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Posted (edited)

No free won't either.

There Is No Free Wont: Antecedent Brain Activity Predicts Decisions to Inhibit (Filevich, Kühn & Haggard, 2013)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3572111/

Without the power to create options or choose among them, what does consciousness do?


Free won't as explained by an outdated blog post:
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-imprinted-brain/201004/free-will-is-real-its-mentalistic-not-mechanistic

  Christopher Badcock said:

The scalp electrodes were picking up so-called readiness potentials. These occur 550 milliseconds before the act they initiate. Subjects become consciously aware of their intention to act 350-400 milliseconds after the readiness potential starts, allowing consciousness a veto in the 200 milliseconds or so before the motor act runs to completion. However, because our conscious awareness lags behind the brain mechanisms causing our decisions, we effectively project our awareness of them backwards, so that we do not normally notice the lag (above). Mechanistically speaking, you could say that we live in a virtual present slightly offset from the real present, and that although we may not have free will at the level of the neuron, we do have free wont at the conscious level.



I will try to summarize the research paper while using as much of their words as possible.

Introduction and Methods sections:

They "operationalized inhibition as a transient process, characterised by delayed responding, rather than as a complete suppression of all behavioural output." Their interface requested the participants to press a particular key. They produced four conditions based on whether the choice was "instructed" or "free" and "rapid" or "delayed". To prevent predecision, they "included a high number of rapid instructed trials to encourage action preparation." Furthermore, "for trials in the instructed rapid condition, participants were rewarded (3p) for every key press that was faster than their average in the previous block." They also used a formal analysis to identify "obvious sequences such as ‘AABBAABB’". (Filevich et al. 2013)

Disscussion Section:

  Filevich, Kühn & Haggard, 2013 said:

Our results show that the neural activity before the moment of decision to inhibit differed from that before a decision to act rapidly. When participants chose to respond rapidly on free-choice trials, they did so on the basis of stronger preparatory activity before the moment of choice. Choosing to transiently inhibit and delay responding was associated with lower preparatory activity. This prestimulus influence on decision was unique to free-choice trials, and was absent or reduced when participants were instructed to inhibit/delay. [...]


They further explain that "the variation in RT [Reaction Time] in [their] data was much larger than that expected due to arousal effects alone." This is important because they "classified free-choice trials as rapid or delayed actions based on their reaction times." They go on to explain that a "resampling analysis" was done to rule this out... :wacko: (Filevich et al. 2013)

They also breifly address the low spatial resolution of ERP analysis of EEG results :wacko: , and the possibility of predecided responses.

 


 

Filevich E, Kuhn S, Haggard P (2013) There Is No Free Won’t: Antecedent Brain Activity Predicts Decisions to Inhibit. PLoS ONE 8(2): e53053. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053

Edited by MonDie
Posted (edited)

These findings of sequence of event have nothing to do with free will or free won't. The notion that the ability to report on the nature of one's decisions only after they have been made somehow prevents the exercise of will in their making is odd and unsupported. When did anyone think the mind had made its choices - after the report?

 

 

 

  Quote
Without the power to create options or choose among them, what does consciousness do?

It gets you across the street safely, despite every single decision to move one's legs or not move them happening before the motion of the legs became reportable via conscious awareness.

 

Try that without consciousness, and the next bus has your number on it.

Edited by overtone
Posted

But overtone, the decision is made before you are consciously aware that it has been made, which means consciousness does not take part in the decision process. I guess this merely places free will outside of consciousness, but I wouldn't call that free will.

 

I digress. I'm plowing through this research paper because I became conscious of it after deciding to start this thread. Time to edit the OP.

Posted (edited)
  Quote
But overtone, the decision is made before you are consciously aware that it has been made,

yes

 

  Quote
which means consciousness does not take part in the decision process

no.

 

 

 

 

  Quote
I guess this merely places free will outside of consciousness, but I wouldn't call that free will.
The decision to inhibit or not was strongly influenced by the subject's awareness of communication from the researcher, the situation facing them on the screen, and so forth.

 

Are you denying the subject had any discretion in how to behave after becoming aware of the researcher's communication?

 

You are not aware of the decisions you make in walking - how to move your legs, where to place your feet, etc - until after you have made them. Does that mean consciousness takes no part in making those decisions?

Edited by overtone
Posted (edited)
  On 11/12/2014 at 9:13 PM, overtone said:

The decision to inhibit or not was strongly influenced by the subject's awareness of communication from the researcher, the situation facing them on the screen, and so forth.

 

Perhaps I forgot that we're still within a compatibilist framework, acknowledging the influence of prior factors. As far as I can tell, these results don't rule out any role of consciousness in the decision; they merely show that consciousness does whatever it does in a consistent manner such that you can predict what consciousness is going to do. ...If it makes sense to speak of consciousness doing things. :P

 

Having gone through the paper, however, I would still enjoy a low-level explanation of the brain activation patterns and EEG methods.

Edited by MonDie
Posted

 

 

  Quote
As far as I can tell, these results don't rule out any role of consciousness in the decision; they merely show that consciousness does whatever it does in a consistent manner such that you can predict what consciousness is going to do. ...If it makes sense to speak of consciousness doing things.
You can't predict what a conscious person is going to do unless you know what they are conscious of. Only that allows you to interpret your neurological data for advance warning of the physical expression. Consciousness carries necessary information for successful prediction of decisions.

 

Unconscious people are much more easily predictable.

Posted

Consciousness has nothing to do with free will. Our physiological responses to stressful and calming stimuli are not within our conscious control, and our consciousness is simply a bi product of the neural processes that are ongoing. It seems like this can't be true, but when looking at the available data, its hard to reason for free will/won't.

 

Consciousness may be related to language acquisition.

 

http://onthehuman.org/2011/01/human-language-human-consciousness/

Posted (edited)
  Quote
Our physiological responses to stressful and calming stimuli are not within our conscious control,

Of course they are. You've never mentally settled yourself before undertaking a voluntary action in response to some demand? You've never felt a physiological response to an imaginary situation or remembered music?

 

 

 

 

" and our consciousness is simply a bi product of the neural processes that are ongoing "

 

If that were true, you could as easily and automatically drive a new route home as a familiar one.

 

 

 

  Quote
It seems like this can't be true, but when looking at the available data, its hard to reason for free will/won't

I don't see a counterargument in the available data. It's just what one would expect, from the apparent role of consciousness in making decisions and responding to the outer world, from the hypothesis of a will with degrees of freedom influenced by consciousness and available for conscious evocation/manipulation.

 

The only freedom of will denied by the data is that of an imaginary supernatural will - a will that does not reside in the pattern levels supported by a physical brain, whose influences are not residing in such pattern levels either, whose operations are not detectable in the patterns supported by the physical substrate of the human brain.

 

"Consciousness has nothing to do with free will"

 

The data available from unconscious people throws doubt on that claim. If free will exists, it seems to at the very least be strongly influenced by the content of the conscious mind.

Edited by overtone
Posted

This thread was a question about the plausibility of free won't until I discovered the countering research. Now that I'm in over my head anyway, I found what I can already tell is going to be a good review of the research.

 

Beyond the "urge to move": objective measures for the study of agency in the post-Libet era. (Wolpe & Rowe, 2014)

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4064703/pdf/fnhum-08-00450.pdf

Posted
  On 11/14/2014 at 5:40 PM, overtone said:

Of course they are. You've never mentally settled yourself before undertaking a voluntary action in response to some demand? You've never felt a physiological response to an imaginary situation or remembered music?

 

 

 

 

" and our consciousness is simply a bi product of the neural processes that are ongoing "

 

If that were true, you could as easily and automatically drive a new route home as a familiar one.

 

 

 

 

I don't see a counterargument in the available data. It's just what one would expect, from the apparent role of consciousness in making decisions and responding to the outer world, from the hypothesis of a will with degrees of freedom influenced by consciousness and available for conscious evocation/manipulation.

 

The only freedom of will denied by the data is that of an imaginary supernatural will - a will that does not reside in the pattern levels supported by a physical brain, whose influences are not residing in such pattern levels either, whose operations are not detectable in the patterns supported by the physical substrate of the human brain.

 

"Consciousness has nothing to do with free will"

 

The data available from unconscious people throws doubt on that claim. If free will exists, it seems to at the very least be strongly influenced by the content of the conscious mind.

What sources are you referencing? I am not aware of neurological studies that support the idea of free will.

 

If this is your opinion, that is fine, but it's not supported by the evidence.

Posted (edited)
  Quote
What sources are you referencing? I am not aware of neurological studies that support the idea of free will.

None of the research posted here so far contradicts the idea of free will.

 

 

 

 

  Quote
If this is your opinion, that is fine, but it's not supported by the evidence.

Sure it is. At least, all the evidence presented here.

 

What evidence fails to support it? All the evidence here is completely consistent with a reasonable, non-magical will in which degrees of freedom are apparent - even demonstrated, to a degree of likelihood.

 

You are looking at evidence that, maybe (with a sound argument), could be interpreted as contradicting supernatural free will, free will by magic. But in a science forum that is not the standard or central kind - right?

 

For example: Where's your data, or any other evidence, showing that unconscious people make the same decisions conscious people make?

 

 

  Quote
Beyond the "urge to move": objective measures for the study of agency in the post-Libet era. (Wolpe & Rowe, 2014)

http://www.ncbi.nlm....um-08-00450.pdf

I can't figure out why you guys think the chronology of neurological event demonstrated, which is the obvious chronology one would expect in any such mental events supported by a physical brain, somehow contradicts a scientific - natural world, non-magical - comprehension of freedom of the will. Edited by overtone
Posted

Overtone, I see what you're saying. All participants were conscious. A direct test of the role of consciousness would have included an un-conscious control group, which would require a completely objective measurement that doesn't rely on verbal reports.

 

I have not read, nor do I think I'll have the background to appreciate, the rest of Wolpe and Rowe. However, they note some limitations of the classical Libet design, which determines the timing of mental events via the reports of participants staring at a "clock".

They had explained how Libet's methods improved upon the previous "subjective" measures. "For example, such experimental paradigms involve asking subjects to rate how much they felt in control of a certain movement, or whether a sensory stimulus was felt to be the result of their own action (Wolpe & Rowe, 2013)."

 

 

  Wolpe & Rowe, 2013 said:
Another criticism surrounds the ambiguity in judging the time
of an “urge to move”. As described above, the great advantage
of Libet’s task was its indirect and somewhat more objective
nature compared to direct judgements of agency, as it looks at
the perceived times of events surrounding a voluntary action.
However, particularly the W judgement requires an introspec-
tion of a conscious experience. Even if this conscious event
of feeling an urge to move is real and discrete, the subjec-
tive account inherent in the Libet task retains the drawbacks
of a direct approach, underscoring the need for fully objective
measures.

I think they're saying that even Libet's methods are subjective because they still rely on a verbal report. The paper then goes on to discuss more objective measures of agency... (to be continued?)

Posted (edited)
  Quote
I think they're saying that even Libet's methods are subjective because they still rely on a verbal report. The paper then goes on to discuss more objective measures of agency... (to be continued?)

It makes no difference whether the chronology is based on verbal reporting or actual measurement of brain activity. The flaw is in the argument from priority in chronology of specific brain action to denial of the role of consciousness or the existence of degrees of freedom in decisions and willed action; or from the other side, from the establishment of the correlation between physical events in the substrate and the mental events in the supported patterns to the presumption that the substrate events cause the patterns they support.

 

It doesn't matter how "objective" their evidence is - the argument is bad.

Edited by overtone
Posted

An unconscious individual, such as someone in a coma is a strawman argument. However, people sleepwalking, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol make behavioural and judgement decisions without conscious awareness.

 

The evidence shows that our brains process the information before we are consciously aware of the information. What does that tell you? It tells me that awareness happens after the brain has processed the information, meaning the conscious reasoning is not the driver of the decision, but likely an artifact of how the brain processes.

Posted (edited)
  Quote
However, people sleepwalking, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol make behavioural and judgement decisions without conscious awareness.

Exactly. And they crash their cars, sleepwalk out of the back of moving RVs, and in general can handle only situations with which they have developed a conscious familiarity in the past - preset their brains, in a sense.

 

 

  Quote
The evidence shows that our brains process the information before we are consciously aware of the information.

The evidence does not show that the processing is independent of the influence of conscious awareness prior to the decision. Quite the contrary - all of the interpretation of those pockets of brain influence depends on the researcher knowing what the subject was consciously aware of, as instruction etc.

 

 

 

 

  Quote
It tells me that awareness happens after the brain has processed the information, meaning the conscious reasoning is not the driver of the decision, but likely an artifact of how the brain processes
That strikes me as an error in logic. I provided an example - walking across the street - to illustrate. The confusion seems to revolve around that word "driver" - consciousness no more need monitor and control the details of decision-making than it need monitor and control the details of walking, to be in some sense running the show. Edited by overtone
  • 1 month later...
Posted

It allows you to be aware as you behave like a preprogramed robot. Maybe when we create an AI advanced enough IT will ironically have the free will.

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