Is metadata private?

[proximity1]

"The Supreme Court has concluded that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in being observed in public. In 1983, in United States v. Knotts, the Court held that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy when the government tracks their movements outside their home."

 

Which is what I have been saying.

 

Your quote talks about what the law should do — it says that if you want to narrow this scope, you have to change the law to reflect that desire.

 

Was this meant to rebut anything I've been saying? Because it agrees with me.

 

"Was this meant to rebut anything I've been saying?"

 

Yes. It's an example of the flagrant nonsense inherent in an utterly ridiculous and unworkable judicial "test", one which, in its wildly varying applications, produces results which range across the spectrum of the human capacity to produce policy horrors through an application of rational concepts which ignore actual principles in living practice.

 

The view you defend is unmistakably clear:

 

in so far as the people's rights, per the Fourth Amendment, "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," are concerned, the Fourth Amendment "preserves" a "right" which is completely at the mercy of technology's limits, a right which is a mere appendage, the "left-overs" from technology's ravages of privacy. We are, by that view, all helpless hostages to whatever may come next in the relentless "advance" of technological "progress."

 

Taken to their logical conclusions, that constitutes a totalitarian conception of technology's role in all our lives, leaving us in conditions which make those in Orwell's picture of life in "Oceania" enviable by contrast. Indeed, Orwell's novel, "1984," is woefully inadequte as a fictional alert to the potentialities of future totalitarian society. Our own conditions already admit of an insidiousness that Orwell didn't conceive of.

 

You are taking positions which--no matter how you deny or attempt to excuse it-- leave open and unchallenged the doorway to this present-and-future nightmare--one which cannot fail to reduce scientists and the pursuit of science to a begging serfdom in the face of an all-powerful state, the very product of scientists' own blindness to the fundamental importance of limits on technological applications of scientific discoveries. Once this situation reaches full-flower, scientists will find themselves in the grips of the just-desserts of their current blindness.

 

RE:

"Your quote talks about what the law should do — it says that if you want to narrow this scope, you have to change the law to reflect that desire. "

 

No, it does more than "talk about what the law should do". It proceeds, as your views do not, from the understanding that the Fourth Amendment's authority preceeded all of the case-law and the acts of Congress which, since the 1920s, have so consistently undermined it. The quote recognizes, as your views do not, that Supreme Court decisions (and their authors) can and do suffer from human frailties and human faults in deliberately or inadvertently reasoning in ways which have repeatedly been seen to corrupt, distort and subvert plain meanings in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. After all, Katz v. United States overturned (forty years later!!!) Olmstead v. United States .

 

There is no need to "change the law to reflect that desire" since "that desire" is to return to a respect for the pre-existing terms and conditions of the Fourth Amendment.

Edited June 22, 2013 by proximity1

[overtone]

 

I have backed up my findings with links to the supreme court decisions, so this is hardly "my assertion".

Not your assertion, but the assertion - of whoever is making the argument, up to and including the Supreme Court.

 

 

If one cop strolls through the playground and gives everyone the
once-over to see that everything is OK, is fine, and perhaps reassuring.
If 100 cops were doing it, it would be creepy. But it's not a
violation of your rights.

If those cops were following you around wherever you went, standing close enough to overhear all your conversations and calls, looking over your shoulder at your screen in all public venues including commercial dealings on other people's property (dentist's office, lawyer's office), I think you would feel your rights were being violated. I would.

 

 

As was partly established in Minnesota with the vehicle and driver's license info,
To what are you referring? I'm not familiar with this issue.

You've replied to a couple of the four or five other posts in which I referred to it, described it in detail, etc - the abuse of driver and vehicle license info by agents of the government of Minnesota. Various people were essentially stalked, their lives monitored, their expectation of privacy violated.

 

The key point was that this possibility was recognized as abusive, and policies established for its discovery, punishment, and redress. No secrecy was allowed - accessing this public data was not allowed to be anonymous or "classified", permanent records of such access were kept and made available to affected parties, and this prevented greater harm.

 

If this kind of file compiling is truly of public info, without any expectation of anonymity and privacy whatsoever , then there is no good reason for keeping the files and methods secret, eh? The secret police seem to have a very high expectation of privacy in their compilations - that seems a contradiction.

 

 

there
is nothing obviously false about the claim that people have a
reasonable and legally enforceable expectation that agents of their
government will not use its power to follow them around, obtain
"metadata" from their phone calls, obtain and compile their entire use
of the internet, aggregate and compile and analyze information about
their entire life as detectable from any location outside the walls of
their house,

on the grounds (among others) that such behavior by
such agents is in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable or unwarranted search and seizure, and an invasion of
privacy, and a bad thing to allow.

Some of that is obviously false, and I've provided the links to demonstrate that.

You will have to be a bit more specific - I can't find anything in my post that any of your links have even dealt with.

[swansont]

"Was this meant to rebut anything I've been saying?"

 

Yes. It's an example of the flagrant nonsense inherent in an utterly ridiculous and unworkable judicial "test", one which, in its wildly varying applications, produces results which range across the spectrum of the human capacity to produce policy horrors through an application of rational concepts which ignore actual principles in living practice.

 

The view you defend is unmistakably clear:

The "view" I've "defended" is that the current law of the land says that metadata is not private. Since that's not so much a view as a fact, and every time you post a counterargument, you quote something that says that the current law says that metadata is not private.

 

 

You are taking positions which--no matter how you deny or attempt to excuse it-- leave open and unchallenged the doorway to this present-and-future nightmare--one which cannot fail to reduce scientists and the pursuit of science to a begging serfdom in the face of an all-powerful state, the very product of scientists' own blindness to the fundamental importance of limits on technological applications of scientific discoveries. Once this situation reaches full-flower, scientists will find themselves in the grips of the just-desserts of their current blindness.

I am taking a position that, whether we currently like it or not, the laws passed by the government are our laws, and the rulings of the supreme court tell us what is or is not constitutional. If we want to change what is legal, we need to change the laws, and if we want the constitutionality of it to change, the court needs to come to a new decision.

 

I am NOT taking the position that these do not need to change.

 

 

RE:

 

No, it does more than "talk about what the law should do". It proceeds, as your views do not, from the understanding that the Fourth Amendment's authority preceeded all of the case-law and the acts of Congress which, since the 1920s, have so consistently undermined it. The quote recognizes, as your views do not, that Supreme Court decisions (and their authors) can and do suffer from human frailties and human faults in deliberately or inadvertently reasoning in ways which have repeatedly been seen to corrupt, distort and subvert plain meanings in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. After all, Katz v. United States overturned (forty years later!!!) Olmstead v. United States .

 

There is no need to "change the law to reflect that desire" since "that desire" is to return to a respect for the pre-existing terms and conditions of the Fourth Amendment.

Once again, you confirm I'm right. If we need to return to some earlier interpretation of the fourth amendment then the current interpretation is that metadata is not private, and the system needs to change.

 

I'm also getting a little tired of you telling me what my views are.

 

If those cops were following you around wherever you went, standing close enough to overhear all your conversations and calls, looking over your shoulder at your screen in all public venues including commercial dealings on other people's property (dentist's office, lawyer's office), I think you would feel your rights were being violated. I would.

 

Feeling like your rights have been violated is not the same as actually having them violated. Case in point: all of this.

 

You've replied to a couple of the four or five other posts in which I referred to it, described it in detail, etc - the abuse of driver and vehicle license info by agents of the government of Minnesota. Various people were essentially stalked, their lives monitored, their expectation of privacy violated.

 

You've mentioned it, but no, not really in detail. You said cops were accessing information and compiling lists. Not even enough for me to reasonably Google if I wanted to look it up myself.

 

 

You will have to be a bit more specific - I can't find anything in my post that any of your links have even dealt with.

 

You specifically mentioned phone metadata. Legal and constitutional.

[proximity1]

RE:

"Once again, you confirm I'm right. If we need to return to some earlier
interpretation of the fourth amendment then the current interpretation
is that metadata is not private, and the system needs to change."

 

No.

 

The issue isn't "metadata" and isn't about asking,

"is 'metadata' 'private' or not under the 'Reasonable expectation of Privacy' test".

 

The issue, the problem, is that what you call "the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" is a figment of your imagination. There is no "current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" since any such depends upon another figment of your imagination: a 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy' court test (ennuciated in Katz v. United States, in 1967), which is, itself , "unstable" (Sherry Colb),"illogical" (Gerald G. Ashdown), engenders "pandemonium" (Richard G. Wilkins), "is in a state of theoretical chaos" (Donald R.C. Pongrace).

 

That's not a "system". It's a faulty legal theory and a faulty manner of reasoning about the Fourth Amendment. For the court to suddenly come to the "recognition" that, now, "metadata is, by an examination of the (so-called) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy test "private" would not "reform the system" it would simply apply it again with a different result based on the same faulty foundations as were previously used to arrive at the nonsensee that "metadata" is "not private".

 

No reform of a system is needed. We need not "climb o'er the house to unlock the little gate". We just need to drop the foolishness of Katz v. United States, with its illusory " 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test".

Edited June 23, 2013 by proximity1

[iNow]

The issue, the problem, is that what you call "the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" is a figment of your imagination. There is no "current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment since any such must current depend upon another figment of your imagination

Leaving aside for a moment the unnecessary vitriol and venom underlying your comment, this doesn't make sense to me a tall. Of course this is about interpretation.

 

All constitutional provisions are subject to interpretation, which is why we have a supreme court in place specifically to assist with those interpretations and to help decide on matters such as this. To argue that interpretation is no a factor misses the fact that supreme court justices themselves often disagree on matters of constitutionality and why we rely on majority opinion for the final decision.

 

Further, the aforementioned justices have, in fact, already decided on this issue regarding metadata specifically, and they agreed it was not subject to reasonable privacy expectations. When they did so, it was AFTER the 1967 Katz case. For this reason, we must logically assume their decision already includes the Katz precedent of reasonable privacy expectations you cited.

 

Your position doesn't make sense, and acting all bratty and aggro about it won't change that. Lots of us here think the laws should change in this new age to better accommodate our technology and to enhance the relationship between the government and the people... but to sit here arguing that it's already illegal or unconstitutional suggests that perhaps you've let your emotions on this issue overrule your reason and rationality.

[proximity1]

Leaving aside for a moment the unnecessary vitriol and venom underlying your comment, this doesn't make sense to me a tall. Of course this is about interpretation.

 

All constitutional provisions are subject to interpretation, which is why we have a supreme court in place specifically to assist with those interpretations and to help decide on matters such as this. To argue that interpretation is no a factor misses the fact that supreme court justices themselves often disagree on matters of constitutionality and why we rely on majority opinion for the final decision.

 

Further, the aforementioned justices have, in fact, already decided on this issue regarding metadata specifically, and they agreed it was not subject to reasonable privacy expectations. When they did so, it was AFTER the 1967 Katz case. For this reason, we must logically assume their decision already includes the Katz precedent of reasonable privacy expectations you cited.

 

Your position doesn't make sense, and acting all bratty and aggro about it won't change that. Lots of us here think the laws should change in this new age to better accommodate our technology and to enhance the relationship between the government and the people... but to sit here arguing that it's already illegal or unconstitutional suggests that perhaps you've let your emotions on this issue overrule your reason and rationality.

 

Of course this is about interpretation.

 

All constitutional provisions are subject to interpretation, which is why we have a supreme court in place specifically to assist with those interpretations and to help decide on matters such as this. To argue that interpretation is no a factor misses the fact that supreme court justices themselves often disagree on matters of constitutionality and why we rely on majority opinion for the final decision.

 

Further, the aforementioned justices have, in fact, already decided on this issue regarding metadata specifically, and they agreed it was not subject to reasonable privacy

expectations. When they did so, it was AFTER the 1967 Katz case. For this reason, we must logically assume their decision already includes the Katz precedent of reasonable privacy expectations you cited.

 

Did you even bother to read any of the linked papers?

 

Since Katz, all the Court's deliberations concerning the Fourth Amendment turn strictly and solely upon an examination of their Almighty 'Reasonable expectation of privacy' test" --leaving aside, in that way, any direct address of the terms and the principles of the amendment. This amounts to judicial thought-saving short cuts and it has lead to the complete chaos in theory and in application which the authors named above have taken pains to point out in their articles.

 

RE:

the aforementioned justices have, in fact, already decided on this issue

regarding metadata specifically, and they agreed it was not subject to

reasonable privacy expectations. When they did so, it was AFTER the

1967 Katz case.

 

For this reason, we must logically assume their decision

already includes the Katz precedent of reasonable privacy expectations

you cited.

 

True, it certainly does 'include the Katz precedent---i.e. a narrow and blind application of the illusory "reasonable expectation of privacy" test --Which makes my point for me. Thank you.

 

In taking up each new Fourth Amendment controversy, the court simply asks itself: 'Okay, in light of the evolutions in technology, what now are our notions of what it is reasonable to suppose may be "expected" "private" on the part of the public? "

 

---and, with that, the Court dispenses handily with any meaningful consideration of the meaning and import of the Fourth Amendment as it concerns the techonological developments which have brought a controvsery to their bench.

 

 

 

----------------------------------------------

The following, cited by Solove, (2010) Note 63, page 15224 of "Fourth Amendment Pragmatism" (Boston College Law Review) :

 

"Fourth Amendment doctrine... is circular, for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that area would be unreasonable." (Michael Abramowicz)

 

(Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, (1979)) wherein Posner is "...arguing that whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is 'circular' because 'such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is."

Edited June 23, 2013 by proximity1

[iNow]

Not sure how any of that is relevant to the point I made.

[proximity1]

Not sure how any of that is relevant to the point I made.

You asserted,

 

"All constitutional provisions are subject to interpretation, which is

why we have a supreme court in place specifically to assist with those

interpretations and to help decide on matters such as this."

 

Of course they're "subject to interpretation," but, as many cited legal scholars have written, argued and pointed out, the Court can also, quite improperly, simply apply a short-cut to interpreting "Constitutional provision" and apply instead, some supposedly handy rule of thumb, such as the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" "Test"--- an artful exercise in judicial self-deception, and expressly described by Solove as "game playing".

[iNow]

And? It's still constitutional if they say so. What's your point, exactly?

[swansont]

RE:

 

 

No.

 

The issue isn't "metadata" and isn't about asking,

"is 'metadata' 'private' or not under the 'Reasonable expectation of Privacy' test".

 

The issue, the problem, is that what you call "the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" is a figment of your imagination. There is no "current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" since any such depends upon another figment of your imagination: a 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy' court test (ennuciated in Katz v. United States, in 1967), which is, itself , "unstable" (Sherry Colb),"illogical" (Gerald G. Ashdown), engenders "pandemonium" (Richard G. Wilkins), "is in a state of theoretical chaos" (Donald R.C. Pongrace).

I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational.

[overtone]

 

I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court
gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is,
frankly, irrational.

The Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of reality. Beyond the deliberately narrow effect of many of their rullings, they make mistakes, and in some obvious cases we can acknowledge them (some human beings have melanistic skin, joint stock corporations are not people with Conbstitutional rights, we have some reasonable expectations of privacy even in our public doings, etc).

 

The OP is not a request for narrow and legalistic scholarship establishing the probabilities of the current US Supreme Court's rulings on hypothetical specific cases, eh?

 

And even in such narrow terms, the prediction is not certain - we do, as others have pointed out, have reason to suspect the Court might rule somewhat differently than implied by some of its past rulings in a completely informed and documented case of these NSA operations. We suspect that is a motive behind the overclassification and rigid insistence on secrecy of an apparently misbehaving government - they share our suspicions of how this would look in daylight, to a Supreme Court or anyone else.

 

 

Feeling like your rights have been violated is not the same as actually having them violated

So we are in agreement that everyone here - and essentially any sane and reasonable person - would feel as if their rights had been violated by some kinds of government handling of public "metadata".

 

 

You've mentioned it, but no, not really in detail. You said cops were accessing information and compiling lists

I said government employees had been discovered accessing puiblic information in ways the general public - everybody, essentiallly - found improper and an abusive violoation the expectations of individual citizens. The temptation of such behavior was so obvious and the abusive nature of it was so clear that official pollicies had ben established in advance forbidding it, and the potential for violating these policies had been deliberately reduced by preventing secrecy in the matter.

 

No such precautions have been taken in the NSA surveillance program. The likelihood of government behavior that any sane and reasonable person would recognize as a violation of the rights people expect is therefore much greater.

[swansont]

The Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of reality. Beyond the deliberately narrow effect of many of their rullings, they make mistakes, and in some obvious cases we can acknowledge them (some human beings have melanistic skin, joint stock corporations are not people with Conbstitutional rights, we have some reasonable expectations of privacy even in our public doings, etc).

 

Until those errors are corrected, those of us in the US have to abide by the rulings. So right now, corporations are being afforded rights whether we like it or not and metadata are not private, whether we like it or not. If you are one of the people that don't like it, you can wait for the system to change it from within, by hoping the court will overturn previous rulings, or you can pressure lawmakers to change what's legal.

 

 

The OP is not a request for narrow and legalistic scholarship establishing the probabilities of the current US Supreme Court's rulings on hypothetical specific cases, eh?

 

I clarified what I was discussing in a later post.

 

 

And even in such narrow terms, the prediction is not certain - we do, as others have pointed out, have reason to suspect the Court might rule somewhat differently than implied by some of its past rulings in a completely informed and documented case of these NSA operations. We suspect that is a motive behind the overclassification and rigid insistence on secrecy of an apparently misbehaving government - they share our suspicions of how this would look in daylight, to a Supreme Court or anyone else.

 

I have serious doubts, and we still have to wait until after such a challenge was made.

 

So we are in agreement that everyone here - and essentially any sane and reasonable person - would feel as if their rights had been violated by some kinds of government handling of public "metadata".

 

Yes. It's creepy, but as I stated in my example, for me it's the scale that makes it creepy and as I've said elsewhere it's the distrust of the government with the data and no credible oversight, because the fisa court appears to be a joke.

 

 

I said government employees had been discovered accessing puiblic information in ways the general public - everybody, essentiallly - found improper and an abusive violoation the expectations of individual citizens. The temptation of such behavior was so obvious and the abusive nature of it was so clear that official pollicies had ben established in advance forbidding it, and the potential for violating these policies had been deliberately reduced by preventing secrecy in the matter.

 

Without the details, though, it's impossible for me to see if the data collection was the problem, or the use of it.

 

The details are important, because if you don't identify where the actual transgressions occur, you may apply the wrong fix and end up not changing anything.

 

No such precautions have been taken in the NSA surveillance program. The likelihood of government behavior that any sane and reasonable person would recognize as a violation of the rights people expect is therefore much greater.

 

That's not entirely true. Even the NSA has rules they are supposed to follow, we just have no way of knowing that they are following them.

http://m.guardiannews.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/21/obama-national-security-state-rogue

 

 

We know, for example, that the NSA is required to abide by laws that prevent the international targeting of American citizens (you can read more about that here). So, while metadata about phone calls made can be used to discover information about the individuals making the calls, there are "minimization" rules, procedures and laws that guide the use of such data and prevent possible abuse and misuse of protected data.

The minimization procedures used by the NSA are controlled by secret Fisa courts. In fact, last year, the Fisa court ruled that these procedures didn't pass constitutional muster and had to be rewritten.

[proximity1]

 

I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational.

 

RE: "I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

 

ignores this, which I posted above and you ignored:

 

 

The issue, the problem, is that what you call "the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" is a figment of your imagination. There is no "current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" since any such depends upon another figment of your imagination: a 'ReasonableExpectation of Privacy' court test (ennuciated in Katz v. United States, in 1967), which is, itself , "unstable" (Sherry Colb),"illogical" (Gerald G. Ashdown), engenders "pandemonium" (Richard G. Wilkins), "is in a state of theoretical chaos" (Donald R.C. Pongrace).

 

Previously, (@78) you'd asserted, "The "view" I've "defended" is that the current law of the land says that metadata is not private."

 

But, with the support of numerous legal scholars, I've shown these scholars explaining that the Court's rulings aren't coherent, consistent, and don't, taken together constitute what can be called "current law of the land" on the issues involved here. This is because the Court has no unifying theory on which it bases its analyses of its sacrosanct "reasonable expectation 'test'", instead, every case is an ad hoc cobble-work of confused rationalizations. That is why it is idle to argue as you do that there is something which can be called "current law" which affords a lawyer or a legal scholar with a hope of guessing correctly how the Court might determine the next twist in its erratic path. You've ignored all that and retreated into strawman responses--when you respond at all:

 

(@ 85) "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

That's a strawman retort since no one here has asserted that the Court doesn't "get to decide what's constitutional and, thus, there is no "argument to the contrary." (Please, otherwise, show where I or anyone else has argued 'to the contrary' of "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

 

I thought strawman tactics were forbidden here.

 

And then there's this "gem of reasoning"(@ 70)

 

 

 

« Well, then you and I have some very different opinions about the function of the police. »

 

And this is supposed to advance the discussion how ? The implication here is that an opinion « differing » from yours « about

the function of the police » is something you can use for probative value in this discussion. Would you please explain how that could

be ? Or, to quote you again, (@ 75) « Was this (@70) meant to rebut anything I've been saying? »

Edited June 24, 2013 by proximity1

[swansont]

(@ 85) "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

That's a strawman retort since no one here has asserted that the Court doesn't "get to decide what's constitutional and, thus, there is no "argument to the contrary." (Please, otherwise, show where I or anyone else has argued 'to the contrary' of "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

 

I thought strawman tactics were forbidden here.

 

Strawman tactics, like truncating quotes to change the meaning from the original? Like that?

[proximity1]

Strawman tactics, like truncating quotes to change the meaning from the original? Like that?

 

What's changed? Cite and explain what meaning was changed, if you can, please. And, on the subject of 'truncating'---I wasn't aware that's either a 'fault,' or a an instance of a 'strawman' argument--please explain how that is.

 

ETA: I cited twice, in full, the comment of yours relevant to my post @ 88:

----

 

 

 

 

 

swansont, on 23 Jun 2013 - 20:56, said:

 

 

I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme courtgets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational.

 

RE: "I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

Edited June 24, 2013 by proximity1

[swansont]

What's changed? Cite and explain what meaning was changed, if you can, please. And, on the subject of 'truncating'---I wasn't aware that's either a 'fault,' or a an instance of a 'strawman' argument--please explain how that is.

"I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

Quoting this as "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational." changes the meaning — a strawman — to make it appear that the second sentence is referring to the court's role in determining constitutionality, since there is nothing else quoted. Which presents a position I did not espouse. In the whole quote, one can see that it refers to the reality of the court decisions. (Which was in response to your claim that this is a figment of my imagination). It's one reason why using the quote function preferred.

 

Is this sufficient, or do I need to explain this in more detail?

[proximity1]

 

"I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

Quoting this as "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational." changes the meaning — a strawman — to make it appear that the second sentence is referring to the court's role in determining constitutionality, since there is nothing else quoted. Which presents a position I did not espouse. In the whole quote, one can see that it refers to the reality of the court decisions. (Which was in response to your claim that this is a figment of my imagination). It's one reason why using the quote function preferred.

 

Is this sufficient, or do I need to explain this in more detail?

 

Yes. You do. You can start by explaining how, since I already cited your complete comment IN FULL in the same post, I must again cite it in full rather than addressing a particular aspect of it as that pertains to my point.

 

Then you could actually address the point I have made and from which, by this unsupported contention of yours, you are diverting our attention.

 

I cited you in full. And you've failed to indicate how anything I wrote is in any sense a distortion of the sense and the point of your fully-cited comment.

 

Then you could explain how your comment is other than a strawman assertion which says that somewhere there has been "argument to the contrary of" the fact that "the Supreme Court gets to decide what's constitutional" (ETA) or that anyone has argued that the Court's opinions, case decisions, aren't real. I've already asked you to indicate where anyone in this thread has claimed otherwise, and you've given us no example. So, as it stands, you've asserted a "strawman" in this:

 

""I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly,

irrational."

 

and, when asked to back up--show where there has been any---"Argument to the contrary," you haven't done so.

 

Let me put AGAIN! and explicitly, what you are attempting to pretend wasn't prefectly clear in the first place:

 

My objection is not and never was that the Court's opinions on Fourth Amendment cases "weren't real". I wrote and I contended that these real opinions---cited from sholars' reviews of them!!!--- do not, in the opinions of these same scholars, supported with cases and quotes--amount to what is or can be coherently called a "current law of the land," where you wrote, @ 78:

 

"The "view" I've "defended" is that the current law of the land says that metadata is not private."

 

A reading of the scholars I cite refutes this assertion's having any valid meaning, since the Court's rulings amount to, in their words, unstable, illogical theoretical chaos. That is your "current law of the land" on the only issue the Court takes into consideration:

 

a fanciful "reasonable expectation of privacy 'test'."

 

To that, to these scholars' cited views, you've offered no pertinent reply.

Edited June 24, 2013 by proximity1

[swansont]

 

 

(@ 85) "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

That's a strawman retort since no one here has asserted that the Court doesn't "get to decide what's constitutional and, thus, there is no "argument to the contrary." (Please, otherwise, show where I or anyone else has argued 'to the contrary' of "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

 

 

 

This is what you posted. The quote is truncated. By truncating it you change the meaning, and then claim it's a straw man. (Which it is, but it's your straw man rather than mine)

[proximity1]

This is what you posted. The quote is truncated. By truncating it you change the meaning, and then claim it's a straw man. (Which it is, but it's your straw man rather than mine)

 

My post, (@ 88) contains a direct and complete cite of your words,

 

 

"RE: "I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional."

Nothing was truncated that wasn't, in the very same post of mine, previously cited in full. Do you deny that? Further, had I included AGAIN the previously-cited part, "I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that " it should have changed nothing about my point. And, again, you've failed to show how it does change your comment's meaning.

 

How has the second, truncated, part changed the meaning? How? You have not explained that. Do you deny that?

 

 

You assert, above, ..."The quote is truncated. By truncating it you change the meaning, and then claim it's a straw man. (Which it is, but it's your straw man rather than mine) "

 

I challenge you to back up your claim that ..."By truncating it you change the meaning,"...

 

So show us! Where--I'm asking you again--have you shown how your meaning was changed?

 

A recap:

 

(me) "You can start by explaining how, since I already cited your complete

comment IN FULL in the same post, I must again cite it in full rather

than addressing a particular aspect of it as that pertains to my point."

 

Ignored by you.

 

 

"I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets

to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly,

irrational."

 

 

Quoting this as "the

supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the

contrary is, frankly, irrational." changes the meaning — a strawman — to

make it appear that the second sentence is referring to the court's

role in determining constitutionality, since there is nothing else

quoted. Which presents a position I did not espouse. In the whole quote,

one can see that it refers to the reality of the court decisions.

(Which was in response to your claim that this is a figment of my

imagination). It's one reason why using the quote function preferred.

 

 

Is this sufficient, or do I need to explain this in more detail?

 

You wrote ""I'm pretty sure those court cases are real, and that the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional. Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational." (my emphasis added)

 

Now, you're trying to pretend that "argument to the contrary" refers ONLY to "those cases are real" and NOT also to "the supreme court gets to to decide what's constitutional". Is that your claim? Again, WHERE did anyone argue that "those cases" aren't real--(ETA) or, indeed, for that matter, that the Supreme Court doesn't get to decide what is constitutional ?

 

In writing AND, linking both that "those cases are real" and that "the supreme court gets to decide what's constitutional," the plain meaning of those words is that they are referred to in what follows in the next sentence by argument to the contrary: "Argument to the contrary is, frankly, irrational."

 

So, RE: your "Is this sufficient, or do I need to explain this in more detail?" I repeat:

 

No, it isn't sufficient. You haven't explained how my reading is a change of the plainly evident meaning in the words you wrote. I'm asking you to explain how, as you worded it, both "those cases are real" AND "the supreme court gets to decide" are not clearly included as referents of "Argument to the contrary is...irrational." Where has there been "argument to the contrary"? That is the strawman assertion you make: back up your implied assertion, please, that there has been "argument to the contrary" on either one of these aspects. Otherwise, your claim is bogus.

Edited June 24, 2013 by proximity1

[swansont]

Oh, FFS. You, not anyone else, said

That's a strawman retort since no one here has asserted that the Court doesn't "get to decide what's constitutional and, thus, there is no "argument to the contrary."

 

In other words, you created the straw man argument, in accusing me of a straw man! My claim was not that the court deciding what's constitutional was in question. The "argument to the contrary" was your claim that the court rulings were a figment of my imagination.

 

Argue that the rulings were wrong all you want, argue that they contain contradictions all you want, but my point was they actually exist.

 

And at this point I'm done responding to you.

[overtone]

 

Without the details, though, it's impossible for me to see if the data collection was the problem, or the use of it.

Secrecy in mass or dragnet data collection is a serious problem in itself. It creates uncertainty, an inability to be secure in one's person and possessions, and is a hallmark of abusive authoritarian government. It's not that they are always watching, it's that the citizen cannot tell where or when or what is being compiled, cannot fix mistakes, has no redress for (or even information about) misuse, is completely at the mercy of people they cannot even identify or confront.

 

 

The details are important, because if you don't identify where the

actual transgressions occur, you may apply the wrong fix and end up not

changing anything.

The first step, then, is a revocation of the abusive secrecy.

 

 

 

No

such precautions have been taken in the NSA surveillance program. The

likelihood of government behavior that any sane and reasonable person

would recognize as a violation of the rights people expect is therefore

much greater.

 

That's not entirely true. Even the NSA has rules they are supposed to

follow, we just have no way of knowing that they are following them.

Nor do you know what the rules are. The precautions I noted, with the public info in Minnesota, centrally and specifically forbid secrecy of access - and that was the single most important factor in the discovery and curbing of abuses. the NSA is obviously not taking such precautions - in reason we can only assume abuses are routine and unchecked (the assumption that the US secret police are radically unlike any other such organization that has ever existed is not reasonable).

[proximity1]

Oh, FFS. You, not anyone else, said

 

In other words, you created the straw man argument, in accusing me of a straw man! My claim was not that the court deciding what's constitutional was in question. The "argument to the contrary" was your claim that the court rulings were a figment of my imagination.

 

Argue that the rulings were wrong all you want, argue that they contain contradictions all you want, but my point was they actually exist.

 

And at this point I'm done responding to you.

 

In fact, you barely even began responding to me. With extremely few exceptions, and even fewer which related directly to the thread's substantive issues, you responded barely at all. In addition, your comments do not show the slightest indication that you ever, even for a moment, looked at, considered or took sincere interest in any of the links I posted with suppporting text from legal scholars or the argument I presented, drawn from them.

 

So, if "at this point [you're] done responding to [me], I don't see that that's going to make any significant difference.