Is philosophy relevant to science?

[Iggy]

peer review and independently verifiable/falsifiable, and checked and rechecked and all that...is a group effort

 

Good point.

 

I was just thinking about how Einstein's system and Newton's system made different predictions about light deflection. When observation agreed with Einstein and rather than Newton (1919), I'd rather science agree with him too even though the majority of physicists were slow and/or reluctant to accept the validity of the new theory.

 

In other words—if honest, diligent, and fair observations falsify one theory and support another, I don't think it should matter if there is a consensus with rejecting the old theory and accepting the new or not. Science, to put it simply, should be indifferent to consensus.

 

That's what I was thinking.

Edited December 8, 2011 by Iggy

[owl]

This is on the margin of the topic (call it the ontology/philosopy of "What IS light?") and not related to recent conversations, but I would still like to understand better the nature of light as attracted by/to mass. (One of the supposed confirmations of "curved spacetime.")

 

I know that "spacetime curvature" is the buzz-phrase for how that works according to GR. But those words don't mean anything until they relate to the dynamics of the observed gravitational attractions in a way that helps us to understand how the force of gravity works. It's not all 'proven' by math without referents in the observable cosmos.

 

So how is "mass-less" light attracted by mass?... (If it doesn't just 'follow the *assumed* curvature of space?)

I first asked (dismissed as irrelevant by the Cap 'n) whether we all know for sure that "a photon" has absolutely zero mass.

That seems to be a question still under investigation by legitimate scientists.

If light (photons) has "momentum" equal to mass, then why say that light has no mass? (A merely logical question.) If a photon has an infinitesimal mass, how is GR theory sure of how much, if 'it only accounts for half of observed curvature'... as GR claims?

"Resting mass" is something that can not be measured for light, because light never stops to be measured for mass 'at rest.'

Just some musings (and sincere questions) in the 'free thinking' category which philosophy of science enjoys.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

I know that "spacetime curvature" is the buzz-phrase for how that works according to GR. But those words don't mean anything until they relate to the dynamics of the observed gravitational attractions in a way that helps us to understand how the force of gravity works. It's not all 'proven' by math without referents in the observable cosmos.

Suppose I make predictions about the behavior of objects in curved spacetime using the math. My predictions are borne out by experiment. I now have evidence to suggest that the mathematics is correct.

 

What kind of experiment or test do you think would establish the "reference in the observable cosmos" that you want?

 

I first asked (dismissed as irrelevant by the Cap 'n) whether we all know for sure that "a photon" has absolutely zero mass.

That seems to be a question still under investigation by legitimate scientists.

If light (photons) has "momentum" equal to mass, then why say that light has no mass?

Momentum is not equal to mass. It is measured in different units and measures a different thing. Photons have momentum without mass. If you'd like details, I'd suggest a book on introductory relativistic dynamics.

[ydoaPs]

How is a mathematical model not an ontological model? Mathematics is every bit of a legitimate language as English or French. It just happens to be far more formal and precise. As such, it makes far more detailed descriptions of events than English can ever make. The sentiment behind "that's not an explanation; that's math!" type statements speaks to a profound failure in the area of philosophy of language.

[mississippichem]

How is a mathematical model not an ontological model? Mathematics is every bit of a legitimate language as English or French. It just happens to be far more formal and precise. As such, it makes far more detailed descriptions of events than English can ever make. The sentiment behind "that's not an explanation; that's math!" type statements speaks to a profound failure in the area of philosophy of language.

 

Agreed very much. I don't understand all this talk of the superiority of "logic" over mathematics.

 

Mathematics is nothing but the most formal, least ambiguous, least (cultural/ethno/language) bound form of logic.

 

If we had this "ontological" argument in Chinese or Swahili the outcome may be different, i.e. some words have no direct translation to other languages.

 

However, I speak no Finnish but I could go to Finland today and make a precise mathematical statement with no ambiguity assuming we use similar notational convention.

 

Any non-quantitative argument eventually degrades to semantics or is at least limited by word choice or prosaic ambiguity.

 

The need for a non-mathematical "ontology" is, in my opinion, an immature sentiment held by those who don't want to put in the tears and sweat to understand extremely complicated and finesse models (or they just don't realize the importance of the mathematics yet).

 

The devil is in the details, and the details are found in the math.

Edited December 9, 2011 by mississippichem

[PeterJ]

 

The need for a non-mathematical "ontology" is, in my opinion, an immature sentiment held by those who don't want to put in the tears and sweat to understand extremely complicated and finesse models (or they just don't realize the importance of the mathematics yet).

 

I think this is unfair. It is not immature to seek an ontology. It's called philosophy. No doubt even you would like to have an ontology if you could find one, and even if you don't actually need one.

 

However I would agree that an ontology is not necessary to the current project in physics. That is presumably why we have a separate discipline called Ontology. I'm with Owl on the importance of developing an ontology but I can see why a physicist would say it's not his job to do it. It's only a mandatory activity in metaphysics or religion. I do not understand physicists' lack of interest in ontology, even if it is not required for the day job, but wouldn't see this as a professional issue. Whether it is possible to do any meaningful kind of theoretical physics without dabbling in ontology seems debatable to me, but I suspect it's a matter of opinion.

[Iggy]

It is not immature to seek an ontology.

 

I agree -- very true, but Mississippichem was saying it's immature to demand a non-mathematical ontology. I think that's a really good point.

 

 

Ontology tries to answer questions about the true nature of things, like "what is spacetime?". That is an ontology question. Here are a couple different answers:

 

• 
   
  
• Spacetime is a Lorentzian manifold populated with events having a form determined by energy and momentum content
  
• Spacetime is like a rubber sheet
  

 

The first one is correct and ontology likes it because it truly explains the nature of spacetime. It conveys the meaning of the concept.

 

Ontology doesn't like the second answer. People who don't have the requisite knowledge to understand spacetime may like the second answer and may be looking for other answers like it, because they can understand better what it means, but that doesn't make it good ontology any more than "an airplane is like a bird" is good ontology because some people don't understand concepts of lift and drag.

 

 

Physicists practice ontology.

 

To develop relativity Einstein had to ask "What is spacetime?", "Is it background independent?", "What is its metric signature?", "What relationship does it have with matter, and what equations must it obey?". And, he used philosophy, like mach's principle and the hole argument to help him answer those questions and develop relativity.

 

To approach the ontology of spacetime and the ontology of relativity a person would have to know what those concepts are, what they do, and how they do them, which requires math. Because Owl avoids the math, he can't help but fail in the ontology and philosophy. It's like a stone mason who refuses to use any building material except Jello. It's bound to fail

[Schrödinger's hat]

Momentum is not equal to mass. It is measured in different units and measures a different thing. Photons have momentum without mass. If you'd like details, I'd suggest a book on introductory relativistic dynamics.

 

I prefer to put it this way:

(Up to some unit conversions/factors of c) Some energy-momentum is mass, all mass is energy-momentum, but not all energy-momentum is mass. The word momentum is used for either all energy-momentum, or the kind that is not mass, depending on context.

Photons have the type of energy-momentum that is not mass.

Also mass in this and similar contexts is rest mass (or invariant mass, as they are the both zero for a photon), not relativistic mass.

Edited December 9, 2011 by Schrödinger's hat

[PeterJ]

Iggy - You're right. I missed the 'non-mathematical' qualifier.

 

I can see that to discuss relativity properly one would have to understand the maths. That's why I stay clear of the topic. But I can't quite see why an ontology of space would need any mathematics. As long as it is consistent with the maths wouldn't that be okay? If Owl's ontology is consistent with the maths and the data then I would say he's entitiled to his theory. After all, ontology as a formal discipline does not traditionally require that we study maths. Sorry to be difficult, but nor am I sure that saying space is like a rubber sheet would be an ontological claim. Really all it says that space behaves like a rubber sheet and nothing at all about what space is or is not, while the whole point of studying ontology would be get past the metaphors and similes. But probably none of this would affect the main disagreement going on.

Edited December 9, 2011 by PeterJ

[Schrödinger's hat]

Iggy - You're right. I missed the 'non-mathematical' qualifier.

 

I can see that to discuss relativity properly one would have to understand the maths. That's why I stay clear of the topic. But I can't quite see why an ontology of space would need any mathematics. As long as it is consistent with the maths wouldn't that be okay? If Owl's ontology is consistent with the maths and the data then I would say he's entitiled to his theory. After all, ontology as a formal discipline does not traditionally require that we study maths. Sorry to be difficult, but nor am I sure that saying space is like a rubber sheet would be an ontological claim. Really all it says that space behaves like a rubber sheet and nothing at all about what space is or is not, while the whole point of studying ontology would be get past the metaphors and similes. But probably none of this would affect the main disagreement going on.

 

The problem comes with english lacking good words for many concepts.

If I had a langauge without words for engine, or metal or air I would find it very hard to describe what an aeroplane is in all but the grossest simplification.

[mississippichem]

The problem comes with english lacking good words for many concepts.

If I had a langauge without words for engine, or metal or air I would find it very hard to describe what an aeroplane is in all but the grossest simplification.

 

Big shiny noisy bird that gives people a ride and flies very fast.

[Schrödinger's hat]

Big shiny noisy bird that gives people a ride and flies very fast.

 

And space is a rubber sheet.

Gotchtya.

[mississippichem]

And space is a rubber sheet.

Gotchtya.

 

 

xkcd

[PeterJ]

Ha. Totally excellent cartoon, and very relevant. Maybe this is also relevant.

 

"Briefly, the position is this. We have learnt that the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols, beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating. If to-day you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the aether or the electron to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that; it has no means of probing beneath the symbolism. To understand the phenomena of the physical world, it is necessary to know the equations which the symbols obey but not the nature of that which is being symbolised.

 

Feeling that there must be more behind, we return to our starting point in human consciousness - the one centre where more might become known. There we find other stirrings, other revelations (true or false) than those conditioned by the world of symbols." (Sir Arthur Eddington- In Ken Wilbur, Quantum Questions)

 

Edited December 9, 2011 by PeterJ

[owl]

Suppose I make predictions about the behavior of objects in curved spacetime using the math. My predictions are borne out by experiment. I now have evidence to suggest that the mathematics is correct.

As I've asked before, how curved spacetime ("whatever"...!) is essential to the math. (You answered something like, it's very complicated, if I remember correctly.)

So, if quantum physicists apply their theory of "gravitons" as massless messenger particles conveying the force of gravity and it turns out to be a predictive improvement over the theory of curved spacetime for describing the gravitational behavior of objects, where would that leave the latter "whatever"... theory. In the trash bin of theory development, replaced by improved theories?

Is it just one "whatever..." vs another "whatever..." (curved spacetime vs gravitons) with no need to explain the "what..." in either case, as ontology demands?

 

What kind of experiment or test do you think would establish the "reference in the observable cosmos" that you want?

I personally doubt if science-as-we-know-it will ever devise an experiment to explain how the force of gravity acts between objects at a distance. If it continues to depend on "whatever...", as metaphysical stuff that can not be identified, we might as well just go metaphysical all the way and say that "consciousness" is the power behind all of it. But that leaves material science behind.,i.e., not its universe of discourse. I, for one, will not go there in a science forum.

 

 

Momentum is not equal to mass. It is measured in different units and measures a different thing. Photons have momentum without mass. If you'd like details, I'd suggest a book on introductory relativistic dynamics.

 

Got it. Actually had it already, having studied it before on an introductory level as summarized below. (edit)* I just continue to wonder 'what it is' that mass pulls on when it bends the path of light. As above, we may never find the answer in material science.

 

I had asked, "If light (photons) has "momentum" equal to mass, then why say that light has no mass? (A merely logical question.)

"Equal to..." was clearly a wrong choice of words. But here is an easily found discussion of the different meanings of "mass" vs "momentum."

 

* From Weburbia:

What is the Mass of a Photon?

 

This question falls into two parts:

Does the photon have mass, after all it has energy and energy is equivalent to mass?

 

This question comes up in the context of wondering whether photons are really "massless," since, after all, they have nonzero energy and energy is equivalent to mass according to Einstein's equation E=mc2.

 

From Ask the Van:

Q & A: How does light have momentum without mass?

 

The use of words can make a lot of confusion. Unfortunately, the word "mass" has been used in two different ways in physics. One was the way Einstein used it in E=mc2, where mass is really just the same thing as energy (E) but measured in different units. This is the same "m" that you multiply velocity by to find momentum (p), and thus is sometimes called the inertial mass. It's also the mass that provides the source of gravitational effects. Light has this "m" because it has energy.

 

I withdraw the inquiry, still not knowing how mass pulls on light and still not satisfied with the "answer", 'It doesn't; it bends space.'

Edited December 9, 2011 by owl

[swansont]

How is a mathematical model not an ontological model? Mathematics is every bit of a legitimate language as English or French. It just happens to be far more formal and precise. As such, it makes far more detailed descriptions of events than English can ever make. The sentiment behind "that's not an explanation; that's math!" type statements speaks to a profound failure in the area of philosophy of language.

 

The issue, as I understand it, is that the math explains how it behaves, and ontologists are asking what it is. e.g. we've had a number of people try and explain what energy is over the years, because they aren't satisfied with the answer that it simply a bookkeeping convenience that exists because of time-translation invariance, and they invariably run away from math.

 

To develop relativity Einstein had to ask "What is spacetime?", "Is it background independent?", "What is its metric signature?", "What relationship does it have with matter, and what equations must it obey?". And, he used philosophy, like mach's principle and the hole argument to help him answer those questions and develop relativity.

 

But the questions that follow "What is spacetime?" all involve behavior, and do not address what it "is". One need not answer that question in order to answer the others.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

As I've asked before, how curved spacetime ("whatever"...!) is essential to the math. (You answered something like, it's very complicated, if I remember correctly.)

Indeed. My answer is "ask someone who understands it better than I do."

 

So, if quantum physicists apply their theory of "gravitons" as massless messenger particles conveying the force of gravity and it turns out to be a predictive improvement over the theory of curved spacetime for describing the gravitational behavior of objects, where would that leave the latter "whatever"... theory. In the trash bin of theory development, replaced by improved theories?

Essentially. It would be known as a useful approximation, capable of giving accurate predictions in some cases, but otherwise superseded, like Newtonian mechanics has been replaced with relativistic mechanics.

 

Is it just one "whatever..." vs another "whatever..." (curved spacetime vs gravitons) with no need to explain the "what..." in either case, as ontology demands?

Indeed.

 

I personally doubt if science-as-we-know-it will ever devise an experiment to explain how the force of gravity acts between objects at a distance. If it continues to depend on "whatever...", as metaphysical stuff that can not be identified, we might as well just go metaphysical all the way and say that "consciousness" is the power behind all of it. But that leaves material science behind.,i.e., not its universe of discourse. I, for one, will not go there in a science forum.

My question is more "do you think it is possible for such an experiment or test to exist?", not "do you think anyone would carry such an experiment out?" The answer is the key to this discussion.

[ydoaPs]

The issue, as I understand it, is that the math explains how it behaves, and ontologists are asking what it is. e.g. we've had a number of people try and explain what energy is over the years, because they aren't satisfied with the answer that it simply a bookkeeping convenience that exists because of time-translation invariance, and they invariably run away from math.

What things "are" is a philosophically unanswerable question. We only have access to phenomena; we cannot legitimately describe noumena. Unless, of course, you're a behaviourist in which case there's no problem.

 

But the questions that follow "What is spacetime?" all involve behavior, and do not address what it "is". One need not answer that question in order to answer the others.

If it looks like a duck and acts like a duck.......

[tar]

Owl,

 

If you know already, that philosophy has not yet found the grounds upon which to know "the thing in itself", and science claims only to know how it appears to behave in some particular ways, "as if" it follows nicely some relational "ideas" or maths, with which one can "predict" its behavior in a consistent fashion, given certain starting relationships...why would you want or expect science to look for or find out what the thing in itself was?

 

Seems almost like you wish to set a trap, which you will spring, once somebody tries to step in it.

 

Nobody has stepped into it.

 

Science is not even attempting to go where it can not possibly go. Its just trying to get as far as it possibly can.

 

Regards, TAR2

 

One considered, empirically tested and "verified", step at a time. Adding up to quite a nice walk in the park. We know more about what the park looks like than when we started...what is it?...looks like a park...acts like a park...must be a park.

 

Oh, I'm sorry. ydoaPs just quacked that, didn't he?

Edited December 10, 2011 by tar

[StringJunky]

Owl,

 

If you know already, that philosophy has not yet found the grounds upon which to know "the thing as it is", and science claims only to know how it appears to behave in some particular ways, "as if" it follows nicely some relational "ideas" or maths, with which one can "predict" its behavior in a consistent fashion, given certain starting relationships...why would you want or expect science to look for or find out what the thing in itself was?

 

Seems almost like you wish to set a trap, which you will spring, once somebody tries to step in it.

 

Nobody has stepped into it.

 

Science is not even attempting to go where it can not possibly go. Its just trying to get as far as it possibly can.

 

Regards, TAR2

 

To my way of thinking, if science doesn't know what a thing is, like space, then philosophy certainly doesn't.

[owl]

To my way of thinking, if science doesn't know what a thing is, like space, then philosophy certainly doesn't.

Philosophy (ontology) asks what it is. Science asks how it works,without asking what it is. Call "it" anything, and make it a part of the math equation. Don't even ask what it is. Ontology asks what it is.

 

TAR:

why would you want or expect science to look for or find out what the thing in itself was?

 

Seems almost like you wish to set a trap, which you will spring, once somebody tries to step in it.

 

Nobody has stepped into it.

 

My understanding of science has always been the objective inquiry into the reality of cosmos, "the thing in itself", objectively, the best we can know transcending subjective perception, or even abstract varieties of observation from extreme frames of reference.

No intention of a "trap." A strange perception of my motives.

 

Do you think that Earth might be flattened, as per SR theory (length contraction), or do you know that it is close to spherical? The latter is true by the best Earth science of direct observation. Take your pick. A flattened Earth is simply nonsense, based on a very stupid theory that objects have no shape on their own but rather depend, for their shape, on how they are observed. Think about it and decide for yourself.

[swansont]

What things "are" is a philosophically unanswerable question. We only have access to phenomena; we cannot legitimately describe noumena.

 

 

I'm not the one you have to convince of this.

[ydoaPs]

I'm not the one you have to convince of this.

Owl, go read some Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein.

[Iggy]

nor am I sure that saying space is like a rubber sheet would be an ontological claim. Really all it says that space behaves like a rubber sheet and nothing at all about what space is or is not...

I completely agree. That's actually what I meant when I said "ontology doesn't like that answer".

 

Without math or an understanding of physics and geometry, a person is somewhat stuck trying to understand theories by analogy

 

If Owl's ontology is consistent with the maths and the data then I would say he's entitiled to his theory.

His position (i wouldn't call it an ontology) is not consistent (either internally consistent or consistent with real world data).

[PeterJ]

My understanding of science has always been the objective inquiry into the reality of cosmos, "the thing in itself", objectively, the best we can know transcending subjective perception, or even abstract varieties of observation from extreme frames of reference.

I think we all agree that physics and onotology are different studies. The reason they are is that the natural sciences cannot study the 'thing-in-itself'. It would not be their job and they do not have the tools. Nor do they study the reality of the universe, for the same reason. The presence or absence of a 'thing-in-itself' is undecidable for the natural sciences. This is why the Upanishads can get away with claiming that there is no such thing.

 

Perhaps this is where we go wrong. What if there is no 'thing-in-itself'? By definition it is unobservable, so according to physics it does not exist. Here Physics, Philosophy and Mysticism are in complete agreement. Kant posited the 'thing-in-itself' as a methodological concept and not as a substance or 'thing'. Apparently. whether we test the evidence of our senses, the results of logical analysis or the actual situation first-hand we cannot establish the existence of a 'thing-in-itself'. So science cannot be an objective inquiry into the reality of the cosmos.

 

Unless, that is, by 'science' you mean to include Metaphysics. I would definitely include Metaphysics in the list of sciences, and Mysticism also, but most people here would not consider either to be sciences, and I think you have to go with whatever definition of 'science' is most orthodox on the forum. Normally 'science' would be shorthand for 'natural science', and this would be the study of what can be observed by our physical senses. This would not include any fundamental substance or 'essence' at the heart of phenomena. Hence to a lot of people your understanding of science would seem to be competely wrong. By the definition of science I'd prefer to use it would be right, so I'm not objecting to it, just commenting.

 

Do you think that Earth might be flattened, as per SR theory (length contraction), or do you know that it is close to spherical? The latter is true by the best Earth science of direct observation. Take your pick. A flattened Earth is simply nonsense, based on a very stupid theory that objects have no shape on their own but rather depend, for their shape, on how they are observed. Think about it and decide for yourself.

Yes, but if you are right it would make no difference to SR, (I hope I'm right to say). To say that an observer travelling a higher speeds would see a flattened Earth is not to say that the Earth would be flattened. It is to say that the observer's view of the world is affected by the speed he is travelling at. It would be an observer effect, and not the idea that Earth can have more than one shape at a time, or even any purely objective shape at all.

Edited December 10, 2011 by PeterJ