Is philosophy relevant to science?

[PeterJ]

I hope it's okay to barge in on the space discussion. I had some thoughts.

 

I think we have to concede that physics has no need for an underlying metaphysic or ontology. This follows from its definition. By definition it is not the study of metaphysics and ontology. If we want to put some flesh on the bones of physical theories then we must venture into metaphysics. A physical or 'scientific' theory cannot be fundamental for then it would be metaphysical, and so physicists have no responsibility for speculating about whether 'space' is a substance, or even as to whether 'matter' is a substance, or even exactly what the term 'substance' actually stands for. This is for those whose interests extend to metaphysics, consciousness studies and so forth. I don't think we can argue that physics should include metaphysics, even though it is pretty useless in philosophy for its failure to make predictions about fundamental principles.

 

I can see that space need not be any more than a concept for physics, and that the idea of it curving and bending and so forth is no more than a convenient visual metaphor for the mathematics, and thus that we cannot ask within physics what space actually 'is'. But we might still ask why everything isn't in the same place. What prevents this? If space is not 'res extensa' then it is not extended. But if space is not extended then what is?

 

Was it Wheeler who said that time is what stops everything happening at once? So what is it that stops everything being in the same place? Extension? Of what? Space? But space is a concept. The only things a concept can keep apart is other concepts. It would follow that the phenomena that space keeps apart are also concepts.

 

To me extension is a more baffling idea than 'space', which takes extension for granted and so disguises the more difficult problem. I don't think any idea of space can make sense except in the context of an idea of extension that makes sense. Here I find it hard to tell where physics ends and metaphysics begins.

 

I believe that the answer to the nature of extension might be indicated by 'nonlocal' correlations, but I won't go there. I only dare talk about physics on philosophy forums.

Edited November 29, 2011 by PeterJ

[owl]

PeterJ:

I hope it's okay to barge in on the space discussion. I had some thoughts.

 

Better than OK. Free thinking is encouraged in philosophy, even in philosophy of science.

 

I can see that space need not be any more than a concept for physics, and that the

idea of it curving and bending and so forth is no more than a convenient visual

metaphor for the mathematics and thus that we cannot ask within physics what space

actually 'is'.

 

Agreed up to ...”we can not ask...”

The root of physics is science of the physical universe, not just theories in various minds, however genius, given names as concepts only with no referents in the cosmos. ("What is curved spacetime?... oh... a coordinate system... right.")

 

This must be just a quick pass-by, but I appreciate not only what you said but what you did not say... like about the taboo word “consciousness”, which can not be uttered in a science forum, even in the philosophy section, without certain ridicule. (Lets not go there.)

 

But what keeps distant particles (entangled) and distant cosmic objects (gravitationally attracted to each other), "in touch" so to speak, sharing "information" and bonded by forces, like gravity?

 

Not introducing metaphysical speculation here. Just open to "what it is" as both information and force of attraction between all things. I am not expecting answers from today's science, materialistic as it must be.

[swansont]

Yes, the question is loaded with the ontological challenge that when relativity says that spacetime is curved by mass, something besides a concept in our minds is supposed to actually be curved and influence masses and light to follow that curvature.

 

It is convenient for you to ignore the philosophy of science as applied to math and physics, but that does not make it irrellevant.

Here again are the most relevant ontological questions about the "philosophical assumptions, foundations, and implications of mathematics" regarding spacetime (ref; Wiki):

 

 

You can continue to ignore them but they will not go away.

 

And yet, somehow, not answering them does not prevent me from doing my job. If this truly mattered, you could answer the question I asked, and list some failures of science that can be traced to not acknowledging philosophy. In the meantime, GPS works. And nuclear reactors, and computers and cellphones and airplanes and internal combustion engines and … well, the list would be quite long.

 

 

I will dig up my unanswered questions referenced above if you like.* And calling a challenge to length contraction a "lie" is just nonsense!

 

Saying that there is no evidence to support length contraction is, in reality, a lie. You've been pointed to the evidence, so you can't claim ignorance of it, and argument from personal incredulity isn't a valid position.

 

I have answered your question about holes... the lack of the physical substance around them. Enough already. Is absence of something "real?" In so far as "absence" has meaning, yes. What is the meaning of something that doesn't exist but is curved by mass?

 

Since conceptual things don't have to be physical objects, how can do you insist that spacetime be physical? Can you pour me a cup of length, please?

 

 

"Run and hide??" You are the one ignoring the ontological questions here, assuming that "what it is" doesn't matter, but mass makes "it" curve anyway! How "convenient" to simply ignore what the dynamics might be... what mass makes into a curved "region" around the mass and how that non-existent curvature makes objects and light travel in curved paths!

A "philosophy" (or hypothesis) that Earth may be squished nearly flat, because an extreme frame of reference might see it that way is definitely "wrong." If a patient walked into my office and claimed the above... well, I would at least refer him to the correct information from a few of those astronomy sites.

 

Since you have yet to present the correct information about length contraction, perhaps you could read them yourself sometime.

[owl]

Swansont:

 

Since you have yet to present the correct information about length contraction, perhaps you could read them yourself sometime.

Maybe the Cap 'n will find time to present my previous questions (about how the particle accelerator experiments both prove length contraction on micro scale and apply to larger scale phenomena) to his boss... as this is a science forum open to such questions. But he is probably busy and tired of my challenges. Hey, Cap 'n...!

 

And the "correct information"... about the astronomical unit of distance and Earth's shape and the length of a meter relative to Earth's surface quadrant... is readily available on line and in science textbooks, and that info will in fact "put the lie" to your "length contracted" version of all of the above.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

I thought we had established that an observation made by an astronomer in Earth's reference frame does not contradict length contraction, since relativity predicts that the astronomer will observe exactly what he does.

 

Your previous questions were not well-posed, since it was clear you didn't know how such experiments work, and so they weren't answerable. Perhaps you could pose new questions after you learn more about the phenomena.

 

Regardless, this is a digression from the topic, and I suggest we leave it here.

[owl]

I thought we had established that an observation made by an astronomer in Earth's reference frame does not contradict length contraction, since relativity predicts that the astronomer will observe exactly what he does.

 

Your previous questions were not well-posed, since it was clear you didn't know how such experiments work, and so they weren't answerable. Perhaps you could pose new questions after you learn more about the phenomena.

 

Regardless, this is a digression from the topic, and I suggest we leave it here.

I thought we had established that there is no empirical evidence for large scale length contraction, though DrRocket said that an experiment to test it was planned. I simply wondered how the accelerator results transferred to the scales spoken of above.

 

You did insist that the 'squished nearly flat' version of Earth's shape is just as valid as the familiar nearly spherical one, so the philosophy behind that extreme perspective seems very relevant to the theory of length contraction, i.e., is a case of how relevant philosophy (realism vs idealism) is to science.

Do you really, truly deny that "...the distance to the Sun (remains) around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it?"

This is clearly not the realism that grants the world an objective, intrinsic reality of its own, independent of observation and measurement. What if there were no observers, no measuring rods, no clocks? That is a philosophical question very relevant to science.

[tar]

PeterJ,

 

You say only concepts can hold concepts apart. However, a concept must be "of something", in my determination. And therefore there may be a something that gives us those concepts in the first place. On perhaps at least two grounds. One, we would not have a relationship modeled in our brains if that relationship did not have an analogue in the outside (the brain) world. Two, our brains are "of the world" and thus would be hard pressed to come up with anything that did not include, in some analogous way, the relationship between real things. (including negation)

 

Regards, TAR2

[swansont]

And the "correct information"... about the astronomical unit of distance and Earth's shape and the length of a meter relative to Earth's surface quadrant... is readily available on line and in science textbooks, and that info will in fact "put the lie" to your "length contracted" version of all of the above.

 

But it is your further contention that his length is not different for other observers. That experiment has not been done, so you cannot claim that you have evidence to back up a claim that the length is invariant. Of course, realism demands a preferred reference frame for a measurement violates other aspects of relativity, all of which has plenty of experimental confirmation that you are either dismissing or haven't bothered to investigate.

 

edit: It's pretty clear that physics, relativity in particular, rejects the notion of realism (as you have presented it, at least). It rejects a lot of scripture-based ideas as well. What compelling reason is there that it should conform to it? For a person, conforming to a philosophy or ideology is a choice, but science has an additional requirement that it must agree with nature.

[PeterJ]

Tar - Yes, I see what you mean. But we can have a concept of a unicorn, so an idea does not have to have a correlate in the world. People who argue for the non-existence of God presumably have a concept of HIm that allows them make this claim. Anyway, I still think that physicists are within their rights to refuse to speculate as to what their theories are describing, unless maybe it's their day off. It's a limitation of physics, but without a limitation we wouldn't be able to define it. It may not be enough for you or me, or even for many physicists, but we are allowed to wander off into metaphyscis if we want to. We just can't call it physics. No?

Edited November 30, 2011 by PeterJ

[owl]

But it is your further contention that his length is not different for other observers. That experiment has not been done, so you cannot claim that you have evidence to back up a claim that the length is invariant. Of course, realism demands a preferred reference frame for a measurement violates other aspects of relativity, all of which has plenty of experimental confirmation that you are either dismissing or haven't bothered to investigate.

 

edit: It's pretty clear that physics, relativity in particular, rejects the notion of realism (as you have presented it, at least). It rejects a lot of scripture-based ideas as well. What compelling reason is there that it should conform to it? For a person, conforming to a philosophy or ideology is a choice, but science has an additional requirement that it must agree with nature.

(My bold) The operative phrase here which distinguishes relativity’s form of idealism from realism is ...”for other observers.”

My three examples in yesterday's post either are what they are, objectively, intrinsically and independent of observation, or they depend on observation and either vary as observed or they can not be known for certain, if all frames of reference yield equally valid results.

 

Depending on how we look at it, Earth might be squished nearly flat

“for me” (traveling past at high speed) and nearly spherical “for you” observing from the space station. How we see it determines reality in idealism, a philosophy assumed,however unconsciously*, by the length contraction part of relativity theory. But which will "agree with nature" best?

 

*My opening quote from Daniel Dennett in this regard bears repeating:

 

There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.

 

So, since science’s job is to investigate “the true nature of the world” (not just the nature of and differences between different observational perspectives), we must determine which of the above frames of reference yields the more accurate observations and measurements. This is a “no brainer.” Any competent scientist familiar with experimental design will agree.

At rest with an object observed will always yield a more accurate analysis of the object that observation of it from a frame of reference flying by at near lightspeed, if that ever becomes possible.

 

Edit regarding your:

It's pretty clear that physics, relativity in particular, rejects the notion of realism (as you have presented it, at least).

From my last post:

...realism... grants the world an objective, intrinsic reality of its own, independent of observation and measurement.

Edited November 30, 2011 by owl

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

So, since science’s job is to investigate “the true nature of the world” (not just the nature of and differences between different observational perspectives), we must determine which of the above frames of reference yields the more accurate observations and measurements. This is a “no brainer.” Any competent scientist familiar with experimental design will agree.

It's funny that you say this, since swansont is a practicing scientist.

 

If science holds that there is no absolute reference frame, why must we determine which is "more accurate"? What does that get us? If you get that information, what can you use it for?

[owl]

TAR, post 107:

However, a concept must be "of something"

 

Yes. Same for physics and for math in this regard. My Wiki quote from post 3 bears repeating (my bold):

 

Philosophy of mathematics is the branch of philosophy that studies the philosophical assumptions, foundations, and implications of mathematics.

Recurrent themes include:

* What are the sources of mathematical subject matter?

* What is the ontological status of mathematical entities?

* What does it mean to refer to a mathematical object?

* What is the character of a mathematical proposition?

* What is the relation between logic and mathematics?

* What is the role of hermeneutics in mathematics?

* What kinds of inquiry play a role in mathematics?

* What are the objectives of mathematical inquiry?

* What is the source and nature of mathematical truth?

*What is the relationship between the abstract world of mathematics and the material universe?

 

It's funny that you say this, since swansont is a practicing scientist.

 

If science holds that there is no absolute reference frame, why must we determine which is "more accurate"? What does that get us? If you get that information, what can you use it for?

Ad hominem.

Well, if the world is as it is independent of how we look at it, and it is science's job to get accurate info from observation of it, then a close up look at an object 'standing still' in front of us (at rest frame) will "see it" more "like it is" than flying by it at near light speed. Don't you agree?

Science must design experiments and observational points of view to maximize accuracy of observation. No?

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

Ad hominem.

Where?

 

Well, if the world is as it is independent of how we look at it, and it is science's job to get accurate info from observation of it, then a close up look at an object 'standing still' in front of us (at rest frame) will "see it" more "like it is" than flying by it at near light speed. Don't you agree?

Science must design experiments and observational points of view to maximize accuracy of observation. No?

Science's job is not to gather information about the world. Science's job is to build testable models which describe how the world behaves. If my observations are different depending on my reference frame, science must build models which produce different results depending on reference frame. And it does.

[swansont]

(My bold) The operative phrase here which distinguishes relativity’s form of idealism from realism is ...”for other observers.”

My three examples in yesterday's post either are what they are, objectively, intrinsically and independent of observation, or they depend on observation and either vary as observed or they can not be known for certain, if all frames of reference yield equally valid results.

 

Depending on how we look at it, Earth might be squished nearly flat

“for me” (traveling past at high speed) and nearly spherical “for you” observing from the space station. How we see it determines reality in idealism, a philosophy assumed,however unconsciously*, by the length contraction part of relativity theory. But which will "agree with nature" best?

 

*My opening quote from Daniel Dennett in this regard bears repeating:

 

Quoting Dennett is one thing, but the question posed by the title of the thread really translates as "Is Dennett right?" It might be true for cognitive science, but you can't present it as if it were true in general, or specifically for relativity, unless you are willing to identify the unexamined philosophical baggage that it carries. The basic framework of science is that what we validly measure is real but the counter to that is that everything is an illusion, which is quite different from saying there is an intrinsic reality to things. Because the latter assumption leads to contradictions. You cannot have an invariant speed of light and invariant length & time, which is trivial to show mathematically.

 

 

So, since science’s job is to investigate “the true nature of the world” (not just the nature of and differences between different observational perspectives), we must determine which of the above frames of reference yields the more accurate observations and measurements. This is a “no brainer.” Any competent scientist familiar with experimental design will agree.

At rest with an object observed will always yield a more accurate analysis of the object that observation of it from a frame of reference flying by at near lightspeed, if that ever becomes possible.

 

Since you are not, by your own admission, a scientist, this is nothing but a bald assertion on your part. It is still based on your claim that there is this inherent reality that we are measuring, which makes this circular logic — you have already excluded the idea that the measurements might disagree and still be valid. I argue that, if given the proper context (i.e. that this is a relativistic measurement), no competent scientist would agree. The implication here is that the difference in the measurements is due to experimental error from the motion, which completely ignores that theory is exclusive of experimental error; this is a fundamental error that a competent scientist would not make. e.g. the prediction of relativity is that for a speed such that gamma=2, a meter stick will be measured at 0.5 meters. Your position seems to be that you only get that number because of a limitation of the apparatus because it's moving, and a proper error analysis would show that the measurement error must inherently be larger than 0.5 meters, thus allowing the two distances to still agree. Is that your position? Further, any competent scientist would see the implication that this requires not only rest, but an absolute rest frame, and be aware of all of the contradictions that entails.

 

(IIRC Cap'n has already demonstrated that you can't have time dilation without length contraction and vice-versa (the invariant quantity is the spacetime interval) and since time is easier to measure precisely, most of the experiments revolve around that. And those experiments easily exclude the possibility of inherent agreement by having a large error.)

 

 

...realism... grants the world an objective, intrinsic reality of its own, independent of observation and measurement.

 

If we can't observe/measure it, what's the point? Realism cannot be a part of science since it contradicts the axiom that measurements represent reality. Realism rejects science. Move along, nothing to see here. Next philosophy, please.

 

Ad hominem.

 

Wolf!

[PeterJ]

Quoting Dennett is one thing, but the question posed by the title of the thread really translates as "Is Dennett right?" It might be true for cognitive science, but you can't present it as if it were true in general, or specifically for relativity, unless you are willing to identify the unexamined philosophical baggage that it carries. The basic framework of science is that what we validly measure is real but the counter to that is that everything is an illusion, which is quite different from saying there is an intrinsic reality to things. Because the latter assumption leads to contradictions. You cannot have an invariant speed of light and invariant length & time, which is trivial to show mathematically.

Hold on. This is not right. I think you'll find that it is the former assumption that leads to contradictions, not the latter. The problem may appear as the 'problem of attributes', Zeno's paradoxes etc.. It disappears only when we say that the things whose behaviour we measure are in some sense unreal. If physics were to prove that these things are real, are actually 'things', then it would have finally proved that the universe is paradoxical.

 

The premise of the film 'The Matrix' is that physicists working within the Matrix would have no reason to doubt that their world is completely real. This premise works because physics takes the reality of the world for granted. This is a choice. It is not because the opposite idea is logically absurd. If the opposite idea were absurd then the plotline of the film would not have worked.

 

If philosophy is relevant to physics, as it blatantly obviously is, in my opinion, then we cannot take it for granted that the things we measure are completely real. Logic does not endorse this idea. It is paradoxical. Hence we have all sorts of two worlds or dual-aspect theories in philosophy, forced on us by the logic of the situation, by which these measurable things are unreal in some sense or other. If realistic theories did not give to contradictions philosophy would be a whole lot easier. It is my belief that physics would go better if it conceded this point to philosophy.

[swansont]

Hold on. This is not right. I think you'll find that it is the former assumption that leads to contradictions, not the latter. The problem may appear as the 'problem of attributes', Zeno's paradoxes etc.. It disappears only when we say that the things whose behaviour we measure are in some sense unreal. If physics were to prove that these things are real, are actually 'things', then it would have finally proved that the universe is paradoxical.

 

Measurements are real is an axiom. You don't prove axioms.

 

Absent the comparison to reality, physics theory is simply math. Within that math, given the framework, you cannot simultaneously have an invariant speed of light, length and time. (There are other terms which are also not invariant and lead to problems with realism, but we're concentrating on these at the moment.) So even before you add in any philosophy, you have this issue — the mathematics is internally consistent. Insisting on these invariant terms overconstrains the problem.

 

If you want to claim that measurements aren't reality, you aren't doing science. So I don't see how you can use that in any way to make a statement about science.

 

The premise of the film 'The Matrix' is that physicists working within the Matrix would have no reason to doubt that their world is completely real. This premise works because physics takes the reality of the world for granted. This is a choice. It is not because the opposite idea is logically absurd. If the opposite idea were absurd then the plotline of the film would not have worked.

 

The basic assumption of science is that we are not being fooled in this way. (But really, proof by movie plot? The actual plotline of the matrix was absurd. It only works because you willingly suspend disbelief.)

 

If philosophy is relevant to physics, as it blatantly obviously is, in my opinion, then we cannot take it for granted that the things we measure are completely real. Logic does not endorse this idea. It is paradoxical. Hence we have all sorts of two worlds or dual-aspect theories in philosophy, forced on us by the logic of the situation, by which these measurable things are unreal in some sense or other. If realistic theories did not give to contradictions philosophy would be a whole lot easier. It is my belief that physics would go better if it conceded this point to philosophy.

 

I disagree. We have to take that for granted. If what we measure isn't reality, then there is no reason to expect repeatability (i.e. the universe follows rules), which is another axiom science has. IOW, there's no point to doing what we call science.

[tar]

SwansonT,

 

Although there is the question of what the gamma two traveler would think of the measured length of a meter stick that SHE placed on a space buoy, before making her gamma two run past it.

 

Owl,

 

That if C is constant then length and time must vary with velocity, seems to be the case.

 

PeterJ,

 

I think Zeno was confused. Here I would use a "switching" grain size argument. That is, we have the capability to mentally "imagine" huge unfathomable things, by analogy. We can divide things up infinitely by always making another subtraction/division or build them up indefinitely by continually making additions/multiplications. But we have to have a grain size in mind, to do it. In some cases, the analogy just doesn't hold, or is improperly carried out, without accounting for the other things that are going to actually change at the new grain size imagined.

If I feel good after two drinks, I should feel twice as good after four, and four times as good after eight and feel eight times as good after 16.

No, you are lying in the gutter in a drunken stupor.

 

Regards, TAR

 

Like the near light speed traveler. She would be so massive at that speed, she would be warping the space around her. Who knows what she would experience.

 

Aside: Too often in math, one has to do an "as if" conception. One of my difficulties with grasping certain mathematical concepts is sometimes stubborn realization that you can't really achieve that "as if" without breaking some "other" law of nature. For instance, lets say I construct a stick one MilkyWay diameter in length. How long did it take me to construct this, couple seconds? Now which end of the stick am I on? I won't even see the other end for a hundred thousand years. How can I "do" anything with that stick.

Edited December 1, 2011 by tar

[swansont]

Like the near light speed traveler. She would be so massive at that speed, she would be warping the space around her. Who knows what she would experience.

 

At gamma=2, your total energy (to a stationary observer) is twice your rest mass energy. [math]E=\gamma mc^2[/math]

 

With GR, we have a really good idea of what she would experience. That's one of the outcomes of doing science. You can replace "who knows" with a much more precise statement.

[PeterJ]

Measurements are real is an axiom. You don't prove axioms.

An axiom that can be refuted in logic is not a good place to start a theory, imho. But you're right, it's your choice whether to take the results of reasoned analysis as a guide to truth or to ignore them.

 

Absent the comparison to reality, physics theory is simply math. Within that math, given the framework, you cannot simultaneously have an invariant speed of light, length and time. (There are other terms which are also not invariant and lead to problems with realism, but we're concentrating on these at the moment.) So even before you add in any philosophy, you have this issue — the mathematics is internally consistent. Insisting on these invariant terms overconstrains the problem.

I would debate the fact that the maths is consistent and suggest that its inconsistencies are usually just buried in the foundations. I'm not sure how any of this bears on light-speed etc. I have no opinion on that one.

 

If you want to claim that measurements aren't reality, you aren't doing science. So I don't see how you can use that in any way to make a statement about science.

Agreed. Science does not have to be philosophically sound. Scientists can define science however they want. That's their right. Just don't expect me to abandon my reason in this way.

 

The basic assumption of science is that we are not being fooled in this way. ;

Exactly. While the basic assumption of philosophy is that we should not make assumptions.

 

(But really, proof by movie plot? The actual plotline of the matrix was absurd. It only works because you willingly suspend disbelief.)

It is a very carefully considered idea. It goes wrong in the details since it does not follow the idea through, and so ends up in an infinite regress of worlds, but the idea that physicists would not be able to tell that they are in the Matrix works. If it did not work then Buddhism's metaphysical scheme would be scientifically falsifiable. Descartes made the same point by reference to evil demons. All the filmakers did was make the demons into aliens. Physics, as usually defined, cannot test the claim that we live in a Matrix-like world. It must simply assume we do or do not, as you say.

 

If what we measure isn't reality, then there is no reason to expect repeatability (i.e. the universe follows rules), which is another axiom science has. IOW, there's no point to doing what we call science.

To say that a phenomenon is in some sense unreal is not to say that it does not exist at all, or that it does not obey laws, or that natural science is useless. No need to be defensive, the idea is not anti-physics, just a recognition of its limits. We can all look at the world and see that it obeys laws. The idea is more subtle, and there are no telling objections to it. We cannot object to it without abandoning physics for logical analysis, and this is why physics must take the reality or unreality of things as an axiom rather than a result. Physics has every right to take the reality of its phenomena as axiomatic, of course, but it has no right to inflict this axiom on anyone else, and to inflict it on philosophy would be impossible. The idea does not work when we analyse it. This is not me being pig-headed, it's just the way things are. There are physicists on both sides of the fence on the reality question so I don't see this as a disagreement about physics, just about which axiom would give us the best theories. Being dogmatic about unproven axioms does not seem a good way forward.

[tar]

SwansonT,

 

Well then, I certainly withdraw my SO massive statement. I carried the analogy at an improper ratio. I guess to get really massive you would have to be much closer to the speed of light.

 

Regards, TAR

[swansont]

I would debate the fact that the maths is consistent and suggest that its inconsistencies are usually just buried in the foundations. I'm not sure how any of this bears on light-speed etc. I have no opinion on that one.

 

Feel free to show that it's not.

 

Absent the comparison to nature, basic relativity is Lorentz transforms. Which give rise to the predictions of length contraction and time dilation. With those predictions, we can run experiments to see if they work, which they do. But that's the only area where we can get contradictions — in the comparison to nature. If the model doesn't work, we discard the model. We have had a lot of success, so we haven't reached the point where we discard the axiom: if nature didn't follow rules we would have dropped scientific inquiry long ago.

[ydoaPs]

The thread as a whole was tl;dr, but I have just a couple of points. Science is a subfield of philosophy, so I'd rather say philosophy is indeed relevant to science. Where do you think the concept of falsification came from?

 

Feel free to show that it's not.

Didn't Gödel do that? Ok, not really. He just proved that any formal language as complex as mathematics cannot be both consistent and complete. So, either it cannot prove all true theorems, or it can prove false ones (perhaps even both). However, I do not know which one(s) it is.

[owl]

Back to this point for further clarification:

 

I thought we had established that an observation made by an astronomer in Earth's reference frame does not contradict length contraction, since relativity predicts that the astronomer will observe exactly what he does.

 

The focus here is philosophy’s relevance to science. Since realism says (in a nutshell) that Earth is as it is, and idealism (specifically the length contraction theory version of idealism as I have explained in depth) says that Earth is as it is seen from different frames of reference... I will ask you again:

Does an observation of Earth from a near lightspeed frame of reference, seeing it as quite flattened rather than almost spherical, mean that Earth IS actually very flattened or that it just looks that way, distorted by the extreme frame of reference?

The well worn phrases from relativity, “for the high speed traveler” vs “for the at rest observer” refer to Earth having a different reality (shape in this case) depending on how it is viewed.

So either Earth changes shape with how it is viewed (idealism) or we can not know what its shape is because of the “no preferred frame” dictum.

Which is it?

 

Ps; Still waiting for a reply to:

Do you really, truly deny that "...the distance to the Sun (remains) around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it?"

This is clearly not the realism that grants the world an objective, intrinsic reality of its own, independent of observation and measurement. What if there were no observers, no measuring rods, no clocks? That is a philosophical question very relevant to science.

Another edit:

Cap ‘n R; post 101:

 

If science holds that there is no absolute reference frame, why must we determine which is "more accurate"? What does that get us? If you get that information, what can you use it for?

 

Are you really saying that science is not concerned with which is the more accurate description of Earth?

Edited December 1, 2011 by owl

[swansont]

The focus here is philosophy’s relevance to science. Since realism says (in a nutshell) that Earth is as it is, and idealism (specifically the length contraction theory version of idealism as I have explained in depth) says that Earth is as it is seen from different frames of reference... I will ask you again:

Does an observation of Earth from a near lightspeed frame of reference, seeing it as quite flattened rather than almost spherical, mean that Earth IS actually very flattened or that it just looks that way, distorted by the extreme frame of reference?

The well worn phrases from relativity, “for the high speed traveler” vs “for the at rest observer” refer to Earth having a different reality (shape in this case) depending on how it is viewed.

So either Earth changes shape with how it is viewed (idealism) or we can not know what its shape is because of the “no preferred frame” dictum.

Which is it?

 

Both. The earth's shape depends on the frame from which it is viewed (with the caveat that I am leery of the use of "change", because that has caused problems in the past) and it has no intrinsic shape in that the shape is not invariant between frames of reference.

 

Do you really, truly deny that "...the distance to the Sun (remains) around 93 million miles, regardless of who is flying by at whatever speed measuring it?"

This is clearly not the realism that grants the world an objective, intrinsic reality of its own, independent of observation and measurement. What if there were no observers, no measuring rods, no clocks? That is a philosophical question very relevant to science.

 

Why is it relevant to science? If there are no observers and no measurements, what science is being done?

 

 

P.S. Still waiting for a list of science that is flawed because of a refusal to address ontology.

 

Didn't Gödel do that? Ok, not really. He just proved that any formal language as complex as mathematics cannot be both consistent and complete. So, either it cannot prove all true theorems, or it can prove false ones (perhaps even both). However, I do not know which one(s) it is.

 

The systems cannot be both consistent and complete. But they can be consistent and incomplete, i.e. there can be true statements that cannot be proven. However, problems with relativity do not arise because of inconsistency in the mathematics.

[owl]

("Ad hominem")

Where?

Ad hominem literally means referring “to the man” rather than to the substance of the argument.

It works both ways. Usually, of course it refers to “attacking an opponent's character rather than answering his argument.” (Dictionary.com)

But it works both ways, as in referring to “a man’s” credentials to support his argument, regardless of its substance.

This forum uses the above a lot.

Science's job is not to gather information about the world.

 

That's news to me. I thought that was the meaning of "empirical science."

 

Swansont:

Why is it relevant to science? If there are no observers and no measurements, what science is being done?

 

The point is that the cosmos exists and has intrinsic properties regardless of how it is observed. But that is the philosophy of realism which does not concern those who believe that reality depends on how it is observed. I've made this point dozens of times, but it is still lost on you.