Faith v Logic in Moral Codes

[MonDie]

That was a very high-level summary of a larger work he did in his book, "The Moral Landscape."

I forgot that I could put "youtube" and "UrA-8rTxXf0" into Google to follow your broken link from the thread you linked to. I already watched the one I posted above, but I'll watch this one too. I should also continue reading that thread.

 

 

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EDIT: From what I've heard, Sam Harris's argument against the is/ought rebuttal is that we can all agree on certain values. This wouldn't apply to sociopaths, but it would be interesting to see if cured sociopaths claim to enjoy life more after being cured, or if people becoming sociopaths feel good about it.

 

EDIT: He mentions well-being a lot. Maybe a good argument would be that all people enlist morals for the sake of their well-being, so well-being would actually be what determines morals and would run deeper than morality. Therefore, a morality that doesn't serve well-being in actuality could be considered a morality that is broken, perhaps as the result of bad reasoning and not just the willy-nilly "I believe!" However, a barrier is that some people might claim to deny their well-being for their god's sake because they would think it is selfish to value their own well-being.

EDIT: However, if morality serves the well-being of the believer, how can anyone justify sacrificing their life for a greater cause in any circumstance?

Edited June 19, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Iggy]

My previous post was somewhat incorrect because formal science claims are not about the nature of reality, but they are still verifiable.

Maybe you mean "support" rather than "verify". Scientific laws are about the nature of reality and are not verifiable. To paraphrase the second law of thermodynamics: "there are no perpetual motion machines" -- it is a statement about reality and nothing you could do would verify it.

 

As for Iggy, I think he should try to prove that a moral belief is objectively correct because I haven't been able to do it.

I keep making the same point and given your response I must be making it very badly.

 

I cannot prove that your notion of "right and wrong" are objectively or empirically correct. In the same way, you can't prove that my notion of "tall and short" are objectively or empirically correct.

 

Because your notion of right and wrong aren't empirically correct or incorrect you've concluded that moral judgements are not judgments about reality.

 

Because my notion of tall and short aren't empirically correct or incorrect should I conclude that judgements about height aren't judgments about reality?

 

The problem I see is that you've left "right and wrong" incomplete and undefined in the same way that "tall and short" are incomplete and undefined. "Murder is wrong" is an incomplete ethical statement. Drawing deductive conclusions about its validity is fraught with trouble for that reason alone. "Murder is injurious to humanity and therefore humans shouldn't do it" is closer to a complete and meaningful ethical statement, and it is empirical in exactly the same way that "humans shouldn't reject God because it makes for a painful afterlife" is not empirical.

 

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If a moral code can't be objectively judged by evidence then I wouldn't think it is a moral code. A good health code prevents sickness. A good criminal code controls crime. They can be judged by their effectiveness.

 

Does anarchy benefit society? Does nihilism advance the species? In so far as humanity has an objective ability to judge evidence we can answer questions like these.

Never really understood this argument. So if god made morals, what makes them necessarily right, compared to man made morals? They were both made.

no, I don't think divine morality would necessarily be better than mortal morality -- even if god were real. I meant that questions like "does nihilism advance humanity" could be empirically answered using an entirely secular toolkit. It doesn't take divine warrant to answer moral questions like that.

[MonDie]

Maybe you mean "support" rather than "verify". Scientific laws are about the nature of reality and are not verifiable. To paraphrase the second law of thermodynamics: "there are no perpetual motion machines" -- it is a statement about reality and nothing you could do would verify it.

EDITED LATER: I understand what you are saying, and I can't argue against it. I haven't learned about thermodynamics much yet, but why must the law be about what is not rather than what is? For example, maybe it could say "all motion machines are non-perpetual." That sounds like it could be verifiable. Of course, we cannot go to every part of the universe and test the law in every place, but we can test it enough that we see it as a law.

 

Also, after some thought, I realized that the formal sciences do concern reality.

For example, we could say that mathematics is the science of amounts, and amounts are part of reality. This applies as long as we can verify the maths with physical representations.

I'm not sure if we could say that logic is the science of reasons, but there could potentially be a science of reasons. If reasons are real, we can test them using experiments. For example, light #2 turns red when light #1 turns red, and #3 turns red when #2 turns red. Therefore, hypothetically, #3 should turn red when #1 turns red. Reasons are real and verifiable.

 

Because your notion of right and wrong aren't empirically correct or incorrect you've concluded that moral judgements are not judgments about reality.

I did assert that, but it was probably a bad use of English. Rather, they aren't judgments about what reality is objectively, they are judgments about what reality is subjectively. Empiricism only applies to what reality is objectively.

 

The problem I see is that you've left "right and wrong" incomplete and undefined in the same way that "tall and short" are incomplete and undefined. "Murder is wrong" is an incomplete ethical statement. Drawing deductive conclusions about its validity is fraught with trouble for that reason alone. "Murder is injurious to humanity and therefore humans shouldn't do it" is closer to a complete and meaningful ethical statement, and it is empirical in exactly the same way that "humans shouldn't reject God because it makes for a painful afterlife" is not empirical.

But you are still leaving the definitions of "right" and "wrong" up to individuals rather than objective reality. Who is to decide that what is "injurious to humanity" is part of what is "bad"? I would generally agree, but what of a person that is killing everyone else in order to save the members of the blood-line they belong to?

 

By the way, you can type instead of making a series of dashes to separate portions of a post, like so.

 

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EDITED: The idea of not being able to derive an "ought" from an "is" got me wondering. When I was considering how the formal sciences relatate to reality, I tried to relate "oughts" to reasons. For example, if #3 ought to turn red, #1 ought to turn red (see first part of post). But where does the ought come from? Amounts exist, reasons exist, and oughts exist too.

Question: What makes something ought to happen? Answer: A living being does.

Oughts must be dependent on life. Matter, energy, amounts, and reasons would exist in a universe without life, but oughts would not.

Our oughts were probably somewhat conditioned by evolution because we usually only give oughts to events that will affect living beings. Most people don't have moral concerns about what might happen after the disappearance of all life because it wouldn't affect us. Someone could think that the universe ought to collapse into a black hole, but they probably wouldn't. Our oughts are usually more along the lines of, "That apple ought to be ripe and nutritious."

This leaves two perspectives. Oughts come from either the mind or evolution. One could argue that evolution determines what oughts are correct. However, if we set out to discover the correct oughts on this basis, we will probably conclude that everyone's oughts are in conflict. On the other hand, I don't know how someone arguing that oughts are from the mind could argue against oughts that are not based on any underlying reasoning (e.g. "#1 should turn red." "#1 turning red doesn't mean #3 will turn red." "I know, but #1 should turn red. My daddy says so.")

Edited June 22, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Prometheus]

no, I don't think divine morality would necessarily be better than mortal morality -- even if god were real. I meant that questions like "does nihilism advance humanity" could be empirically answered using an entirely secular toolkit. It doesn't take divine warrant to answer moral questions like that.

 

Then i misunderstood. I agree questions like 'does nihilism advance mankind' can be answered empirically. However, there is nothing inherently 'good' about advancing mankind, nor is there necessarily agreement about what advancing mankind actually entails: there is still a value judgement.

 

 

For example, we could say that mathematics is the science of amounts, and amounts are part of reality.

 

Maths is not a science. The 'facts' derived from mathematics are quite different from the 'facts' science discovers.

 

This leaves two perspectives. Oughts come from either the mind or evolution. One could argue that evolution determines what oughts are correct.

 

How about combining the two via memes?

[Iggy]

How can something be a law if it cannot be verified.

This site explains, Being Scientific: Fasifiability, Verifiability, Empirical Tests, and Reproducibility

 

Also, after some thought, I realized that the formal sciences do concern reality.

For example, we could say that mathematics is the science of amounts, and amounts are part of reality. This applies as long as we can verify the maths with physical representations.

Musings aside, the scientific method defines science such that its predictions are tested against reality.

 

...Rather, they aren't judgments about what reality is objectively, they are judgments about what reality is subjectively. Empiricism only applies to what reality is objectively.

 

But you are still leaving the definitions of "right" and "wrong" up to individuals rather than objective reality.

Defining morality as "subjective judgments about what is right and wrong" is like defining height as "subjective judgments about what is short and tall". I'm not doing that. I'm not defining morality in terms of right and wrong -- that's what you did, and on that tenuous basis you came up with a problematic conclusion.

 

Who is to decide that what is "injurious to humanity" is part of what is "bad"?

I didn't say it is "bad". I said it is injurious to humanity and therefore humans shouldn't do it. Who decides that humans shouldn't do it? Humanity does.

 

I would generally agree, but what of a person that is killing everyone else in order to save the members of the blood-line they belong to?

Murdering a lot of people may not be the best approach to protecting one's offspring.

[MonDie]

Musings aside, the scientific method defines science such that its predictions are tested against reality.

I guess I was using the word "verify" wrongly.

 

Claim: 2+3=5

Put two apples next to three apples. If you have five apples total, your math hasn't been falsified.

 

Claim: An object moving in an ellipse with an extreme eccentricity can come near to the foci of the ellipse.

Observe a comet's path.

Better yet, make a precise drawing.

 

These are quite scientific methods of testing mathematical claims. The only difference I notice is that they aren't claims about objects or systems with very specific properties (e.g. the qualifications for being considered a living organism). Rather, they are claims about objects or systems with a single property (e.g. shape or amount), which are quite abundant (e.g. a comet's orbit works just as well as a precise drawing).

 

Maths is not a science. The 'facts' derived from mathematics are quite different from the 'facts' science discovers.

How so? What does it mean that mathematics is a "formal science"? I don't get the "formal" part because numbers are no less formal than words, and they both refer to real things.

 

 

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Defining morality as "subjective judgments about what is right and wrong" is like defining height as "subjective judgments about what is short and tall". I'm not doing that. I'm not defining morality in terms of right and wrong -- that's what you did, and on that tenuous basis you came up with a problematic conclusion.

How do you define morality?

 

 

I didn't say it is "bad". I said it is injurious to humanity and therefore humans shouldn't do it. Who decides that humans shouldn't do it? Humanity does.

How can you come to a conclusion about what should and shouldn't be done without also concluding that what shouldn't be done is bad and what should be done is good? I think should nots, shoulds, goods, and bads are all derived from value judgments, and you cannot make a value judgment from which a should could be derived, but a good or bad couldn't be derived.

 

 

Murdering a lot of people may not be the best approach to protecting one's offspring.

For most possible situations, you would be right about this. We could just say you're right for all practical purposes. However, this is a philosophical argument, and my point is about a broader logic that applies to a diverse category of situations.

 

 

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How about combining the two via memes?

I know the term "meme," but I don't know what you mean.

Edited June 22, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Iggy]

How do you define morality?

I wouldn't constrain it too much. Maybe... "the tendency to value others in order to benefit the group".

 

How can you come to a conclusion about what should and shouldn't be done without also concluding that what shouldn't be done is bad and what should be done is good? I think should nots, shoulds, goods, and bads are all derived from value judgments, and you cannot make a value judgment from which a should could be derived, but a good or bad couldn't be derived.

Some moral judgements are better and some are worse than others. This doesn't mean that morality is defined as and nothing more than "subjective judgments about what is right and wrong". In the same way... some structures are taller and some are shorter than others. This doesn't mean that height is defined as and nothing more than "subjective judgments about what is tall and short"

 

If you didn't completely equate morality with subjective judgements about right and wrong you wouldn't come to the conclusion that it has no relation to objective reality, and you wouldn't further conclude that belief in morality is as broken as belief in god.

 

There is no reason morality can't be evaluated objectively and empirically. I think there is a video of Harris talking about his work toward that end in this thread.

[Prometheus]

I guess I was using the word "verify" wrongly.

 

Claim: 2+3=5

Put two apples next to three apples. If you have five apples total, your math hasn't been falsified.

 

Claim: An object moving in an ellipse with an extreme eccentricity can come near to the foci of the ellipse.

Observe a comet's path.

Better yet, make a precise drawing.

 

These are quite scientific methods of testing mathematical claims. The only difference I notice is that they aren't claims about objects or systems with very specific properties (e.g. the qualifications for being considered a living organism). Rather, they are claims about objects or systems with a single property (e.g. shape or amount), which are quite abundant (e.g. a comet's orbit works just as well as a precise drawing).

 

How so? What does it mean that mathematics is a "formal science"? I don't get the "formal" part because numbers are no less formal than words, and they both refer to real things.

 

I guess you could 'prove' a mathematical assertion like that, but you don't have to. By the very definition of the terms involved we see that 2+3=5 must be true, we do not need to see any real life examples, only agree on certain assumptions (axioms). You would then get a proof in mathematics. Science is not at all true by definition and needs to be verified empirically, and so we get evidence, but never a proof. Don't get hung up on the term 'formal science', its just a noun, it doesn't mean mathematics is actually a science or vice a versa. Maybe one of the physics or maths guys could explain it better, but they rarely lurk around philosophy threads.

 

I know the term "meme," but I don't know what you mean.

 

You conjectured that oughts come from either the mind or evolution. If we imagine morals as memes, then it would be possible that oughts come from our mind and are evolved, no reason to be one or the other. Just food for thought.

 

 

 

If you didn't completely equate morality with subjective judgements about right and wrong you wouldn't come to the conclusion that it has no relation to objective reality, and you wouldn't further conclude that belief in morality is as broken as belief in god.

 

There is no reason morality can't be evaluated objectively and empirically. I think there is a video of Harris talking about his work toward that end in this thread.

 

I would completely agree with this so long as there is an acceptance that an original moral itself (e.g.value others in order to benefit the group) has no objective basis. I.e it is not inherently 'right' to value others in order to benefit the group, but we choose to accept it is right (or this meme has evolved to occupy a central position in out thoughts, if you prefer that language). Once we accept it as 'true', then morality can be evaluated objectively and empirically (with the same practical limitations as soft sciences).

[Iggy]

I would completely agree with this so long as there is an acceptance that an original moral itself (e.g.value others in order to benefit the group) has no objective basis.

I don't see how you can figure that. There is no way to objectively decide if an action values others and benefits the group?

 

An example: If I own a restaurant and I spend extra money ensuring that the food I sell exceeds heath code requirements to ensure that people will not get sick from eating it then I have done a moral thing. Objectively, by our definition, I have performed an action which values others in order to benefit the group. I can empirically and deductively show that my action meets that definition.

 

I.e it is not inherently 'right' to value others in order to benefit the group, but we choose to accept it is right (or this meme has evolved to occupy a central position in out thoughts, if you prefer that language).

I don't follow the argument that the definition of morality has to be "inherently right" for morals to be objective.

 

If I defined height as "the distance between two points" would you argue that we cannot objectively measure the height of something as five meters because we don't know if "the distance between two points" is inherently right?

 

Once we accept it as 'true', then morality can be evaluated objectively and empirically (with the same practical limitations as soft sciences).

If I defined an apple as the fruit of an apple tree would you say that we need to accept that definition as 'true' before we could evaluate empirically whether something is an apple? I know how to determine if a logical proposition is true or false, but not a definition. Words mean what they are understood to mean... they aren't true or false, or inherently right or wrong.

 

I guess I don't understand in what sense defining a thing makes evaluations of that thing subjective.

[Prometheus]

I don't see how you can figure that. There is no way to objectively decide if an action values others and benefits the group?

 

An example: If I own a restaurant and I spend extra money ensuring that the food I sell exceeds heath code requirements to ensure that people will not get sick from eating it then I have done a moral thing. Objectively, by our definition, I have performed an action which values others in order to benefit the group. I can empirically and deductively show that my action meets that definition.

 

 

I don't follow the argument that the definition of morality has to be "inherently right" for morals to be objective.

 

If I defined height as "the distance between two points" would you argue that we cannot objectively measure the height of something as five meters because we don't know if "the distance between two points" is inherently right?

 

 

If I defined an apple as the fruit of an apple tree would you say that we need to accept that definition as 'true' before we could evaluate empirically whether something is an apple? I know how to determine if a logical proposition is true or false, but not a definition. Words mean what they are understood to mean... they aren't true or false, or inherently right or wrong.

 

I guess I don't understand in what sense defining a thing makes evaluations of that thing subjective.

 

I agree there is at least theoretically an objective measure for whether an action 'values others and benefits the group'. But whether an action 'values others and benefits the group' is not necessarily the right thing to do, and there is no objective way to say that it is. Some people believe humanity a cancer upon the Earth, and so anything which propagates mankind is actually bad. They would conclude an action which 'values others and benefits the group', as being morally bad. How would you prove them wrong via empiricism? How would you prove them wrong using logic?

 

Let us consider mathematics (because its treatment tends to be far more rigorous than that of words). It is axiomatic, so it starts with a premise which is deemed to be self-evident. However, the premise is never actually proved: there is no way to actually 'prove' it is correct. But once the premise is accepted, by consensus, then all proofs will follow form the premise. So, your example measuring height as the distance between two points can be argued from an assumption of a different set of premises, giving different conclusions. Which premises is correct? There is no objective or logical way to decide (the choice would be made based on the practical realities of each premise i suspect). A real life example might be Riemannian geometry vs. Euclidean geometry, which i understand have different axioms, and so different conclusions regarding the nature of geometry (i don't understand these concepts too well, it'd be nice to have one of the maths guys round these ways).

 

Moving back to ethics, the main difference is that it is even less clear which premise we should accept. There is no 'objective' way to decide, but there are other ways to decide (empathy plays a large part in morals, i suspect).

[MonDie]

Iggy, you said you define morality as "the tendency to value others in order to benefit the group."

If this were true, then any action performed to benefit the group would, by definition, be a moral action. However, this doesn't imply that people should do things that benefit the group.

 

My red light analogy might be the simplest example of what we're talking about.

L2 turns red when L1 turns red, L3 turns red when L2 turns red, etc. This is a factual claim about causation.

If somebody says that L3 ought to turn red (not a factual claim), then they are implying that, via causation, all lights leading to L3 ought to turn red.

If you want to argue to them that L2 needn't turn red, you can argue that L2 turning red won't lead to L3 turning red. However, as long as their idea that L3 ought to turn red is the basis for everything that ought to occur, you cannot argue for or against it. This is because an underlying ought like "L3 ought to turn red" cannot be derived from the knowledge of causation.

 

This becomes clearer when you imagine a world without any living beings. A lifeless world still has causation, but it doesn't have oughts. If those lights were the only things in existence, we could say that the causation is real, but the oughts are non-existant. It is sentient beings that imagine a world with oughts. One could argue something like, "It is unnatural for certain living beings to imagine certain oughts," but that is going to be a tough argument.

 

"Benefiting the group" is like L3 turning red, and everything that must be done in order to benefit the group is like the turning of a prior light red, which should lead to L3 turning red.

Edited June 24, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Iggy]

I agree there is at least theoretically an objective measure for whether an action 'values others and benefits the group'. But whether an action 'values others and benefits the group' is not necessarily the right thing to do, and there is no objective way to say that it is.

Iggy, you said you define morality as "the tendency to value others in order to benefit the group."

If this were true, then any action performed to benefit the group would, by definition, be a moral action. However, this doesn't imply that people should do things that benefit the group.

I should should stress that my point was that morality could be objective and empirical and belief in it not as broken as belief in god. Morality is not exactly the same as 'what a person should do' or 'what is right for a person to do'.

 

I should also date my girlfriend. It is the right thing for me to do. Considering my goals, my desires, all the things I want to give, and want to receive -- she is right for me. This has nothing to do with morality, and it is hugely subjective.

 

Morality is the tendency to value others just like egotism and self-dignity are tendencies to value oneself. They are all qualities without which humanity couldn't do, so there are obviously additional concerns besides morality when a person makes a subjective decision about what action is right.

 

When a society makes laws morality is also not their only guidepost. Not every immoral act is illegal, and not every statute is written to prevent immorality or to ensure morality.

 

So... you guys say that even if something is objectively and empirically deemed to be moral that doesn't necessarily make it the right thing to do. I couldn't agree more. Giving all my money to charity would be a very moral act, but I wouldn't call it right for me. Killing myself so that my organs could be donated to 8 people who would otherwise die -- that would be extraordinarily moral, but not necessarily what I should do.

 

I do, therefore, completely agree with you both.

 

 

Some people believe humanity a cancer upon the Earth, and so anything which propagates mankind is actually bad. They would conclude an action which 'values others and benefits the group', as being morally bad. How would you prove them wrong via empiricism? How would you prove them wrong using logic?

I can prove objectively and deductively that destroying humanity doesn't value others and benefit the group. If someone wants to define morality differently so that it aligns with their broken moral compass -- that is to say, if someone wants to define morality such that it is morally good to destroy humanity, it isn't my job to prove that definition wrong (although I think I easily could). If nobody else understands "morality" to mean what this guy thinks it means then he is just talking nonsense.

 

It is no different from people who want to define murder such that killing a pig is murder. You don't have to prove these people wrong. You don't have to prove that killing a pig *isn't* murder. The fact that nobody agrees with their definition is enough for their point to be a nonsense statement.

 

 

Let us consider mathematics (because its treatment tends to be far more rigorous than that of words). It is axiomatic, so it starts with a premise which is deemed to be self-evident. However, the premise is never actually proved: there is no way to actually 'prove' it is correct. But once the premise is accepted, by consensus, then all proofs will follow form the premise. So, your example measuring height as the distance between two points can be argued from an assumption of a different set of premises, giving different conclusions. Which premises is correct? There is no objective or logical way to decide (the choice would be made based on the practical realities of each premise i suspect). A real life example might be Riemannian geometry vs. Euclidean geometry, which i understand have different axioms, and so different conclusions regarding the nature of geometry (i don't understand these concepts too well, it'd be nice to have one of the maths guys round these ways).

That is a good analogy, and I agree. My original point was that defining morality as "subjective judgements about what is right and wrong" is not useful and it leads to unuseful conclusions. Like Pirsig said: no geometry is more true than another -- just more useful. I think it is a fine analogy for a definition.

 

The reason morality is usefully defined the way I defined it is because evolution has provided humans with certain tendencies, and the tendency to value others is one of them. It allows us to function in groups because we are much more effective as a cooperative group than as hostile individuals. So... there is some objective basis for the usefulness of that definition.

Edited June 24, 2012 by Iggy