Is philosophy relevant to science?

[mississippichem]

Generally speaking, knowledge about 'the world' does not effect either what 'it' is (in any case) or how it works. So, no. But that should not keep 'inquiring minds' from asking the questions.

 

What is to be gained by answering such a question? The predictive value of the theory and validity of the mathematical model are unaffected by any possible answer.

[Dekan]

What is to be gained by answering such a question? The predictive value of the theory and validity of the mathematical model are unaffected by any possible answer.

 

The answer depends on who you are. If you ask:

 

- what does it do, you're an engineer

 

- how does it do it, you're a scientist

 

- why does it do it, you're a philosopher

 

- how much does it cost to do it, you're an economist

 

- will people vote for it, you're a politician

 

- will it get me some welfare/aid money, you're a Democrat voter

 

 

-

[tar]

mississippichem,

 

What is to be gained by asking such a question?

 

That would depend on what the answers turn out to be.

 

In any case, say in looking for the "final theory", there is a guess that all this symmetry and the mirror images that seem to keep actually being the case might "mean" something. That there may be an underlying principle or two or three or four or 5 or 6 or 10 or 12 or so from which everything follows. Looking for this would only be appropriate if "so far" we have found such answers that were actually in agreement with both our expectations and our experience. Since there are many cases in which our expectations DO indeed match with what is actually the case, there is no harm in continuing to look for such "patterns" in reality. We have found them before, we will likely continue to find them.

 

Regards, TAR

 

If it is evil gnomes that are doing it all, and not good elves, I might feel differently about it.

It might even make a difference if it was good gnomes instead of evil elves.

But if it is one or the other, or what ever the answer might be, I would still like to know the principles involved. Wouldn't hurt to know. And might open up some new avenues of exploration.

 

 

Ever notice how certain "patterns" seem to be actually the case, on completely different scales?

Like the shape of hurricanes and the shape of the Milky Way? Or an atom and a solar system both having this central thing that other smaller things orbit around?

 

Might be some "principles" involved.

Edited November 23, 2011 by tar

[PeterJ]

Hoffman was a good mathematician/physicist but would you please make it clear what the above means. It strikes me as the sort of pat, cereal-box, philosophy that we can do without.

Okay. It strikes me as true, and I think you would have to admit that the layman is usually best to go with what's been checked by peers and published than a casual chat. I think he means that metaphysics and theoretical physics are impossible to conceptually disentagle. I just happened to remember the remark.

 

Find one point they agree on and I will fight it

I already gave the point, and listed these philosophers as being in agreement on it. Or I thought I did.

 

very little has been known and agreed for millennia - let alone any "result of metaphysics"

Everyone agrees that metaphysical questions are dilemmas. It is a result of metaphysics. I'm actually confused as to why you're not accepting this. David Chalmers, Paul Davies, Colin McGinn, the list goes on, they all agree about this. It is simply unavoidable. Try deciding a metaphysical question and you'll find it's undecidable.

 

It is true that philosophers disagree wildy about how to interpret this result, and this may disguise the level of agreement about the result. Many refuse to consider that this is a proof of what is actually true in reality, preferring to endorse, say, materialism or idealism rather than nondualism, but they all reach it. That's why there's so much confusion. It's why so many people think metaphysics is unimportant.

 

model-making is about all that modern science does. there is very rarely any claim of any discernment of underlying truth - science tends to restrict itself to postulating models that accurately depict nature in a limited set of circumstances. philosophy is ill-suited to model making because of the fetish for underlying truth, ethical underpinning, moral basis etc

Yes, okay. But that is not quite an answer to my question. Is QM a theory if it does not have an interpretation? I don't have a view on this, just want to know the official one.

 

Any hypothesis or theorem can always be re-presented by an alternative interpretation which opens new vistas and allows different understandings; I do not think that Quantum Mechanics, because it can be explained in less mathematical terms, is altered/lessened in any way. QM is a highly predictive and accurate theory; as per my above comment, science no longer calls for some metaphorical reinforcement from an underlying truth. A description of what happens, with a mathematical basis that allows for both empirical testing and future predictions is a theory. A data set is clearly not a theory, and neither is a blank prediction; a physical theory tends to say, we have observed X situation gives rise to Y results, we have derived a mathematical model in which X gives rise to Y, the theory would predict that in a situation W we will see the results Z, we can test this by looking at this real world scenario in which W will occur and thus should give rise to Z .... there is no need to attempt to drill down to an unarguable truth - we have more or less decided that this is unobtainable

Fine. I'm not arguing with any of this. Would this process of generating alternative interpretations belong in science or philosophy or both? If they are dinstinct stand-alone disciplines we must be able to draw a distinct line between them. I'm exploring whether it is possible to do this.

Edited November 23, 2011 by PeterJ

[superball]

I do not think that Quantum Mechanics, because it can be explained in less mathematical terms, is altered/lessened in any way. QM is a highly predictive and accurate theory; as per my above comment, science no longer calls for some metaphorical reinforcement from an underlying truth. A description of what happens, with a mathematical basis that allows for both empirical testing and future predictions is a theory.

 

Reinforcing you claim in lay-men

 

philosophy view This is disheartening. You say science no longer calls for some metaphorical reinforcement from an underlying truth. Tell that to the guy trying to reproduce in a laboratory experimental evidence.

 

How in the world of pots, and pans does is given explanation sufficient? without grasping the concept? How might I understand by observation this is so? It has been said mathematics may be reduced to a simple understanding. Binary code, binary words. How could you grasp meaning living in the realm of scrutiny without knowledge of what is actually occurring?

 

QM is a highly evolved mathematical discipline. QM is needed for the task.

The statement (I do not think) is exactly what I am trying to determine.. In reality, and not fantasy we must think. In order for the next man to grasp a given concept. It must be relative to the observer. You may say QM gives solutions to a given problem. I tend to agree, but QM is giving answers, not short cuts? For vastly difficult problems, and models that require QM for the solution. It is not philosophy, nor is it a theory. It is the data set required, as it stands. QM is needed...

 

 

A data set is clearly not a theory, and neither is a blank prediction; a physical theory tends to say, we have observed X situation gives rise to Y results, we have derived a mathematical model in which X gives rise to Y, the theory would predict that in a situation W we will see the results Z, we can test this by looking at this real world scenario in which W will occur and thus should give rise to Z .... there is no need to attempt to drill down to an unarguable truth - we have more or less decided that this is unobtainable.

 

I 100% agree with this statement in relation to QM finding specific particles, and relating these particles to the world of pots, and pans is irrelevant. (unobtainable)

 

I hope my statements are not is some way unrelated, or in poor taste.

 

Respectably super-ball.

Edited November 23, 2011 by superball

[tar]

PeterJ,

 

Everyone agrees that metaphysical questions are dilemmas. It is a result of metaphysics. I'm actually confused as to why you're not accepting this. David Chalmers, Paul Davies, Colin McGinn, the list goes on, they all agree about this. It is simply unavoidable. Try deciding a metaphysical question and you'll find it's undecidable.

 

 

Noticed a little contradiction there, that might be very important to the discussion. Everybody agrees on this metaphysical point that is undecidable? If we all agree, then its been decided, which would make it decidable.

 

I am not a fan of these logical "binds". I think set theory has a famous one similar. Russell's. I understand them, but don't quite agree that they are so problematic as they are set out to be.

 

For instance in the contradiction in your statement above, you can understand the contradiction, only if you set the assumptions up as "strawmen" that can be easily taken down. There are different senses that statements can be taken in, and it is not difficult to find some sense in which the thing you are saying is not true.

 

One of my favorite statements is "listen to what I mean, not what I say".

 

Such may be the problem with philosophers who can always say something that weakens their own statements in some manner or another if the "meaning" of the assumptions is twisted or misunderstood or switched to another referant where things might not fit so well.

 

Such may be where scientists discount the "absolute" value of thought, and say...look here, it just happened, its true. The world verifies itself. It never contradicts itself. It cannot. It must all fit together. It has no way to lie. It has no way to go back on its word. It has no way to take a "different" perspective. What ever has happened cannot be "undone", whatever is happening is actual, and what will happen next is contingent upon what has happened before. The world is absolutely true. What we think of it is accurate but not complete. Being part of it, we cannot contain it all in thought, except by analogy. Analogies which are not necessarily completely appropriate.

 

But to prove my point...that science and philosophy are closely intertwined...my support of science in the above paragraph was a statement of "my" philosophy, which can easily be torn apart by focusing on the ways it is not true or not possible. But can be "understood" as true, if a "meaning" behind my words has a "real" object which also has "meaning" to you.

 

As in what Superball said.

In reality, and not fantasy we must think. In order for the next man to grasp a given concept. It must be relative to the observer.

 

Regards, TAR2

Edited November 24, 2011 by tar

[PeterJ]

Noticed a little contradiction there, that might be very important to the discussion. Everybody agrees on this metaphysical point that is undecidable? If we all agree, then its been decided, which would make it decidable.

The point is not a complicated one. Lots of people think that the Reimann hypothesis and the background-dependent problems are undecidable. It would not follow that they have been decided. The question of whether metaphysical questions are undecidable is not in itself undecidable. Do you think I'm making this up as I go along?

 

I am not a fan of these logical "binds".

What logical 'binds'? I see none.

 

I think set theory has a famous one similar. Russell's. I understand them, but don't quite agree that they are so problematic as they are set out to be.

I fear they may be more problematic than you think. Russell's paradox, more properly Cantor's, was solved by George Spencer Brown, as Russell acknowledged, by adopting the view that you are currently arguing against, once having translated it into mathematics. It is an important problem in metaphysics, and probably cannot be underestimated.

 

For instance in the contradiction in your statement above, you can understand the contradiction, only if you set the assumptions up as "strawmen" that can be easily taken down. There are different senses that statements can be taken in, and it is not difficult to find some sense in which the thing you are saying is not true.

No contradictions and no strawmen, but I agree that it's possible to miss the sense of even the simplest of sentences. In person we have more clues to go on.

 

One of my favorite statements is "listen to what I mean, not what I say".

Wandering around forums I sometimes think it is 'I'll listen to what I want you to say so that I can disagree with you, and not what you actually say, and never mind what you mean".

 

Btw, I agree that philosophy and science are inextricable and that there are no true contradictions, so we needn't argue about that.

 

I assume that you are not aware that the demonstrable logical indefensibility of extreme metaphyscial psotions is the entire justifaction for Priest and Routkley's 'dialethism', a view for which the world would contradict itself, and for Melhuish 'paradoxical universe', and for McGinn's 'mysterianism', and for Chalmers' 'naturalistic dualism', and for ... well, I just don't know why you won't accept that this is a well known result. But I won't go on pushing the point.

Edited November 24, 2011 by PeterJ

[owl]

Some food for thought here before I take off for the feast of "real food."

I think "What is it?" ontological questions are very relevant to science.

Here are a few examples.

What is a "dimension?" Context: Everyone is familiar with 3-D space. Some call time a dimension, and I can live with that as 'what elapses' as things move. But what kind of science adds seven more without any explanation as to what they are, or the ability to observe and verify their existence. String/M-theory is metaphysics parading as science. It needs a strong dose of ontology.

They say dimensions are the "degrees of freedom" in which strings vibrate. Beyond line, plane and volume, or up-down, left-right, and forward-back, what other "direction" is there? That is a philosophical question, asked as if science should actually make sense!

 

How about theories of gravity? We have GR which is an improvement over Newtonian physics, but it depends on a malleable mystery medium, spacetime to guide things around as mass attracts mass (and light.) How is "what is it?" not a relevant question?

 

Quantum mechanics posits the hypothetical graviton as a massless "messenger particle" which somehow transfers the pull of gravity between masses. But, like spacetime, gravitons remain hypothetical.

 

Science can not just make up new words for physical objects and processes/forces and say that "what it is" doesn't matter! They must refer to actual things and processes, not just concepts in models.

So this is where epistemology (philosophy) comes in and demands to know how we verify our hypotheses.

And ontology, paradoxically, is the 'metaphysics' of inquiry into the physical nature, if any, of the mechanisms involved in such theories as above (and countless others.)

Gotta go. Happy turkey day to all.

 

A follow up to Swansont's challenge, having a little 'delay before take off.'

Me:

Generally speaking, knowledge about 'the world' does not effect either what 'it' is (in any case) or how it works. So, no. But that should not keep 'inquiring minds' from asking the questions.

Asking questions is one thing. But taking the position that it is wrong is quite another. Science doesn't address the questions you are asking, but you admit that it doesn't affect the veracity of the model, and the veracity of the model is what science cares about.

... the position that what is wrong?

I know that GR's math is an improvement over Newtonian physics. Maybe quantum mechanics will not only improve on that but come up with the 'holy grail' of unified theory on all scales. But I do not see how knowing what it is that we are talking about when we use the terms spacetime and graviton is irrelevant to science.

 

My quote above also applies to a part of relativity that I do think is wrong. I argued to the best of my ability in my 'objective vs subjective' thread in this section that the world/cosmos is real all by itself, independent of and not effected by measurements (from different frames of reference) and what knowledge is gained from our observations.

Case in point:

The part of epistemology that employs reason tells us that the distance between Earth and Sun varies only with its position in elliptical orbit, not with how it is observed from extreme frames of reference ( 'subjective' perception, even if just an abstract point of view.) Likewise with the shrunken solid meter rod, both examples of bogus "length contraction" applied on macro scale. We beat that to death with no concession on your part that our measurements of the Au, etc do not change the 'real world' distance/length.

[tar]

The point is not a complicated one. Lots of people think that the Reimann hypothesis and the background-dependent problems are undecidable. It would not follow that they have been decided. The question of whether metaphysical questions are undecidable is not in itself undecidable. Do you think I'm making this up as I go along?

 

 

What logical 'binds'? I see none.

 

 

I fear they may be more problematic than you think. Russell's paradox, more properly Cantor's, was solved by George Spencer Brown, as Russell acknowledged, by adopting the view that you are currently arguing against, once having translated it into mathematics. It is an important problem in metaphysics, and probably cannot be underestimated.

 

 

No contradictions and no strawmen, but I agree that it's possible to miss the sense of even the simplest of sentences. In person we have more clues to go on.

 

 

Wandering around forums I sometimes think it is 'I'll listen to what I want you to say so that I can disagree with you, and not what you actually say, and never mind what you mean".

 

Btw, I agree that philosophy and science are inextricable and that there are no true contradictions, so we needn't argue about that.

 

I assume that you are not aware that the demonstrable logical indefensibility of extreme metaphyscial psotions is the entire justifaction for Priest and Routkley's 'dialethism', a view for which the world would contradict itself, and for Melhuish 'paradoxical universe', and for McGinn's 'mysterianism', and for Chalmers' 'naturalistic dualism', and for ... well, I just don't know why you won't accept that this is a well known result. But I won't go on pushing the point.

 

PeterJ,

 

Had to do a little Wikiing to understand your references. After my jaunt, I think I know what you mean, although I am not sure what point of yours I was arguing against in an ungrounded fashion. Never-the-less, meaning-wise, I am sort of feeling that you and me are OK. That is, not in a state of conflict.

 

However the intertwinishness of philosopy and science was evident, looking at the topics and people and concepts you mention.

 

Logic-set theory-math are the underpinnings of science. And in the other direction, truth is already in place, we just have to locate it.

 

Regards, TAR2

 

and on a personal investigative note...language, whether math, or words only works if the users know the meaning behind the symbols...and I have a good guess that there actually is a "consistent" world to which we all refer.

 

Or as Owl might put it. A world that would exist, whether we referred to it or not.

[PeterJ]

Tar - Nice one. A surprising number of people do not see this crucial fact about metaphysics, even though once we have it seems quite obvious.

Edited November 25, 2011 by PeterJ

[swansont]

How about theories of gravity? We have GR which is an improvement over Newtonian physics, but it depends on a malleable mystery medium, spacetime to guide things around as mass attracts mass (and light.) How is "what is it?" not a relevant question?

 

But in all these discussions, it seems that you are the only one insisting that spacetime is a "malleable mystery medium". Others have explained, sometimes at length, that this is not the case. The real philosophical mystery is why you continue to ignore this and keep insisting that it is true.

At some point one must transition from "that's wrong" to "that is a lie". Refuting a lie does not make one's position correct.

 

Quantum mechanics posits the hypothetical graviton as a massless "messenger particle" which somehow transfers the pull of gravity between masses. But, like spacetime, gravitons remain hypothetical.

 

Science can not just make up new words for physical objects and processes/forces and say that "what it is" doesn't matter! They must refer to actual things and processes, not just concepts in models.

 

Who are you to dictate what science must do? What is your justification — has science been getting it wrong for these several hundred years? Is there a lack of success of science to which you can point?

 

... the position that what is wrong?

I know that GR's math is an improvement over Newtonian physics. Maybe quantum mechanics will not only improve on that but come up with the 'holy grail' of unified theory on all scales. But I do not see how knowing what it is that we are talking about when we use the terms spacetime and graviton is irrelevant to science.

 

My quote above also applies to a part of relativity that I do think is wrong. I argued to the best of my ability in my 'objective vs subjective' thread in this section that the world/cosmos is real all by itself, independent of and not effected by measurements (from different frames of reference) and what knowledge is gained from our observations.

Case in point:

The part of epistemology that employs reason tells us that the distance between Earth and Sun varies only with its position in elliptical orbit, not with how it is observed from extreme frames of reference ( 'subjective' perception, even if just an abstract point of view.) Likewise with the shrunken solid meter rod, both examples of bogus "length contraction" applied on macro scale. We beat that to death with no concession on your part that our measurements of the Au, etc do not change the 'real world' distance/length.

 

I don't have to make any concessions against a lie.

 

Let me ask this: is a hole a real object? A hole is the absence of material. I can step or fall into a hole, depending on its size. Yet it is not a substance. From your stance, I would expect you to be upset that this word exists in the English language and you would be railing against its use since it is not a real substance. So: are holes real?

[fractalres]

Research biology may address each minutiae but cannot express collective experiences (events) the way contextualized philosophy provides conceptual tools to do. Additionally, scientific innovations often result from contextualizing non-technical relationships: breakthroughs are often inspired by metaphors.

[Appolinaria]

 

Quantum mechanics posits the hypothetical graviton as a massless "messenger particle" which somehow transfers the pull of gravity between masses. But, like spacetime, gravitons remain hypothetical.

 

Science can not just make up new words for physical objects and processes/forces and say that "what it is" doesn't matter! They must refer to actual things and processes, not just concepts in models.

 

 

What the hell do you think the science world is doing? Twiddling their thumbs?

 

Yeah, the LHC is just for shits and giggles.

[owl]

But in all these discussions, it seems that you are the only one insisting that spacetime is a "malleable mystery medium". Others have explained, sometimes at length, that this is not the case. The real philosophical mystery is why you continue to ignore this and keep insisting that it is true.

 

Ever since Minkowski came up with 'spacetime' and Einstein made it the (whatever) curved by mass to explain how gravity makes matter and light travel in curved paths, all explanations of general relativity refer to the curvature of spacetime. To what part of "malleable mystery medium" do you object? If mass makes 'it' curve, 'it' must be malleable. If no one knows "what it IS," 'it' is mysterious. What noun besides "medium" do you prefer? If 'it' is just a concept in a coordinate system, then to what does the concept refer in the cosmos which the theory attempts to describe?

 

At some point one must transition from "that's wrong" to "that is a lie". Refuting a lie does not make one's position correct.

 

Who are you to dictate what science must do? What is your justification — has science been getting it wrong for these several hundred years? Is there a lack of success of science to which you can point?

I don't have to make any concessions against a lie.

 

I argue that the "length contraction" part of relativity is based on a form of idealism which says that the length of a rod, the distance to the Sun and even the shape of Earth are not intrinsic properties of those objects and the distance between them (in the case of the Au), but rather they all depend on the frame of reference from which they are observed and measured.

Realism asserts that 'the world' (cosmos and all its parts) exists and has intrinsic properties independent of how they are observed/measured... that if intelligent observers never evolved, cosmos would be the same (less our technology)... and the distance to the Sun would remain around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it... etc. for the other two examples.

 

There is 'a world of difference' between the two philosophies. Yet you present realism as not only merely my personal point of view, but a "lie"... calling me a liar in the process. As to "Who are you...?," again, it is not about 'me' as you keep insisting.

 

You continually insist on personally attacking me rather than discussing the substance of my arguments.

 

Let me ask this: is a hole a real object? A hole is the absence of material. I can step or fall into a hole, depending on its size. Yet it is not a substance. From your stance, I would expect you to be upset that this word exists in the English language and you would be railing against its use since it is not a real substance. So: are holes real?

 

If you are an expert in what a "strawman argument" is, as you claim, you know that this is a bogus and completely irrelevant argument.

I have presented (many times) the ontological argument that space is simply the emptiness, the volume or distance, between particles/objects, both subatomic and on cosmic scale. "It" is not a "thing" that has shape/curvature or the ability to expand. So ontology examines "what it IS" (or is not) in each case. Yes, a hole is the absence of the material around it, and space is the absence of material in between things on all scales.

 

Now, back to some of the questions I asked before T-day...

What IS a dimension... etc... anyone? What direction does even one "extra dimension" signify after the three known directions? Or is "What do we mean by 'extra dimensions'", not a question relevant to the "scientific" theories which employ them?

[owl]

Pantheory and I disagree (I think) on whether or not space is infinite... see the Big Bang Theory thread in Speculations. Since that was going off topic I will continue my answer here, as it concerns the ontological (philosophical) question, "What is space?"

Some of us hammered on this question already in at least two threads:

"If there is no end to space" in the Astronomy and Cosmology section and "Infinite Space" in the Relativity section.

 

To very briefly summarize my argument on that, I "invoke" the a-priori reason branch of epistemology and ask you to consider what an "end of space" would be and describe it.

What would be on the "other side" of that proposed end of space.

 

Infinity means, in this case, "no end" or "not finite."

Whoever proposes an end defining "finite space" must describe what that 'boundary' or whatever IS... in the ontological sense.

[pantheory]

Pantheory and I disagree (I think) on whether or not space is infinite... see the Big Bang Theory thread in Speculations. Since that was going off topic I will continue my answer here, as it concerns the ontological (philosophical) question, "What is space?"

Some of us hammered on this question already in at least two threads:

"If there is no end to space" in the Astronomy and Cosmology section and "Infinite Space" in the Relativity section.

 

To very briefly summarize my argument on that, I "invoke" the a-priori reason branch of epistemology and ask you to consider what an "end of space" would be and describe it.

What would be on the "other side" of that proposed end of space.

 

Infinity means, in this case, "no end" or "not finite."

Whoever proposes an end defining "finite space" must describe what that 'boundary' or whatever IS... in the ontological sense.

 

Right on top, cool. This was my answer concerning how space should be understood and defined, transferred from the Big Bang thread:

 

I believe space is best defined and understood as the volume which matter and field collectively occupies. This excludes/ eliminates hypothetical space that one might consider that might exist outside the bounds of matter and field. The same thing applies to the similar definition that: space is a limited extension of matter. (i.e. that the extension is limited to the volume that matter collectively occupies but not beyond the extension of the ZPF.)

 

The "absence of matter" is a cool definition but it includes an infinity of "potential space" beyond the possible extension of matter and field (if it is finite), which I believe is an unnecessary theoretical complication. Of course the definition of space should include distances between designated matter, as well as areas or volumes encompassed by designated matter.

 

If one believes/ theorizes and infinite universe concerning the extension of matter and field, then simply "the absence of matter would be good, but what about the volume that solid matter

occupies. What would you call it?

 

By saying that "space is a distance, area, or volume designated between specified coordinates," seemingly could simply define space for both finite and infinite models, providing one does not give any character to space such as being able to warp, expand, be digitalized, etc.

 

My primary definition for space is based upon my own cosmological model which is finite concerning the volume of all space which would be equal to the volume of the universe, and is based upon a universe finite in time, matter, field, and finite in every possible way, but vastly older than the BB model proposes.

 

As to what the end of space would look like in a finite universe if you could be there? In my model matter particles cannot exist without the pressure of the surrounding field, the ZPF. But let's say in our mind's eye what would it look like? Answer: You could not see anything because there would be no light coming from it. More accurately there would be nothing there, not even space. Only a vastly separated field particles could accordingly exist at the limits of matter and field, the perimeter of the universe.

Edited November 29, 2011 by pantheory

[swansont]

Ever since Minkowski came up with 'spacetime' and Einstein made it the (whatever) curved by mass to explain how gravity makes matter and light travel in curved paths, all explanations of general relativity refer to the curvature of spacetime. To what part of "malleable mystery medium" do you object? If mass makes 'it' curve, 'it' must be malleable. If no one knows "what it IS," 'it' is mysterious. What noun besides "medium" do you prefer? If 'it' is just a concept in a coordinate system, then to what does the concept refer in the cosmos which the theory attempts to describe?

 

"It" is a concept and you keep referring to it as a physical object or material, to which you then conveniently object. But you're the only one referring to it as a material.

 

Realism asserts

 

Yes, it asserts. But it either does not test this assertion to see if it is true, or it fails the test.

 

There is 'a world of difference' between the two philosophies. Yet you present realism as not only merely my personal point of view, but a "lie"... calling me a liar in the process. As to "Who are you...?," again, it is not about 'me' as you keep insisting.

 

I did not call you a liar. Either cite the passage or retract the accusation.

 

You continually insist on personally attacking me rather than discussing the substance of my arguments.

 

They are not personal attacks (I have not called you a jerk or a blowhard, etc. or even a liar. I have attacked what you said), and you keep avoiding the issues that are raised by repeating your assertions and complaining of being personally attacked. You made an assertion abut what science must do, and I asked if you can point to how science has failed us all these years doing just that. And in place of an answer, you throw up a distraction about how you are being mistreated.

 

If you are an expert in what a "strawman argument" is, as you claim, you know that this is a bogus and completely irrelevant argument.

 

If it's a strawman, what statement of yours have I misrepresented and subsequently refuted? I simply asked a question (Is a hole real?). One which you (once again) have avoided answering.

[owl]

pantheory:

...but what about the volume that solid matter

occupies. What would you call it?

 

Matter. Space is obviously not empty where it is occupied by matter.

 

By saying that "space is a distance, area, or volume designated between specified coordinates," seemingly could simply define space for both finite and infinite models, providing one does not give any character to space such as being able to warp, expand, be digitalized, etc.

 

"...volume designated between specified coordinates..." is not infinite, as the specified coordinates designate its boundaries.

We agree, I think, that empty space is no-'thing'-ness between "things" (on all scales), and therefore is not a medium with malleable characteristics.

 

My primary definition for space is based upon my own cosmological model which is finite concerning the volume of all space which would be equal to the volume of the universe, and is based upon a universe finite in time, matter, field, and finite in every possible way, but vastly older than the BB model proposes.

 

As to what the end of space would look like in a finite universe if you could be there?... More accurately there would be nothing there, not even space.

 

"Nothing there" IS empty space.

How could the "volume of all space which would be equal to the volume of the universe..." be finite? Again, what boundary do you propose that would make the universe, all space and all that is in it, finite? And beyond that... more space. What end?

Please re-read my challenge of reason again on this point:

 

To very briefly summarize my argument on that, I "invoke" the a-priori reason branch of epistemology and ask you to consider what an "end of space" would be and describe it.

What would be on the "other side" of that proposed end of space.

 

Infinity means, in this case, "no end" or "not finite."

Whoever proposes an end defining "finite space" must describe what that 'boundary' or whatever IS... in the ontological sense.

[pantheory]

swansant,

 

I know this question was directed to owl, but I hope neither of you would mind if I added my two centavos here

 

Is a hole real?

Explanations should clarify a favored meaning of a word that better adds clarification to a concept. In this case the word is "hole."

 

Some definitions of a hole are: an opening through something (hole in sock); an area or volume where something is missing -- a void within the whole; a hypothetical volume that is uncharacteristically different from its surroundings (black hole, worm hole).

 

Where the definition of a hole is "a void within the whole," then the hole can be understood as a relative condition of "void" and a physical place that one might be able to point out like a doughnut hole. In this case one could say the hole is something that exists within reality.

 

Where the definition of a hole is a hypothetical location "uncharacteristically different from the whole," then the hole may not necessarily be real concerning its physical existence. Maybe the best example of this would be if the universe were molded in a Riemann torus (doughnut like shape). One could physically access any location within the form of the doughnut, but could not access the doughnut hole itself because this location would be outside of physical reality, so therefore this hole would have no physical existence or location to it, just a conceptual one, therefore the hole would not be real (not part of reality) in a physical sense.

//

Edited November 29, 2011 by pantheory

[owl]

Swansont:

"It" is a concept and you keep referring to it as a physical object or material, to which you then conveniently object. But you're the only one referring to it as a material.

 

Me:

If 'it' is just a concept in a coordinate system, then to what does the concept refer in the cosmos which the theory attempts to describe?

Do you think that the concept of spacetime requires no referent in 'the real world' even though GR constantly claims that "IT" is curved by mass? "What is curved by mass?" is the ontological question here posed as "relevant to science." A concept is not curved by mass.

 

Me: "Realism asserts..."

You: "Yes, it asserts. But it either does not test this assertion to see if it is true, or it fails the test."

 

This thread asks whether or not philosophy is relevant to science.

Epistemology, how we know what we know, is not limited to empirical data, but also includes reason. It is reasonable to believe (and 'realism asserts') that Earth has a certain intrinsic shape in and of itself, independently of how it is observed and measured. A mountain of empirical data from Earth science verifies that shape as nearly spherical and specifies the difference between its polar and equatorial diameters. There is no evidence for a severely oblate shape of Earth as seen from hypothetical extreme frames of reference, as posited by length contraction.

 

In my previous post I just summarized yet again for you the difference between the form of idealism which claims that reality (shape of Earth, length of a meter rod, and distance to the Sun, in this case) depends on how it is observed, from whatever frame of reference... and realism, which 'realizes' that the reality of the cosmos does not depend on how it is observed, but is as it is, intrinsically, and would be not different (except sans technology) if it were never observed and measured.

 

Another way to say it, as I did yesterday is that

"...the distance to the Sun would remain around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it."

 

This is the philosophical difference between idealism and realism as applied to relativity's theory of length contraction.

 

You:

I did not call you a liar. Either cite the passage or retract the accusation.

 

At some point one must transition from "that's wrong" to "that is a lie". Refuting a lie does not make one's position correct.

.....

I don't have to make any concessions against a lie.

 

"At some point...?"... not to say "at this point" (transparent hedge) ...you are saying, "that's a lie"... not to say I am a liar??... but to whom other than me might you be referring as the one who "lied?" Doesn't a lie require a liar?

I will leave it to an hypothetical jury to decide whether or not the intent of the above is to call me a liar, stripped of the transparent hedge.

 

I simply asked a question (Is a hole real?). One which you (once again) have avoided answering.

 

I simply answered,

Yes, a hole is the absence of the material around it, and space is the absence of material in between things on all scales.

That would be, "yes, a hole really is the absence of the material around it."

Edited November 29, 2011 by owl

[pantheory]

pantheory:

 

 

Matter. Space is obviously not empty where it is occupied by matter.

That's what I hoped that you meant

 

"...volume designated between specified coordinates..." is not infinite, as the specified coordinates designate its boundaries.

We agree, I think, that empty space is no-'thing'-ness between "things" (on all scales), and therefore is not a medium with malleable characteristics.

I choose a slightly different perspective because the ZPF is everywhere within the universe in all cosmological models that I know of. So in my model nothingness does not exist within the universe. I choose to use the word non-existent as to any conceptual volume outside the physical universe. Conceptually we seem to totally agree on the general idea of it however, maybe a slight difference of chosen semantics

 

"Nothing there" IS empty space.

How could the "volume of all space which would be equal to the volume of the universe..." be finite? Again, what boundary do you propose that would make the universe, all space and all that is in it, finite? And beyond that... more space. What end?

Please re-read my challenge of reason again on this point:

In my own model the meaning of space is meaningless in the absence of matter and field. In this way I agree with Einstein when he said "When forced to summarize the general theory of relativity in one sentence: (he said) Time and space and gravitation have no separate existence from matter."(parenthesis added)

 

In my own model there could be no theoretical meaning to space at all outside the bounds of matter and field. But if the space outside the confines of matter contained the ZPF, then the space would not be void and could have theoretical consequences to its existence.

 

My views concerning what the boundary of the universe would "look like" can be seen in my last posting to you

 

regards, Forrest

//

Edited November 29, 2011 by pantheory

[owl]

Pantheory quoting Einstein:

..."Time and space and gravitation have no separate existence from matter."

I agree that without matter moving around through space, time would be meaningless. But we do have a difference on what space is (and, more to the point, is not.)

Einstein said, to the same point as above, that if all matter vanished, there would be no time or space either. I think that if there were nothing in space, as above, there would only be empty space left.

I have used the example of a small scale to illustrate. If all objects were removed from a box (ignoring air for the moment), the box would 'contain' nothing. It would be empty. (Empty space.)

[pantheory]

Pantheory quoting Einstein:

..."Time and space and gravitation have no separate existence from matter."

I agree that without matter moving around through space, time would be meaningless. But we do have a difference on what space is (and, more to the point, is not.)

Einstein said, to the same point as above, that if all matter vanished, there would be no time or space either. I think that if there were nothing in space, as above, there would only be empty space left.

I have used the example of a small scale to illustrate. If all objects were removed from a box (ignoring air for the moment), the box would 'contain' nothing. It would be empty. (Empty space.)

An infinity of empty space without field or characteristics to it, such as totally empty space outside the physical universe, would seem to be a concept without possible meaning to it, in my opinion. But there are many others that also would agree with you and think that this concept makes sense to them -- so it is not devoid of logic. I think it is only a matter of definition and function and is inconsequential concerning physical reality.

 

As to your example, "empty space" has a definite and certain meaning within the bounds of the universe. Every existing cosmological model today proposes that the ZPF extends throughout the physical universe. If so empty space cannot exist such as in your example. The space within the box must accordingly contain the Zero Point Field and cannot be totally empty, which of course has been demonstrated though countless experiments. In common language one could call it empty space, but in physics/ reality it is not empty.

//

Edited November 29, 2011 by pantheory

[swansont]

Do you think that the concept of spacetime requires no referent in 'the real world' even though GR constantly claims that "IT" is curved by mass? "What is curved by mass?" is the ontological question here posed as "relevant to science." A concept is not curved by mass.

 

In this context "What is curved by mass?" is a loaded question. You demand that the answer be something physical, despite being told repeatedly that it is not going to happen.

 

Me: "Realism asserts..."

You: "Yes, it asserts. But it either does not test this assertion to see if it is true, or it fails the test."

 

This thread asks whether or not philosophy is relevant to science.

 

And went off the tracks pretty quickly into this same old argument.

 

Epistemology, how we know what we know, is not limited to empirical data, but also includes reason. It is reasonable to believe (and 'realism asserts') that Earth has a certain intrinsic shape in and of itself, independently of how it is observed and measured. A mountain of empirical data from Earth science verifies that shape as nearly spherical and specifies the difference between its polar and equatorial diameters. There is no evidence for a severely oblate shape of Earth as seen from hypothetical extreme frames of reference, as posited by length contraction.

 

There is evidence in support of length contraction, so in that regard this is yet another lie. That you choose to ignore the evidence does not change that fact; you have been made aware of it. The fact that you selectively choose to ignore it, but not other "gaps" in evidence makes matters worse. (Have you objectively, scientifically measured gravity in your place of residence yet?)

 

In my previous post I just summarized yet again for you the difference between the form of idealism which claims that reality (shape of Earth, length of a meter rod, and distance to the Sun, in this case) depends on how it is observed, from whatever frame of reference... and realism, which 'realizes' that the reality of the cosmos does not depend on how it is observed, but is as it is, intrinsically, and would be not different (except sans technology) if it were never observed and measured.

 

Another way to say it, as I did yesterday is that

"...the distance to the Sun would remain around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it."

 

This is the philosophical difference between idealism and realism as applied to relativity's theory of length contraction.

 

You cannot simultaneously say that there is evidence for a constant length between the sun and earth regardless of observer and that there is no evidence of length contraction because nobody has done the experiment. If the measurement does not exist, it does not exist. Thus, you have no evidence to support your claim.

 

"At some point...?"... not to say "at this point" (transparent hedge) ...you are saying, "that's a lie"... not to say I am a liar??... but to whom other than me might you be referring as the one who "lied?" Doesn't a lie require a liar?

I will leave it to an hypothetical jury to decide whether or not the intent of the above is to call me a liar, stripped of the transparent hedge.

 

The statement was/is a lie. I made no personal claim about you, though I won't contend the implied admission here.

 

I simply answered,

That would be, "yes, a hole really is the absence of the material around it."

 

Is the hole a physical object, i.e. can you have a half a hole, or can you hand a hole (and just the hole) to someone else? Feel free to say yes and support that idea (at which point also feel free to hand over half a hole), but I'm going to continue with the obvious answer that no, a hole is not a physical object. And yet it has a shape and a volume, which are properties we normally assign to physical objects. Yet it is a concept used for convenience, because it's a lot easier to talk about a hole than to continue to discuss the absence of material. Similarly, we talk of shadow and darkness, even though that's the absence of light, and of cold, even though that's the absence of (the lay notion of) heat.

 

And similarly we talk of spacetime, because it is convenient to do so. Which is no more than a 4-D combination of space and time, neither of which are physical objects. But they are useful concepts, especially under the realization that if the speed of light is a constant, length and time are not invariant. But all of this has been explained, and been denied by you partly under the excuse of not wanting or being able to do the math and partly by incredulity, which makes this whole argument a giant farce.

 

If you make scientific claims, you can't claim truth/validity if you run and hide behind the curtain of philosophy. You make claims about nature and nature gets to decide if you're right. And you aren't. A philosophy that asserted the moon is made of green cheese would be similarly wrong.

[owl]

In this context "What is curved by mass?" is a loaded question. You demand that the answer be something physical, despite being told repeatedly that it is not going to happen.

 

Yes, the question is loaded with the ontological challenge that when relativity says that spacetime is curved by mass, something besides a concept in our minds is supposed to actually be curved and influence masses and light to follow that curvature.

 

It is convenient for you to ignore the philosophy of science as applied to math and physics, but that does not make it irrellevant.

Here again are the most relevant ontological questions about the "philosophical assumptions, foundations, and implications of mathematics" regarding spacetime (ref; Wiki):

 

* What is the ontological status of mathematical entities?

*What is the relationship between the abstract world of mathematics and the material universe?

You can continue to ignore them but they will not go away.

 

And went off the tracks pretty quickly into this same old argument.

 

The "track" here at hand is a philosophical inquiry into the validity of relativity's claim that science either can not know the exact shape of Earth, or average distance to the Sun, or length of a meter rod, ... or that they vary with how they are observed and measured... all based on hypothetical theory which has never been verified empirically.

 

( Cap 'n R once invited me to ask questions of his boss on how the particle accelerator "confirmation" of length contraction applies to the above measurements. I asked a few, but there was no reply. And the reality of Earths atmospheric thickness according to muons really does not establish an alternative measure of same.)

 

There is evidence in support of length contraction, so in that regard this is yet another lie. That you choose to ignore the evidence does not change that fact; you have been made aware of it. The fact that you selectively choose to ignore it, but not other "gaps" in evidence makes matters worse. (Have you objectively, scientifically measured gravity in your place of residence yet?)

 

I will dig up my unanswered questions referenced above if you like.* And calling a challenge to length contraction a "lie" is just nonsense!

The "lie" is that Earth is (or could be) so oblate that its diameter is about 1000 miles, as seen from a near light-speed fly-by.

* I get that the particle accelerator results on length contraction are extremely complicated. I do question whether they show distance traveled by particles actually shortened (as applied to atmospheric muons) or whether they just "lived longer" than expected, prompting the claim for "time dilation."

 

You cannot simultaneously say that there is evidence for a constant length between the sun and earth regardless of observer and that there is no evidence of length contraction because nobody has done the experiment. If the measurement does not exist, it does not exist. Thus, you have no evidence to support your claim.

I can say with certainty based on realism that the distance between Earth and Sun does not vary with how it is observed.* The measurement from at rest on Earth (one end of the distance) is precise and well published in many astronomical websites and texts. The bodies can not and do not move closer together and further apart with every possible extreme in the frame of reference from which they might, hypothetically, be observed and measured. Belief that they do is delusional. (That is a professional opinion.)

* Obviously it varies with Earth's position in its elliptical orbit.

 

The statement was/is a lie. I made no personal claim about you, though I won't contend the implied admission here.

 

What statement was a "lie" exactly?

 

I have answered your question about holes... the lack of the physical substance around them. Enough already. Is absence of something "real?" In so far as "absence" has meaning, yes. What is the meaning of something that doesn't exist but is curved by mass?

 

But all of this has been explained, and been denied by you partly under the excuse of not wanting or being able to do the math and partly by incredulity, which makes this whole argument a giant farce.

See Wiki quotes above... and continue to ignore the questions, as always.

 

If you make scientific claims, you can't claim truth/validity if you run and hide behind the curtain of philosophy. You make claims about nature and nature gets to decide if you're right. And you aren't. A philosophy that asserted the moon is made of green cheese would be similarly wrong.

 

"Run and hide??" You are the one ignoring the ontological questions here, assuming that "what it is" doesn't matter, but mass makes "it" curve anyway! How "convenient" to simply ignore what the dynamics might be... what mass makes into a curved "region" around the mass and how that non-existent curvature makes objects and light travel in curved paths!

A "philosophy" (or hypothesis) that Earth may be squished nearly flat, because an extreme frame of reference might see it that way is definitely "wrong." If a patient walked into my office and claimed the above... well, I would at least refer him to the correct information from a few of those astronomy sites.

(late spelling edit)

Edited November 30, 2011 by owl