Scientific testing (split from goal of science)

[Strange]

But this picking over the choice of words is slightly irrelevant to the point: you appeared to be saying, originally, that you thought scientists would ignore contradictory evidence to hang on to existing theories. That is obviously not what happens (or we wowuld never have any new theories!)

[Reg Prescott]

"But this picking over the choice of words is slightly irrelevant to the point: you appeared to be saying, originally, that you thought scientists would ignore contradictory evidence to hang on to existing theories. That is obviously not what happens (or we wowuld never have any new theories!)"

 

With all due respect, this IS obviously what happens. Have you read Thomas Kuhn?

 

And I'm not attacking. Good theories are hard to come by. They shouldn't be dropped just like that. So the wise men say anyway.

[Strange]

"But this picking over the choice of words is slightly irrelevant to the point: you appeared to be saying, originally, that you thought scientists would ignore contradictory evidence to hang on to existing theories. That is obviously not what happens (or we wowuld never have any new theories!)"

 

With all due respect, this IS obviously what happens. Have you read Thomas Kuhn?

 

And I'm not attacking. Good theories are hard to come by. They shouldn't be dropped just like that. So the wise men say anyway.

So, if all you are saying is that science is slow to overthrow established theories then I don't think anyone would disagree.

 

That "conservatism" is one of the reasons for the success of the process. If scientists did things like observe the anomalous orbit of Uranus and say "oh no, Newton got it all wrong; let's throw it all away and start again" then science would never progress.

 

So you weren't being "provocative," just stating the obvious.

[Reg Prescott]

Hi again to all.

I've been reading through the thread again after being away for a couple of days. The train of the discussion was somewhat desultory, not surprising given that several of us in were posting in "real time", so I thought I'd try here to summarize my main gripe, which in a nutsell, is that certain members are advancing claims that are exaggerated, unjustifiable, or just plain false.

The impression I get is that certain of my interlocutors may be working scientists themselves, and I have no misgivings at all regarding your own professtional expertise. At the same time, though, I also get the distinct impression that you're not well read, or possibly not read at all, in the philosophy of science -- no disgrace in that, of course, but your lack of knowledge in this area is leading you astray at times. Issues we've been addressing here -- the nature of scientific theories, realism vs instrumentalism, testing, evidence, confirmation, The Scientific Method (if there is such a thing), the goals of science, historical examination of individual cases -- are all standard fare in the philosophy of science.

Overall, I sense that the notion you have of theory testing, and the dynamics of science in general, is largely Popperian, whether you're aware of it or not. Karl Popper tells us roughly that:

1. Scientists (do or should) test their hypotheses/theories by deductively deriving observational consequences (predictions) and comparing them against nature herself.

2. If there is a mismatch between the two, then the hypothesis/theory is falsified and must be rejected.

(And on Youtube you'll find a fascinating old black and white clip of Richard Feynman teaching (his version of) The Scientific Method to a class. The method he's espousing is pure Popper.)

Alas, I think it's fair to say that Popper's ideas are pretty thoroughly discredited these days, largely because of the work of his successors including Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, W.V.O. Quine, etc. I asked in the thread earlier whether other posters were familiar with the work of these men. No one replied.

Quine shows that hypotheses/theories cannot be tested in isolation; Popper's ideas are too naive. There can be no simple contradiction between theory and evidence; auxiliary hypotheses are always implicated; and so when there is a prima facie mismatch between theory and evidence, assuming your evidence is unproblematic, then the problem might lie with your theory. But then again it might not, it might lie in the auxiliaries We all know that scientists can and do move on from an old theory to a new one, but we should not suppose this is because the old theory has been "falsified" in any logical sense.

Meanwhile, Kuhn, Lakatos and others adduced voluminous evidence from the actual history of science, demonstrating that -- contra Popper and certain posters here (see Strange, top of post 3) -- it's simply not the case that scientists invariably reject a theory when there's an apparent contradiction between theory and evidence/observation. What's much more likely to happen is that they will try to fit the recalcitrant evidence into the paradigm. Examples of this are numerous and well known; we touched on one or two earlier -- the anomalous orbits of both Uranus and Mercury under Newtonian physics, Copericanism and stellar parallax (or lack thereof), natural selection and altruism, the positing of dark matter and dark energy to protect theory against falsification... in each case there was an apparent contradiction between theory and observation; in no case was the theory considered to be falsified and ignominiously dumped.

In brief, if Popper's has indeed identified The Scientific Method, or the method of testing theories -- and this is the schema that my interlocutors here seem to endorse -- then scientists don't follow it, I'm afraid. What will happen out there in the real scientific community when observation appears to be at odds with theory? Well, they might indeed consider the theory falsified and abandon it. But then again, they might try to incorporate the troublesome evidence into the theory. Or if that fails, they might just leave it on the back burner (which is what happened in the case of the anomalous orbit of Mercury). In other words, your guess is as good as mine. So much for "testing".

Given my remarks above, I'd invite both ajb and Strange to reread their opening posts.

From hereon, I'd like to address what I regard to be some of the most dubious claims made by other posters in the last two pages.

1. "Remember, science is not about "truth" but about models that work; ..." - Strange, post 5, and

"Science has (almost) nothing to do with "truth", whatever that is. For that you want religion" -- Strange, post 10

(and also ajb, post 15)

This claim is manifestly false. The attitude you're characterizing here is that of instrumentalism, that is, the belief that scientific theories should be properly regarded as nothing more than calculating devices (black boxes); the belief that the entities posited within are simply useful fictions; that theories should not be taken to be describing reality. And there are people who adopt such an instrumentalist stance, particularly with respect to a weird theory such as quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr held a roughly instrumentalist position, I believe.

Instrumentalism is contrasted with realism; the position that scientific theories purport to describe reality; the way things really are out there - truth! Black holes, quarks, species, fields, forces, genes, etc, etc really do exist. It's true! Einstein was well known as being a realist, at least in his later years. For a person like him, and I would suspect the majority of working scientists too, science is ALL about truth. They are not engaged in fiction. They are in the business of getting the world right, or at least trying to.

Why not ask a few?

2. "But this is, in the long run, corrected by the scientific method." - Strange, post 10

I don't believe there is such a thing as The Scientific Method, and a growing number of people who've devoted a great deal of time to examining these things agree with me. Meanwhile, those who do believe in it and write on the topic - from Bacon and Descartes to Newton, from Mill to Popper and Lakatos, and a hundred others -- can't agree what it is. Yet you simply assert it blithely. Of course, it's quite possible I could be wrong and there is indeed a universal method of science. How about you? Could you be wrong? I feel it's irresponsible to make claims of this kind as if the matter is not in dispute; as if you could not possibly be wrong -- the same way the religious folks do.

3. "If scientists did things like observe the anomalous orbit of Uranus and say "oh no, Newton got it all wrong; let's throw it all away and start again" then science would never progress." - Strange, post 28

Science progesses? Towards what? Truth? (in other words, increasingly accurate descriptions of reality)

Once again, if this is what you mean, I don't think it should be simply asserted -- as the religious loonies invariably do with their own doctrine and dogma --as if the matter is wholly uncontroversial. Are you aware of the well known arguments (notably by Larry Laudan) which suggest, to me anyway, that convergent realism is an untenable position. How, for example, can theories in optics which have taken us from light as corpuscles, then to a wave of one kind or another, and now to photons, be said to be progress towards truth? How is a photon closer to truth than a corpuscle?

And if science is not progressing towards more and more accurate descriptions of reality, what is it progressing towards?

[ajb]

I personally take a pragmatic view to all this. As a philosophical stance cannot really be supported by empirical evidence the best one can do is say that this position has served me well so far.

 

So, we all acknowledge that Popper's description of the scientific method is not great. In practice there are subtleties and the method may need some adaptation. It is more a philosophy than a hard rule. As science has given us medicine and technology, both of which overall are beneficial to mankind, I state that the scientific method is a reasonable philosophical stance to take.

[Strange]

1. Scientists (do or should) test their hypotheses/theories by deductively deriving observational consequences (predictions) and comparing them against nature herself.

2. If there is a mismatch between the two, then the hypothesis/theory is falsified and must be rejected.

 

I don't think anyone would claim that science works that way in practice.

 

When I agreed with this in response to your initial post, I assumed you were talking about the general principle rather than the ridiculous notion of discarding the entirety of science on the basis of one, potentially, erroneous result. (See, we can all be ridiculously hyperbolic.)

 

Alas, I think it's fair to say that Popper's ideas are pretty thoroughly discredited these days, largely because of the work of his successors including Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, W.V.O. Quine, etc. I asked in the thread earlier whether other posters were familiar with the work of these men. No one replied.

After you posted this, I noticed there was some discussion of this in this thread: http://www.scienceforums.net/topic/73253-effing-science-how-does-it-work/

There have been other threads on the subject over the years.

 

For a person like him, and I would suspect the majority of working scientists too, science is ALL about truth. They are not engaged in fiction. They are in the business of getting the world right, or at least trying to.

Why not ask a few?

When this has been discussed on this and other forums, and on the radio, etc. I don't remember hearing any scientists say anything other than theories are just attempts to model reality, not attempts to uncover the truth. Given the way that theories are constantly being modified in the light of new evidence, it would be very short sighted for anyone to say "this theory is true".

2. "But this is, in the long run, corrected by the scientific method." - Strange, post 10

I don't believe there is such a thing as The Scientific Method, and a growing number of people who've devoted a great deal of time to examining these things agree with me. Meanwhile, those who do believe in it and write on the topic - from Bacon and Descartes to Newton, from Mill to Popper and Lakatos, and a hundred others -- can't agree what it is. Yet you simply assert it blithely.

 

A few years ago, I said something similar and used a phrase like "the process of science" and someone said "you mean the scientific method, why can't you say that". <shrug>

 

Whether "The Scientific Method" in its ideal form exists or not (and I think we all agree it doesn't), the overall process is, in the long-run, self correcting.

Science progesses? Towards what? Truth? (in other words, increasingly accurate descriptions of reality)

Towards more accurate descriptions, yes. Truth? I am not convinced.

Once again, if this is what you mean, I don't think it should be simply asserted

 

Ironic, from someone so fond of opinion and assertion.

 

How, for example, can theories in optics which have taken us from light as corpuscles, then to a wave of one kind or another, and now to photons, be said to be progress towards truth? How is a photon closer to truth than a corpuscle?

 

Quite. It is not about truth, it is about better, more useful, more accurate descriptions.

 

it's simply not the case that scientists invariably reject a theory when there's an apparent contradiction between theory and evidence/observation. What's much more likely to happen is that they will try to fit the recalcitrant evidence into the paradigm. Examples of this are numerous and well known; we touched on one or two earlier -- the anomalous orbits of both Uranus and Mercury under Newtonian physics, Copericanism and stellar parallax (or lack thereof), natural selection and altruism, the positing of dark matter and dark energy to protect theory against falsification... in each case there was an apparent contradiction between theory and observation; in no case was the theory considered to be falsified and ignominiously dumped.

 

There are cases where a theory has been "ignominiously dumped" but they are few and far between. Simply because a good theory is based on what we observe and is usually going to be a reasonable description of that. In the cases where the old model is found to be totally contradicted by new evidence then the old model will be discarded as completely incorrect (phlogiston, steady state cosmology, plum-pudding atomic model, static continents, etc).

 

In other cases, where the evidence does not contradict the theory but just shows it is not always accurate or is otherwise incomplete, then the theory is not dumped but adjusted for the new observations. And, in some cases, a new theory is developed which can co-exist with the old theory.

 

But, I suppose one could argue that the old theory is discarded: our old model of the solar system was thrown away and replaced with a new one containing one extra planet; our old model of the galaxy was dumped and replaced with a new one containing a large amount of dark matter (attempts to dump GR and formulate a new theory of gravity haven't worked out yet). And so on.

 

However you describe it, surely it is the right thing to do: replace or modify a theory when evidence requires it. And this is, of course, only possible because theories are not regarded as religious truths.

[Reg Prescott]

@ Strange -- I'm having difficulty making sense of some of your comments regarding "truth" and "reality. For example, you tell us:

"When this has been discussed on this and other forums, and on the radio, etc. I don't remember hearing any scientists say anything other than theories are just attempts to model reality, not attempts to uncover the truth. Given the way that theories are constantly being modified in the light of new evidence, it would be very short sighted for anyone to say "this theory is true".

So, on your account, they're not aiming at discovering truth, just aiming at accurately modeling reality. What's the difference? Is truth not that property of statements/hypotheses which describes reality? The statement "The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if, in reality, the cat is on the mat. Right? And false otherwise. Likewise for the statement/hypothesis "The Earth is four billion years old." If not, which notion of truth do you have in mind?

No offence intended, but it seems you can't make up your mind whether you're a realist or an instrumentalist. The realist would not necessarily claim that out best theories are perfect descriptions of truth/reality, that would be rash, but she would probably claim that they are close approximations. Science aims at truth on the realist account, but might never attain it.

Do you hold that theories which posit black holes, quarks, species, fields, forces, genes, electrons, spacetime and all the rest should be read literally? That we are justified in believing (i.e. have good reason to believe) such entities actually exist with the properties and behavior specified by the theories? Or is it your position that all talk of such entities should be regarded as merely useful fictions, not to be taken literally, just as it would be a mistake to read "average taxpayer", say, in a theory of economics to mean that such a beast exists in reality? If it's the former, you're a realist; if the latter, an instrumentist. Statements about "the average taxpayer" are evidently just tools or instruments; not even candidates for truth or falsity.

Later you write : "Towards more accurate descriptions, yes. Truth? I am not convinced."

Towards more accurate descriptions of what? A description must be a description of something. Descriptions of an imaginary realm? Or descriptions of reality? i.e., a true description.

And once again, you tell us : " It is not about truth, it is about better, more useful, more accurate descriptions."

I can make no sense of this. Please explain. Descriptions of what? Are scientists doing their best to describe the real world or not?

[Strange]

 

@ Strange -- I'm having difficulty making sense of some of your comments regarding "truth" and "reality. For example, you tell us:

"When this has been discussed on this and other forums, and on the radio, etc. I don't remember hearing any scientists say anything other than theories are just attempts to model reality, not attempts to uncover the truth. Given the way that theories are constantly being modified in the light of new evidence, it would be very short sighted for anyone to say "this theory is true".

So, on your account, they're not aiming at discovering truth, just aiming at accurately modeling reality. What's the difference?

 

So there seem to be two ways in which "truth" is used in this context. It appears I have misunderstood you. You seem to be using "truth" as a synonym for reality (i.e. whatever it is that exists "out there").

 

In which case, I would say there is no difference: producing better models of reality = better models of the truth (because, by your definition these are exactly the same thing).

 

What others often mean when they talk about truth with regard to scientific theories is whether the underlying model is true or not. So, for example, they may say that the model of gravity as a force in Newtonian physics is not true because we now know that gravity is space-time curvature. And they may assert that this description is "true"; i.e. there really is a thing called space-time and it really is curved. All I am saying is that that model is not necessarily true, it is just a better model of reality or, at least, what we observe ("reality" might be something completely different).

 

On the subject of realism vs idealism (or instrumentalism); I think it is irrelevant. If there is some sort of "reality" out there that we produce increasingly accurate (or "truer") models of, then great. But the nature of that reality (or whether it even exists) is probably unknowable. So if all we do is produce better models of what we perceive (which may not necessarily be "the truth") then, great. Either way it is a useful and productive exercise.

 

Which is one of the reasons I don't have much time for this sort of philosophical havering (so I wonder why I have spent so much time on it).

 

 

No offence intended, but it seems you can't make up your mind whether you're a realist or an instrumentalist.

 

I don't have an opinion either way. It is a meaningless question.

Edited September 30, 2015 by Strange

[ajb]

Are scientists doing their best to describe the real world or not?

Like Strange, I am wondering what is your definition of 'truth' is?

[Strange]

 

For a person like him, and I would suspect the majority of working scientists too, science is ALL about truth.

 

Do you have any evidence to support this?

Edited September 30, 2015 by Strange

[DrP]

SB - Look at the history for the make up of the atom from JJ Thompson through Bhor to modern day theories....

 

JJ Thompson's model of the atom (plumb pudding theory) was genius - he was the first to accurately describe the atom as a mix of positive and negative parts which were separate... He had the pudding as the negative field and the plumbs as positive cores... He was right! His model was very good - it more accurately described what an atom was like than any other theory that went before. He KNEW that it wasn't the absolute truth of the matter and that someone else would take the 'truths' he had learnt or observed and expand his model further. He was not wrong. Then Bohr came along... and so on. you know Niels Bhor was right - absolutely right when he realised that JJs modal was not correct and could be improved and he built a better model.

 

If you can't follow where this is going then you might as well pack up... As with Newtonian gravity being replaced with GR - there maybe a better theory which better describes reality one day, but we don't have it yet. I don't know what that chip on your shoulder is all about, or what tripe lectures you have listened to that knock science, but I would advise that you re-read this entire thread and see that many of your points just come from a position of ignorance. That is fine - but listen and learn.

 

Regards,

 

P.

[Strange]

@ Strange -- I'm having difficulty making sense of some of your comments ...

 

Don't worry it is mutual.

 

 

it's simply not the case that scientists invariably reject a theory when there's an apparent contradiction between theory and evidence/observation.

 

OK. So what should they do, in your opinion? Ignore the evidence? Start again, de novo, with every new observation?

[studiot]

This is my first reading of this thread and I wonder why it is so narrowly focused.

 

The discussion seems to concentrate on absolutes.

 

What about the use of statistics in scientific testing?

 

And what exactly is meant by 'scientific testing'

 

Would analysis of blood samples be included?

 

What safe working load certification testing?

 

Is there any data on what distribution of testing activity between various motivations?

[Strange]

This is my first reading of this thread and I wonder why it is so narrowly focused.

 

The discussion seems to concentrate on absolutes.

 

Indeed, that does seem to be part of the problem. The OP's insistence that theories are either true or false doesn't allow for the realistic nature of science (or the world in general). Things are never that black and white.

[swansont]

 

1. "Remember, science is not about "truth" but about models that work; ..." - Strange, post 5, and

"Science has (almost) nothing to do with "truth", whatever that is. For that you want religion" -- Strange, post 10

(and also ajb, post 15)

This claim is manifestly false. The attitude you're characterizing here is that of instrumentalism, that is, the belief that scientific theories should be properly regarded as nothing more than calculating devices (black boxes); the belief that the entities posited within are simply useful fictions; that theories should not be taken to be describing reality. And there are people who adopt such an instrumentalist stance, particularly with respect to a weird theory such as quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr held a roughly instrumentalist position, I believe.

Instrumentalism is contrasted with realism; the position that scientific theories purport to describe reality; the way things really are out there - truth! Black holes, quarks, species, fields, forces, genes, etc, etc really do exist. It's true! Einstein was well known as being a realist, at least in his later years. For a person like him, and I would suspect the majority of working scientists too, science is ALL about truth. They are not engaged in fiction. They are in the business of getting the world right, or at least trying to.

Why not ask a few?

 

 

Ask me. I'm a physicist, and much of physics is abstraction, not reality. Electric fields, for example, are not real, they are descriptions we use so that we can predict or explain the behavior of charged particles. Phonons are not real, they are convenient descriptions of vibrational modes of atoms in a lattice structure. Neither momentum nor energy is a substance. QM is rife with abstraction. Do particles actually take all pathways as described by Feynman diagrams, or is that just a calculational tool? Are superpositions of states (or the states themselves) real? How can you tell?

 

Physics describes how things behave, not what they are.

[Strange]

Physics describes how things behave, not what they are.

 

And it can be argued that it is impossible to know what they "really" are. All we have are our observations and measurements. Even without science, we build a mental model of the world around us based on those perceptions but there is no way of knowing how well, if at all, that model corresponds to the reality out there. Because all we have are our perceptions.

 

Science just allows us to make more accurate measurements and build more detailed and mathematical models. We can test these models against what we observe but never against what is "really" out there.

[Klaynos]

How can you tell?

This is the question that I found myself wanting to ask several times on reading this thread.

[Reg Prescott]

I'm dismayed, although not entirely surprised, by the undisguised hostiliy of certain contributors. Nonetheless, a few points to ponder...

Firstly, Strange asks : "Do you have any evidence to support this?" (post 35)

I'd hate to have to go searching for quotes. An instrumentalist approach, as opposed to a realist one, is surely the exception rather the rule in science. You'll find intrumentalist leanings notably in the writings of Mach, Duhem, Poincare, Newton (vis-à-vis gravity), perhaps Bohr, and precious few others. These people held that the aim of science is, or should be, at least in certain areas, to produce theories that WORK; that is, to produce theories that act as useful tools for us to gain some measure of control over nature; but not to regard these theories (and the entities posited therein) as models or descriptions of reality itself.

The scientific realist, on the other hand, wants more. She feels science ought to -- in addition to the aims of the instrumentalist -- produce theories that get the world right; to accurately describe the architecture and furniture of the universe; to produce theories that are true, or approximately so.

As I say, quote mining would be tedious. The most obvious example that springs immediately to mind is that of Galileo's endorsement of the Copernican system - a literal (i.e., a realist) endorsement, not an instrumentalist one. His adversaries were quite clear that he'd be in no trouble at all as long as he championed the theory as merely a useful calculating instrument, an abstraction, and not a description of reality. Galileo wanted more than a calculating device; he wanted to get the cosmos right. That makes him a realist.

It was interesting to hear from a physicist earlier (Swansont, post # 40). The attitude he descibes himself as adopting is precisely the instrumentalist one. But he's referring only to a very limited range of the scientific spectrum. As I said earlier (post 29), quote:

"And there are people who adopt such an instrumentalist stance, particularly with respect to a weird theory such as quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr held a roughly instrumentalist position, I believe."

If we stop focusing on quantum mechanics, ask yourself how many physicists are instrumentalists about atoms or electrons, say (They mainly were until the late 19th/early 20th century when they converted en masse to a realist stance -- with Ernst Mach bravely holding the fort for the instrumentalists, insisting that talk of atoms was not be taken literally). Do you also consider atoms to be merely an abstraction, Swansont? Ask yourself whether Stephen Hawking thinks black holes are real or simply a useful fiction. How many chemists hold that theories of molecules are nothing more than a useful calculating device? What about biologists and germs, say?

And so finally, in response to your rudeness and apathy...

"I don't know what that chip on your shoulder is all about, or what tripe lectures you have listened to that knock science, but I would advise that you re-read this entire thread and see that many of your points just come from a position of ignorance. That is fine - but listen and learn" - DrP, post # 36

"Which is one of the reasons I don't have much time for this sort of philosophical havering (so I wonder why I have spent so much time on it)." - Strange, post # 33

"I don't have an opinion either way. It is a meaningless question." - ibid

... etc., etc., ad nauseum, all I can say is that Galileo felt otherwise. So did Einstein. And a thousand other "ignorant" people.

[Strange]

 

I'm dismayed, although not entirely surprised, by the undisguised hostiliy of certain contributors.

 

I can't really see any hostility.

(Edit: OK, one post.)

 

 

Firstly, Strange asks : "Do you have any evidence to support this?" (post 35)

 

So that's a no then.

 

 

If we stop focusing on quantum mechanics, ask yourself how many physicists are instrumentalists about atoms or electrons, say (They mainly were until the late 19th/early 20th century when they converted en masse to a realist stance -- with Ernst Mach bravely holding the fort for the instrumentalists, insisting that talk of atoms was not be taken literally). Do you also consider atoms to be merely an abstraction, Swansont? Ask yourself whether Stephen Hawking thinks black holes are real or simply a useful fiction. How many chemists hold that theories of molecules are nothing more than a useful calculating device? What about biologists and germs, say?

 

You do insist on making these all-or-nothing judgments. Nothing is as black and white (or true and false) as you claim.

 

 

And a thousand other "ignorant" people.

 

Who said they were ignorant?

 

You make some interesting points, even claiming that they are "provocative", and then have a hissy fit when people disagree. That's a bit sad, but never mind. It takes all sorts.

 

Do you want to answer my question in post #37 ?

Edited September 30, 2015 by Strange

[studiot]

Do I conclude from the diatribe in your post 43 that I am wasting my time offering an opinion, or additional discussion points?

Edited September 30, 2015 by studiot

[Reg Prescott]

In reply to Strange's question in post # 37 ("OK. So what should they do, in your opinion? Ignore the evidence? Start again, de novo, with every new observation?")

 

I have no interest in normative questions of what scientists should do. That's their business. All I care about is what they do do, and that we not mischaracterize this with overly simplistic models of scientific method.

Some readers less familiar with the philosophical literature on the instrumentalism vs realism debate that we've been alluding to might enjoy the following essay by Stathos Phillos examining the arguments of Jean Perrin which were instrumental (sorry!) in convincing the scientific community that atoms and molecules were not simply useful fictions or abstractions as they'd hitherto been taken to, but that the correct attitude to adopt to them is one of realism -- these things are real, and our theories about them are true, or approximately so.

 

http://users.uoa.gr/~psillos/PapersI/10-Perrin-JGPS.pdf

 

 

A quote from page 340...

 

QUOTE

 

Indeed, between roughly 1908 and 1912, there was a massive shift in the scientific community in favour of the atomic conception of matter. The importance of Perrin’s own work is nicely captured by the following observation, made by Andre´ Lalande (1913, 366–367) in his annual essay on the philosophy in France for the year 1912:

 

"M. Perrin, professor of physics at the Sorbonne, has described in Les Atomes, with his usual lucidity and vigour, the recent experiments (in which he has taken so considerable a part) which prove conclusively that the atoms are physical realities and not symbolical conceptions as people have for a long time been fond of calling them. By giving precise and concordant measures for their weights and dimensions, it is proved that bodies actually exist which, though invisible, are analogous at all points to those which we see and touch. An old philosophical question thus receives a positive solution."

 

This brief and matter-of-fact announcement expressed a rather widely shared sentiment on the European continent that Perrin’s experimental work had clinched the issue of the reality of atoms. When Perrin received the Nobel Prize for physics in 1926, it was noted in the presentation speech by Professor C W Oseen that he ‘‘put a definite end to the long struggle regarding the real existence of molecules’’.

 

UNQUOTE

Edited September 30, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[studiot]

 

I have no interest in normative questions of what scientists should do. That's their business. All I care about is what they do do, and that we not mischaracterize this with overly simplistic models of scientific method.

 

 

 

I can't say if this was addressed to my post 38, immediately following post 37 that you addressed in your previous paragraph.

 

However if you can't or won't discuss then you have no business posting here.

 

I suggest you read the rules.

[Klaynos]

This is the question that I found myself wanting to ask several times on reading this thread.

I'm still interested in this.

 

If you can test which model is closer to "truth" then they are distinguishable and the "better" model wins. If you cannot test then there's no way of knowing and you could speculate until the cows come home but it would make no difference and you could never know.

[Reg Prescott]

As requested by studiot, my responses to his post # 38...

"What about the use of statistics in scientific testing?"

I don't know

"Would analysis of blood samples be included?"

I don't know

"What safe working load certification testing?"

I know nothing about it

"Is there any data on what distribution of testing activity between various motivations?"

I haven't the foggiest

"And what exactly is meant by 'scientific testing' "?

That's what I was hoping might be explained. My complaint is that I often hear of a major theory -- evolutionary theory, say -- having been "thoroughly tested". I've no idea what sense to make of this which does not trivialize our use of the term "test" into some Kafka-esque farce.

(Why didn't I past the "test"? Because we failed you)

I was hoping those who speak of testing might specify the criteria under which a theory will fail one of these "tests" (we would need certain criteria, wouldn't we, if the "test" was not to be entirely arbitrary?). We've seen, I think, that Popper's criterion (mismatch been observation and theory) isn't up for the task. I don't believe anyone has offered any other criteria of a general nature, i.e., applicable to all theories.

After that, I challenged what I took to be the manifestly false claims made by other posters along the lines of "Science has almost nothing to do with truth" and "Physics describes how things behave, not what they are." (see posts 5 and 40, for example). I was asked to support my challenge with evidence. That's what I've been trying to do lately.

As for rules, I only joined the site a few days ago, so I'm afraid I'm not familiar with them. I'm not trying to flaunt any.

Let's hope I don't fail the test. Peace and love!

... a word or two from philosopher of biology, Elliott Sober, on the topic of testing:

 

"Creationists often talk of 'testing evolutionary theory', and biologists sometimes talk this way as well. The context of their remarks sometimes reveals which specific proposition the authors have in mind, but often this is not the case. It is important to recognize that the phrase 'evolutionary theory' is too vague when the subject of testing is broached. There are a number of propositions that evolutionary biologists take seriously. The first step should be to specify which of these is to be the focus."

[Strange]

I have no interest in normative questions of what scientists should do. That's their business. All I care about is what they do do, and that we not mischaracterize this with overly simplistic models of scientific method.

 

You appear to be arguing against a strawman here. No one is supporting the simplistic model that you propose (you can tell you are making a stawman argument when all those attacking you are in agreement with you )

 

But, of course, it is OK for you to mischaracterise the actual science with overly simplistic descriptions.

 

As requested by studiot, my responses to his post # 38...

I don't know

I don't know

I know nothing about it

I haven't the foggiest

 

So it sounds as if the earlier characterization of you arguing from a position of ignorance was accurate after all.

 

 

I was hoping those who speak of testing might specify the criteria under which a theory will fail one of these "tests"

 

When the results predicted by the model do not match observation. You gave the example of Newtonian gravity not correctly predicting the precession of Mercury. This shows that Newtonian gravity is "wrong" (inaccurate, incomplete) in some sense. In your fantasy version of science, this would mean that Newtonian gravity would be instantly discarded. But of course it isn't because it works (is "true") for a large domain of problems.

 

The other possibility is that a model just cannot predict the observations at all. For example, the steady state model of the universe was eventually abandoned when there was a critical mass of evidence that it could not explain. There wasn't the silly "throw away the theory because one observation is contradictory" reaction that you argue for, but the detection of the CMB was pretty much the nail in the coffin (the straw that broke the camels back, anyway).

 

 

After that, I challenged what I took to be the manifestly false claims made by other posters along the lines of "Science has almost nothing to do with truth" and "Physics describes how things behave, not what they are." (see posts 5 and 40, for example). I was asked to support my challenge with evidence. That's what I've been trying to do lately.

 

You seem to only support that by expressing your opinions on what some scientists thought. Many of them from a period in the past when the common assumption probably was that science was an attempt to discover the truth.

 

 

... a word or two from philosopher of biology, Elliott Sober, on the topic of testing:

 

His point seems to be less about the nature of testing than the fact that creationists are attacking something very vague (the "theory of evolution", which is a family of interrelated theories and hypotheses) rather than focussing on specific bits of the science. This is hardly surprising as (1) few of them understand the science and (2) there isn't really any contradictory evidence.