Since we have no free will, what purpose does/did consciousness serve?

[iNow]

You are taking for granted a definition that is rooted in theology and metaphysics.

Actually, I'm dismissing it as irrelevant. Theology and metaphysics don't rest on empiricism which is where I prefer to live, and that which can be asserted without evidence can equally be dismissed without evidence.

 

The model of free will you are using supposes that consciousness is a subsystem in the brain, and that actions originate from this consciousness. You show that this is not the case, and voila!, there is no free will.

 

But you deny the existence of a straw man: there is no place in the brain where everything 'comes together' (of course you know that). Free will (and control) apply only to the system, i.e. the person, as a whole.

This appears to be the root of our disagreement. I agree that the decision took place within the "person as a whole." Never disagreed, I just find that point to be a red herring.

 

At the risk of oversimplifying, I'm saying that the decision was realized unconsciously and also occurred chronologically prior to any activation of the parts of the brain that generates the "self." The suggestion is that control and free will require executive function, the freedom you imply requires influence from those areas. However, those areas only enter the picture after the choice has already been made. Ergo, it's not free.

 

I prioritize the executive function aspect of self, you prioritize the whole body like some spherical cow which is why we're talking past each other.

 

Not every action of us is free, not every evaluation of future scenarios is perfect. But saying that our free will is severely limited, does not mean that we have no free will at all.

I remain unconvinced that ANY action of us is free in the way you describe. Hence, our disagreement.

 

Oh, come on, don't be so agitated.

Just guessing here, but it's most likely just a chemical reaction to comments like these:

 

People using ..... in every post ...... hide how incoherent their thinking .... is. I am pretty sure [poster] is not able to write a good argumentative piece of text.

I do not think your argument is very relevant, but I will make mine a bit more precise to avoid loopholes for clever clogs

The point here is that you assume a naive notion of free will

You may be a productive writer, but you are a very bad reader. <...> you see the concept of free will as some form of magic <...> your nonsense lies in your ideas about what control and free will are.

You are a bit dense, dimreepr.

you are a bad reader. <...> Again you show that you are a bad reader.

Edited March 13, 2017 by iNow

[Eise]

Actually, I'm dismissing it as irrelevant. Theology and metaphysics don't rest on empiricism which is where I prefer to live, and that which can be asserted without evidence can equally be dismissed without evidence.

 

But you argue against a concept of free will that stems from theology and metaphysics.

 

You argue as an incompatibilist: that free will and determinism do not go together.

 

On good grounds you defend that we are determined, and that consciousness is a function of the brain, and that it is clear that consciousness is not in charge of brain processes. Until here I agree with you. But this is only an argument against free will if one believes that free will implies that consciousness should be in control of neural processes. I do not defend that.

 

This appears to be the root of our disagreement. I agree that the decision took place within the "person as a whole." Never disagreed, I just find that point to be a red herring.

 

Yes, here is the root of our disagreement. But by calling it a red herring, you just sweep it from the table, without giving any argument. I gave an argument: that my concept of free will is rooted in our daily use of the concept of free will. Somebody acted out of free will when he acted according to his own motivations. I am acting of free will when I am allowed to choose the cauliflower, and am not forced to eat Brussels sprouts.

 

At the risk of oversimplifying, I'm saying that the decision was realized unconsciously and also occurred chronologically prior to any activation of the parts of the brain that generates the "self." The suggestion is that control and free will require executive function, the freedom you imply requires influence from those areas. However, those areas only enter the picture after the choice has already been made. Ergo, it's not free.

 

Bold and italics by me. Please refer to a posting where I suggest such a thing. This is your consistent misreading of what I write. Every time you see me using the words 'free will' you seem to fill in your concept of free will, but that is simply not what I mean with it.

 

I prioritize the executive function aspect of self, you prioritize the whole body like some spherical cow which is why we're talking past each other.

 

OK, at least you see the difference. But to dismiss my viewpoint by calling my idea of free will a 'red herring', or your use of 'spherical cow' is not really arguing against my points. If somebody does not know how a thermostat works, it is also a 'spherical cow' for him. Somehow this device controls the temperature in the room. Now if he learns how it works, that it is a simple deterministic mechanism, doesn't it control the temperature anymore? Of course, some of the magic is gone, but the thermostat still controls the temperature. (Just replace it with a copper cable: temperature will arise above what you want).

 

You in fact are just sweeping my arguments from the table without looking at them. They just do not fit your ideas, and so they are wrong. Not worth looking at it.

 

I remain unconvinced that ANY action of us is free in the way you describe. Hence, our disagreement.

 

Really? For you there is no difference between being forced to eat Brussels sprouts, and freely choosing the vegetable you like, cauliflower?

 

Just guessing here, but it's most likely just a chemical reaction to comments like these:

 

Of course, I was not always friendly. But seeing how you consistently misread me, and you do not react on my arguments, it is a logical reaction. Nowhere I said that you believe in magic, a soul or whatever. But you supposed I did.

[dimreepr]

Yes, here is the root of our disagreement. But by calling it a red herring, you just sweep it from the table, without giving any argument. I gave an argument: that my concept of free will is rooted in our daily use of the concept of free will. Somebody acted out of free will when he acted according to his own motivations.

 

My dogs are unique (in every way a human is), but they're still dogs and, despite their differences, will all bark at the postman and chase squirrels, cats and pretty much anything that runs away; but since they aren't self aware, do they have free will?

 

I am acting of free will when I am allowed to choose the cauliflower, and am not forced to eat Brussels sprouts.

 

 

Are you?

 

I have a friend that has a serious eating disorder, his diet consists of pasta, potatoes and toast (with either butter, cheese or baked beans), he has yet to be forced to eat anything else.

[Eise]

My dogs are unique (in every way a human is), but they're still dogs and, despite their differences, will all bark at the postman and chase squirrels, cats and pretty much anything that runs away; but since they aren't self aware, do they have free will?

 

Uniqueness has nothing to do with it. E.g. suppose 90% of the people like beer. Does that mean I am not free when I want to drink a beer, and can actually do it?

 

If dogs have free will is an interesting question. If you simply apply my definition, then I would say yes. Of course much less pronounced than we, but still. If you can force a dog to do something he normally would not do, e.g you force him in a very small dog kennel, threatening to beat him with a stick, then obviously you artificially restrict the capability to act according his own motivations.

However, there is also another viewpoint, which is reflected in your question ('since they aren't self aware'). Suppose this is really the case, they are not self aware. Then an important difference between humans and dogs is that humans have, at least in principle, the capability to act out of reasons they are aware of. The Dutch reclaimed land from the sea, because they found they had not enough land for agriculture. This of course is a long planning process, and the exact way how to realise this highly depends on the reasons you have. But a dog does not has this capability (we assume here: no self-awareness). To say it another way: the dog acts for a reason (trees grow tall also for a reason), but they do not act because they are aware of this reason.

 

So, I don't know where I exactly stand: I have had two dogs myself, and I am inclined to say that they have a bit of free will. But definitely less than we do.

 

Now I think I can predict what iNow and you will say: we can be completely wrong about our reasons. We can be manipulated, and everything is a rationalisation in hindsight. I simply do not believe that. You can set up situation where this is true, but I perfectly well know why I fetched a bottle of red wine from my cellar: because my son made lasagne, and I know I love to drink red wine with lasagne. So I acted from a reason, and I know the reason beforehand.

 

I have a friend that has a serious eating disorder, his diet consists of pasta, potatoes and toast (with either butter, cheese or baked beans), he has yet to be forced to eat anything else.

 

I do not understand: you say he is forced to eat other stuff. So it means his free will is partially and intentionally restricted. People too often do not want to do what rationally seen would be the best.

Edited March 14, 2017 by Eise

[Strange]

What control do you have over the chemical processes responsible for your sense of self and the postdictive illusion of choice? By your own logic, absent that you absolutely lack freewill.

 

That set of chemical processes is you; the you that has free will.

[Eise]

That set of chemical processes is you; the you that has free will.

 

Yep. The complete set, not just some subset in the brain.

[Bender]

I have a friend that has a serious eating disorder, his diet consists of pasta, potatoes and toast (with either butter, cheese or baked beans), he has yet to be forced to eat anything else.

So anyone without an eating disorder is free to decide what to eat. Even your friend is free to choose between pasta, potatoes and toast.

[iNow]

That set of chemical processes is you; the you that has free will.

I don't disagree that it's me. I disagree that it's properly described as free.

 

I've just driven a thousand miles with a cargo trailer attached, so apologies for the crude analogy, but...

 

It's as if someone asked what's responsible for the spinning wheels on a vehicle. Eise's position is akin to arguing that the car is responsible. My position is akin to arguing that such an approach is far too simplistic to be useful, that it's better to acknowledge that the wheels spin due to a complex interplay between the engine and the transmission, and that even then it's silly to suggest the engine is responsible or in control since it's only moving due to the underlying chemical reactions (combustion).

[Eise]

I've just driven a thousand miles with a cargo trailer attached, so apologies for the crude analogy, but...

 

It's as if someone asked what's responsible for the spinning wheels on a vehicle. Eise's position is akin to arguing that the car is responsible. My position is akin to arguing that such an approach is far too simplistic to be useful, that it's better to acknowledge that the wheels spin due to a complex interplay between the engine and the transmission, and that even then it's silly to suggest the engine is responsible or in control since it's only moving due to the underlying chemical reactions (combustion).

 

No, no, no. Stop fantasying what I think. Really, you still have not understood what I am arguing for. Nowhere I said, or even implied, that I am responsible for what my neurons are doing.

 

I have the feeling I have said it already a hundred times: my critique on your position against free will and control, is that you apply these concepts it on the wrong level: on subsystems of the brain, or even on chemical reactions. And now you do as if I make this error.

 

I repeat it: every time you see me using the words 'free will' and 'control' you fill in your own meaning of the words, and so my position seems absurd to you. But my critique on your viewpoint is that your use of these words is wrong. And I do not just say it: I gave arguments for it.

 

So please first get a good rest of your trip, then reread my postings, and then point your arguments against my position, and not the straw man you create again and again by mixing my viewpoint with yours.

Edited March 15, 2017 by Eise

[Argent]

 

No, no, no. Stop fantasying what I think. Really, you still have not understood what I am arguing for. Nowhere I said, or even implied, that I am responsible for what my neurons are doing.

 

I have the feeling I have said it already a hundred times: my critique on your position against free will and control, is that you apply these concepts it on the wrong level: on subsystems of the brain, or even on chemical reactions. And now you do as if I make this error.

 

I repeat it: every time you see me using the words 'free will' and 'control' you fill in your own meaning of the words, and so my position seems absurd to you. But my critique on your viewpoint is that your use of these words is wrong. And I do not just say it: I gave arguments for it.

 

So please first get a good rest of your trip, then reread my postings, and then point your arguments against my position, and not the straw man you create again and again by mixing my viewpoint with yours.

The difficulty is that you appear to be using the words free will, and perhaps also control, in a completely different sense to how I have ever seen them used in informal discussion, or scholarly writing. Perhaps this is because I have not read widely enough. Or perhaps it is because you have chosen a personal set of definitions then failed to attach a very large warning sign to them.

[Eise]

The difficulty is that you appear to be using the words free will, and perhaps also control, in a completely different sense to how I have ever seen them used in informal discussion, or scholarly writing. Perhaps this is because I have not read widely enough. Or perhaps it is because you have chosen a personal set of definitions then failed to attach a very large warning sign to them.

 

I do not think that I use them so differently. The simplest definition of free will is that you can do what you want. If people say, no we can't, because we are determined, I say that they use another, pretty absurd definition of free will: that you can want what you want.

 

It is only when some kind of neurologists and misguided philosophers uncritically take over this absurd definition, and 'go metaphysical' with it, that we get into a free will problem. And then this problem is e.g. 'solved' by saying that free will is just an illusion.

 

As I said earlier, I think the whole confusion is historically a remnant of Christian theology: that we have souls, that freely, uncaused themselves, can interfere with the causal universe. This is an absurd idea, of course, but most of us still feel this way. That is an illusion, but it doesn't touch the simple definition of free will, to be able to do what you want.

 

Now this definition is a bit simple, and therefore I proposed a bit more technical one:

 

A person is said to have free will if he is able to act according his own motivations.

 

This stresses the point that the difference between a free and a non-free action is not that the first one would be determined, and the secondly 'free'. Of course not: both are determined. But the correct opposition is that between a free action, and a coerced action.

 

An even more technical definition is the following:

 

A person is said to have free will if he recognises his action as in agreement with his own motivations.

 

This implies that we might be wrong: we might be manipulated, and it could turn out that somebody manipulated me. But grosso modo, this is not the case in daily life. And also, we should not make the error to apply this on the inner workings of the brain. Persons are free or not. You do not find persons in the brain. You find a person in his talking, his actions, thoughts, feelings, etc. The concepts of free or coerced do not apply at the physical level. One does not understand an article by studying the chemical components of the ink with which it is printed.

Edited March 15, 2017 by Eise

[Strange]

that it's better to acknowledge that the wheels spin due to a complex interplay between the engine and the transmission, and that even then it's silly to suggest the engine is responsible or in control since it's only moving due to the underlying chemical reactions (combustion).

 

 

And that is pretty much what I am saying about how a set of chemical reactions can have consciousness and free will. It is a complex interplay of reactions that cause an effect that then changes the reactions that are taking place. Form that emerges "you", your (possibly illusory) sense of consciousness, and your freedom to choose what to do.

 

You seem to be thinking that there is a one directional, one-dimensional and deterministic progress from chemistry to result. That is too naive. There are complex interactions at and between all levels.

 

Your position seems to be similar to those who say that a computer can never be conscious because it is a machine that just does what it is told. That is too naive, in exactly the same way.

[iNow]

Again, our agreement seems robust. I'm primarily challenging the suggestion of freedom.

I'm fine if others disagree, but my conclusion right now is that this freedom is an illusion.

The chronological separation of brain processing between unconscious and executive areas seems to support this.

Work in the field of choice also seems to support this.

 

http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v18/n3/full/nrn.2017.7.html

 

I agree it's entirely possible for AI to become conscious. That doesn't affect my stance that calling it "free" is abuse of the term.

[Bender]

The chronological separation does not support it. It is not because we only become aware of a decision later that it is not a decision we want to make.

 

Our preprocessing obeys our motivations.

 

Other than that, you are free to disagree based on your discussion with Eise, but these elements don't favour one view over the other.

Edited March 15, 2017 by Bender

[iNow]

And yet even your "wants" can be manipulated by the structure of the choice.

 

It's the classic example of opt-in versus opt-out choices. If I make you check a box to donate organs at death, odds are better that you won't. However, if I make you check a box to opt-out of donating organs at death, chances are significantly higher that you will.

 

Your wants were manipulated by the mere structure of the question and it was done completely unaware to you, and that's before we even get into the messy weeds of your underlying neurochemistry.

 

Perhaps I've done a poor job supporting my position. I'm only peripherally interested in this topic anyway, so I apologize to all if you who are more engaged on the subject. I acknowledge that's not fair to you, but all evidence suggests we lack the control over our wants and choices that you seem to think we have. It changes nothing about our day to day experiences since it's always been this way,., it's all we've ever known... but this sense of control and freedom to which you each appear to so passionately cling very much appears to be a constructed postdictive narrative, what I've been calling an illusion.

Edited March 15, 2017 by iNow

[Strange]

And yet even your "wants" can be manipulated by the structure of the choice.

 

 

It is still your choice. If a salesman persuades you to buy their product, it is still your choice.

 

I suppose, even if they hold a gun to your head, it is still your choice.

 

If they deliver a new car you have never heard of, and then take the money out of your bank, then that probably isn't an example of free will!

[iNow]

Me, as an organic bag of water, bones, and chemicals, owns the choice, sure...but if my executive functions were only engaged after the fact and if the parts of my brain that generate my sense of self and nowness and consciousness merely come up with a narrative to explain a "choice" that was already made before reaching those areas, then it cannot rightly be said that it was done freely any more than it can said that oxygen "freely chooses" to interact with hydrogen when forming water.

[Strange]

Me, as an organic bag of water, bones, and chemicals, owns the choice, sure...but if my executive functions were only engaged after the fact

 

 

They weren't. You just were not consciously aware of it before. (Because that would be too confusing.)

[iNow]

And if it wasn't my conscious self, then how can it be said I did so freely and controlled the decision?

Edited March 15, 2017 by iNow

[Delta1212]

And if it wasn't my conscious self, then how can it be said I did so freely and controlled the decision?

Depends on how you define the self. One of the things we have is the capability to self-monitor our thoughts. If the self-monitoring function is the totality of what you think of as "you" then yes, your free will is limited to possibly some circumstantial override functions that allow you to block decisions. Otherwise you are a prisoner looking out of the window as some other entity drivers the truck and tricks you into thinking that it's you doing the steering.

 

On the other hand, it could be you making all of the decisions and it just takes a bit of extra time from when you make a decision to collect your thoughts, so to speak, and process them in a way that allows you to self-monitor those decisions.

 

A bit like a signal delay that your brain automatically filters out in the same way it filters out the blind spot in your vision from where the optic nerve is.

 

Then what you are really experiencing is not an illusion of control but a functionally more representative version of what is actually going on.

 

If the thoughts you think are simply the end results of your actual thoughts served up after processing in a more easily analyzed form, then it's not terribly surprising that there is a delay from when those thoughts "actually occur" and when you become fully conscious of having them.

 

After all, I know where the end of this sentence is going as soon as I start it even though I haven't immediately finished thinking "out loud."

[Eise]

Perhaps I've done a poor job supporting my position.

 

No, you did not. But you did very poor in reacting on the position of others.

 

I'm only peripherally interested in this topic anyway, so I apologize to all if you who are more engaged on the subject. I acknowledge that's not fair to you,

 

Well, it is not fair if people do not agree with you that you are not even interested in understanding their viewpoint and countering their arguments. Nearly always your only reaction on my postings was giving your viewpoint in slightly other words again: not countering my arguments.

 

but all evidence suggests we lack the control over our wants and choices that you seem to think we have.

 

I do not think that. So you really did not understand one word of what I have been arguing for.

 

And yet even your "wants" can be manipulated by the structure of the choice.

 

It's the classic example of opt-in versus opt-out choices. If I make you check a box to donate organs at death, odds are better that you won't. However, if I make you check a box to opt-out of donating organs at death, chances are significantly higher that you will.

 

No doubt we can be lured. But that is not the point. Our standpoints are influenced by external factors. Many, maybe even most of them, are unconscious. But if I can do what I want, recognise what I did as not coerced, then it was a free action. If I afterwards recognise that I was manipulated, I will say it was not of free will. So I can be mistaken. But that does not suffice to say we have no free will at all. Many of my daily choices are not not influenced in this way at all.

 

Of course, I like coffee, and if I was not born in a culture where drinking coffee is a normal daily ritual, I wouldn't do it. My will is of course a product of my genes, of my cultural, biological and personal history. But the possibility for this will to express itself in actions is the point where we can decide if these actions were free or coerced. This is the place where the concept of free will can be applied. Definitely not in the brain itself. So forget about the biochemistry. It has nothing to do with it.

 

And I think you should come with a better example. I would react exactly as you describe: but consciously and on good grounds.

 

You behave like what I call 'a scientist on Sundays'. During his work, the scientist works very precisely, and does not jump to conclusions he knows that are not fully supported by his (empirical or logical) evidence. But on Sundays he is free, via unsupported extrapolations, to extend his scientific findings to the universe and everything. At this moment he becomes deaf to rational arguments and does not behave better than any believer. He has become a devotee of scientism.

 

Scientism may refer to science applied "in excess". The term scientism can apply in either of two senses:

• To indicate the improper usage of science or scientific claims. This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply,[such as when the topic is perceived as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to claims made by scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. This can be a counterargument to appeals to scientific authority. It can also address the attempt to apply "hard science" methodology and claims of certainty to the social sciences, which Friedrich Hayek described in The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) as being impossible, because that methodology involves attempting to eliminate the "human factor", while social sciences (including his own field of economics) center almost purely on human action.
• To refer to "the belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry", or that "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective" with a concomitant "elimination of the psychological dimensions of experience".

 

Just to add: I am not anti-science, not at all. If you think that, then it is clear again that you haven't understood what I am arguing for.

Edited March 16, 2017 by Eise

[Strange]

And if it wasn't my conscious self, then how can it be said I did so freely and controlled the decision?

 

 

I didn't say it wasn't your conscious self (whatever that means).

 

But I see Delta1212 has answered far better than I could ...

[iNow]

If the thoughts you think are simply the end results of your actual thoughts served up after processing in a more easily analyzed form, then it's not terribly surprising that there is a delay from when those thoughts "actually occur" and when you become fully conscious of having them.

We agree that there is a delay. We experience the cosmos as it was, not as it is. That's peripheral to my suggestion that executive function and conscious awareness are required for it to be rightly described as free or within our "control."

 

We are not ship captains with our hand on the rudder, but are instead drifters being carried by a multitude of currents and proverbial wind gusts. The storm (in this context, that storm is chemoelectrical and expressed across the neural web) controls us, not the other way around.

 

After all, I know where the end of this sentence is going as soon as I start it even though I haven't immediately finished thinking "out loud."

Much more likely is that specific neural pathways have been etched and fortified, processing speeds improved and myelin layers added since you've been practicing forming and expressing coherent thoughts since your infancy, like continued rains eroding a channel down the hillside....the water doesn't actually know where it's flowing ahead of time...it just flows and follows least resistant paths, but that's peripheral to our discussion.

[Bender]

We are not ship captains with our hand on the rudder, but are instead drifters being carried by a multitude of currents and proverbial wind gusts. The storm (in this context, that storm is chemoelectrical and expressed across the neural web) controls us, not the other way around.

Ship captains do not have their hand on the rudder. They map out the course ahead of time (motivation), and notice the ship going in the correct direction after the navigator turns the rudder.

[iNow]

Yeah. It was an analogy, poetic license intended. The point remains.