my utilitarianism that philosophically resembles empiricism

[MonDie]

I have separated this post into two portions. The first portion is a philosophical argument for the soundness of utilitarian ethics. The second portion just discusses some interesting utilitarian considerations that I couldn't find a place for within the major argument.

---

Utilitarianism is as Rational as Empiricism

When one thinks analytically, they reach conclusions via linguistic and mathematical definitions. These definitions are outlined by criteria. Without criteria, there would be no definitions or language, and no truth; it's an easily justifiable system. However, analytical thought alone won't lead to ethical formulations. A famous example of this deificiency is the ought/is distinction. Any criteria used to identify what ought to be done is inevitably arbitrary, casting "ought" statements outside the realm of truth and falsity. However, analytical thought isn't just insufficient for the purpose of ethical claims, it's insufficient for claims about reality. Essential to the discussion of reality is the discussion of what exists. Although "existence" may seem so intuitive so as to be beyond question, it's not. We need some criterion for determining whether an hypothetical thing would hypothetically "exist" or "be" before we can talk about reality. AFAIK, the only good criteria are empirical, for example: whether the thing (a) has impact upon our senses or (b) is the result of a process that impacts our senses. It's hard to imagine any sort of existence criterion for things that do not impact our senses. The empirical criteria are quite nice, but we should acknowledge that they aren't fundamentally analytical, they're based on intuition.

The chain of analytical criteria derived from other analytical criteria derived from other analytical criteria cannot go on infinitely, so there must be some unanalytical base. Furthermore, language deals in the abstract, but reality is thought to be something more than abstract. In order for language to describe anything other than language itself, there must be some reality-derived criteria. These criteria are our sensations. Without these intuitive criteria, analytical thought just drills an abysmal hole of circularity. Yet Wittgenstein's private language argument makes explicit the unanalytical nature of our sensations. Without any external reference, what criteria could I provide you for the sensation or experience of red? None. Yet, despite this deficiency, I can consistently identify wavelength combinations by this intuitive criteria. Furthermore, just as I can point at a thing in response to the sensation of its color, I can respond with an utterance such as "red". When I make the right utterances in response to various experiences, they become ripe for logical analysis.

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory based on pleasure and pain. Although there are objective definitions of "pleasure" and "pain", they can also be thought of as utterances resulting from brain states. The same goes for words such as "discomfort", "anger", or "happiness". If these utterances have a significant degree of correlation with brain states, they are meaningful. Yet meaning isn't enough, we must prove that "good" and "bad" brain states are somehow ethically relevant. The key lies in "desirability". Although the sociopath can be set on causing pain rather than pleasure, this point would not be lost on them. They still understand one's desire of food and comfort for one's self, if not one's desire of it for someone else. "Desirability" may not be as consistent as color, but an individual can understand what is desirable intuitively; there is enough culture-independent consistency in our use of the term to suggest that there is a right answer as to what is desirable, that desire is not learned. Furthermore, just as sight is useful in wavelength identification, our sense of desirability is useful in empathy. With an understanding of pleasure, I can effectively bring pleasure to others. Of course, pleasure isn't easy to quantify, but bringing pleasure without adverse effects will obviously add to the total amount of pleasure.

Up until now, I have left the notion of desirability unrefined. The above makes sense if we are thinking of e.g. the desirability of a ripe and healthy vegetable, but things change for an issue like addiction. But what seems like a contradiction is only a complication. Our desires can conflict. If a desirable thing is immediately available, we may succumb to the desire for it even though it conflicts with long-term desires. One moment of weakness, of forgetfulness toward our long-term goals, wastes all our efforts at self-control. This applies to everything from appetite & weight loss to crime & jail-time to cocaine & responsibility to lust & emotional fulfillment to suicide & long-term effort. These issues can be framed in terms of "higher order" and "lower order" desires. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher-order_volition It could even be argued that some "pleasures" are merely automatic or impulsive, or that some "pleasures" they don't really please a person except by relieving the discomfort brought about by the desire for it. In such cases, the person may wish to be free of the desire, and it may be better to eliminate the desire through clinical treatment or medication rather than fulfill it repeatedly.

---

Other Interesting Considerations

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist ethics, but deontological ethics can be derived from it. Law enforcement is valuable to the utilitarian because it provides a sense of security and promotes positive behaviors. Furthermore, murder is wrong because it hurts loved ones and takes away the pleasure that the individual would have experienced otherwise. After all, it takes a lot of work to make, nurture, and assimilate a healthy person.

An advantage of utilitarianism is that it bypasses certain prejudices that are manifest in arbitrary morality. For example, if two homosexual men have a brain state similar to that of a man interacting with a woman, the heterosexual cannot argue that his sexual desires are intrinisically superior. The same would apply for interracial sexuality, inter-religious sexuality, etc.

Although this ethical system is atheistic (does not require theism), it would acknowledge the value of "spiritual" states and aesthetics even though the pursuit of such states (through mysticism/superstition) is often regarded as harmfully self-indulgent by the rational thinker, especially when/if it has the potential to produce prejudiced attitudes or lunatic behavior.

 

Lastly, did evolution design morality, or did it merely allow morality to persist because of its beneficial nature?

Edited July 1, 2013 by Mondays Assignment: Die