Scientific testing (split from goal of science)

[swansont]

It was interesting to hear from a physicist earlier (Swansont, post # 40). The attitude he descibes himself as adopting is precisely the instrumentalist one. But he's referring only to a very limited range of the scientific spectrum. As I said earlier (post 29), quote:

 

"And there are people who adopt such an instrumentalist stance, particularly with respect to a weird theory such as quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr held a roughly instrumentalist position, I believe."

It doesn't matter if you think QM is weird or not. It's a major part of physics, not some part tucked away in the corner.

 

If we stop focusing on quantum mechanics, ask yourself how many physicists are instrumentalists about atoms or electrons, say (They mainly were until the late 19th/early 20th century when they converted en masse to a realist stance -- with Ernst Mach bravely holding the fort for the instrumentalists, insisting that talk of atoms was not be taken literally). Do you also consider atoms to be merely an abstraction, Swansont? Ask yourself whether Stephen Hawking thinks black holes are real or simply a useful fiction. How many chemists hold that theories of molecules are nothing more than a useful calculating device? What about biologists and germs, say?

Saying there are lots of abstractions in physics is not a claim that there are no things one can consider real. So I won't be addressing your straw-man argument. The issue is whether theories represent realities, and I have given examples of well-established physics where abstractions are used. Do you have a rebuttal to that or not? (I'll add another to the list: virtual photon exchange for E-M interactions. The non-reality of the mechanism is right there in the name)

 

Also, quoting Galileo (or any historical figure in the remote past) is of little import. That's not modern science. I mean Galileo died before Newton was even born, so there wasn't even a scientific basis for discussing orbits in his time.

[Reg Prescott]

In response to Strange (post # 50):

1. "You appear to be arguing against a strawman here. No one is supporting the simplistic model that you propose (you can tell you are making a stawman argument when all those attacking you are in agreement with you."

Not at all. I'm not proposing any models. I'm attacking the model you explicitly condone with your "Exactly" comment at the top of your post # 3. As I pointed out earlier, you've backpedalled time and time again throughout the thread. I can only hope that other members will judge impartially.

2. "So it sounds as if the earlier characterization of you arguing from a position of ignorance was accurate after all."

I can live with that. There's a great deal I don't know, friend. I presume you're the same.

3. "But of course it isn't because it works (is "true") for a large domain of problems"

This is another point you continuously fail to grasp, I'm afraid. A theory working does not entail that is true. We infer at our peril from a theory yielding accurate predictions to its truth, i.e. its offering a (more or less) accurate representation of reality. The instrumental efficacy of a theory and its truth are two different matters, not to be confused.

Consider, for example, (not necessarily true to life, but just for illustrative purposes) the case of navigational charts produced based on a Ptolemaic-like model of the cosmos with the heavens spinning around a static Earth every 24 hour vs those based on a Copernican-like model with the heavens static and the Earth rotating on its axis every 24 hours. Both theories might work equally well; they both get you where you want to go. But who among us would claim they are equally true, or truth-like? Presumably there is only one way things really are out there.

4. "In your fantasy version of science, this would mean that Newtonian gravity would be instantly discarded." ... and ...

"There wasn't the silly "throw away the theory because one observation is contradictory" reaction that you argued for..."

This is a blatant misrepresentation of my position. I'm offering no normative guidelines on what scientists ought to do. I am not arguing for any methodological rules. What I am doing, I hope, is pointing out that the over-simplistic methodology endorsed by others (yourself included; see 1. above) is inadequate to capture what scientists actually do do.

5. "You seem to only support that by expressing your opinions on what some scientists thought. Many of them from a period in the past when the common assumption probably was that science was an attempt to discover the truth."

Once again you're moving the goalposts. What you originally said was (and I quote) "... science is not about "truth" but about models that work; .." (post 5)

Would you now like to change this to "Science is not about truth these days"? Or perhaps "No scientist -- no, not even one -- since [enter date] has cared a jot about truth"?

How, then, may I ask would our other members reply to a wayward Creationist, say, who wandered in and expressed his firmly held belief that evolutionary theory was a load of crap? How many among you, in all honesty, would tell him, "Don't worry, pal. Our evolutionary theory has nothing to do with truth. You're better to think of it as a model, or a useful fiction, that we use as a calculating device to .... erm, cure baldness (or whatever). It has nothing at all to do with the way things really are out there."

* raises eyebrow *

To Swansant : You said "It doesn't matter if you think QM is weird or not. It's a major part of physics, not some part tucked away in the corner."

 

 

Why is everyone getting so knee-jerk defensive? My calling QM weird is not an insult. And I'm not the first person to say so. C'mon now!

 

It's precisely because it's weird - or "counterintuitive", if you prefer -- that many have chosen to adopt an instrumental attitude towards it. Yourself included, evidently.

[studiot]

 

As requested by studiot, my responses to his post # 38...

"What about the use of statistics in scientific testing?"

I don't know

"Would analysis of blood samples be included?"

I don't know

"What safe working load certification testing?"

I know nothing about it

"Is there any data on what distribution of testing activity between various motivations?"

I haven't the foggiest

"And what exactly is meant by 'scientific testing' "?

That's what I was hoping might be explained. My complaint is that I often hear of a major theory -- evolutionary theory, say -- having been "thoroughly tested". I've no idea what sense to make of this which does not trivialize our use of the term "test" into some Kafka-esque farce.

(Why didn't I past the "test"? Because we failed you)

I was hoping those who speak of testing might specify the criteria under which a theory will fail one of these "tests" (we would need certain criteria, wouldn't we, if the "test" was not to be entirely arbitrary?). We've seen, I think, that Popper's criterion (mismatch been observation and theory) isn't up for the task. I don't believe anyone has offered any other criteria of a general nature, i.e., applicable to all theories.

After that, I challenged what I took to be the manifestly false claims made by other posters along the lines of "Science has almost nothing to do with truth" and "Physics describes how things behave, not what they are." (see posts 5 and 40, for example). I was asked to support my challenge with evidence. That's what I've been trying to do lately.

As for rules, I only joined the site a few days ago, so I'm afraid I'm not familiar with them. I'm not trying to flaunt any.

Let's hope I don't fail the test. Peace and love!

... a word or two from philosopher of biology, Elliott Sober, on the topic of testing:

 

"Creationists often talk of 'testing evolutionary theory', and biologists sometimes talk this way as well. The context of their remarks sometimes reveals which specific proposition the authors have in mind, but often this is not the case. It is important to recognize that the phrase 'evolutionary theory' is too vague when the subject of testing is broached. There are a number of propositions that evolutionary biologists take seriously. The first step should be to specify which of these is to be the focus."

 

 

Thank you for responding.

 

But you did miss out what I consider the most important part of my post 38.

 

That I consider the focus too narrow and the definition of scientific and testing unclear.

 

The rest of the post just contained examples and could have been omitted.

 

So I am still not clear where you are coming from.

 

The great bulk of what I consider scientifc testing is not involved with checking the validity of esoteric theories.

It is employed in the everyday business of furthering activity in our modern technical world.

 

More examples

 

What is the moisture content of my wheat?

Does that fingerprint match?

Is this batch of concrete acceptable?

 

 

I introduced the statistical element because even in basic reasearch these days statistical methods play a vital role.

 

Does standing in the rain give you a cold?

 

Well sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't.

So how do you investigate and report without statistical methods?

 

Some testing cannot ever be usefully performed.

What is the breaking load of this crane hook?

 

Well yes you could load the hook until it breaks, but of what use is that knowledge?

You have a broken hook you can no longer use.

So an entirely different sort of testing is required.

 

As to the scientific part.

 

When that hook is tested is it 'scientific' to keep adding old railway sleepers until it breaks?

 

Or do we need something more objective, repeatable, reportable etc?

[Reg Prescott]

@ swansont again : you said -- "The issue is whether theories represent realities, and I have given examples of well-established physics where abstractions are used. Do you have a rebuttal to that or not?

 

I'm sorry, but this is another misrepresentation of events. You originally made the claim (post 39) that "Physics describes how things behave, not what they are."

 

I took umbrage. Perhaps what you claim is true in some cases. But it's certainly not true in all cases. And I've posted evidence that I believe refutes your claim.

[Strange]

 

Not at all. I'm not proposing any models. I'm attacking the model you explicitly condone with your "Exactly" comment at the top of your post # 3. As I pointed out earlier, you've backpedalled time and time again throughout the thread. I can only hope that other members will judge impartially.

 

I wouldn't describe it as back-pedalling. More an attempt to come to terms with the ridiculous caricature that you suggest is the way science does or should work. No one else proposed this model except you in your first post so I have to assume it is your model.

 

3. "But of course it isn't because it works (is "true") for a large domain of problems"

This is another point you continuously fail to grasp, I'm afraid. A theory working does not entail that is true.

 

That is what I and others have been trying to explain to you. It is a bit weird to have you parroting it back. Theories are not "true" or "false", they are better or worse models. Some of them become such poor models that they are abandoned.

This is a blatant misrepresentation of my position. I'm offering no normative guidelines on what scientists ought to do. I am not arguing for any methodological rules. What I am doing, I hope, is pointing out that the over-simplistic methodology endorsed by others (yourself included; see 1. above) is inadequate to capture what scientists actually do do.

Again, you are the only one proposing this simplistic model. And you seem to be both ignorant and dismissive of what scientists actually do.

Would you now like to change this to "Science is not about truth these days"?

 

That is probably a better characterization.

 

Or perhaps "No scientist -- no, not even one -- since [enter date] has cared a jot about truth"?

 

No, that is the sort of ridiculous strawman argument you are fond of. I try and avoid those.

Why is everyone getting so knee-jerk defensive?

 

I don't see anyone getting defensive. You seem to be one of those people who likes to think they are winding people up and getting a strong reaction (there is a word for that, on the Internet). Sorry to disappoint you; people are just pointing out that you are making some dubious arguments against a position that no one holds.

But it's certainly not true in all cases.

 

You are the only one claiming that things have to be always true or always false.

 

"I think you’ll find it’s a bit more complicated than that…"

[Klaynos]

Test test, is my post visible? Because the op is either ignoring the question is how you can tell or can't see my posts.

[swansont]

 

3. "But of course it isn't because it works (is "true") for a large domain of problems"

This is another point you continuously fail to grasp, I'm afraid. A theory working does not entail that is true. We infer at our peril from a theory yielding accurate predictions to its truth, i.e. its offering a (more or less) accurate representation of reality. The instrumental efficacy of a theory and its truth are two different matters, not to be confused.

 

How do you evaluate a theory, then? Or discard one? How do you test for the "reality" of a theory, other than by evaluating whether it makes correct predictions of experiments?

[Reg Prescott]

@ swansont : "How do you evaluate a theory, then? Or discard one? How do you test for the "reality" of a theory, other than by evaluating whether it makes correct predictions of experiments?"

As I've explained, I'm not here -- I wouldn't pretend -- to make normative judgements on what scientists ought to do. Many people have written on these matters though, of course -- and they offer wildly divergent advice.

In an earlier age, inductivists like Bacon, Newton, and Mill would have told you roughly, I suspect, that theories are somehow derived from data; testing therefore is largely redundant. Descartes might have appealed to deduction from first principles. Whewell would invoke somethink akin to the hypothetico-deductive model. Popper would insist that theories can never be confirmed to any degree (since induction is incurably invalid. How many scientists would be willing to bite THAT bullet?); they can only be deductively falsified. Kuhn would mention paradigms and explain the reasons he believes lead to scientists abandoning one in favor of another. Lakatos would speak of scientific research programmes. And bad-boy Feyerabend would tell us there is no universal method or rationality in either the discovery or the confirmation/testing of theories - anything goes!

And as we see, everyone in this thread has their own views on the matter too.

@ Klaynos

Sorry, I'm not deliberating ignoring anyone. A lot has been said, and just writing as much as I have has been very time consuming. Would you mind repeating which point you'd like addressed, please?

And don't hold your breath that I'll have anything intelligent to say on it.

[studiot]

 

How do you evaluate a theory, then? Or discard one? How do you test for the "reality" of a theory, other than by evaluating whether it makes correct predictions of experiments?

 

 

You check it against the party official handbook of doctrine of course.

 

What a silly quesion number 7. Take twenty extra correctness lessons.

 

[Strange]

As I've explained, I'm not here -- I wouldn't pretend -- to make normative judgements on what scientists ought to do. Many people have written on these matters though, of course -- and they offer wildly divergent advice.

 

So the whole purpose of this thread is for you to point out that the model that none of them proposed is wrong.

 

With the possible exception of Popper. But did he really not know that his was an unrealistic and idealised description?

Edited October 1, 2015 by Strange

[Klaynos]

I'm still interested in this.

 

If you can test which model is closer to "truth" then they are distinguishable and the "better" model wins. If you cannot test then there's no way of knowing and you could speculate until the cows come home but it would make no difference and you could never know.

The original question was "how can you tell?". This post expanded the point somewhat. How can you quantify trueness to compare models?

[Reg Prescott]

The original question was "how can you tell?". This post expanded the point somewhat. How can you quantify trueness to compare models?

 

 

I'm not at all sure that it is possible to tell. Again, many people much more capable than myself have written on this, and if there's a last word to be said, it sure ain't gonna come from yours truly.

 

I suspect -- and you guys may confirm or disconfirm -- that most scientists would like to believe that even if they're not capturing the absolute truth in their best theories (which would be a very hard claim to defend), they're at least making an approximation to a true description of reality - they're getting SOMETHING right.

See my comments above on evolutionary theory, for example (post 52), or consider, perhaps, the case of geologists and plate tectonics. I find it very hard to believe that all geologists regard these beasts as nothing more than abstractions or useful fictions. What do you think?

 

I suppose, furthermore, that many/most scientists would like to believe that successor theories have a greater truth content than predecessor theories. But here the philosophical waters get pretty deep. No one so far, to my knowledge at least, has been able to provide a satisfactory characterization of the notion of verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. Popper, for one, tried and failed.

 

One thing, though, that is pretty much universally conceded these days, I believe, is that no amount of testing or evidence or confirmation can ever prove a theory, in the logical sense. A theory is never entailed by data/evidence, again in the logical sense. Or as they like to say, theories are underdetermined by data.

 

Here's a quote from Einstein that captures this nicely:

 

Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of the mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison."

[Strange]

I suspect -- and you guys may confirm or disconfirm -- that most scientists would like to believe that even if they're not capturing the absolute truth in their best theories (which would be a very hard claim to defend), they're at least making an approximation to a true description of reality

 

Those who are realists (which probably includes those who have never thought about it) would say yes. Those who are idealists (which, I guess, would be most of those who have studied philosophy) would say no. I have no idea what the relative numbers are. But then neither do you!

 

they're getting SOMETHING right.

 

Both the realists and idealists would agree with that. (Which is why science works, independent of any metaphysical discussions as to the nature of reality.)

 

They would disagree about what that "something" is. The realists would say they have a better model of reality, the idealists would say we have a better model of what we observe (reality beyond that being unknowable).

 

I suppose, furthermore, that many/most scientists would like to believe that successor theories have a greater truth content than predecessor theories.

 

Again, the realists would agree they have a greater truth content. The idealists would just smile smugly.

Edited October 1, 2015 by Strange

[swansont]

 

@ swansont : "How do you evaluate a theory, then? Or discard one? How do you test for the "reality" of a theory, other than by evaluating whether it makes correct predictions of experiments?"

As I've explained, I'm not here -- I wouldn't pretend -- to make normative judgements on what scientists ought to do. Many people have written on these matters though, of course -- and they offer wildly divergent advice.

 

Explain in terms of what they actually do. If theories are tied in with truth (as you have described it), how are these realists testing that theories are truly describing reality? Take any example I have given of things that I say are abstractions.

 

One thing, though, that is pretty much universally conceded these days, I believe, is that no amount of testing or evidence or confirmation can ever prove a theory, in the logical sense. A theory is never entailed by data/evidence, again in the logical sense. Or as they like to say, theories are underdetermined by data.

 

Here's a quote from Einstein that captures this nicely:

 

Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of the mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison."

 

It also nicely captures the idea that he was not a realist. He's saying there's no way to know if your model is reality. You've successfully debunked part of your own argument.

 

I suspect -- and you guys may confirm or disconfirm -- that most scientists would like to believe that even if they're not capturing the absolute truth in their best theories (which would be a very hard claim to defend), they're at least making an approximation to a true description of reality - they're getting SOMETHING right

 

They're getting the behavior right. No surprise there, since it's what people have been saying all along. You've failed to make your point. You have to establish that they are getting something else right, too.

[Reg Prescott]

It's frustrating that I'm being misunderstood and misrepresented over and over again, particulary by the two most recent posters. I will not even address Strange anymore; he's done it once too often (why don't the staff do something about this?) And how did "idealists" get into the discussion. Whoever mentioned idealism?

Just briefly, in response to swansont's latest post:

@ - "Explain in terms of what they actually do. If theories are tied in with truth (as you have described it), how are these realists testing that theories are truly describing reality? Take any example I have given of things that I say are abstractions."

Sorry, I can't even make sense of this (test an abstraction for reality?). Anyway, let's just say my answer is "I've no idea". Why don't you explain? Thanks.

@ - "It also nicely captures the idea that he was not a realist. He's saying there's no way to know if your model is reality. You've successfully debunked part of your own argument."

I don't think I have debunked myself; Einstein's remarks seem perfectly consistent with a realist position to me. He even says explicitly "In our endeavour to understand reality ... ", and again, "He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism ..."

What more evidence could you possibly need for his realist stance? He's speaking (or at least this is how I see it) as man who holds that there is just one way things are out there independent of ourselves, our theories are an attempt to capture that reality (they are not mere abstractions or useful fictions, which is the attitude adopted by the instrumentalist), and while we might enjoy some degree of epistemic justification that we've got things right, we can never be "quite sure".

Deepest apologies to Mr Einstein if I'm misreprenting you. Interpreting other people's words is a hazardous business.

@ - "They're getting the behavior right. No surprise there, since it's what people have been saying all along. You've failed to make your point. You have to establish that they are getting something else right, too."

No, you misrepresent me again. Please stop doing this. I didn't claim they're getting something (or something else) right; I expressed my suspicion that they'd like to believe they're getting something right. Whether they are or not is another question. I made no claim that they're getting something right, so I'm under no obligation to establish it. Perhaps the elliptical form of my sentence misled you. Apologies if so. Let me be more clear. Here's the sentence again (clarification in blue):

"I suspect -- and you guys may confirm or disconfirm -- that most scientists would like to believe that even if they're not capturing the absolute truth in their best theories (which would be a very hard claim to defend), (they would like to believe that) they're at least making an approximation to a true description of reality - (they would like to believe that) they're getting SOMETHING right." - Me, post 62

P.S. I believe much of the confusion in this thread arises from some posters failing to appreciate that scientific realism and instrumentalism are attitudes that one can adopt to any given theory as one pleases, on a case by case basis. It is not necessarily an en bloc position taken across the board with respect to all theories. One might, for example, assume an instrumentalist attitude toward quantum theory (i.e. holding that what we have is a useful tool, but it should not be understood as describing how things really are down there), while at once adopting a realist attitude to tectonic plate theory in geology.

[Reg Prescott]

.

.

.

In the thread so far, I seem to have made myself very unpopular by challenging what I take to be absurd claims such as the following:

(i) "Remember, science is not about "truth" but about models that work;" (post # 5)

(ii) "Science has (almost) nothing to do with "truth", whatever that is. For that you want religion." (post # 10)

(iii) "I don't remember hearing any scientists say anything other than theories are just attempts to model reality, not attempts to uncover the truth. Given the way that theories are constantly being modified in the light of new evidence, it would be very short sighted for anyone to say "this theory is true"." (post # 31)

(iv) "Theories are not "true" or "false", they are better or worse models." (post # 55)

In the Youtube clip I'll post below (assuming the link works), Neil deGrasse Tyson tells us "The good thing about science is that it's true whether or not you believe in it."

Well, Prof Tyson's claim is patently as absurd as the claim that science has (almost) nothing to do with truth.

I'm just wondering if my assailants in this thread would administer the same treatment to Prof Tyson as they have to myself. After all, if one of you is right, the other is hopelessly wrong. But what worries me is that, under normal circumstances, they'd join in the thunderous applause with the studio audience in the background.

Yes, you might say it's just a chat show. Let's not get our kinickers in a twist. Fair enough. But then again, we don't like it when the religious nutters advance absurd, exaggerated, unjustifiable, or even demonstrably false claims.

Why, then, do we not only condone a high profile scientist doing so, but cheer too?

Edited October 2, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[John Cuthber]

 

.

.

.

In the thread so far, I seem to have made myself very unpopular by challenging what I take to be absurd claims such as the following:

(i) "Remember, science is not about "truth" but about models that work;" (post # 5)

(ii) "Science has (almost) nothing to do with "truth", whatever that is. For that you want religion." (post # 10)

(iii) "I don't remember hearing any scientists say anything other than theories are just attempts to model reality, not attempts to uncover the truth. Given the way that theories are constantly being modified in the light of new evidence, it would be very short sighted for anyone to say "this theory is true"." (post # 31)

(iv) "Theories are not "true" or "false", they are better or worse models." (post # 55)

In the Youtube clip I'll post below (assuming the link works), Neil deGrasse Tyson tells us "The good thing about science is that it's true whether or not you believe in it."

Well, Prof Tyson's claim is patently as absurd as the claim that science has (almost) nothing to do with truth.

I'm just wondering if my assailants in this thread would administer the same treatment to Prof Tyson as they have to myself. After all, if one of you is right, the other is hopelessly wrong. But what worries me is that, under normal circumstances, they'd join in the thunderous applause with the studio audience in the background.

Yes, you might say it's just a chat show. Let's not get our kinickers in a twist. Fair enough. But then again, we don't like it when the religious nutters advance absurd, exaggerated, unjustifiable, or even demonstrably false claims.

Why, then, do we not only condone a high profile scientist doing so, but cheer too?

 

It's almost as if you don't understand that a word can have two meanings, depending on context.

[swansont]

@ - "Explain in terms of what they actually do. If theories are tied in with truth (as you have described it), how are these realists testing that theories are truly describing reality? Take any example I have given of things that I say are abstractions."

 

Sorry, I can't even make sense of this (test an abstraction for reality?). Anyway, let's just say my answer is "I've no idea". Why don't you explain? Thanks.

According to your stated position these aren't abstractions; they must be real, and that there are many scientists who think so. Further, these scientists can't be satisfied with the theory just working. So give me some examples of scientists testing to see if a theory is true, rather than just working.

 

 

@ - "It also nicely captures the idea that he was not a realist. He's saying there's no way to know if your model is reality. You've successfully debunked part of your own argument."

 

I don't think I have debunked myself; Einstein's remarks seem perfectly consistent with a realist position to me. He even says explicitly "In our endeavour to understand reality ... ", and again, "He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism ..."

 

Indeed — one cannot test to see if the idea to see if it is real, so one is not striving for that. One can only test to see if it works. Realism is unattainable, therefore theories are not representing reality.

 

 

@ - "They're getting the behavior right. No surprise there, since it's what people have been saying all along. You've failed to make your point. You have to establish that they are getting something else right, too."

 

No, you misrepresent me again. Please stop doing this. I didn't claim they're getting something (or something else) right; I expressed my suspicion that they'd like to believe they're getting something right. Whether they are or not is another question. I made no claim that they're getting something right, so I'm under no obligation to establish it. Perhaps the elliptical form of my sentence misled you. Apologies if so. Let me be more clear. Here's the sentence again (clarification in blue):

On the contrary, I think I got you perfectly. Everyone believes they're getting something right. What I have been asking is for you to establish that they think they are getting anything more than the behavior right.

 

P.S. I believe much of the confusion in this thread arises from some posters failing to appreciate that scientific realism and instrumentalism are attitudes that one can adopt to any given theory as one pleases, on a case by case basis. It is not necessarily an en bloc position taken across the board with respect to all theories. One might, for example, assume an instrumentalist attitude toward quantum theory (i.e. holding that what we have is a useful tool, but it should not be understood as describing how things really are down there), while at once adopting a realist attitude to tectonic plate theory in geology.

Well, then, you have to take responsibility for this confusion. In post #29, things were pretty black-and-white. When I said physics contains abstractions, you tagged me as an instrumentalist and then, by all indications, immediately surmised that I assumed nothing was real. All of which is at odds to your description here, which is decidedly different, and with which I agree.

 

In the Youtube clip I'll post below (assuming the link works), Neil deGrasse Tyson tells us "The good thing about science is that it's true whether or not you believe in it."

 

The problem here is one of equivocation. True as in it works or it doesn't, vs truth reflecting reality.

[Reg Prescott]

@ swantson -- "According to your stated position these aren't abstractions; they must be real, and that there are many scientists who think so."

 

Utter nonsense. I've never said such a thing.

 

 

It's pointless to even continue. Apparently you're a physicist. I'm not. If you were to talk heavy duty physics to me, it would probably go right over my head. Unfortunately what's happening here is that we're discussing philosophy of science (something I do know a little about) and the reverse is happening -- you (and others) are consistently failing to understand me. All I can do is post a link and perhaps some readers will take a little time read it.

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

[Strange]

And how did "idealists" get into the discussion. Whoever mentioned idealism?

 

I did.

 

Sorry, I can't even make sense of this (test an abstraction for reality?). Anyway, let's just say my answer is "I've no idea". Why don't you explain? Thanks.

 

And that is the problem with your insistence that science is about "truth"; if you can't test whether a model is just an abstraction or describes reality then how can you say that science is about reality rather than abstractions?

 

And, of course, there is no way of testing that. (Which is why realism vs idealism is relevant.)

 

P.S. I believe much of the confusion in this thread arises from some posters failing to appreciate that scientific realism and instrumentalism are attitudes that one can adopt to any given theory as one pleases, on a case by case basis. It is not necessarily an en bloc position taken across the board with respect to all theories. One might, for example, assume an instrumentalist attitude toward quantum theory (i.e. holding that what we have is a useful tool, but it should not be understood as describing how things really are down there), while at once adopting a realist attitude to tectonic plate theory in geology.

 

You are the one who, when swansont pointed out that fields are an abstraction, said, "How many chemists hold that theories of molecules are nothing more than a useful calculating device? What about biologists and germs, say?"

 

So perhaps you need to remember that these decisions can be made on a case by case basis.

 

(But some people would say that molecules, germs and even chairs are just models of reality. Some people will insist that fields and chairs are equally real.)

I'm just wondering if my assailants in this thread would administer the same treatment to Prof Tyson as they have to myself.

 

Based on your comment (I haven't and almost certainly won't be able to watch the video) I think he is wrong and I would like to discuss this with him. (So, yes, I would give him exactly the same treatment: tell him I think he is wrong and discuss his views.)

 

After all, if one of you is right, the other is hopelessly wrong.

 

You do love your extremes. The real world isn't like that.

@ swantson -- "According to your stated position these aren't abstractions; they must be real, and that there are many scientists who think so."

 

Utter nonsense. I've never said such a thing.

 

Really?

 

This claim ["science is not about truth"] is manifestly false.

...

Instrumentalism is contrasted with realism; the position that scientific theories purport to describe reality; the way things really are out there - truth! Black holes, quarks, species, fields, forces, genes, etc, etc really do exist. It's true! Einstein was well known as being a realist, at least in his later years. For a person like him, and I would suspect the majority of working scientists too, science is ALL about truth. They are not engaged in fiction. They are in the business of getting the world right, or at least trying to.

....

3. "If scientists did things like observe the anomalous orbit of Uranus and say "oh no, Newton got it all wrong; let's throw it all away and start again" then science would never progress." - Strange, post 28

Science progesses? Towards what? Truth? (in other words, increasingly accurate descriptions of reality)

...

And if science is not progressing towards more and more accurate descriptions of reality, what is it progressing towards?

 

And many other posts.

 

 

Unfortunately what's happening here is that we're discussing philosophy of science (something I do know a little about) and the reverse is happening -- you (and others) are consistently failing to understand me.

 

Maybe the problem is that you may know a little bit about the philosophy of science but you know nothing about science or how it is actually done. This means you are like someone who read a book on first aid telling a bunch of surgeons what they are doing wrong.

[Reg Prescott]

@ Strange

 

Your last post is another case of gross misrepresentation. I honestly don't understand why the staff don't do anything about this. I can't even be bothered pointing out your misrepresentations, or trying to get through to you anymore, but I'll be happy to explain to any impartial staff member who contacts me.

 

Finally, re your "This means you are like someone who read a book on first aid telling a bunch of surgeons what they are doing wrong."

 

Or perhaps you're like a football player who believes ONLY football players themselves could possibly know anything or have anything worthwhile to say about football.

P.S. Just as the religious loonies claim too -- the "You're not one of us. What could you know about it?" syndrome.

[Strange]

@ Strange

 

Your last post is another case of gross misrepresentation. I honestly don't understand why the staff don't do anything about this. I can't even be bothered pointing out your misrepresentations, or trying to get through to you anymore, but I'll be happy to explain to any impartial staff member who contacts me.

 

There is a "Report" link at the bottom of every post. Feel free to use it.

 

I do have a bad habit of letting the important points get lost in meta-comments. I apologise for that.

 

How about addressing this:

 

And that is the problem with your insistence that science is about "truth"; if you can't test whether a model is just an abstraction or describes reality then how can you say that science is about reality rather than abstractions?

 

And, of course, there is no way of testing that. (Which is why realism vs idealism is relevant.)

 

You insist science is about testing theories against reality (or maybe you are only saying that [in your opinion] most scientists think that) but if it is impossible to test a theory against reality, then that is untenable position.

[Klaynos]

Indeed one cannot test to see if the idea to see if it is real, so one is not striving for that. One can only test to see if it works. Realism is unattainable, therefore theories are not representing reality.

 

This to me is key. If you can't test it then you can't distinguish them. If you can't distinguish then what's the point in the discussion?

[Reg Prescott]

@ Klaynos

 

Well, no one ever gave me an answer to this (post 52)...

 

"How, then, may I ask would our other members reply to a wayward Creationist, say, who wandered in and expressed his firmly held belief that evolutionary theory was a load of crap? How many among you, in all honesty, would tell him, "Don't worry, pal. Our evolutionary theory has nothing to do with truth. You're better to think of it as a model, or a useful fiction, that we use as a calculating device to .... erm, cure baldness (or whatever). It has nothing at all to do with the way things really are out there." "

[Klaynos]

Evolution is consistent with what we observe, your argument is a strawman. I think a further definition of truth and "really are" would be required for someone to make the statement you present.