Highly Contagious Flu Strain Developed

[jimmydasaint]

The fear is that if you create something this deadly and it goes into a global pandemic, the mortality and cost to the world could be massive," a senior scientific adviser to the US Government told The Independent, speaking on condition of anonymity.

 

"The worst-case scenario here is worse than anything you can imagine."

 

For the first time the researchers have been able to mutate the H5N1 strain of avian influenza so that it can be transmitted easily through the air in coughs and sneezes. Until now, it was thought that H5N1 bird flu could only be transmitted between humans via very close physical contact.

The Independent UK

 

(emphasis is my own - jimmy)

 

Some may ask: 'What is the bloody point?'

Edited December 20, 2011 by jimmydasaint

[CaptainPanic]

According to the article, the point is to study how to fight an airborne version of the H5N1 strain.

For that, you first have to create it.

 

But I agree that it's pretty damn dangerous and it might be better to do this study at a very different location (not a university), even though the virus is kept behind locked doors, guarded by armed guards..

 

At the same time, it's only a matter of time before another disease spreads...

[imatfaal]

I found this blog which tempers the news slightly - http://www.virology....influenza-h5n1/

 

As usual some of the press reports are OTT - and it seems some of the scientists quotes are a little hot-headed as well

[jimmydasaint]

According to the article, the point is to study how to fight an airborne version of the H5N1 strain.

For that, you first have to create it.

 

But I agree that it's pretty damn dangerous and it might be better to do this study at a very different location (not a university), even though the virus is kept behind locked doors, guarded by armed guards..

 

At the same time, it's only a matter of time before another disease spreads...

 

With respect, I don't think there is any clear justification for the introduction of a highly virulent strain of a virus that can cause pandemics, after potentiation by passing through animals and selection. What is the point in creating a vaccine when we already know there will be resistant strains created by Natural Selection? IMHO, this is one of the reasons that vaccines against HIV have been partly successful.

 

I found this blog which tempers the news slightly - http://www.virology....influenza-h5n1/

 

As usual some of the press reports are OTT - and it seems some of the scientists quotes are a little hot-headed as well

 

Although I am aware of the attenuation of viral pathogenicity in other species, and even in the same species, the justification of creating a vaccine is highly contentious, given the viral proclivity to mutate.

Edited December 20, 2011 by jimmydasaint

[CaptainPanic]

I can understand that people say that the risks in this research are so great, that is would be better if it is stopped, and the virus destroyed.

 

But look at the potential benefits. If we understand the avian flu better, we can save people.

If this research goes horribly wrong, we lose half the population of the planet.

If this research goes the right way, and the avian flu does break out naturally, we can save a lot of people because we understand it better, and can make a vaccin a lot quicker.

 

With respect, I don't think there is any clear justification for the introduction of a highly virulent strain of a virus that can cause pandemics, after potentiation by passing through animals and selection. What is the point in creating a vaccine when we already know there will be resistant strains created by Natural Selection? IMHO, this is one of the reasons that vaccines against HIV have been partly successful.

Researchers in the topic of nuclear fission initially also did not intend to kill people.

 

Should we blame the researchers for working on nuclear fission, or maybe the leaders who started the war, made a huge project to create a bomb, and perhaps in a secondary way the generals who decided to use this bomb instead of alternative measures? Or should we applaud the researchers, because it also gave us (relatively) clean energy from nuclear powerplants?

[CharonY]

If that is the work I am thinking of, there is a definite good reason for this research, and I am not talking about bioterror or something like that.

What they did is introducing alleles in H5N1, which already exist in nature, just not yet combined in a single strain. The goal was to find out, how many changes are required to result in a strain that can be transmitted between humans. There are two reasons why this is important. First, to evaluate the likelihood of that occurring in nature. Remember the first outbreak, when people claimed that the warnings of this strain were overrated because it was not transmissible between humans (and thus declared it alarmism)?

Well, this study provides how many allele exchanges are necessary. I think they have not yet published, due to ethical reasons, but they mentioned that it was only five or so. Thus, I would think that this work is important as it shows that a limited number of recombinations can result in this precise strain in nature.

 

The second important bit is closely related to the first is what CaptainPanic mentioned. If it is only a matter of time that the virus may pop up, isn't it better to develop a vaccine beforehand? And for that, this strain is also needed.

 

Will the vaccine work? Well, the question here is whether further mutated strain are A) still able to transmit between humans and B) be more virulent. And again, to analyze that one has to know what actually are the factors leading to transmission.

 

To be honest, I was pretty much on the fence, too, when the information started to pop up. However, in the end I think the likelihood of the recombinations/mutations are going to happen anyway that I prefer proper research before it really hits.

Edited December 20, 2011 by CharonY

[CaptainPanic]

With more people on this planet than ever, can we say that diseases can also mutate quicker , because they basically have more feeding grounds - more humans - around?

 

Would there be a reason to assume that the amount of diseases that evolve are a linear function of the amount of people (limited only by our health and healthcare, which kills off a lot before it spreads).

 

If not, is there any other way to estimate the likelihood that a serious disease will evolve within X years?

[jimmydasaint]

If that is the work I am thinking of, there is a definite good reason for this research, and I am not talking about bioterror or something like that.

What they did is introducing alleles in H5N1, which already exist in nature, just not yet combined in a single strain. The goal was to find out, how many changes are required to result in a strain that can be transmitted between humans. There are two reasons why this is important. First, to evaluate the likelihood of that occurring in nature. Remember the first outbreak, when people claimed that the warnings of this strain were overrated because it was not transmissible between humans (and thus declared it alarmism)?

Well, this study provides how many allele exchanges are necessary. I think they have not yet published, due to ethical reasons, but they mentioned that it was only five or so. Thus, I would think that this work is important as it shows that a limited number of recombinations can result in this precise strain in nature.

 

CharonY, I cannot think of any good reason to make a more dangerous form of the influenza virus. Perhaps the researchers can identify the mutations involved in increasing infectivity in aerosolised form, but then where does the research go next? IIRC, orthomyxoviruses have segmented genomes and are capable of recombination of genomic segments (correct me if I am wrong here). Mutations are bound to arise in the serotype anyway.

 

The second important bit is closely related to the first is what CaptainPanic mentioned. If it is only a matter of time that the virus may pop up, isn't it better to develop a vaccine beforehand? And for that, this strain is also needed.

 

Will the vaccine work? Well, the question here is whether further mutated strain are A) still able to transmit between humans and B) be more virulent. And again, to analyze that one has to know what actually are the factors leading to transmission.

 

To be honest, I was pretty much on the fence, too, when the information started to pop up. However, in the end I think the likelihood of the recombinations/mutations are going to happen anyway that I prefer proper research before it really hits.

 

I would have thought that resistant 'strains' of the influenza virus would arise within a short time of circulating a vaccine. I am not up to date with the data on HIV, but is there a successful vaccine now available?

 

With more people on this planet than ever, can we say that diseases can also mutate quicker , because they basically have more feeding grounds - more humans - around?

 

Would there be a reason to assume that the amount of diseases that evolve are a linear function of the amount of people (limited only by our health and healthcare, which kills off a lot before it spreads).

 

If not, is there any other way to estimate the likelihood that a serious disease will evolve within X years?

 

Excellent question Captain but I will let CharonY answer it, because I do not have the knowledge of the biostatistics field. However, a quick glance at a paper seems to suggest high mutation rates for RNA viruses.

 

The rate of spontaneous mutation is a key parameter in modeling the genetic structure and evolution of populations. The impact of the accumulated load of mutations and the consequences of increasing the mutation rate are important in assessing the genetic health of populations. Mutation frequencies are among the more directly measurable population parameters, although the information needed to convert them into mutation rates is often lacking. A previous analysis of mutation rates in RNA viruses (specifically in riboviruses rather than retroviruses) was constrained by the quality and quantity of available measurements and by the lack of a specific theoretical framework for converting mutation frequencies into mutation rates in this group of organisms. Here, we describe a simple relation between ribovirus mutation frequencies and mutation rates, apply it to the best (albeit far from satisfactory) available data, and observe a central value for the mutation rate per genome per replication of μg ≈ 0.76. (The rate per round of cell infection is twice this value or about 1.5.) This value is so large, and ribovirus genomes are so informationally dense, that even a modest increase extinguishes the population

Link to Paper

Edited December 21, 2011 by jimmydasaint

[CharonY]

CharonY, I cannot think of any good reason to make a more dangerous form of the influenza virus. Perhaps the researchers can identify the mutations involved in increasing infectivity in aerosolised form, but then where does the research go next? IIRC, orthomyxoviruses have segmented genomes and are capable of recombination of genomic segments (correct me if I am wrong here). Mutations are bound to arise in the serotype anyway.

 

This may be correct, but the next logical step is figuring out the mechanisms behind it and how whether they affect potential epitopes.

 

I would have thought that resistant 'strains' of the influenza virus would arise within a short time of circulating a vaccine. I am not up to date with the data on HIV, but is there a successful vaccine now available?

 

Last time I looked there were flu vaccines around. And strain analyses are routinely conducted to estimate which strain is going to hit next. Vaccines are produced accordingly.

Your main argument is apparently that vaccines are useless against flu (and therefore research into mechanisms is does not bring any useful information), however the fact that there are seasonal vaccinations around somewhat weakens the point, no? You may be thinking of lifelong immunity, this may not happen with flu, but that is beside the point. The idea of immunization is to prevent large spreads throughout the population.

 

High mutation rates are therefor not a dealbreaker when it comes to viruses. The important bits are identifying epitopes and their variations (though much is done on a far rougher scale).

There are a lot of issues with developing an HIV vaccine which I cannot cover in a short post, but they are not limited to the mutation rate, but also include e.g. raising a decent immune responses from inactivated viruses (however there are a number of trials for HIV vaccines right now).

 

In contrast, seasonal flu vaccines are routinely derived from inactivated strains which generally requires the isolation of the strain to begin with (thus having the strain already at hand, accelerates vaccine development and testing). Again, mutation rate is one issue, but does not render vaccines useless. Think about polio (also an RNA virus).

 

 

Regarding mutation rate: that rates are not dependent on population size, however a larger pool increases the probability of a given mutation to occur (essentially like throwing a die more times). Assuming a large pool of flu carriers it definitely increases the chances of certain recombinations to occur within a given time frame.

Edited December 21, 2011 by CharonY

[DrRocket]

If that is the work I am thinking of, there is a definite good reason for this research, and I am not talking about bioterror or something like that.

What they did is introducing alleles in H5N1, which already exist in nature, just not yet combined in a single strain. The goal was to find out, how many changes are required to result in a strain that can be transmitted between humans. There are two reasons why this is important. First, to evaluate the likelihood of that occurring in nature. Remember the first outbreak, when people claimed that the warnings of this strain were overrated because it was not transmissible between humans (and thus declared it alarmism)?

Well, this study provides how many allele exchanges are necessary. I think they have not yet published, due to ethical reasons, but they mentioned that it was only five or so. Thus, I would think that this work is important as it shows that a limited number of recombinations can result in this precise strain in nature.

 

The second important bit is closely related to the first is what CaptainPanic mentioned. If it is only a matter of time that the virus may pop up, isn't it better to develop a vaccine beforehand? And for that, this strain is also needed.

 

Will the vaccine work? Well, the question here is whether further mutated strain are A) still able to transmit between humans and B) be more virulent. And again, to analyze that one has to know what actually are the factors leading to transmission.

 

To be honest, I was pretty much on the fence, too, when the information started to pop up. However, in the end I think the likelihood of the recombinations/mutations are going to happen anyway that I prefer proper research before it really hits.

 

Informed, rational counter-point to emotiona,l knee-jerk reactions.

 

kudos

[kitkat]

Creating a highly infectious virus during these uncertain times where the masses are losing its trust with a government that is hell bent on controlling the masses is going to be viewed as intentional for bioterrorist means of using it and that includes the scientists that are doing it with the government that funds the research. When nature produces a new virus, that is the time to find a vaccine to prevent it not one that nature might never create it in the first place.

[zapatos]

For the first time ever, a government advisory board is asking scientific journals not to publish details of certain biomedical experiments, for fear that the information could be used by terrorists to create deadly viruses and touch off epidemics.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/health/fearing-terrorism-us-asks-journals-to-censor-articles-on-virus.html

[kitkat]

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/health/fearing-terrorism-us-asks-journals-to-censor-articles-on-virus.html

 

 

See the US bioterror watchdog wants this information censored which tells us you can't trust the government at all.

[zapatos]

I believe one of the main reasons they wanted to create the virus is so they can quickly identify when this is happening naturally. Recognizing a new virus that is potentially devastating prior to its wide spread could save many lives.

 

See the US bioterror watchdog wants this information censored which tells us you can't trust the government at all.

I don't see the link between the two. Can you expand on this a bit?

Edited December 22, 2011 by zapatos

[CharonY]

I have no clue where the government plays a role here. They advise no to publish, but the journals can do what they want. Also the work was carried out mostly in the Netherlands (though there are collaborators in the US) and is an independent group in Japan working on this, IIRC. So which government is now doing what? As you can tell, I do not understand the line of reasoning here.

 

My personal opinion is that bioterrorism is a relatively poor argument when it comes to pathogens. They are, as a whole, rather inefficient. Blowing something up creates much more immediate sense of danger and fear (a goal of terrorism) rather than something that may or may not have been man-made.

Compare for instance the anthrax mails with the regular deaths we have in the US due to seasonal flu, Salmonella outbreaks or Clostridium poisoning. It would be easier to claim responsibility for the deaths due to contaminated food rather than try to get spread the agents on your own.

Seriously, in the US alone Salmonella is responsible for over 500 deaths annually (and still there is resistance against control programs). Where is the panic and outcry here?

[jimmydasaint]

This may be correct, but the next logical step is figuring out the mechanisms behind it and how whether they affect potential epitopes.

 

 

 

Last time I looked there were flu vaccines around. And strain analyses are routinely conducted to estimate which strain is going to hit next. Vaccines are produced accordingly.

Your main argument is apparently that vaccines are useless against flu (and therefore research into mechanisms is does not bring any useful information), however the fact that there are seasonal vaccinations around somewhat weakens the point, no? You may be thinking of lifelong immunity, this may not happen with flu, but that is beside the point. The idea of immunization is to prevent large spreads throughout the population.

 

I have been trying to clarify my main point but that is close to what I meant. Also, I extended the example to the lack of success of HIV-based vaccines because I did not anticipate a high success rate for another important virus which has historically shown notorious resistance, both to anti-retroviral drugs and to effective vaccine development. Link to HIV Subtype Diversity

 

Your main point is correct. The seasonal strain is anticipated for, and vaccines produced accordingly. However, do we produce a vaccine against a huge number of possible epitopes that may emerge, or is it currently circulating strains? I do take the point that the research may be valuable in ascertaining the zoonosis of influenza, or its propagation in a species. Additionally, is the seasonal protection even close to an average of 50%? There may be confounding factors in measuring both deaths attributable to flu, or degree of immunoprophylactic activity.

 

I did learn something from both what you have written and also this site:

 

Key Facts About Seasonal Flu Vaccine

The single best way to protect against the flu is to get vaccinated each year.There are two types of vaccines:

 

The flu shot an inactivated vaccine (containing killed virus) that is given with a needle, usually in the arm. The flu shot is approved for use in people older than 6 months, including healthy people and people with chronic medical conditions.

 

There are three different flu shots available:

◦a regular flu shot approved for people ages 6 months and older

◦a high-dose flu shot approved for people 65 and older, and

◦an intradermal flu shot approved for people 18 to 64 years of age.

 

The nasal-spray flu vaccine a vaccine made with live, weakened flu viruses that is given as a nasal spray (sometimes called LAIV for Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine). The viruses in the nasal spray vaccine do not cause the flu. LAIV is approved for use in healthy* people 2 through 49 years of age who are not pregnant.

 

Seasonal flu vaccines protect against the three influenza viruses that research indicates will be most common during the upcoming season. The viruses in the vaccine can change each year based on international surveillance and scientists estimations about which types and strains of viruses will circulate in a given year. About 2 weeks after vaccination, antibodies that provide protection against the influenza viruses in the vaccine develop in the body. Information specific to the 2011-2012 season, including the vaccine formulation, can be found at 2011-2012 Flu Season.

 

When to Get Vaccinated

CDC recommends that people get their seasonal flu vaccine as soon as vaccine becomes available in their community. Vaccination before December is best since this timing ensures that protective antibodies are in place before flu activity is typically at its highest. CDC continues to encourage people to get vaccinated throughout the flu season, which can begin as early as October and last as late as May. Over the course of the flu season, many different influenza viruses can circulate at different times and in different places. As long as flu viruses are still spreading in the community, vaccination can provide protective benefit.

 

 

CDC

Edited December 24, 2011 by jimmydasaint

[CharonY]

The seasonal strain is anticipated for, and vaccines produced accordingly. However, do we produce a vaccine against a huge number of possible epitopes that may emerge, or is it currently circulating strains? I do take the point that the research may be valuable in ascertaining the zoonosis of influenza, or its propagation in a species. Additionally, is the seasonal protection even close to an average of 50%? There may be confounding factors in measuring both deaths attributable to flu, or degree of immunoprophylactic activity.

 

Flu vaccines are usually live or inactivated viruses. I.e. they require the strain to develop a vaccine. [The selection of the strains for the seasonal vaccine is based on known spread. IIRC H1N1 (the one that caused a pandemic 2009) was in the 2010 and 2011 vaccine. For some reasons I overlooked that you actually cited that from the CDC website] The first step is usually isolating a new strain from the wild and then develop a vaccine. Having e.g. identified crucial parts of the genome for the spread between humans as a template, can improve the detection, as well as monitoring of spread. It can also accelerate the production of attenuated viruses (though that is usually not the most time-consuming part).

 

With the average of 50%, do you mean how much of the population is being vaccinated? A quick google search shows that in the US the average is indeed below 50%. Though it varies a lot and of course it depends on local rate that determines spread and especially death rates. Elderly and children are most susceptible and here the question is how high the vaccination rate is in a given school, for instance.

However, for vaccination morbidity rates are often not a good measure as the goal is usually to limit spread. The reason why H1N1 caused a pandemic (whereas other strains did not) was the lack of immunity within the populations.

Edited December 28, 2011 by CharonY