Cogito ergo sum, really?

[Tres Juicy]

Hi all,

 

Descartes said "cogito ergo sum" or "I think therefore I am"

 

Isn't this a cop out?

 

Picture the scene: The existentially challenged Descartes is pondering his existence, is it real or some illusion/dream.

 

It becomes a bit difficult and he thinks "well, if I'm thinking about it then I must be real otherwise I couldn't think at all", job done off he goes.

 

Isn't this a perfect example of circular reasoning? A self fulfilling prophesy of sorts?

 

Why not say "I have legs therefore I am" or "I can see things so they must be real" or "I have a hammer therefore I must be a builder".

 

It seems a bit weak to me...

 

Surely just the ability to think does not in any way prove your existence, the best he could hope for would be "I think therefore I think I am..." and then probably best to go think about it some more and come up with an actual answer.

 

I mean, if his (or anyones) existence was an illusion it (the illusion) would contain the illusion of his thoughts on the subject.

 

How did this meaningless cop out become so well known?

 

It seems like wishful thinking to me, he jumped at the first conclusion that confirmed the result he wanted in the easiest and least provable way.

[Dekan]

Hi all,

 

Descartes said "cogito ergo sum" or "I think therefore I am"

 

Isn't this a cop out?

 

Picture the scene: The existentially challenged Descartes is pondering his existence, is it real or some illusion/dream.

 

It becomes a bit difficult and he thinks "well, if I'm thinking about it then I must be real otherwise I couldn't think at all", job done off he goes.

 

Isn't this a perfect example of circular reasoning? A self fulfilling prophesy of sorts?

 

Why not say "I have legs therefore I am" or "I can see things so they must be real" or "I have a hammer therefore I must be a builder".

 

It seems a bit weak to me...

 

Surely just the ability to think does not in any way prove your existence, the best he could hope for would be "I think therefore I think I am..." and then probably best to go think about it some more and come up with an actual answer.

 

I mean, if his (or anyones) existence was an illusion it (the illusion) would contain the illusion of his thoughts on the subject.

 

How did this meaningless cop out become so well known?

 

It seems like wishful thinking to me, he jumped at the first conclusion that confirmed the result he wanted in the easiest and least provable way.

 

Descartes was right though. He did definitely exist and think.

 

We know that, because while he was existing, he did some thinking about things. Like analytical geometry. And he wrote books about it. Which we can still read today.

 

If Descartes was deluded, and didn't really exist, where did his books come from?

[Iggy]

I mean, if his (or anyones) existence was an illusion it (the illusion) would contain the illusion of his thoughts on the subject.

He doesn't say "I am not an illusion". He wouldn't be able to prove that. All he can prove is that he exists -- either in an illusion or however else.

 

How did this meaningless cop out become so well known?

What do you think about the example Descartes gives with the devil tricking him? What could a devil trick you into believing? If it were powerful enough it could trick you into believing most any mistaken notion. But it could never trick you into thinking you exist when you do not, because that would be a self contradiction.

Edited December 6, 2011 by Iggy

[Tres Juicy]

Descartes was right though. He did definitely exist and think.

 

We know that, because while he was existing, he did some thinking about things. Like analytical geometry. And he wrote books about it. Which we can still read today.

 

If Descartes was deluded, and didn't really exist, where did his books come from?

 

 

Obviously WE know that he existed, his question related to his own existence and proving it to himself.

 

He couldn't have said "If I'm deluded, and don't really exist, where did my books come from?"

 

This again is circular reasoning and proves nothing... It's obvious to us that he existed but not to him

 

Thanks

[Iggy]

Obviously WE know that he existed

no, we don't. Perhaps everything related to Descartes was added to our current literary cannon by people or a powerful being or who knows what for whatever end. It isn't impossible. You can't prove that Descartes existed.

 

, his question related to his own existence and proving it to himself.

and his existence is something he could prove to himself at the time he said it and that's the whole point.

 

I think you've missed the point of the cogito.

 

EDIT: by the way, what does "it is circular" mean?

 

The cogito is tautological, and tautologies are circular in a sense, but what does that have to do with "proves nothing"

Edited December 7, 2011 by Iggy

[Tres Juicy]

no, we don't. Perhaps everything related to Descartes was added to our current literary cannon by people or a powerful being or who knows what for whatever end. It isn't impossible. You can't prove that Descartes existed.

 

 

and his existence is something he could prove to himself at the time he said it and that's the whole point.

 

I think you've missed the point of the cogito.

 

EDIT: by the way, what does "it is circular" mean?

 

The cogito is tautological, and tautologies are circular in a sense, but what does that have to do with "proves nothing"

 

 

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/begging-the-question.html

[ydoaPs]

Descartes was right though. He did definitely exist and think.

 

We know that, because while he was existing, he did some thinking about things. Like analytical geometry. And he wrote books about it. Which we can still read today.

 

If Descartes was deluded, and didn't really exist, where did his books come from?

Actually, based on the rules he set forth prior to the cogito, it is an illegitimate step. Descartes started out by saying we must discard all sensory information because our senses can fool us. To get to the cogito argument, Descartes had to realize that he was thinking; that is, he utilized an act of reflection. Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument. This, however, is far from the only place in the Meditations where Descartes cheats.

 

Obviously WE know that he existed, his question related to his own existence and proving it to himself.

 

He couldn't have said "If I'm deluded, and don't really exist, where did my books come from?"

 

This again is circular reasoning and proves nothing... It's obvious to us that he existed but not to him

 

Thanks

No we don't; the one thing Descartes did do legitimately was to bring the problem of solipsism to light. This is a problem which has still not been solved.

[Schrödinger's hat]

Actually, based on the rules he set forth prior to the cogito, it is an illegitimate step. Descartes started out by saying we must discard all sensory information because our senses can fool us. To get to the cogito argument, Descartes had to realize that he was thinking; that is, he utilized an act of reflection. Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument. This, however, is far from the only place in the Meditations where Descartes cheats.

I'm glad I'm not the only one who was frustrated by the cheating.

I seem to recall the full argument was something along the lines of:

I believe I am thinking, therefore I either exist or I am being decieved.

BUT GOD EXISTS AND HE WOULDN'T TRICK ME SO I EXIST, AND BECAUSE I EXIST THEREFORE GOD.

 

The philosophers I have discussed this with usually say this second part was more of an anti-excommunication/execution clause than something he would have included otherwise (regardless of his spiritual beliefs).

No we don't; the one thing Descartes did do legitimately was to bring the problem of solipsism to light. This is a problem which has still not been solved.

 

Indeed.

[Tres Juicy]

Actually, based on the rules he set forth prior to the cogito, it is an illegitimate step. Descartes started out by saying we must discard all sensory information because our senses can fool us. To get to the cogito argument, Descartes had to realize that he was thinking; that is, he utilized an act of reflection. Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument. This, however, is far from the only place in the Meditations where Descartes cheats.

 

 

No we don't; the one thing Descartes did do legitimately was to bring the problem of solipsism to light. This is a problem which has still not been solved.

 

"Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument. This, however, is far from the only place in the Meditations where Descartes cheats."

This is my point, it's a cop out

 

You can't say "lets discard sensory information" and then simply NOT

 

"No we don't; the one thing Descartes did do legitimately was to bring the problem of solipsism to light. This is a problem which has still not been solved."

 

If that were the case, surely he would not have questioned his own existence but rather the existence of others?

[Iggy]

Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument.

Can you explain that? It seems very confused.

 

Descartes would agree with both these statements:

• 
   
  
• I perceive books, therefore my perception of my own thoughts exist.
  
• I perceive my own thoughts, therefore my perceptions of my own thoughts exist.
  

 

Descartes' point (that perceiving books doesn't imply that books exist) isn't inconsistent with the above two statements.

 

They are inherently different because "I" and "book" are not self-referential, but "I" and "my perceptions" are.

 

If my perception of a book is misguided then it may well mean that the book doesn't exist.

 

If my perception of my own thoughts is misguided it doesn't follow that my perception of my own thoughts doesn't exist... obviously.

 

BUT GOD EXISTS AND HE WOULDN'T TRICK ME SO I EXIST, AND BECAUSE I EXIST THEREFORE GOD.

Wow!

 

Can you quote Descartes saying this?

 

"Reflection itself is a form of sensation as it is one's way to sense one's own thoughts. As such, it was inconsistent for Descartes to use it in his argument. This, however, is far from the only place in the Meditations where Descartes cheats."

This is my point, it's a cop out

 

You can't say "lets discard sensory information" and then simply NOT

Sensory information exists otherwise one wouldn't be able to question their own senses. That is the first thing.

 

Now, sensory information may either be misguided or not. No way to know -- that's Descartes' point.

 

If it is misguided, does that imply that the misguided sensory information could possibly not exist?

 

No, clearly not.

Edited December 7, 2011 by Iggy

[Tres Juicy]

Can you explain that? It seems very confused.

 

Descartes would agree with both these statements:

I perceive books therefore I my thoughts regarding my own perceptions exit.

I perceive my own thoughts therefore my thoughts regarding my own perceptions exit.

 

The fact, as Descartes points out, that one cannot prove the existence of books using one's own perceptions doesn't make either of the above inconsistent.

 

If my perception of a book is misguided then it may well mean that the book doesn't exist.

 

If my perception of my own thoughts is misguided it doesn't follow that my perception of my own thoughts doesn't exist... obviously.

 

 

Wow!

 

Can you quote Descartes saying this?

 

 

Sensory information exists otherwise one wouldn't be able to question their own senses. That is the first thing.

 

Now, sensory information may either be misguided or not. No way to know -- that's Descartes' point.

 

If it is misguided, does that imply that the misguided sensory information could possibly not exist?

 

No, clearly not.

 

 

"The fact, as Descartes points out, that one cannot prove the existence of books using one's own perceptions doesn't make either of the above inconsistent."

If you can't use your own perceptions to prove the existence of a book, what makes you think you can use it to prove your own existence?

 

If your perceptions are somehow skewed, then you may be fooled into imagining your existence is something it's not

 

If you cant trust your perceptions then you can't use them to verify your existence, for all he new Descartes could have been a thought in someone else's mind or a character in a book - how does "Cogito ergo sum" disprove that?

 

 

EDIT) It's like questioning the length of a ruler/tape measure:

 

Descartes says "Is it really 30cm? How can I know?" He then proceeds to use it to measure itself to verify that it's the correct length "yep, 30cm alright"

Edited December 7, 2011 by Tres Juicy

[Schrödinger's hat]

Can you explain that? It seems very confused.

 

Descartes would agree with both these statements:

I perceive books therefore I my thoughts regarding my own perceptions exit.

I perceive my own thoughts therefore my thoughts regarding my own perceptions exit.

 

The fact, as Descartes points out, that one cannot prove the existence of books using one's own perceptions doesn't make either of the above inconsistent.

 

If my perception of a book is misguided then it may well mean that the book doesn't exist.

 

If my perception of my own thoughts is misguided it doesn't follow that my perception of my own thoughts doesn't exist... obviously.

 

I think what ydoaps was getting at -- and this is a path I have gone down many a time -- is that the only thing one can know for sure is that the perception of thinking exists. I do not know off hand whether I have seen it written elsewhere before or since, or if it was entirely original/independantly come up with.

So I know that something is thinking (or mimicking thinking, or at the very least that _NOUN_ _VERB_), but I cannot be certain that it is the entity I consider 'me', or of the tense of the action it is taking. I could, for example, be part of a dream of this entity, or a fiction or simulation it is writing (or has written). This may just be an issue of semantics, but I don't think Descarte was talking about some general thing when he said me/I.

It also seems I had projected these thoughts onto Descartes. I was under the impression that he acknowledged this briefly before moving on, but I was mistaken, he either does not consider this possibility, or has a broader definition of 'me' than I give him credit for.

 

Wow!

 

Can you quote Descartes saying this?

I was exaggerating somewhat and being facetious, but there is a grain of seriousness there, let's see if I can back it up.

 

He takes sooo long to say anything, but I think the gist of it is summed up here (spoiler tags to save wall of text):

 

 

 

From meditation 3

33. But perhaps the being upon whom I am dependent is not God, and I have been produced either by my parents, or by some causes less perfect than Deity. This cannot be: for, as I before said, it is perfectly evident that there must at least be as much reality in the cause as in its effect; and accordingly, since I am a thinking thing and possess in myself an idea of God, whatever in the end be the cause of my existence, it must of necessity be admitted that it is likewise a thinking being, and that it possesses in itself the idea and all the perfections I attribute to Deity. Then it may again be inquired whether this cause owes its origin and existence to itself, or to some other cause. For if it be self-existent, it follows, from what I have before laid down, that this cause is God; for, since it possesses the perfection of self-existence, it must likewise, without doubt, have the power of actually possessing every perfection of which it has the idea--in other words, all the perfections I conceive to belong to God. But if it owe its existence to another cause than itself, we demand again, for a similar reason, whether this second cause exists of itself or through some other, until, from stage to stage, we at length arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God.

 

 

 

This follows from some stuff about having ideas that must have come from external to himself because he cannot seem to alter their truth or his perception of them.

To paraphrase the whole lot as one statement:

If I am not being deceived, then there's all these ideas of perfection and therefore God exists. (let's assume the ontological argument is valid for now)

 

Then

 

 

From meditation 3

38. And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that the mark should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my creator, it is highly probable that he in some way fashioned me after his own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself, in other words, when I make myself the object of reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, [imperfect] and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that he upon whom I am dependent possesses in himself all the goods after which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find in my mind], and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that he is thus God. And the whole force of the argument of which I have here availed myself to establish the existence of God, consists in this, that I perceive I could not possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a God, if God did not in reality exist--this same God, I say, whose idea is in my mind--that is, a being who possesses all those lofty perfections, of which the mind may have some slight conception, without, however, being able fully to comprehend them, and who is wholly superior to all defect [ and has nothing that marks imperfection]: whence it is sufficiently manifest that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect.

 

 

If God exists and is perfect etc he will not deceive me.

 

 

There's more there if I/you have the patience to dig further, Using this copy which seems to match the paper copy I read at some point in the past.

[Iggy]

"The fact, as Descartes points out, that one cannot prove the existence of books using one's own perceptions doesn't make either of the above inconsistent."

If you can't use your own perceptions to prove the existence of a book, what makes you think you can use it to prove your own existence?

Because "my perceptions" references "me". "Book" doesn't reference "me". Why would you assume that his proof applies equally to both. His proof relies on the self-reference.

 

Descartes, by the way, wasn't inept -- despite how any matchbook cover summary of his proof might make him appear.

 

If your perceptions are somehow skewed, then you may be fooled into imagining your existence is something it's not

Sure, I may be a cat named "princess anastasia" being convinced that I'm human, but this doesn't imply that *I don't exist*

 

If you cant trust your perceptions then you can't use them to verify your existence

I haven't seen any reasonable justification for why that might be.

 

, for all he new Descartes could have been a thought in someone else's mind or a character in a book - how does "Cogito ergo sum" disprove that?

If a book says "John perceives" then John does exist as a character in a book. It would be a rather dull and unenlightened character, but what can we do?

 

Perhaps we make the book more sophisticated. If you watched star trek the next generation you might know what I mean. Books were played out on the holodeck and it did eventually happen that a character in a book (Professor Moriarty as it happened) became self-conscious and questioned his own existence.

 

Even though Moriarty existed in the form of a simulation on a computer he would nevertheless correctly conclude that he exists, simply because he is able to question his own existence.

 

Descartes' isn't saying "I exist, and not in a simulation or some predetermined and prewritten form". He was just saying "I exist", by which he meant that he could logically doubt the existence of other things, but it would be illogical to doubt his own existence.

 

--------------------------

 

 

I think what ydoaps was getting at -- and this is a path I have gone down many a time -- is that the only thing one can know for sure is that the perception of thinking exists....

So I know that something is thinking (or mimicking thinking, or at the very least that _NOUN_ _VERB_), but I cannot be certain that it is the entity I consider 'me', or of the tense of the action it is taking.

I may well be the imaginings of an extremely adept being who is able to simulate, in his own mind, every thought I am capable of having. But, this doesn't matter. Descartes' proof doesn't involve the nature of the universe. We may exist in a universe accountable only to itself, or we may exist in a universe simulated in some Deity's head. When I say "I exist", it doesn't matter. I exist whatever the circumstances of my existence.

 

I was under the impression that he acknowledged this briefly before moving on, but I was mistaken, he either does not consider this possibility, or has a broader definition of 'me' than I give him credit for.

Sorry, i wrote my paragraph above before reading this. I think you have a very distinct possibility there.

 

But perhaps the being upon whom I am dependent is not God, and I have been produced either by my parents, or by some causes less perfect than Deity. This cannot be: for, as I before said, it is perfectly evident that there must at least be as much reality in the cause as in its effect; and accordingly, since I am a thinking thing and possess in myself an idea of God, whatever in the end be the cause of my existence, it must of necessity be admitted that it is likewise a thinking being, and that it possesses in itself the idea and all the perfections I attribute to Deity.

-Descartes

Right. That is why I said "extremely adept being".

 

If I have consciousness enough to contemplate my perceptions (rather complex ones at that) and question my own existence then any entity dreaming me up must be just as intelligent as me and even more capable. This is why Tres Juicy's example of "how do I know I'm not a character in a book" falls apart and why I moved on the example of a holodeck. A book just isn't capable of simulating consciousness.

 

He was refuting the same points brought up here.

 

Also, I would take his use of "God" and "Devil" to mean very powerful and capable beings. Those words represented a very recognizable allegory at the time is all.

 

If I am not being deceived, then there's all these ideas of perfection and therefore God exists.

No, he really isn't saying that. He is midway through saying "maybe my perceptions are wrong". His example is that... just perhaps... some being is purposefully deceiving him. This is only an example to illustrate some way by which perceptions could be mistaken... and it is an analogy commonly used in his time just because a lot of people in that time were quite comfortable imagining a God or a Devil doing that sort of thing.

 

He goes on to examine the necessary attributes of that being, but I'm sure he doesn't try to imply "...therefore the being exists".

 

The other quote does seem to be an extension of the ontological argument. I'd never seen it or imagined that line of reasoning. It does, like you said, seem superfluous.

Edited December 7, 2011 by Iggy

[Schrödinger's hat]

Sorry, i wrote my paragraph above before reading this. I think you have a very distinct possibility there.

Yes, I think any remaining disagreement comes down mostly to semantics.

The one minor difference of opinion may be that I still entertain the possibility that there is a perception of thinking without though occurring. I do not know what this would entail, but I can't find a good reason to rule it out either. If the laws of logic are not as we perceive them, then I sort of run into a brick wall. I'm reasonably certain of the statement that some kind of entity/place/event occured/is/was/some other atemporal verb, and that this verb produced the perception of thought.

We very quickly get into shaky territory (differing definitions of thought/mind/perception etc) and somewhere along this line lies a semantic issue, as with most philosophy.

 

 

No, he really isn't saying that. He is midway through saying "maybe my perceptions are wrong". His example is that... just perhaps... some being is purposefully deceiving him. This is only an example to illustrate some way by which perceptions could be mistaken... and it is an analogy commonly used in his time just because a lot of people in that time were quite comfortable imagining a God or a Devil doing that sort of thing.

 

He goes on to examine the necessary attributes of that being, but I'm sure he doesn't try to imply "...therefore the being exists".

 

The other quote does seem to be an extension of the ontological argument. I'd never seen it or imagined that line of reasoning. It does, like you said, seem superfluous.

 

Read the whole thing (again?), or just the letter at the front of that copy. Unless I am completely missing some heavy irony, he is talking specifically about the Christian God (although the deceiver is a generic character). Most of the latter chapters are dedicated to the ontological argument for said god.

At some point he abandons the idea that he might be being deceived with no justification than that certain thoughts are 'clear and precise'. He then uses this to argue for god, then uses this to finally dismiss the deceiver completely.

If I have misread this I would be interested to know. I don't quite care enough to trawl through it myself and find any misinterpretation I have, but if you could point one out it would be appreciated.

 

Descartes, by the way, wasn't inept -- despite how any matchbook cover summary of his proof might make him appear.

I must say I do/did let my personal opinions of the man colour my opinion of his work more than it should. The more I learn about the intellectual environment, the more I come to respect (or at least stop disrespecting) him.

 

Also, it doesn't appear to be in this edition, but one of the others I read opened with letter in which he was complaining about someone having translated some of his earlier works into French, and how this allowed unworthy people to read them.

Edited December 7, 2011 by Schrödinger's hat

[Iggy]

Read the whole thing (again?)

No, I see what you mean. It seems tied to the ontological argument and makes similar conclusions. I don't find that bit convincing (the second part of the first quote to be exact). But, I would just stress that it really doesn't matter as far as the 'cogito ergo sum' goes. His musings about a deity are superfluous when it comes to that.

 

I must say I do/did let my personal opinions of the man colour my opinion of his work more than it should.

My memory serves the same purpose. I rely on my memory of Descartes' argument as if that is the thing being talked about. It would be better to have a rereading first, but like you said, "I don't quite care enough to trawl through it myself"

 

The one minor difference of opinion may be that I still entertain the possibility that there is a perception of thinking without though occurring.

If I am in the mind of God or in a holodeck simulation then my thoughts will exist as part of God's intellectual imagination or part of the holodeck computer. But, I think that doesn't matter in the least. Wherever my thoughts reside, they exist. After reading on the subject, I'm sure that's the point Descartes was trying to prove.

[Tres Juicy]

Because "my perceptions" references "me". "Book" doesn't reference "me". Why would you assume that his proof applies equally to both. His proof relies on the self-reference.

 

Descartes, by the way, wasn't inept -- despite how any matchbook cover summary of his proof might make him appear.

 

 

Sure, I may be a cat named "princess anastasia" being convinced that I'm human, but this doesn't imply that *I don't exist*

 

 

I haven't seen any reasonable justification for why that might be.

 

 

If a book says "John perceives" then John does exist as a character in a book. It would be a rather dull and unenlightened character, but what can we do?

 

Perhaps we make the book more sophisticated. If you watched star trek the next generation you might know what I mean. Books were played out on the holodeck and it did eventually happen that a character in a book (Professor Moriarty as it happened) became self-conscious and questioned his own existence.

 

Even though Moriarty existed in the form of a simulation on a computer he would nevertheless correctly conclude that he exists, simply because he is able to question his own existence.

 

Descartes' isn't saying "I exist, and not in a simulation or some predetermined and prewritten form". He was just saying "I exist", by which he meant that he could logically doubt the existence of other things, but it would be illogical to doubt his own existence.

 

--------------------------

 

 

 

I may well be the imaginings of an extremely adept being who is able to simulate, in his own mind, every thought I am capable of having. But, this doesn't matter. Descartes' proof doesn't involve the nature of the universe. We may exist in a universe accountable only to itself, or we may exist in a universe simulated in some Deity's head. When I say "I exist", it doesn't matter. I exist whatever the circumstances of my existence.

 

 

Sorry, i wrote my paragraph above before reading this. I think you have a very distinct possibility there.

 

 

Right. That is why I said "extremely adept being".

 

If I have consciousness enough to contemplate my perceptions (rather complex ones at that) and question my own existence then any entity dreaming me up must be just as intelligent as me and even more capable. This is why Tres Juicy's example of "how do I know I'm not a character in a book" falls apart and why I moved on the example of a holodeck. A book just isn't capable of simulating consciousness.

 

He was refuting the same points brought up here.

 

Also, I would take his use of "God" and "Devil" to mean very powerful and capable beings. Those words represented a very recognizable allegory at the time is all.

 

 

No, he really isn't saying that. He is midway through saying "maybe my perceptions are wrong". His example is that... just perhaps... some being is purposefully deceiving him. This is only an example to illustrate some way by which perceptions could be mistaken... and it is an analogy commonly used in his time just because a lot of people in that time were quite comfortable imagining a God or a Devil doing that sort of thing.

 

He goes on to examine the necessary attributes of that being, but I'm sure he doesn't try to imply "...therefore the being exists".

 

The other quote does seem to be an extension of the ontological argument. I'd never seen it or imagined that line of reasoning. It does, like you said, seem superfluous.

 

 

"Descartes, by the way, wasn't inept -- despite how any matchbook cover summary of his proof might make him appear."

 

I didn't suggest he was inept, I just felt he had cheated a bit...

 

"A book just isn't capable of simulating consciousness."

 

If the book reads "Descartes pondered his own existence... blah, blah, blah...". Then the conciousness of the reader will to some extent bring Descartes to life and lend some of that conciousness to him, however briefly.

Does Descartes still truly exist if he is a fleeting thought in the mind of someone else? "cogito ergo sum" says yes but, even now as you imagine Descartes in your mind, however vividly you may picture him he is only real to you (even though the imagined Descartes is likely pondering his existence, I mean its hard, for me at least to imagine the guy NOT pondering his existence).

 

You could argue the existence of this "virtual" Descartes (I expect he would), but thats a whole differnt thread I expect...

 

My point is that "cogito..." does not prove anything. How can it?

[Schrödinger's hat]

 

You could argue the existence of this "virtual" Descartes (I expect he would), but thats a whole differnt thread I expect...

 

My point is that "cogito..." does not prove anything. How can it?

 

It proves that Descartes -- whatever he/it is -- exists.

Again it comes down to issues of semantics.

Iggy's definition of 'me' in Descartes' argument is broader than mine, which is broader than yours.

[Tres Juicy]

It proves that Descartes -- whatever he/it is -- exists.

Again it comes down to issues of semantics.

Iggy's definition of 'me' in Descartes' argument is broader than mine, which is broader than yours.

 

 

Maybe Descartes was too vague in his definition of "me/I" and "exist"...

 

"Cogito..." It certainly can't prove that his existence is true to how he percieves it.

 

Although I can conceed that his ability to think goes some way to proving that he exists in some way, be it as a man or as a passing thought/simulation/delusion/waveform/... Surley he can't make any distinction between these using his fallible senses though.

 

Thanks,

 

Al

[Schrödinger's hat]

Maybe Descartes was too vague in his definition of "me/I" and "exist"...

 

"Cogito..." It certainly can't prove that his existence is true to how he percieves it.

 

Although I can conceed that his ability to think goes some way to proving that he exists in some way, be it as a man or as a passing thought/simulation/delusion/waveform/... Surley he can't make any distinction between these using his fallible senses though.

 

Thanks,

 

Al

 

Indeed, and this is primarily what the first two (and some of the third) meditations are about. Establishing that there is some kind of thing generating this perception of thought, regardless of all other factors.

Destartes speaks of knowing that he is a thinking being, but bear in mind that this is the/one of the first work(s) on solipsism. On top of that, We read it in a different language to the one it was written in. Because of this I think it's quite reasonable to allow some room for interpretation on the exact definition of 'me' and the distinction between thought and perception of thought. Getting bogged down in semantic issues around these two words serves no purpose I can think of in this discussion.

[ydoaPs]

Can you explain that? It seems very confused.

There are two sources of ideas: sensation and reflection. Sensation gives us perception of outward things and reflection gives us perception of our minds and allows us to make complex ideas from the impressions given to us by sensation. In one of those two regards, reflection is just a form of sensation that allows us to sense inward things. It is just as unreliable as our outward senses.

[Iggy]

In one of those two regards, reflection is just a form of sensation that allows us to sense inward things. It is just as unreliable as our outward senses.

I agree. Schizophrenia is a good example. But, what has this to do with the cogito being inconsistent or wrong? All of these are true:

 

• 
   
  
• I perceive (though the perception could be misled) a book, therefore I exist
  
• I perceive (though the perception could be misled) Natalie Portman, therefore I exist
  
• I perceive (though the perception could be misled) my own thoughts, therefore I exist
  
• I perceive (though the perception could be misled) music, therefore I exist
  

 

So, I can't find the inconsistency. I can't figure how it matters that perceptions (or "sensations" as you say) are mentioned in all of them.

 

The problem comes when person says, "I perceive (though the perception could be misled) Natalie Portman, therefore Natalie Portman exists." That would be non sequitur because if I perceive her, and the perception is misled, then the perception of her could be entirely mistaken. The conclusion relies on the validity of the perceptions. Perhaps I was really looking at a cat and I was misled into believing the perception involved Natalie Portman. In that case she may not exist at all.

 

 

On the other hand — if I perceive something, and the perception is misled, I may be wrong about the nature of the thing perceived but I couldn't be wrong that "I perceived". "I exist" is not non sequitur — "I perceive" and "I exist" have the same subject.

 

I don't get this idea that if the proof of existence involves the perception of one's own thoughts, it is inconsistent. Descartes' idea that perceptions may not be reliable doesn't imply that they are unperceived or that they don't exist, or that the thing perceiving them doesn't exist.

Edited December 8, 2011 by Iggy