances when you can convince someone to surrender after telling them that they will be given a bad place in the history books and then executed. How many other people would have to die just for that one little bit of justice?

 

Not quite. Lots of censorship went on. Video had to be edited out if they even hinted at the presence of Allied soldiers in Japan.

 

Wow, I never knew that.