Designer babies: That old chestnut

[Tridimity]

So, I was thinking recently about the ethics of the principle of so-called designer babies. I know there have been a few (three, to be precise) previous threads on the topic, but they are all a few years old now, and tended to focus a lot on whether or not the deliberate genetic modification of gametes and/or embryos to create human offspring with certain specifications is biologically plausible. An equally interesting question concerns whether or not it is ethical to create designer babies?

 

In order to be considered ethical, the practice must fulfill the following criteria:

 

• No living humans should be harmed (physically, psychologically or emotionally) by the implications of the procedure
• The offspring should not be harmed (physically, psychologically or emotionally) by the implications of the procedure

Some may consider that, in creating a designer baby, one is effectively choosing not to have a baby that would otherwise have been conceived naturally - and so, it is argued, the interests of these potential or would-have-been offspring ought to be considered. Presumably these people genuflect before their own gametes.

 

These criteria may sound simple, but complications arise when attempting to define and predict 'harm'. As for the second point, it would seem that the designer offspring have little to lose from the concept and much to gain. There is, of course, the possibility of side-effects of the necessary procedures - but this is true of any medical intervention and so does not constitute grounds for immediate dismissal of the proposal. A member previously mentioned that it is impossible to predict the future environmental conditions under which the offspring will be living and so, likewise, it is impossible to design the genetics of the offspring in such a way that it is best suited to its environment. Still, the same is true for standard, naturally-derived genomes: such genomes have been shaped through the process of natural selection to best suit the environment in which the organism's ancestors lived. This provides no guarantees for a future with uncertain environmental challenges on the horizon. The latter point does, however, inspire an appreciation for the efficacy of natural selection in shaping genotype and phenotype so as to produce organisms that are very good indeed at acting as gene propagators. Blind though the process is, perhaps we ought not to tamper with Evolution? One counter point that I would make, is that the timescales involved would allow for rapid modification of the genetic make-up of the next generation. Still, the procedure would constitute a major social experiment.

 

The first point, above, possibly holds the key to the visceral resistance to the concept of creating designer babies. Since we are the products of Evolution, is it not likely that we would defend the very process that has created us? The biological desire to propagate our genes drives Evolution; it is natural that we should wish our own personal genome to be merged with that of the fittest possible person of the opposite sex. Genetic manipulation would render the latter point moot - we would no longer need to expend so much time and energy in searching out the ideal mate (what would happen to our culture? No rom-coms?) but we would probably still wish for our own genes, however imperfect, to be loaded alongside those that we have specified as desirable. Isn't that a little selfish? Doesn't it prove that actually our interests are nothing more than self-interest - we do not have the offspring's best interest at heart (if we did, then presumably we would wish for them to be as fit, in evolutionary terms, as possible - which may well mean contributing specially selected genes, none of which are our own?). The point is - perhaps living humans would be 'harmed' (or at least, would not get their own way) where designer babies are concerned, since it could mean sacrificing their opportunity to pass their own fallible genes into the next generation (contrast this with the case of eugenics in which there is obvious suffering caused to living humans). Hypothesis: the visceral reaction to designer babies stems from a reluctance to move to a situation in which the 'perfecting' of the genomes of offspring means sacrificing the interest of the parent?

Edited September 18, 2013 by Tridimity

[Roquentin]

These criteria may sound simple, but complications arise when attempting to define and predict 'harm'. As for the second point, it would seem that the designer offspring have little to lose from the concept and much to gain. There is, of course, the possibility of side-effects of the necessary procedures - but this is true of any medical intervention and so does not constitute grounds for immediate dismissal of the proposal. A member previously mentioned that it is impossible to predict the future environmental conditions under which the offspring will be living and so, likewise, it is impossible to design the genetics of the offspring in such a way that it is best suited to its environment. Still, the same is true for standard, naturally-derived genomes: such genomes have been shaped through the process of natural selection to best suit the environment in which the organism's ancestors lived. This provides no guarantees for a future with uncertain environmental challenges on the horizon. The latter point does, however, inspire an appreciation for the efficacy of natural selection in shaping genotype and phenotype so as to produce organisms that are very good indeed at acting as gene propagators. Blind though the process is, perhaps we ought not to tamper with Evolution? One counter point that I would make, is that the timescales involved would allow for rapid modification of the genetic make-up of the next generation. Still, the procedure would constitute a major social experiment.

 

I think the argument from 'side-effects' is not as relevant to the ethical debate as you said, but partly because we aren't designing (and could not design) babies from scratch. At best designer babies will contain minor modifications at best. In that case, of course we have to accept risks but I think they won't be overwhelming in all but exceptional cases where the unexpected happens. Even so, removing the Huntington's gene for instance, has benefits that far outweigh most conceivable risks and most people would support it.

 

 

The first point, above, possibly holds the key to the visceral resistance to the concept of creating designer babies. Since we are the products of Evolution, is it not likely that we would defend the very process that has created us? The biological desire to propagate our genes drives Evolution; it is natural that we should wish our own personal genome to be merged with that of the fittest possible person of the opposite sex. Genetic manipulation would render the latter point moot - we would no longer need to expend so much time and energy in searching out the ideal mate (what would happen to our culture? No rom-coms?) but we would probably still wish for our own genes, however imperfect, to be loaded alongside those that we have specified as desirable. Isn't that a little selfish? Doesn't it prove that actually our interests are nothing more than self-interest - we do not have the offspring's best interest at heart (if we did, then presumably we would wish for them to be as fit, in evolutionary terms, as possible - which may well mean contributing specially selected genes, none of which are our own?). The point is - perhaps living humans would be 'harmed' (or at least, would not get their own way) where designer babies are concerned, since it could mean sacrificing their opportunity to pass their own fallible genes into the next generation (contrast this with the case of eugenics in which there is obvious suffering caused to living humans). Hypothesis: the visceral reaction to designer babies stems from a reluctance to move to a situation in which the 'perfecting' of the genomes of offspring means sacrificing the interest of the parent?

 

There are a lot of ideas here and I will address a few. Firstly, I don't think we have any unconscious inclination to defend the 'evolutionary process', more like a diffuse desire to spread our genes and even that has been successfully curbed by monogamy and by codoms/birth control. The reward mechanism for these desires is what really drives behavior (e.g. the sensation of orgasms) and I don't think there is any deep-seated mystical 'desire to spread my genes'. Maybe some people do feel this way but by and large this may be a non-issue.

 

On a different point you hit though, it really would be interesting to see how this transforms social relations, and how people would respond to it. Where you might normally marry a blue-eyed girl if you want blue-eyed kids, now you might want to marry a girl who can afford blue-eyed kids, still we've yet to see how humans will respond to this possibility and if it really would register (a lot of science, e.g. quantum mechanics, tends not to register or affect human behavior). I think you are right to predict humans would continue to feel the need to have their kids resemble themselves, most of the times, even if it meant less fit kids.

 

At least for a while.

 

Consider the case, far out in the future where humanity has grown objective enough to no longer fret about that sort of thing either. This isn't impossible because I actually personally feel this way (and it's safe to assume I am a human).

 

 

[chris logan]

On a different point you hit though, it really would be interesting to see how this transforms social relations, and how people would respond to it. Where you might normally marry a blue-eyed girl if you want blue-eyed kids, now you might want to marry a girl who can afford blue-eyed kids, still we've yet to see how humans will respond to this possibility and if it really would register (a lot of science, e.g. quantum mechanics, tends not to register or affect human behavior). I think you are right to predict humans would continue to feel the need to have their kids resemble themselves, most of the times, even if it meant less fit kids.

 

 

 

i think the whole idea is a bit shallow. i think the 'designer' baby's freedom of choice would be compromised. we are born with certain features like the colour of our eyes. As far as we know, it was not our choice, blame science, god, fate, whatever... When the baby grows up if he doesn't like his brown eyes he can CHOOSE to wear contacts which changes his eye colour to blue. Why should that decision be made for him. What if the kid likes brown eyes and finds out that his eyes were made blue by his mom because SHE felt it was cute.

[iNow]

Following your own logic, when he grows up and doesn't like his blue eyes he can CHOOSE to wear contacts that change his eye color to brown.

[Tridimity]

i think the whole idea is a bit shallow. i think the 'designer' baby's freedom of choice would be compromised. we are born with certain features like the colour of our eyes. As far as we know, it was not our choice, blame science, god, fate, whatever... When the baby grows up if he doesn't like his brown eyes he can CHOOSE to wear contacts which changes his eye colour to blue. Why should that decision be made for him. What if the kid likes brown eyes and finds out that his eyes were made blue by his mom because SHE felt it was cute.

 

Equally, none of us choose to be born. Following the logic of your 'free will' argument, would you therefore suggest that having babies is unethical and that we all ought to stop procreation at once?