Emergence and Decline of Scientific Paradigms

[thinker_jeff]

Abstract

 

Scientific paradigms have a tendency to rise fast and decline slowly. This asymmetry reflects the difficulty in developing a truly original idea, compared to the ease at which a concept can be eroded by numerous modifications. Here we formulate a model for the emergence and spread of ideas which deals with this asymmetry by constraining the ability of agents to return to already abandoned concepts. The model exhibits a fairly regular pattern of global paradigm shifts, where older paradigms are eroded and subsequently replaced by new ones. The model sets the theme for a new class of pattern formation models, where local dynamics breaks the detailed balance in a way that prevents old states from defending themselves against new nucleating or invading states. The model allows for frozen events in terms of the coexistence of multiple metastable states.

 

© 2011 American Physical Society

 

Link: http://prl.aps.org/abstract/PRL/v106/i5/e058701

 

 

 

[lemur]

Abstract

 

Scientific paradigms have a tendency to rise fast and decline slowly. This asymmetry reflects the difficulty in developing a truly original idea, compared to the ease at which a concept can be eroded by numerous modifications. Here we formulate a model for the emergence and spread of ideas which deals with this asymmetry by constraining the ability of agents to return to already abandoned concepts. The model exhibits a fairly regular pattern of global paradigm shifts, where older paradigms are eroded and subsequently replaced by new ones. The model sets the theme for a new class of pattern formation models, where local dynamics breaks the detailed balance in a way that prevents old states from defending themselves against new nucleating or invading states. The model allows for frozen events in terms of the coexistence of multiple metastable states.

 

© 2011 American Physical Society

 

Link: http://prl.aps.org/a...v106/i5/e058701

Kuhnian paradigmism is overly structuralist, imo. It assumes that scientists are uniformly programmed to operate within a more or less unified paradigm until such time as sufficient revolutionary force is built up to radically overturn the old paradigm with a new one. In practice, I think it makes more sense to approach this in a more "post-structural" way, meaning to look at the conceptual and linguistic institutions attributed to a particular "paradigm" and examine how patterns of thinking/research are influenced and how they are malleable through evolving application. Also, rather than assuming that paradigms are unified approaches to knowledge, I think it makes more sense to see them as constituted from hybridizing aspects of older paradigms and adding new elements. Like any other technology, new forms are usually the result of innovating older forms and then institutionalizing them as a radical break from their predecessors. This, of course, involves identity politics (how do you objectively differentiate a revolution from evolution?), and the way you define the identity of one paradigm vis-a-vis others probably influences the observations you make about the paradigms and their interactions, no?

 

I'm sorry I didn't read the article before responding to this thread. I just thought it would be worth mentioning these caveats about the Kuhnian perspective. Is there a way to read the article without paying, or does it have to be bought?

 

 

[ewmon]

Reminds me of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

[Marat]

Although Thomas Kuhn made a useful contribution to the theory of scientific evolution and revolution back in the 1970s, his original theory of how paradigms of scientific explanation are defended and abandoned is now long outmoded. Imre Lakatos refined Kuhn's approach usefully in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so that it is now recognized that the eventual collapse of a paradigm of scientific explanation under the accumulated weight of theoretical complications to absorb the pressure of data which don't fit into the paradigm easily is a much more complicated, dialectical process than originally envisioned.

 

A major problem is that Kuhn's original theory became so important in the history and philosophy of science that many outside of the field in history, literature, sociology, and political science adopted grossly oversimplified versions of it, and they still toss Kuhn's terminology around as though using his technical vocabulary could somehow ensure that whatever ideas are being presented somehow become 'scientific.'

[thinker_jeff]

Is there a way to read the article without paying, or does it have to be bought?

 

I guess that you have to pay to read the article, that why the line of copyright follows.

 

I have a question - Is consciousness really an established concept in scientific paradigms?

Edited March 2, 2011 by thinker_jeff

[lemur]

Although Thomas Kuhn made a useful contribution to the theory of scientific evolution and revolution back in the 1970s, his original theory of how paradigms of scientific explanation are defended and abandoned is now long outmoded. Imre Lakatos refined Kuhn's approach usefully in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so that it is now recognized that the eventual collapse of a paradigm of scientific explanation under the accumulated weight of theoretical complications to absorb the pressure of data which don't fit into the paradigm easily is a much more complicated, dialectical process than originally envisioned.

 

A major problem is that Kuhn's original theory became so important in the history and philosophy of science that many outside of the field in history, literature, sociology, and political science adopted grossly oversimplified versions of it, and they still toss Kuhn's terminology around as though using his technical vocabulary could somehow ensure that whatever ideas are being presented somehow become 'scientific.'

I would say that the problem is exactly the opposite: i.e. that despite the enormous popularity of discourse about "paradigm shifts," not enough of the discussion was critical, or it wasn't critical enough, to result in a lucid dissection of how exactly knowledge and theory evolves. It is definitely a complex dialectical process, but the problem is that there is little mindfulness of the various levels at which the dialogue is negotiated. Ultimately, I think innovations emerge from human minds, but to reach the point where they emerge, a lot reading, discussing, and thinking (not to mention empirical research hopefully).

 

On the other hand, there is also a complex dialectical discourse of all the disciplinary conservatism that resists innovations and challenges to institutionalized knowledge/ideas/theory. So it would also be oversimplifying to say that innovation proceeds without resistance from pro-active conservatism. What's more, this conservatism very often contributes handsomely to the emergence of innovative thought and work so it is not as simple as net progress/regress as offense and defense push against each other to see who can produce the biggest gain or loss in yardage of the other side.

 

 

[Marat]

The problem is that science has two diametrically opposed goals. One is to advance our understanding of the empirical world by adapting our theories progressively to new data as they emerge, while the other is to weave all newly emerging data back into explanation in terms of our existing paradigms of explanation. So we have to be prepared simultaneously to break and preserve paradigms in response to new data, which creates a significant internal tension in scientific theorizing. Generally, scientists tend to be too conservative, and their first response to the discovery of anything that challenges existing paradigms of explanation (UFOs, ESP, faith-healing, etc.) is to dismiss it with a dogmatic lack of curiosity since it does not fit into the theory structures which already exist. An institutional problem operating here is that scientists owe their reputation to being educated in and understanding the existing explanatory paradigms, and if these are suddenly challenged and discarded, then Mr. Expert finds that he knows no more than the layman, and who likes that?

 

The stubbornness with which defenders of Ptolemaic astronomy resisted Copernicus, or Aristotelian physics resisted Galilean relativity, or Cartesian particle-in-motion physicists resisted Newtonian action-at-a-distance, or phlogiston chemistry opposed Lavoisier's discovery of the central role of oxygen and heat transfer in chemical reactions, or subtle fluid heat theory resisted Rumford's mechanical theory of heat, all severely retarded the development of science. This should encourage scientists today to be more willing to take a close look at recalcitrant data before dismissing it. But then again, they shouldn't go overboard and start building new paradigms on odd data, since otherwise they will replicate the error of a good physicist like Sir Oliver Lodge falling for the revival of purported mystical effects in his own era.

[lemur]

The problem is that science has two diametrically opposed goals. One is to advance our understanding of the empirical world by adapting our theories progressively to new data as they emerge, while the other is to weave all newly emerging data back into explanation in terms of our existing paradigms of explanation. So we have to be prepared simultaneously to break and preserve paradigms in response to new data, which creates a significant internal tension in scientific theorizing. Generally, scientists tend to be too conservative, and their first response to the discovery of anything that challenges existing paradigms of explanation (UFOs, ESP, faith-healing, etc.) is to dismiss it with a dogmatic lack of curiosity since it does not fit into the theory structures which already exist. An institutional problem operating here is that scientists owe their reputation to being educated in and understanding the existing explanatory paradigms, and if these are suddenly challenged and discarded, then Mr. Expert finds that he knows no more than the layman, and who likes that?

 

The stubbornness with which defenders of Ptolemaic astronomy resisted Copernicus, or Aristotelian physics resisted Galilean relativity, or Cartesian particle-in-motion physicists resisted Newtonian action-at-a-distance, or phlogiston chemistry opposed Lavoisier's discovery of the central role of oxygen and heat transfer in chemical reactions, or subtle fluid heat theory resisted Rumford's mechanical theory of heat, all severely retarded the development of science. This should encourage scientists today to be more willing to take a close look at recalcitrant data before dismissing it. But then again, they shouldn't go overboard and start building new paradigms on odd data, since otherwise they will replicate the error of a good physicist like Sir Oliver Lodge falling for the revival of purported mystical effects in his own era.

Another approach is to simply avoid the reifying imagery of paradigms altogether and just treat them as networks of related ideas that facilitate sense-making for certain knowledge or other ideas. In that sense, you wouldn't have to worry about paradigms being totally undermined, discarded, replaced, etc. because they would be nothing more than contextualization patterns. Granted, it was a shock to me when I read Popper's criticism of Marxist class-conflict analysis as being essentially tautological but it didn't ultimately undermine it as a paradigm for me - I just learned to treat it as a non-falsifiable interpretative lens that isn't really useful for proving or disproving anything per se'. I can't presently think of any other examples where paradigmatic context is challenged to the point of rendering knowledge fundamentally baseless, but I think any undermined paradigm can only shed further light on how knowledge predicated on that paradigm can/must be developed and/or understood to maintain validity. The only real examples of total paradigm-undermining I could imagine would occur in cases where knowledge was systematically built on a radically false assumption. Even then, though, certain aspects of research could involve valid knowledge (according to some paradigm) despite other aspects being paradigmatically misguided. I guess the issue here is that no knowledge is mono-paradigmatic.

Edited March 3, 2011 by lemur

[Marat]

Yours is a point often made in historical discussions of the phlogiston debate. The scientists using the phlogiston paradigm to explain combustion and chemical reactions accumulated a great deal of empirical information and developed many vital chemical techniques, so when Lavoisier overthrew their central explanatory paradigm, their results remained usable, but just needed to be integrated into a new paradigm to be of value.

[lemur]

Yours is a point often made in historical discussions of the phlogiston debate. The scientists using the phlogiston paradigm to explain combustion and chemical reactions accumulated a great deal of empirical information and developed many vital chemical techniques, so when Lavoisier overthrew their central explanatory paradigm, their results remained usable, but just needed to be integrated into a new paradigm to be of value.

Thanks, I didn't know about that aspect of phlogiston history - had forgotten about it altogether actually. So, would you also say that the various empirical information and valid ideas that survived the fallen paradigm were already indicative of some other paradigm that survived phlogiston's? I see paradigms like culture and culture as always mixed in practice. Thinking of a discourse as monoparadigmatic is, imo, like thinking of an empirical social situation as purely monocultural or an empirical thermodynamic system as energetically uniform.