Consciousness Thought Experiment

[StringJunky]

I don't think it makes any difference to the question whether we are the DVD or the film on the DVD. Both the film and the DVD can be identical, but will still not be the same one. The original will still be the only original and the copy will still only be one copy. If you place them next to each others you can clearly see that they are not the same one, they are identical but still two separate objects.

So what is it that makes the original different?

[Eise]

The something is indeed my brain process. The process that continues is not that of my brain, it is that of another brain. Just because two objects work the same does not mean they are the same thing.

 

That is true. Two clocks, made according the same blueprint and exactly the same materials will be exactly alike. That means you will not care which clock you get, they will function exactly the same.

 

Let's take your wife into the game: you are duplicated to Mars, 2 days later, you die on earth, but your wife doesn't know anything about it. Even worse, an hour after the duplicating she has phoned with your duplicate, and the duplicate says that everything went fine, he felt nothing of the whole process, and he wishes your wife a nice week, because you will return next week... with the teletransporter of course. At earth your wife welcomes you at the teletransporter gate, during your duplicate on his turn dies after two days on Mars in great pains. (Want to add some emotion...). Your wife is happy that your back, she notices no difference at all, you tell what you did on Mars, you remember the party where you both were 2 weeks before.

 

Now here is the difference: for you the two clocks are the same, as long as you have one. For your wife, you your first duplicate and your second duplicate are exactly the same. So we are all happy. But for you, yourself: did you really die? Even twice? The difference is that for your there is another point of view: your experience of you being you. A clock has no inner experience.

 

But if you believe that your are a brain process, and the brain process is exactly copied, you should believe that it doesn't matter in what piece of matter this process is running. Or you believe that your brain is something special, that is not copied to Mars. But then I want to know what this speciality of your present brain is. If you really believe that you are a process of your brain, then on Mars that other brain is then your brain. Where is the difference?

[Delta1212]

I most certainly wouldn't step into the transporter.

 

I am a process of the brain, that is true. And quantitatively if I am replicated on Mars, it would not be possible to differentiate that being, that I, from the I that stepped into the transporter. So clearly B feels like me and remembers everything that led to that moment. But A, the original me, is dead. My qualitative, subjective experience of life has ceased. And it doesn't matter how many replicas you produce, they are not the me that died.

 

From the perspective of A, I have died. I will never again experience life.

 

From the perspective of B, nothing has changed, life goes on.

 

But of course, B never lived before that moment. So not only is B essentially an illusion, but B's life before that moment is but an illusion of an illusion.

But what about A makes a you that B does not have?

 

i.e.

 

Not sure what you mean by "priority of continuity". There is no priority. In the case where A is annihilated, A ceases to exist. B does exist, and imagines herself to be A. But that's just an initial conditions thing. If A and B remain in existence their paths will diverge. Neither will have any inner awareness of things experienced by the other after the moment of replication.

 

Macro scale objects behave according to physical laws and processes. The physical framework that holds the atoms and molecules of a person together operate predictably across the time that a person lives. While the cells may divide, die, be cast off or whatever, the macro object - a person - remains wholly substantial while that person lives. The mind, the "I" arises from the function of that brain.

 

So, is the "me" of today the same "me" as yesterday? In a sense, yes. I can feel my self through ideas, memories, connections and so on. I have a linearity of existence. In another stricter sense, I don't think so. "I" am entirely an illusion, a construction of the brain. As the brain changes, so too do I. Whack me around the head hard enough and "I" might become something else entirely. I change in every moment of my existence. More accurately, I think "I" arise afresh in every moment of existence. I just imagine myself to have continuity.

 

Disperse my molecules so that they no longer exhibit the macro scale behaviour of a human body, and "I" no longer exist. Reassemble my molecules in precisely the same way and "I" will exist again, but the two me's are not the same being. Old me is dead. And that's exactly how it felt to old me. Old me has no awareness of new me whatsoever.

If "you" are refreshed every moment, what is the difference between the refresh happening in B's head versus in A's head?

[Graeme M]

Ahhh... I see what you are saying. So Eise and Delta, you are arguing FOR some kind of separate mental continuity. Here I was thinking you were arguing against it.

 

Let's step back because I think you have confused yourselves when you think about "I".

 

Let's take Hannah and Linda. Hannah is German, born in Leipzig. Linda is a native New Yorker. Both are female, aged 45. Both were raised by traditional two parent families and have shared similar life experiences although they have never met. Would you suggest in any way that Hannah and Linda are privy to each other's thoughts? Does Hannah share in the mental cognition of Linda? I hope you agree that this does not happen, at least not that we have been able to establish in science.

 

Let's assume Hannah dies at 46 and Linda at 89. Did Hannah share in Linda's mental cognition at any time after she died? I trust you will agree that she did not.

 

Hannah died, her subjective experience, rooted in her brain, ceased at death.

 

Taking me and my copy, let's call me Graeme 1 and my copy Graeme 2. We are the same as Hannah and Linda. Two quite separate brains with separate mental cognitions. Due to the circumstance of Graeme 2's creation, he is an identical copy at his creation and imagines himself to be me. Quantitatively of course he is me. I doubt there is any measurement you could make at that moment that would distinguish any difference.

 

However, my mental cognition, were I to die at the moment of 2's creation, ceases. Just as Hannah's did. 2's mental cognition continues, like Linda's. But I am no more aware of, or privy to, 2's cognition than Hannah is of Linda's.

 

You need to disentangle the fact that the two brains are identical at a single moment. The cognitions are indeed separate. "I", Graeme 1, is not aware of Graeme 2's existence. To all outside observers of course, Graeme 2 is me.

 

This is illustrated if we run both processes to their conclusion. At moment 1, Graeme 2's creation, we are identical. A circumstance of creation. Allow 1 and 2 to live on for another 40 years, and measure the processes activities and eventual final states. they will be different. 1 is not 2. Never were, never will be.

[pzkpfw]

...

You need to disentangle the fact that the two brains are identical at a single moment. The cognitions are indeed separate. "I", Graeme 1, is not aware of Graeme 2's existence. To all outside observers of course, Graeme 2 is me.

...

But given the assumption of perfect replication, at the moment of replication Graeme 2 pretty much is Graeme 1. He'll have the same memories and the same personality. He'll know he is the "copy", because he's the one who steps out of the transporter, but other than that, he'll consider himself "Graeme".

 

Hardly different from waking up from a deep dreamless sleep. You wouldn't know that during your sleep you were "transported". What if during the night, every one of your atoms were replaced? You wake up, you still remember what you had for dinner the day before. Are you still you?

 

I'd step into the transporter, if it were proven (by earlier, braver people) to be as safe as any other transportation system.

Edited May 29, 2015 by pzkpfw

[Delta1212]

Ahhh... I see what you are saying. So Eise and Delta, you are arguing FOR some kind of separate mental continuity. Here I was thinking you were arguing against it.

 

Let's step back because I think you have confused yourselves when you think about "I".

 

Let's take Hannah and Linda. Hannah is German, born in Leipzig. Linda is a native New Yorker. Both are female, aged 45. Both were raised by traditional two parent families and have shared similar life experiences although they have never met. Would you suggest in any way that Hannah and Linda are privy to each other's thoughts? Does Hannah share in the mental cognition of Linda? I hope you agree that this does not happen, at least not that we have been able to establish in science.

 

Let's assume Hannah dies at 46 and Linda at 89. Did Hannah share in Linda's mental cognition at any time after she died? I trust you will agree that she did not.

 

Hannah died, her subjective experience, rooted in her brain, ceased at death.

 

Taking me and my copy, let's call me Graeme 1 and my copy Graeme 2. We are the same as Hannah and Linda. Two quite separate brains with separate mental cognitions. Due to the circumstance of Graeme 2's creation, he is an identical copy at his creation and imagines himself to be me. Quantitatively of course he is me. I doubt there is any measurement you could make at that moment that would distinguish any difference.

 

However, my mental cognition, were I to die at the moment of 2's creation, ceases. Just as Hannah's did. 2's mental cognition continues, like Linda's. But I am no more aware of, or privy to, 2's cognition than Hannah is of Linda's.

 

You need to disentangle the fact that the two brains are identical at a single moment. The cognitions are indeed separate. "I", Graeme 1, is not aware of Graeme 2's existence. To all outside observers of course, Graeme 2 is me.

 

This is illustrated if we run both processes to their conclusion. At moment 1, Graeme 2's creation, we are identical. A circumstance of creation. Allow 1 and 2 to live on for another 40 years, and measure the processes activities and eventual final states. they will be different. 1 is not 2. Never were, never will be.

Ok, let's say there is a Graeme Prime. Graeme Prime is "I" and is 15 years old.

 

After 45 years, we now have Graeme 1, who steps into the transporter and produces Graeme 2. If Graeme Prime is "I", can either Graeme 1 or Graeme 2 lay claim to being "I" as well, and if so, why? If not, why not?

[StringJunky]

All you are, is the sum total of your experiences recorded in the atoms that make up you. If we copy that arrangement, it is still you. To think any other way would mean that you think we are actually some physically insubstantive corpus residing within a body.

[ACG52]

If you are the sum total of your experiences, those experiences diverge as soon as you step into the transporter. The arrangement changes, and you and the copy are now separate beings with different histories.

[Graeme M]

Heh, this is a remarkable discussion, and I am enjoying it. Doesn't make the slightest bit of sense to me but that's OK. I am really struggling with why you think consciousness continues past death.

Of course, this is all opinion based, none of us knows any of this for sure, so when I argue my case I am not trying to convince you of a truth. I am trying to convince you of my point of view. I am happy to be convinced of your point of view, but so far at least the point of view that the copy is "me" seems absurd.

pzkpfw, yes, G2 will wake up, aware that he stepped into a transporter, and he will feel and think exactly as G1 does. In that sense, he is me. But he is a copy of me, as you note. G1 is dead. G1's experience stops at that point. And G1 is the me typing this. Once I have been vaporised, I am dead. I will have no further subjective experience. G2 will, but that's a new thing entirely. The only way for G1 to cognitively share in G2's experience is for some kind of external consciousness pool to exist. Imagine G1 is immediately replicated into G2, and the two stand side by side. Do you imagine G1 now experiences what it is to be G2? If I slowly grind off G2's left hand, G1 will feel this?

Delta, no idea what you mean there. While the experience of consciousness arises from my brain and is not an external substance, it should in most cases have a subjective linearity. My brain puts together a whole synthesis of inputs and memories and so on to create a sense of self. Normally, this sense of self retains its sense of linearity. There are conditions which prevent some people having that, but by and large that is how it works for most of us. The "I" in question is the linear subjective experience arising in a particular brain. In that sense, G1 is the same being as GPrime. Physically we can prove that the human called Graeme has existed in that form since he was born. Of course, at every moment his physical construction changes at micro scales, and even at the macro scale as he grows and ages, suffers illnesses and accidents. G2 however can be shown to not exist at T -5 years for example (where T is the moment of replication). G1 is an "I", G2 is an "I", but G1 is the one I am concerned with - it is me, and when it stops, so does my experience of the world. G2's experience is a different thing entirely.

StringJunky, a copy of me is a copy of me. 10 million copies of me would be 10 million copies of me. Each would be conscious of itself as me. But not one of them is conscious of the experience of any other. Each subjective experience lies rooted in the physical brain of each. And when one ceases, it ceases. Imagine 1000 copies of me, each perfect. One dies every hour for 1000 hours. Will the first copy have any sense of what happened to the 1000th copy who lived for some 999 hours longer? No.

Simply put, when G1 steps into the transporter and is vaporised, he is dead. He will not 'wake up' as G2. G2 of course will. For mechanical purposes, that is fine. Not so much subjectively.

[StringJunky]

 

Heh, this is a remarkable discussion, and I am enjoying it. Doesn't make the slightest bit of sense to me but that's OK. I am really struggling with why you think consciousness continues past death.

Look at it objectively, from the perspective of a third person. Would they think G2 is G1? Yes, and G2 would carry on like G1 would have done, if he was still around. I am not implying there has been a transfer of 'self' You are just information that has been copied. The idea of self is an emergent property of of all the experiences we've had, embedded in the molecular arrangements of our brain. The one recurring thing, I find when studying the ontology of life and matters relating to it, is you have to get to grips with is the idea of emergence.

Edited May 29, 2015 by StringJunky

[Graeme M]

I'll have a read of your link StringJunky. I completely agree with your summation of G2's experience. G2 would certainly think and feel as G1.

 

My point is simply that G1's experience does not continue, it is a property of G1's brain. Subjectively, G1 died. The I that was G1 died. While G2 is to all intents and purposes the same thing, I - G1 - will have no awareness of that.

 

Perhaps you could take a stab at my question then.

 

Create a perfect copy of yourself so that we have SJ1 and SJ2. Both think they are SJ1, that much is agreed. However, the original SJ1 continues to experience his internal mental cognition. He has no awareness of the internal state of SJ2 which diverges immediately upon creation. What is your distinction between SJ1's internal state, and that of SJ2? By your argument, they are one and the same.

[Delta1212]

I think the point that is being made here is that you have pre-transporter Graeme and post-transporter Graeme 1 and Graeme 2. Graeme 1 is made up of the same atoms as pre-transporter Graeme while Graeme 2 is not, but pre-trabsporter Graeme is not made up of the same atoms as 20-years-ago Graeme.

 

What do 20-years-ago Graeme and Graeme 1 have in common that 20-years-ago Graeme and Graeme 2 do not?

[StringJunky]

I'll have a read of your link StringJunky. I completely agree with your summation of G2's experience. G2 would certainly think and feel as G1.

 

My point is simply that G1's experience does not continue, it is a property of G1's brain. Subjectively, G1 died. The I that was G1 died. While G2 is to all intents and purposes the same thing, I - G1 - will have no awareness of that.

 

Perhaps you could take a stab at my question then.

 

Create a perfect copy of yourself so that we have SJ1 and SJ2. Both think they are SJ1, that much is agreed. However, the original SJ1 continues to experience his internal mental cognition. He has no awareness of the internal state of SJ2 which diverges immediately upon creation. What is your distinction between SJ1's internal state, and that of SJ2? By your argument, they are one and the same.

The internal states of the two subjects is identical and, for a short time anyway, their responses to a new situation will fall within the same narrow band,.commensurate with their similar past experience up to that point in time. Responses will diverge with time as they each gain new unique experiences; they will eventually become noticeably different people.

[Graeme M]

StringJunky, that was not my question. I asked specifically how much of the internal state of SJ2 is accessible to SJ1. Not what they appear to a third observer.

 

Delta, no that's not my point. I am arguing that the mind of a brain is so closely tied to the brain that it ceases when that brain is destroyed. No more, no less. Forget the mind for a moment. If Object 1 is created at T1, then at T plus 10 years copied, then destroyed, and a new object, Object 2, is created by the copying process, do you argue that O2 is the same thing as O1? That O2 has a linearity of existence from the time O1 was created?

[StringJunky]

StringJunky, that was not my question. I asked specifically how much of the internal state of SJ2 is accessible to SJ1. Not what they appear to a third observer.

 

None, other than SJ1 will have considerable familiarity with what SJ2 is thinking and feeling. Two distinct people are made with identical molecular makeup. The essence I'm trying to get across is that, all we are is code. All copies are valid as me, at the instant thay are made. The universe couldn't care less which one is the real me.

Edited May 29, 2015 by StringJunky

[pzkpfw]

...

pzkpfw, yes, G2 will wake up, aware that he stepped into a transporter, and he will feel and think exactly as G1 does. In that sense, he is me. But he is a copy of me, as you note. G1 is dead. G1's experience stops at that point. And G1 is the me typing this. Once I have been vaporised, I am dead. I will have no further subjective experience. G2 will, but that's a new thing entirely. The only way for G1 to cognitively share in G2's experience is for some kind of external consciousness pool to exist. Imagine G1 is immediately replicated into G2, and the two stand side by side. Do you imagine G1 now experiences what it is to be G2? If I slowly grind off G2's left hand, G1 will feel this?

...

No, I'm not suggesting any link between G1 and G2. After the copy, G1 and G2 do not have any connection and will not feel or experience anything from each other.

 

All I'm saying is that (given the assumption of perfect replication) G1 and G2 are indistinguishable (up to that point, not afterwards, as their experiences differ). Both will consider themselves as "the" G. If G1 is vaporised, G2 will happily continue being G.

 

If I step onto a transporter, and am re-made on Mars while my "original" on Earth is vaporised, the "copy me" on Mars will happily continue being "the" me.

[Delta1212]

StringJunky, that was not my question. I asked specifically how much of the internal state of SJ2 is accessible to SJ1. Not what they appear to a third observer.

 

Delta, no that's not my point. I am arguing that the mind of a brain is so closely tied to the brain that it ceases when that brain is destroyed. No more, no less. Forget the mind for a moment. If Object 1 is created at T1, then at T plus 10 years copied, then destroyed, and a new object, Object 2, is created by the copying process, do you argue that O2 is the same thing as O1? That O2 has a linearity of existence from the time O1 was created?

If you have an axe, and after five years you replace the head and after another five years you replace the handle, and then you make a perfect replica of that axe, which of the two is the original axe?

[Graeme M]

Perhaps I am just misunderstanding what people have said. I agree completely that G2 will continue quite happily as "the" me. But I do not agree that G1 can step into such a transporter and then wake up on Mars as G2. G1s experience will be cessation of existence - death. G2's experience will be to have stepped into the transporter and emerged on Mars.

 

I would therefore not step into the transporter if I could help it.

Delta, neither.

Edited May 29, 2015 by Graeme M

[Delta1212]

Perhaps I am just misunderstanding what people have said. I agree completely that G2 will continue quite happily as "the" me. But I do not agree that G1 can step into such a transporter and then wake up on Mars as G2. G1s experience will be cessation of existence - death. G2's experience will be to have stepped into the transporter and emerged on Mars.

 

I would therefore not step into the transporter if I could help it.

 

Delta, neither.

Then are you the same you that you were 20 years ago? You are largely made of none of the same material at that point, just as G2 is not made of the same matter as G1.

 

I guess the question I'm asking, is how are you defining your linear continuity of consciousness?

[StringJunky]

Graham. What are you ontologically; information or the atoms that make up you? My opinion is that you are, ultimately, information.

Edited May 29, 2015 by StringJunky

[Spyman]

So what is it that makes the original different?

They are not different, they are indistinguishable from each other.

 

The important thing is that they are two objects physically separated from each other.

 

Lets assume that I would take one of those two DVDs in each hand and hide my hands behind my back. If I first show you one DVD in my right hand and then hide it again behind my back, seemingly shuffling the discs before I show you one DVD in my left hand, then you can't possibly know if I showed you one of the discs twice or if I showed you both and in which order.

 

I however who did the secret shuffling have been very careful not to mix the two DVDs and know perfectly well if I showed you the same one twice or both in a specific order.

 

Even if they are exactly identical they would still have a different timeline and physical location. During the creation there is a one way connection where the copy duplicates data from the original but after that they would no longer have any connection or shared data.

 

If I would make a scratch in the original DVD then they would be different, there would not suddenly be a second scratch on the copy and everyone, (who knows where the original and the copy are located), can agree that it was the original that got this scratch.

 

Similar if I destroyed the original, it would be the original that got destroyed and not the duplicate.

 

I don't think there is any difference between the physical disc and the data on it, if there is a change in the data on the original then this change would only be on the original. If I wiped the data from the original then it would be the original data that got destroyed and not the data on the copy. The copy would still maintain the data that was copied to it during replication.

 

Thus they are two different objects with their own sets of data even though they are exactly identical.

 

If a human was replicated like this then I don't think the consciousness would be transferred to the replica, I think a new consciousness would be created which would be exactly identical and totally indistinguishable from the original.

 

None, other than SJ1 will have considerable familiarity with what SJ2 is thinking and feeling. Two distinct people are made with identical molecular makeup. The essence I'm trying to get across is that, all we are is code. All copies are valid as me, at the instant thay are made. The universe couldn't care less which one is the real me.

While I agree that all we are is 'code', I don't think that one copy is valid as the original or as another copy, the Universe might not care which is which, but it will certainly know which one it is that was the original and which copy that was made when and where.

 

Like Graeme I would not voluntarily step into any such 'transporter'. The original 'me' don't want to die and there is very little consolation in the knowledge that somewhere else another 'me' will be created.

[StringJunky]

...Like Graeme I would not voluntarily step into any such 'transporter'. The original 'me' don't want to die and there is very little consolation in the knowledge that somewhere else another 'me' will be created.

Every time you fall asleep your consciousness dies. Cue for a favourite of mine: "How I hate those little slices of Death we call Sleep" - E. A. Poe

 

It doesn't matter if you don't wake up... you will not know you are dead, but your replicant will carry on your life's work. The code that is you still has the potential to increase in size and complexity.

Edited May 29, 2015 by StringJunky

[Spyman]

Every time you fall asleep your consciousness dies. Cue for a favourite of mine: "How I hate those little slices of Death we call Sleep" - E. A. Poe

 

It doesn't matter if you don't wake up... you will not know you are dead, but your replicant will carry on your life's work. The code that is you still has the potential to increase in size and complexity.

I don't consider my consciousness to be dead while I am sleeping, granted it's working on a lower level but the brain is still processing data and functioning, the 'code' is still there and alive, such that when someone says my name I can recognise it and wake up.

 

If I would be sedated and secretly be put in the transporter then the replica wouldn't know that he was an duplicate or that the original had been killed. But if I would be forced into the transporter while awake then I would know that I was going to die, as that is my current conviction, and the replica that inherits my conviction and memories would know that the original was killed and that he was a replica.

[Graeme M]

I thought about this overnight and I think I have grasped where some of you are going with this. You believe "I" to be some kind of thing that can be packaged up and moved around and when reactivated it just continues as before. So in a way you see the mind, the self, as an entity in its own right that can be run anywhere (I think this is what StringJunky means when he describes mind as information). Hence a careful mapping of my mind and the right program means we could copy my mind and run it in a computer simulation. The hardware is relatively unimportant. Thus not only do you see the mind as separate but you also see it has a continuity in its own right. Package it up, move it on, fire it up and "you" just wake up and keep on cognising. Sort of like Frank Tipler's idea for immortality - if we can emulate all possible conditions then all life can be resurrected.

 

You think that there would be continuity of consciousness for me using this transporter. My self has been packaged up - my programs, operating system and hardware if you will - and all we have to do is reconstitute that and "I" will quite happily continue on. Probably without even being aware of the momentary lapse in awareness.

Edited May 29, 2015 by Graeme M

[StringJunky]

I thought about this overnight and I think I have grasped where some of you are going with this. You believe "I" to be some kind of thing that can be packaged up and moved around and when reactivated it just continues as before. So in a way you see the mind, the self, as an entity in its own right that can be run anywhere (I think this is what StringJunky means when he describes mind as information). Hence a careful mapping of my mind and the right program means we could copy my mind and run it in a computer simulation. The hardware is relatively unimportant. Thus not only do you see the mind as separate but you also see it has a continuity in its own right. Package it up, move it on, fire it up and "you" just wake up and keep on cognising. Sort of like Frank Tipler's idea for immortality - if we can emulate all possible conditions then all life can be resurrected.

 

You think that there would be continuity of consciousness for me using this transporter. My self has been packaged up - my programs, operating system and hardware if you will - and all we have to do is reconstitute that and "I" will quite happily continue on. Probably without even being aware of the momentary lapse in awareness.

Yes, what it appears to boil down to is that we are programmed machines and that program that is 'you' can be copied/moved around. It's not much different to when DNA replicates: it unzips and the appropriate amino acids attach to the unzipping strands and... voila!... you have two DNA identical molecules. It's a difficult thing to accept because it means we are not, somehow, metaphysically special. I don't like it, but nature couldn't care less what I like. Science is unpalatable sometimes.

Edited May 30, 2015 by StringJunky