Consciousness Thought Experiment

[MigL]

If you wanted to replicate yourself, you would need to copy two things.

The individual atoms and molecules that make you up ( the easy part ), and the information that these atoms hold. This information is encoded as a property of the individual atoms. In effect their quantum states.

Now, if you could copy their quantum states exactly ( QM and Mr. Heisenberg say you cannot ), you at this exact point in time would not be the same 'you' as one nanosecond before, because these states are time dependant.

 

In effect if your 'death' and your twin's re-materialisation on Mars was instantaneous, you would have no clue that anything had happened other than that your location had instantaneously changed.

If you had twin teleporters, the second on Mars, and you were killed here on Earth, instantly re-materialized on Mars, instantly killed on Mars, and instantly re-materialized as a third 'you' back on Earth, There is no experiment you could perform that would indicate anything had ever happened. So how would it make any difference to you ?

 

The only way you would know something had happened, is if an independent observer had witnessed the whole thing and told you about it. but that is not how we define consciousness, is it ?

You don't need an independent observer to validate consciousness.

 

 

 

 

And I still think this is a worthless thought experiment because it's based on un-physical principles and assumptions.

( and you would think that would stop me from being opinionated and offering my 'two cents' )

Edited May 30, 2015 by MigL

[Graeme M]

If we could resist offering our two cents worth there'd be no forums...

[StringJunky]

..And I still think this is a worthless thought experiment because it's based on un-physical principles and assumptions.

( and you would think that would stop me from being opinionated and offering my 'two cents' )

I don't think it'[s a bad thought experiment for determining and understanding mind/body duality and consciousness, You are reading too much too much into this toy model and not the discussion. You are being too literal about this thought experiment. It's just a vehicle for this discussion for visualising a concept.

Edited May 31, 2015 by StringJunky

[Spyman]

I thought about this overnight and I think I have grasped where some of you are going with this. You believe "I" to be some kind of thing that can be packaged up and moved around and when reactivated it just continues as before. So in a way you see the mind, the self, as an entity in its own right that can be run anywhere (I think this is what StringJunky means when he describes mind as information). Hence a careful mapping of my mind and the right program means we could copy my mind and run it in a computer simulation. The hardware is relatively unimportant. Thus not only do you see the mind as separate but you also see it has a continuity in its own right. Package it up, move it on, fire it up and "you" just wake up and keep on cognising. Sort of like Frank Tipler's idea for immortality - if we can emulate all possible conditions then all life can be resurrected.

 

You think that there would be continuity of consciousness for me using this transporter. My self has been packaged up - my programs, operating system and hardware if you will - and all we have to do is reconstitute that and "I" will quite happily continue on. Probably without even being aware of the momentary lapse in awareness.

Well put, I think you explained the opponents views better than they did themselves, +1.

 

This discussion reminds me of the movie: The 6th Day with Arnold Schwarzenegger. He gets cloned against his will and decides to take his life back from the clone, but finds out that it is he himself that is the clone and cooperates with himself to defeat the bad guys.

 

However I don't know if I have managed to make myself clear, so I want to make another go at it:

 

I share others view that the mind is nothing more than configuration of physical signals in the brain and if they could be duplicated then the mind would be copied too. So in a global sense there would be a continuity of the consciousness when a new body and mind takes the place of the old body and mind.

 

But I would still not step into any such 'transporter' voluntarily. If a knew I was going to die or there was a very high risk of death, because of some other reason, then I could consider it because of this continuity. A copy living my life would be better than no one living my life, but as long as I have a good chance to live this life 'myself', with current mind and body then I will do my best to avoid any harm to the myself that I have right now.

 

My first argument is that even if you make a perfect copy into the smallest detail, this copy would still only be a copy. There is really no difference if you copy a human with a mind or something as simple as a ball, the new ball will be indistinguishable from the old ball, but if you place them beside each other it is clear that they are two distinct objects even if they are exactly identical. Thus the new you will not be you, it will only be an replica of you, albeit indistinguishable in body and mind.

 

Secondly, even when there is a global continuity of the consciousness, if everyone of the distinct individuals in such a chain of duplications can define the beginning and termination of their own existence, then they should strife to improve and prolong their very own part as much as possible. Handing over the future to another individual, even if it's an indistinguishable replica both in body and mind would be to admit defeat and resign.

 

Here are a few examples where I try to highlight my stand:

 

1) Lets say that you are working with a very important step in a production line where your decisions affects the diversity and quality. One day you get an apprentice and you teach him all you know. You proudly reports to the management that he now can perfectly duplicate your production results, but at the next recession you get fired because he is younger and thus have a higher future value to the company.

Even though you can be happy for the success of the young apprentice and take pride in the fact that your method will continue to be used in the future at the factory, would it still not suck for you as a individual to be replaced and discarded?

 

2) Someone made a clone of you without your permission and now this other you is demanding to get everything you have, would you give your spouse, children, home and everything to the last cent to your unwanted copy of yourself?

 

3) Someone made a clone of you without your permission and now the authorities demands that you should take the punishment for a crime that your other you committed, would you voluntarily take the replica's place in jail for several years?

 

4) For safety reasons the original you entering the 'transporter' is not destroyed until the data has been transmitted and a verified fully operational duplicate has been created at the exit location. Now the personnel at the entrance tells you that your replica has been confirmed and ask you to commit suicide by jumping down into a large meat grinder which recycles your body parts for other travellers.

Would you happily die a painful death because of the knowledge that your replica will successfully continue your life where you left off?

(Painful might seem a bit excessive but is there to point out that you at the entrance would be selfish and not want to be sacrificed.)

Edited June 1, 2015 by Spyman

[StringJunky]

...Would you happily die a painful death because of the knowledge that your replica will successfully continue your life where you left off?

(Painful might seem a bit excessive but is there to point out that you at the entrance would be selfish and not want to be sacrificed.)

Not in the way put it. Look at this way: whilst you were asleep you were given a lethal dose of barbiturates. Spyman 2 continues Spyman 1's life. The point being, I'm suggesting, is what constitutes 'you' is just information. Whether you would actually do something or not is not the point.

[Graeme M]

The question of whether or not to step into the transporter was a diversion raised by me. The original question asked whether a perfect duplicate would be "me".

 

I now realise that the OP can be read in two ways, and my reading was not the same as others. So I offer this amendment to my earlier answer.

 

1. Am "I" inside the head of the new person? Yes. But there is a distinction in that the experience of life has continuity only for my copy. I - the original me - am dead.

2. If we retain original and copy (G1 & G2), who experiences the world through the one that isn't me? The answer is G2. There is no connection between the two, nor is there any continuity between the experiences of each past the exact moment of duplication. G1 and G2 are two independent beings with identical memories of life prior to duplication.

I agree with StringJunky that if we could create such a duplicate, it would indeed think and experience as I do - from its perspective, and any observer, the duplicate is effectively me. In that wise, I agree that "I" am just information.

 

However, that's a different thing to whether or not the original I would experience a continuity of existence. I agree here with Spyman - if you offer me the opportunity to travel through space in this fashion I would decline. If you define Me as the being cognising through the body I currently inhabit, then such a transporter will surely kill me.

[Delta1212]

You are, however, making an assumption that "you" already experience continuity of existence in a form other than that which would be experienced by G2.

 

You-at-10-years-old is just as dead as G1. Your link to 10-year-old-you exists pretty much entirely in the patterns that have been preserved as memories, personality, physical characteristics, etc., all of which are also present in G2. G1 isn't made up of the same matter as G-at-10. G1 simply preserves some elements of the pattern of G-at-10. The difference, of course, is that there is a clear moment where G2 replaces G1, while the erasure of G-at-10 and emergence of G1 seems more gradual, but the end result is ultimately the same.

 

There is a different you that retains the memories of the old you, but is demonstrably not the same you.

[StringJunky]

 

....

However, that's a different thing to whether or not the original I would experience a continuity of existence. I agree here with Spyman - if you offer me the opportunity to travel through space in this fashion I would decline. If you define Me as the being cognising through the body I currently inhabit, then such a transporter will surely kill me.

 

The reality is though, that that continuity only exists until you fall asleep... after that anything can happen and you'll be none the wiser. In principle, I'd go in the transporter, because I think I know what I am, and it doesn't matter if a perfect clone carries on my life and I never woke up again.

[Spyman]

Not in the way put it. Look at this way: whilst you were asleep you were given a lethal dose of barbiturates. Spyman 2 continues Spyman 1's life. The point being, I'm suggesting, is what constitutes 'you' is just information. Whether you would actually do something or not is not the point.

StringJunky, I think I fully understand your point, the question is if you did understand mine?

 

I am not contesting that "what constitutes 'you' is just information", I am saying that Spyman 2 is not Spyman 1 even though Spyman 2 have both indistinguishable body and mind from Spyman 1. Spyman 2 can continue Spyman 1's life, but Spyman 1 would be dead.

 

Spyman 1 don't want to be dead, Spyman 1 don't want Spyman 2 to live his life, Spyman 1 want to live his life as Spyman 1.

 

What you would do or not reflects how much you consider the duplicate to actually be you and not only a copy of you, which is my point.

 

Do you not agree that from the reference of Spyman 1 that Spyman 2 is another individual with a different origin?

[Delta1212]

StringJunky, I think I fully understand your point, the question is if you did understand mine?

 

I am not contesting that "what constitutes 'you' is just information", I am saying that Spyman 2 is not Spyman 1 even though Spyman 2 have both indistinguishable body and mind from Spyman 1. Spyman 2 can continue Spyman 1's life, but Spyman 1 would be dead.

 

Spyman 1 don't want to be dead, Spyman 1 don't want Spyman 2 to live his life, Spyman 1 want to live his life as Spyman 1.

 

What you would do or not reflects how much you consider the duplicate to actually be you and not only a copy of you, which is my point.

 

Do you not agree that from the reference of Spyman 1 that Spyman 2 is another individual with a different origin?

Again, we're assuming as part of the premise that Spyman 1 post-transport is "more" a continuation of Spyman 1 pre-transport than Spyman 2 is.

 

Instead, it may be the case that we have Spyman 1 step into the transporter, and Spyman 1a who steps out on Earth while Spyman 1b steps out on Mars.

 

Spyman 1a is certainly not Spyman 1b, but neither is he Spyman 1 any more or less than Spyman 1b is.

[StringJunky]

StringJunky, I think I fully understand your point, the question is if you did understand mine?

 

I am not contesting that "what constitutes 'you' is just information", I am saying that Spyman 2 is not Spyman 1 even though Spyman 2 have both indistinguishable body and mind from Spyman 1. Spyman 2 can continue Spyman 1's life, but Spyman 1 would be dead.

 

Spyman 1 don't want to be dead, Spyman 1 don't want Spyman 2 to live his life, Spyman 1 want to live his life as Spyman 1.

 

What you would do or not reflects how much you consider the duplicate to actually be you and not only a copy of you, which is my point.

 

Do you not agree that from the reference of Spyman 1 that Spyman 2 is another individual with a different origin?

Spyman 2 is another distinct individual, yes; he is a different future path.

Edited June 1, 2015 by StringJunky

[tar]

Spyman,

 

I think I like your thinking the best, so far, but I don't see why you have to submit to the idea that you are ultimately just information. There is as well the consideration you mentioned of your history.

 

Heisenburg aside, every quark and isotope, every carbon chain and eyelash has been put into the exact arrangement as the original, except you cannot transfer the history of each of the quarks, and each of the molecules. These have to be unique, for each quark, for each molecule of carbon.

 

Suppose for instance, the 3d printer on Mars ran out of a certain isotope of carbon, and a horse used at a riding stable on Mars was killed, to extract the required isotope, to complete your copy.

 

Original on Earth, may have eaten a few cows, but no horse we know of ever died to place that isotope of carbon in that particular cell of original's pinky, as did die to place that atom in the clone's left pinky. Suppose original always loved horses, and was ashamed that clone's existence required the death of one. At this point, even before everybody learned what was going on, instantly, at the point of reproduction, original and clone are not the same person. They are different body/brain/heart groups, with different histories. One was born of woman on Earth, the other was born of 3D printer on Mars.

 

Two different folks. If one traveled to the other's planet and they stood, one in front of the other, one would have nobody in front of them, and the other would be looking at the back of a very familiar looking head. Well maybe not that familiar, I rarely have seen the back of my head.

 

So I would disagree that you are just information. I would suggest you are particular, unique information, with a history, a present location, and a future.

 

Regards, TAR

On a different note. What about the spark of life? How do we know if the clone will be alive, just because all the parts are in place. I have seen the faces of a few loved one's in their coffins, and they looked as if they were asleep, but they were not actually working anymore. Like Frankenstein's monster, how do get the clone "started"?

Edited June 1, 2015 by tar

[MigL]

Thank you Delta1212, you have made my point much more eloquently than I previously did.

 

Every time some little bit of information, or some quantum state, changes in just one atom of your brain, you are not 'you' anymore.

There may not be any displacement ( to Mars ), but the old 'you' is just as dead as if it went into a meat grinder ( minus the pain, what are you, Spyman, a sadist ? ). Other than in your memories, the old 'you' is gone.

 

So is there a difference if the change is accompanied by an instantaneous displacement to Mars ?

[tar]

MigL,

 

The old you is history, but you still have your history.

 

Regards, TAR

[Delta1212]

MigL,

 

The old you is history, but you still have your history.

 

Regards, TAR

So does the new you.

[tar]

Delta1212,

 

I don't think we are disagreeing. Are we?

Are we talking about the 10 year old you or the clone you? The 10 year old you has the same history as the original, present you (up to when you were 10 years old). The clone you, has no history as a human, he/she just was born.

 

Regards, TAR

Edited June 1, 2015 by tar

[StringJunky]

....Spyman 1 don't want to be dead, Spyman 1 don't want Spyman 2 to live his life, Spyman 1 want to live his life as Spyman 1.

What this means then is that, as Eise said earlier, you think you are special and you have a soul.

[tar]

"I'm always trying to reconcile consciousness and physics. This is a thought experiment that scrutinises the relationship between our experience of the universe and the idea that consciousness is just neurons firing in a predicatable way due to their position in space (and their connection to each other)."

 

Yoseph,

 

I think in the experiment, it is important to note that the clone is printed out at a different position in space, than the original.

 

This may be crucial to note, because of what a conscious person is conscious of. The time of day the season of the year, which way he/she is oriented to the Earth and so on. If for instance the original is subject to a strong magnetic field to read the position of all the quarks through some sensors, and this same magnetic field is not present at the printer location, then the cells and position of things in the clone, will not be the same as in the original.

 

Regards, TAR

Thread,

 

Original has a certain position in the universe and a certain orientation that can not be exactly replicated in the clone.

 

It is like my trivial objection to the idea of a doppelganger existing somewhere in the universe. If each of the doppelgangers were to suddenly point at their doppelganger, they would have to point in a different direction than their doppelganger was pointing in, making them exactly not identical in every detail. One would be pointing toward the Milkyway, the other would be pointing away from it.

 

Regards, TAR

Edited June 1, 2015 by tar

[Graeme M]

Wait... What??? I'm lost again. You all do seem to be arguing for continuity of consciousness between G1 and G2. I must misunderstand your words, but that seems to me what Delta is saying and others agree.

 

I'll pose a single idea, do you agree of disagree.

 

I create a perfect duplicate of myself, G2, and he is to all intents and purposes "me". To himself and any other observer, he is indistinguishable from me.

 

We all agree on that.

 

In the process of duplication, I - G1 - am destroyed. G2 continues as me. For G2, life has continuity. He recalls stepping into the duplicator, he is aware of stepping out, and he has all the memories of life before that point.

 

We agree on that as well.

 

So.... Do you think that G1's continuous experience is that of G2, or not?

[Delta1212]

I don't think you five minutes from now is the same you from five minutes ago in any meaningful sense that isn't effectively replicated by G2.

 

The only difference is that there's no event between five minutes ago and five minutes from now that would cause you to question whether those two entity's were the same "being" or not the way the transporter does.

 

Edit:

 

Let's say we have two different scenarios.

 

Graeme steps into the transporter at 5:00 and at 5:01 you have Graeme A and Graeme B.

 

In the other, Graeme doesn't step into the transporter at all.

 

At 5:01 in both scenarios, 5:00 Graeme no longer exists. In the first scenario, there are now two minds that arose from 5:00 Graeme. In the latter, there is only one. But in either case, 5:00 Graeme no longer exists no matter what he chooses.

Edited June 1, 2015 by Delta1212

[pzkpfw]

...

So.... Do you think that G1's continuous experience is that of G2, or not?

What's the difference?

 

On Monday night you go to bed. You wake up Tuesday morning; you know who you are, you remember your fifth birthday party, and what you had for dinner on Monday.

 

On Tuesday night you go to bed. During the night, gas is used to knock you out and keep you asleep while you are "perfectly replicated". Every atom in your body is duplicated. The original you is then made into Soylent green. You wake up Wednesday morning; you know who you are, you remember your fifth birthday party, and what you had for dinner on Tuesday.

 

Is Wednesday "you" really "you"? Well, is there any real difference? Your muscles have been replicated, your bones have been replicated, your mind has been replicated. If you walk like a duck and quack like a duck, you're a duck.

Edited June 2, 2015 by pzkpfw

[StringJunky]

What's the difference?

 

On Monday night you go to bed. You wake up Tuesday morning; you know who you are, you remember your fifth birthday party, and what you had for dinner on Monday.

 

On Tuesday night you go to bed. During the night, gas is used to knock you out and keep you asleep while you are "perfectly replicated". Every atom in your body is duplicated. The original you is then made into Soylent green. You wake up Wednesday morning; you know who you are, you remember your fifth birthday party, and what you had for dinner on Tuesday.

 

Is Wednesday "you" really "you"? Well, is there any real difference? Your muscles have been replicated, your bones have been replicated, your mind has been replicated. If you walk like a duck and quack like a duck, you're a duck.

Succinctly put.

[Graeme M]

OK, I have to capitulate. I think I dimly get what you are driving at, but to me you are arguing for an external seat of consciousness. By suggesting that packaging me up and implementing me elsewhere confers me with an ongoing continuous experience, you are saying that my consciousness has an independent property to my brain.

The sticking point for me is the idea that "I" will have an ongoing experience in the scenarios described.

I have demonstrated that this isn't so by considering the case where we retain both original and duplicate and neither has access to the other's internal experience. This remains so regardless of the time at which one or the other dies.

What you seem to be doing is mistaking each instance of me as the same thing. A duplicate may in its own experience believe it is me, but it is a separate being. It is physically another human being, no different to any other. It is simply a quirk of circumstance that it is identical to me.

Take pzkpfw's most recent example above. If I go to bed and wake up next morning, my physical being retains its physical continuity (regardless of what you think is happening at the atomic level). And that brain gives rise to my mind. If you copy me in the night and then kill me, I am dead. The replica, the new instance of me, does indeed wake up and get on with life. But that is not me. It is a copy that thinks it is me. I will not go to bed and wake up in my new body.

So I have to leave it there. Thanks for a fun discussion!

[StringJunky]

 

....So I have to leave it there. Thanks for a fun discussion!

 

Yes, it's been fun. It's been a nice change to discuss this sort of subject without metaphysics pervading it all.

[tar]

Thread,

 

Fun, but not done.

 

That which consciousness is, is still not agreed upon, completely.

 

It just occurred to me, that the "pattern" that was scanned of the original, and sent to the 3d printer, was, at some point, neither in the original or the clone, but in the apparatus in between.

 

If a person was just information, then this person would exist as the original, as the information in between, and as the clone. A simple wiring adjustment and this information could be sent to 1000 3d printers. Assuming that our technology was precise enough and complete enough that all 1000 would work, I would say that NONE of them are me. My consciousness has no way to travel through the wires and the air, to each of the clones.

 

The situation we are speculating upon is already provided for us, (as someone, I forget who, already suggested) if we think about what a child is.

 

Regards, TAR