Simulation Argument Question

[Ostrich Strangler]

I've been thinking about Nick Bostrom's simulation argument, which basically argues that we are living inside a computer simulated universe created by our descendants. I began to wonder just how plausible this argument is, and after thinking about it for a I came up with the following idea:

 

Assuming the first two possibilities that Bostrom proposes, which are 1) that we go extinct before becoming technologically capable of creating simulated universes and 2) That we do become capable of creating simulated universes but do not create any, are incorrect, Bostrom says that we are almost guaranteed to be living in a simulated universe inside a supercomputer, because the number of simulated universes would far outnumber the single real universe.

 

Bostrom says it is likely that there are simulated universes inside simulated universes, ad infinitium. Now, I was thinking about this, and assuming there are simulated universes inside simulated universes, always creating new simulated universes, wouldn't statistics say that our universe would most likely be created when the amount of simulated universes is at it's highest? And wouldn't the moment when the amount of simulated universes be highest right before the end of the one real universe? And if the real universe ended, wouldnt it cause the simulated universes to end as well? So therefore, if our simulated universe has the highest likelyhood of being created just before the end of the real universe, wouldn't that mean that if our universe was a simulation, statistically, it would have most likely ended already?

 

So doesn't that mean that it is highly unlikely that we are living in a simulated universe instead of a real one?

 

I've only been thinking about this theory for a short while, so I'm assuming I must have missed something somewhere, and I might be wrong. So am I?

 

Also sorry for any typos or anything, I'm on a phone and it's hard to proof read.

[Prometheus]

It's such ideas that give philosophy a bad name.

[ecoli]

Bostrom says that we are almost guaranteed to be living in a simulated universe inside a supercomputer, because the number of simulated universes would far outnumber the single real universe.

Bostrom says that there are empirical reasons why the universe might be a simulation. AFAIK, he doesn't make strong guarantees. By stating it in this way, you're making the general philosophy sound a whole lot kookier than it is.

 

Bostrom says it is likely that there are simulated universes inside simulated universes, ad infinitium. Now, I was thinking about this, and assuming there are simulated universes inside simulated universes, always creating new simulated universes,

Again, Bostrom postulates the possibility of multi-level simulations, but I don't think he even says it's likely.

 

wouldn't statistics say that our universe would most likely be created when the amount of simulated universes is at it's highest?

Only if the probability of the existence of each multi-level simulation is independent, which isn't likely, even by the reasoning of the simulation hypothesis:

For one thing since, as Bostrom argues, if the fraction of observers that live in a simulation is close to 1, then the fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running or survive to run ancestor-simulations is close to 0. This seems to be contrary to the simulation within a simulation scenario, since the likelihood of each successive simulation advancing to a stage where that kind of computation is feasible is very low and you have to assume that creating simulations is allowable by the rules of that simulation.

 

Further, you have to argue that stacked simulation doesn't degrade computational efficiency, which isn't true in our own observable universe.

 

And wouldn't the moment when the amount of simulated universes be highest right before the end of the one real universe? And if the real universe ended, wouldnt it cause the simulated universes to end as well? So therefore, if our simulated universe has the highest likelyhood of being created just before the end of the real universe, wouldn't that mean that if our universe was a simulation, statistically, it would have most likely ended already?

if the universe already ended, the probability of us having this conversation would be zero, so no.

 

So doesn't that mean that it is highly unlikely that we are living in a simulated universe instead of a real one?

Well yeah, but more from lack of evidence than by your reasoning above. Even Nick Bostrom puts the probability of the simulation argument being true at around 20%... which is still pretty insanely high.

 

It's such ideas that give philosophy a bad name.

Postulating that reality could be an illusion has long been treated by Philosophy, from Descartes and back to the Greeks. Do you have a more substantial complaint?

[Prometheus]

Postulating that reality could be an illusion...

 

Therein lies the problem. Let us assume for a moment we live in such a simulated world, and that there is no way to tell whether we live in such a simulated world. There would then be no way to distinguish reality from illusion. The world we occupy is the only reality we can ever know. Being empirically unverifiable, the question is as futile as beliefs in unprovable god(s). The question would only have value if a 'simulated reality' were distinguishable from 'real reality'.

 

There is also another option to consider, perhaps more likely than all other options given; that it is impossible to model the complexity of our universe, regardless of technological level, due to mathematical constraints. Consider the three body problem ( i know little of physics, but we could put this question to the physics or maths sub-forums for a fuller treatment).

 

As for giving philosophy a bad name, i am yet unconvinced otherwise. I feel philosophy offers much to pursuits of knowledge, but many scientists feel it is nothing but speculations and tail chasing. I think the simulated argument idea is a classic example of tail chasing, in that it does not change the way we think about or engage with the universe. Diogenes had the right idea in his treatment of Zeno's paradox.

[immortal]

One of the criteria that our ancients adopted to distinguish the real from the unreal is that real things were considered to be eternal and unchanging and the whole theory of Forms of Plato and the Advaita Vedanta of the Upanishads is based on this philosophical thought.