Is this it for Iran and Israel?

[zapatos]

Read what you quoted again.

Yeah, line one is clearly out of whack. I stick with line two.

[ydoaPs]

I'm sensing a small amount of bias which I can't share.

 

Well, reality has a bias. America is an imperial nation that doesn't care about facts when it decides it wants to bomb someone. Anyone remember Iraq?

 

Iranians aren't brown.

 

The ones I know must be unusually dark, then. Even so, it's not really the point, is it? The point is that the US government doesn't care about what's true.

 

The words "Iranian" and "Aryan" are in fact equivalent (you may have noticed they sound the same).

 

I was unaware that Persian and Sanskrit were the same language.

[Iggy]

Well, reality has a bias. America is an imperial nation that doesn't care about facts when it decides it wants to bomb someone. Anyone remember Iraq?

It's ok. They were brown.

 

The ones I know must be unusually dark, then. Even so, it's not really the point, is it?

It's far from the point and I didn't bring it up. The Iranians I know aren't dark skinned and if you're at all interested look at Greek history where Agesilaus invaded Persia and couldn't help notice how pale they all were (i.e. more pale than the typical Greek soldier who spends most of his time outdoors).

 

The point is that the US government doesn't care about what's true.

Ok

 

I was unaware that Persian and Sanskrit were the same language.

I don't know what that means. Old Persian and Sanskrit are very similar and old Persian was called 'aryan', but I don't think you're talking about that. I honestly don't know what you mean.

[iNow]

how much evidence you have that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.

This is a bit like asking me to show you evidence that I'm not hiding an invisible dragon in my garage.

...I'm just supposed to accept that claim and not question it?

I guess they changed the rules on this site. I didn't realize that you were now allowed to make factual claims but not be expected to provide evidence.

Fair enough. What would you accept as evidence that they do NOT have a nuclear weapons program? I'm unsure how to even start securing that evidence.

 

We can talk about what they "seem" to be doing or not doing... we can talk about how the evidence we HAVE found does not confirm they have a program for nuclear weapons... we can talk about speeches they've made and comments that have been offered that imply certain things about their nuclear weapons program... But how precisely could any of us ever possibly satisfy your request to provide "evidence" that they do NOT have a nuclear weapons program?

 

I'm genuinely confused by your request, and look forward to gaining clarity.

[zapatos]

Fair enough. What would you accept as evidence that they do NOT have a nuclear weapons program?

 

ydoaPs started out fine when he said that the fear of an imminent nuclear weapons program is "Based on absolutely zero evidence". He then went from that statement to "Iran does not have a nuclear weapon program". My question is, What led ydoaPs to assert that "Iran does not have a nuclear weapon program"?

 

Not all "zero evidence" is equal. If you have never looked for a nuclear weapons program you have no evidence of one. If you've looked extensively and not come up with any you still have no evidence of one. However, if you have no evidence after looking, and can specifically rule out a nuclear weapons program at some sites, then you can speak with more confidence (but not certainty) that one does not exist. The more you look the more confidence you have.

 

I believe you can provide evidence that a nuclear weapons program does not exist (as opposed to providing evidence that an invisible dragon doesn't exit). An invisible dragon is supernatural and leaves no natural trace of itself. A nuclear weapons program is natural and therefore exists in nature. While it would be difficult, it is possible to search every inch of Iran and provide evidence that no trace of those components of a nuclear weapons program exists in Iran. Partial evidence that a nuclear weapons program does not exist would of course come from things such as unrestricted access to suspected sites by the IAEA, as this is a partial search of the country.

 

After all of this writing I believe I would have been better served if my first response to ydoaPs had been:

"You have asserted that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. What level of confidence do you have in that statement and why?"

[Iota]

I will not give you classified information. Ever. Don't expect specifics.

 

 

Good god. I haven't asked you once for "classified information", in fact, you're the one who mentioned you had classified information, before I even asked you a question. Of all of the things you should have elaborated on, you assume I meant that ambiguous reference you made about classified information???

 

You're just show-boating the fact that you once worked as a nuclear technician, because this thread is loosely linked to it. I'm far more interested in the politics. So keep your classified information, pal.

 

 

Fuel cells have what we call distributed poisons. These do a lot of things like make power generation more even, but they also make it such that you cannot make a nuclear bomb from a nuclear reactor.

 

They offered the enriched fuel so that we could make the fuel cells and medical equipment for them so that we would know for a fact that it wasn't used for bombs. We refused. Haven't you figured out yet that the US will lie, cheat, and steal to be able to bomb brown people? Israel's not much different.

 

Thank you for that slight elaboration. However, you're still hung on the idea that I'm pro America, and that I believe Iran should be destroyed before it's too late. That is NOT what I think. I'm just poking at both sides of the argument as a good two sided analysis should.

 

I'm constantly banging on about corruption in the US in other threads all over Science Forums, so clearly I recognise it. You assume too much.

 

 

 

 

[john5746]

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals

 

Sometimes, you have to do some reading.

 

Excerpt from link:

 

Tehran Research Reactor “Fuel Swap” Proposal

 

In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was seeking assistance to refuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a U.S.-supplied 5 megawatt research reactor that produces medical isotopes. Following Iran’s entreaty, the United States proposed that, in return for a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel for the TRR, Iran ship out an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to 4%, totaling about 1,200 kilograms. The 1,200 kilograms accounted for roughly 80% of Iran’s LEU stockpile at that time, a percentage that diminished as Iran continued to produce LEU. At an initial meeting between the United States, France, Russia, Iran, and the IAEA October 1, 2009, Iranian officials agreed “in principle” to the exchange.

 

Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009

Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods

France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply

The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR

Following reservations expressed by Iran about the terms of the deal, the P5+1 indicated their readiness to take some steps to facilitate the arrangement:

 

A political statement of support by the six countries to guarantee that the TRR fuel would be delivered to Iran

Financing for the movement of LEU and fuel

An option for the IAEA to hold Iran’s LEU in escrow in a third country until the TRR fuel is delivered

In the months following the initial agreement of the TRR proposal Oct.1, Iran delayed giving the IAEA and the P5+1 a definitive response to the proposal, with many prominent Iranian politicians voicing their opposition to the arrangement, motivated at least in part by their opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Iranian officials publicly suggested alterations to the fuel swap proposal, including: staggering the export of Iran’s LEU over the course of a year or transporting 400 kilograms of LEU to Iran’s Kish Island to exchange for TRR fuel. These proposals, however, undermined or eliminated the confidence-building nature of the export of the bulk of Iran’s LEU. Tehran began to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, ostensibly for TRR fuel.

 

Brazil, Turkey, Iran Tehran Declaration

 

Brazil and Turkey carried out a diplomatic initiative in the Spring of 2010 to broker the TRR fuel swap with Iran. In an April 20 letter to the leaders of the two countries, President Obama said Iran’s agreement to export 1,200 kilograms of LEU “would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.” The initiative resulted in the May 17 Tehran Declaration agreed between Presidents Lula da Silva, Erdogan, and Ahmadinejad.

 

The three countries “recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities)”

Iran transfers 1,200 kilograms of LEU to be held in escrow in Turkey within one month

Pending their approval of the Tehran Declaration, the IAEA, France, Russia, and the United States (the Vienna Group) would agree to provide 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium fuel to Iran within one year

If the terms were not filled by the Vienna Group, Turkey would transfer the LEU back to Iran (which maintains legal possession of the material)

France, Russia, and the United States rejected the Tehran Declaration on a number of grounds identified in a June 9 letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. The key critique was that the declaration did not address Iran’s production of 20%-enriched uranium and Iran’s accumulation of a larger amount of LEU.

 

 

 

 

Second article from Wall Street Journal - I tried link, but asked for subscription, so:

 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed last week that his government isn't interested in nuclear weapons: "Our motto is nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none," he said. A better perspective was provided almost simultaneously from the world's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which on Aug. 30 released its latest report on Iran's nuclear activities.

 

The report, written in a mix of bureaucrat-speak and obscure science, nevertheless conveys a worrying message. It shows that Iran continues to expand its capacity for enriching uranium. There are now two new groups of centrifuges installed at Fordow—the hardened site built under a mountain near the holy city of Qom—which signals a doubling of the site's capacity since May.

 

Crucially, Iran continues to stockpile uranium enriched to 3.5% and 20% purity—levels for which Iran has no immediate use unless it is planning to make an atomic bomb. (Its stockpiles of 20% uranium far exceed Tehran's claimed needs for a reactor making medical isotopes.)

 

Iran is now operating around 11,000 centrifuges categorized as "IR-1," which are based on a Dutch design acquired by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. This means that, despite international sanctions and surveillance, Iran has acquired (and perhaps continues to acquire) important supplies from abroad, particularly maraging steel and high-strength aluminum. Alternatively, and no less worrying, is the possibility that Iran is now able to produce such special metals domestically.

 

A piece of apparent good news is that Iran's IR-1 centrifuges are performing at half their design potential, producing less enriched uranium than they might otherwise. This indicates quality problems, perhaps due to the manufacturing process or to the raw materials used. It also appears that Iran remains slow in developing more advanced centrifuge types. This could be because of design and manufacturing problems. Or Iran could be saving the advanced centrifuges for another secret, yet-to-be-revealed facility. We can only speculate.

 

 

Judging from this report, Iran seems determined to achieve the capability of producing nuclear materials suitable for nuclear weapons. Whether it has made a decision to produce a fully operational nuclear weapon is unclear. (The Obama administration says it hasn't, according to its latest declared intelligence on Iran's government.)

 

Going forward, the matter of advanced centrifuges will be important to watch. If Iran acquires or develops them, it could pursue a "fast break-out"—moving within months to 90%-enriched uranium, which is weapons-grade—using its already sizable and growing inventories of 20%. Once it has five or six bombs-worth of 90% enriched uranium, it would essentially be a latent nuclear-weapon state—whether it has actually tested a bomb or not.

 

Indeed, given the intelligence uncertainties involved with monitoring whether such a secretive program moves to "break-out," even a stockpile of five or six bombs-worth of 20%-enriched uranium would effectively make Iran a nuclear-weapon state.

 

Last week's IAEA report also shows that inspectors continue to struggle to get access to the controversial site of Parchin, outside Tehran, where satellite imagery shows that Iran has carried out substantial landscaping and construction activities, presumably to cover up past nuclear work. Similar Iranian obstructionism and destruction of evidence has taken place in the past.

 

Still, the IAEA has powerful inspection tools—plus information from member states such as the U.S.—which means it could take a view on what earlier happened at Parchin. The suspicion is that Iran used a giant steel chamber at the site to experiment on "implosion," the technique of squeezing a nuclear explosive (such as highly enriched uranium) into a critical mass using conventional explosives. Evidence of such testing would be a "smoking gun" indicating Iranian military nuclear intentions.

 

Cautious politicians will argue there is still time for diplomacy, plus sanctions and military threats, to succeed. But Iranian leaders give little impression they are about to give in to pressure. And during last week's flurry of news, this newspaper reported that Iran's suspected chief nuclear bomb maker, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, appears to have been brought back to the fore after several years of apparently being sidelined.

 

The IAEA report concludes by saying that Director-General Yukiya Amano "will continue to report as appropriate." But Mr. Amano does not have a sign on his desk saying "the buck stops here." The future of Iran's nuclear program is in the hands of whoever does.

Edited September 7, 2012 by john5746

[Iota]

*...The IAEA report concludes by saying that Director-General Yukiya Amano "will continue to report as appropriate." But Mr. Amano does not have a sign on his desk saying "the buck stops here." The future of Iran's nuclear program is in the hands of whoever does.

 

Very interesting. I'd heard from a friend that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was being brought back into 'play', as well as this article saying it. It's a worrying development if all claims are true.

Edited September 8, 2012 by Iota

[MigL]

Canada uses but one reactor to make medical isotopes for our own use plus several other countries, Why does Iran need so many enrichment facilities ?

Iran burns the natural gas which is a byproduct of their oil wells, in amounts which could supply the energy needs of a country like Canada, why does it need to enrich Uranium for energy ?

It may not be proof that they have or have not a nuclear weapon program, but it is proof that they are hiding their true intentions.

 

I don't think the opinion of someone who would believe the word of the Iranian LEADERSHIP over that of his native or host country is relevant as it obviously implies a bias, because of course, in their history Iran, or the Persians were never an imperial power, only those evil Americans were. . And while American fuel rods may have the impurities to make them unuseable for weapons, can the same be said of the ones produced by the Iranians ? I guess not, ydoaPs.

I may not know about the type of reactors used in the US today, but given the fact that no new reactors have been built since Tree Mile Island, I would assume they are still mostly of the breeder type, and so, no, they don't use a higher pecentage of U235 ( fissionable ) to U238, than a fission weapon does.

[Jebus]

Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. Israel bombed it. Lets hope they stop the Ayatollah's as well.

[iNow]

A nice piece today from Fareed Zakaria.

 

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-the-folly-over-red-lines-for-iran/2012/09/12/119a6a62-fd10-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_story.html

 

Underneath the headlines of the presidential campaign, there are growing signs that we are moving toward another war in the Middle East. This week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly scolded the United States for refusing to draw a “red line” on Iran’s nuclear program that, if crossed, would commit Washington to military strikes. He added that he would not accept a “red light” placed in front of Israel. Unless something dramatic changes its course, Israel is on a path to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in the next six to nine months.

 

Israel’s rhetoric over the past year had seemed, to me, designed to force the international community into action and the United States into hyper-action. It worked in the sense that international sanctions and isolation of Iran are at their highest point ever. But Iran has not surrendered, and Israel seems to view any other scenario as unacceptable. Last month, an Israeli “decision maker” — widely reported to be Defense Minister Ehud Barak — gave a revealing interview to the newspaper Haaretz in which he... <continue reading>

[Iota]

A nice piece today from Fareed Zakaria.

 

 

http://www.washingto...e377_story.html

 

 

 

This depicts the side of Israel despicably pulling strings for a lost cause/pointless war. It's hard to tell if Benjamin Netanyahu wants to attack Iran, but doesn't realise the long term repercussions and limitations of stopping Iran's nuclear program. Or if they expect America to occupy or DEFCON 1 Iran to avoid future complicaitons. Both which will end horribly. But the writer of this article is obviously right in saying that Israel expects America to assist their assault whatever Netanyahu's mindset might be.

Edited September 14, 2012 by Iota

[Bill Angel]

If the issue of an offensive motion picture can provoke riots in Moslem countries, what might the reaction be in these countries to US participation in military strikes against Iran? It's difficult to predict, as Iran is allied with the repressive regime of Syria, and is certainly not supportive of the revolts that toppled repressive regimes in other Moslem countries.

[Iota]

If the issue of an offensive motion picture can provoke riots in Moslem countries, what might the reaction be in these countries to US participation in military strikes against Iran? It's difficult to predict, as Iran is allied with the repressive regime of Syria, and is certainly not supportive of the revolts that toppled repressive regimes in other Moslem countries.

 

And China and Russia might not look too favourably towards American involvement-to say the least- in a country they seem to be backing slightly, and have investments in (oil). That's stepping into WW3/Cold War II theory territory; but the point being tensions are likely to increase, albeit, probably not that dramatically.