Popper, Confirmation, and Evidence (split from "Is religion being picked on?")

[Reg Prescott]

Part 1: A response to Ophiolite's post # 46

-----------------------------------------------------

Two possibilities present themselves immediately:

(i) Your appraisal of me is, in fact, accurate, and that is, roughly: I'm a supercilious, arrogant, pot-stirring, passive-aggressive, anti-science troll wanker

or

(ii) People who consider themselves authorities -- and indeed ARE authorities in a particular domain -- do not take kindly to having factual and conceptual confusions in their own authoritative pronouncements brought to light. While no one DOES science better than the players themselves, surely this needn't imply that the players have the final word on all science-related matters: history, sociology, philosophy, etc. of science, not to mention basic logical inference.

If one's entire inventory of beliefs is founded on the concept of "evidence"...

Why do you belief X? Ans: It is supported by the evidence

Why do you not believe Y? Ans: There is no evidence for Y

... then is it not a matter of the utmost importance to subject the concept "evidence" itself to scrutiny?

Part 2 : A summary of some of the confusions revealed thus far

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Initially John Cuthber tells us simply there is no evidence for God, which implies at least that it's the kind of thing evidence could bear upon; there might be evidence, it's just that no one has presented any.

iNow tells us God is not even a theory ("It's an ill-defined three letter word with no objective characteristics and no predictive ability that differs from person to person and even day to day within the same individual." -- post 42), implying it's not even the kind of thing there could be evidence for.

Both vacillate between "theory", "scientific theory", and "hypothesis"; as one gets awkward, they seek refuge in another.

Ajb tells us there IS evidence (sometimes hedged with scare quotes) for God, but nothing that satisfies his fourfold criteria: objectivity, consistency, repeatability, and credibility.

Both himself (post 49) and Swansont (posts 27, 30) have objected to my focussing only on the obvious circularity of the fourth (credibility) and ignoring the conjunctive nature of his criteria. But these are not four independent criteria; the first three JUST ARE a list of objective criteria constitutive of his fourth subjective criterion -- credibility -- which, of course, is to be read as credibility to him and people like him. (as Swansont notes himself: "For it to boil down to credibility the evidence must first be consistent, repeatable and objective." - post 30).

Meanwhile, all of this masks a much deeper concern. Supposing we eliminate credibility from the list, for it's a dangler doing no work at all, and grant ajb's other criteria, then we're left with three objective criteria which constitute only necessary conditions for evidential acceptability, i.e., anything not satisfying these criteria will not even be considered as scientific evidence. Now this might or might not succeed --after all, granting ajb's criteria we can now say what is not admissible as evidence; we still don't know what IS admissible -- in keeping You-Know-Who (as well as Bigfoot and friends) safely outside the party, but we're still left entirely in the dark as to the relationship between evidence and theory. Ajb's revised trio of criteria would still not even begin to address this. Evidentiality is not something intrinsic; evidence is always evidence FOR something.

Say, for example, a certain behaviour is observed in penguins, and this observation satisfies ajm's aforementioned criteria, does it now constitute evidence? Evidence for WHAT? For relativity theory? Presumably not. I trust the problem is clear. Nothing whatsoever has been advanced by any contributor, as far as I can see, to specify the nature of the relationship between evidence and theory (and oscillating between theory, scientific theory, and hypothesis is entirely unhelpful; presumably they are all the kinds of beasts that evidence can bear upon).

Leaving evidence aside, we see further confusions regarding the "agenda of science"; some claim verification, others falsification, some both, and when inconsistencies are exposed everyone scrambles to reconcile the contradictory claims. The same applies to the relationship between science and truth; does science have nothing to do with truth, as some members claim implausibly, or do many scientists believe they are producing theories which are true or approximately so (ydoaPs - post 6)

"We're really all saying the same thing, you see" you try to persuade. Sorry, you're not.

Part 3: What's the big deal?

-----------------------------------

Do I think it's reprehensible that no consensus exists, and confusion is rife, on matters of evidence, scientific method, the aims of science, etc?

Ans: Not in the slightest. We all get confused. Better to acknowledge and address the confusion than sweep it under the rug.

Well, what's the problem then?

The problem is that everyone is behaving as if there IS no confusion. Everyone seems to believe he has the last word on these extremely complicated and possibly intractable problems: We know exactly what we're talking about. With our pithy one-liners we have solved problems which have vexed innumerable very clever thinkers for decades or even centuries.

I don't think anyone throughout the entire thread has qualified one of his pronouncements with a humble "in my opinion" or "I might be wrong about this". Meanwhile I get accused of arrogance.

Each post I make is almost invariably and predictably met with "You're wrong", "Your rebuttal is ineffective" or words to this effect -- not forgetting the obligatory -1 reputation stain. It appears I haven't advanced a single cogent criticism throughout the thread -- and another similar thread -- implying either that I may be eligible for an award for the most incompetent poster in the history of the site, or else certain people are simply impervious to criticism, at least from what they consider to be an enemy.

It's been said that anyone who is not bothered by quantum physics has rocks in their head. I submit the same might be said of those who think there is an easy, one-line, be-all-and-end-all answer to questions of evidence.

Edited November 4, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[Ophiolite]

Silly Billy you have presented a false dichotomy. You have ignored the third, factual alternative.

 

I happen to agree with most of what you have said. I just think the way you have said is deliberately aggressive, counterproductive in the extreme and - coming from a person who clearly possess both intelligence and education - strongly suggests that you just want to stir shit rather than actually convince anyone.

 

That is unfortunate since the basic points you are making are important to be discussed and understood. Unfortunately your attitude makes this next to impossible to achieve. If Carl Sagan had blown raspberries at his audience and called them fools he wouldn't have acquired the following he did. You are no Carl Sagan, so you need to try even harder to be listened to when you are taking a controversial position.

 

I don't expect you to change, but I would be delighted if I were proved wrong.

[Reg Prescott]

Silly Billy you have presented a false dichotomy. You have ignored the third, factual alternative.

 

I happen to agree with most of what you have said. I just think the way you have said is deliberately aggressive, counterproductive in the extreme and - coming from a person who clearly possess both intelligence and education - strongly suggests that you just want to stir shit rather than actually convince anyone.

 

That is unfortunate since the basic points you are making are important to be discussed and understood. Unfortunately your attitude makes this next to impossible to achieve. If Carl Sagan had blown raspberries at his audience and called them fools he wouldn't have acquired the following he did. You are no Carl Sagan, so you need to try even harder to be listened to when you are taking a controversial position.

 

I don't expect you to change, but I would be delighted if I were proved wrong.

 

I didn't present an exhaustive dichotomy. I simply mentioned two possibilities that immediately leapt to mind.

 

As for attitude, perhaps your own might be a little different if you'd had to endure what I have in these forums.

 

Re - calling people fools. I don't believe I've done any such thing (although clearly you and others have interpreted me this way). It's patently obvious that your members are very clever people. I do believe a significant number of them might be aptly described as excessively stubborn though.

Edited November 4, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[moth]

can "evidence" be considered to be the attributes of an event or object?
attributes including things like affects,effects,repeatability...

I'm not sure if there could be a one-size-fits-all list of attributes to suit every argument

[Reg Prescott]

can "evidence" be considered to be the attributes of an event or object?

attributes including things like affects,effects,repeatability...

 

I'm not sure if there could be a one-size-fits-all list of attributes to suit every argument

 

Well, this is a good start, Moth. Let's begin with the simplest hypothesis/theory/law imaginable -- H1 : all ravens are black

 

Does each observed black raven constitute evidence for H1?

 

Even this most fundamental scenario immediately confronts us with perplexing problems. Those familiar with Hempel's raven paradox will know what I'm alluding to.

Edited November 4, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[iNow]

iNow tells us God is not even a theory ("It's an ill-defined three letter word with no objective characteristics and no predictive ability that differs from person to person and even day to day within the same individual." -- post 42), implying it's not even the kind of thing there could be evidence for.

 

Both vacillate between "theory", "scientific theory", and "hypothesis"; as one gets awkward, they seek refuge in another.

Given that this discussion is occurring in a thread specifically related to the nature of science and scientific evidence, one should safely be able to assume that the context is clear and that any mention of the term "theory" is understood in a scientific sense.

 

If we were in a furniture store and I mentioned a chair, would you equally assume that I was referring to the leader of a conference or a person in charge of a group, or would it be reasonable to assume that you and other readers have reading comprehension abilities strong enough to recognize that I'm talking about a four legged wooden item with a back in which we sit, usually around tables or behind desks?

 

Ophiolite is correct. You raise good points, intelligent ones, too. It's really too bad you choose to be such a dick when raising them. We might actually be able to have a mutually enriching and edifying discussion were it otherwise. Oobla dee, oobla whatever, I suppose.

[Reg Prescott]

Given that this discussion is occurring in a thread specifically related to the nature of science and scientific evidence, one should safely be able to assume that the context is clear and that any mention of the term "theory" is understood in a scientific sense.

 

If we were in a furniture store and I mentioned a chair, would you equally assume that I was referring to the leader of a conference or a person in charge of a group, or would it be reasonable to assume that you and other readers have reading comprehension abilities strong enough to recognize that I'm talking about a four legged wooden item with a back in which we sit, usually around tables or behind desks?

 

You initially told us God is not a theory (post 42).

 

If what you say above is true, and by theory you had scientific theory in mind, why would you feel the need to inform us that there is no scientific theory of God.

 

Wouldn't our members be expected to know this already?

Edited November 4, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[moth]

is there a paradox?
if I think of figure and ground, the statement all ravens are black has the "shape" of every raven who's color I've checked, and ground is everything else.
the ground only tells you the shape of the figure by its absence, so the only knowledge we can get about figure is "this piece of ground, a red apple, is not a raven".

[iNow]

If what you say above is true...

It is.

[Reg Prescott]

is there a paradox?

if I think of figure and ground, the statement all ravens are black has the "shape" of every raven who's color I've checked, and ground is everything else.

the ground only tells you the shape of the figure by its absence, so the only knowledge we can get about figure is "this piece of ground, a red apple, is not a raven".

 

Well, here's the problem, Moth. If you accept...

 

1. Each instance of a black raven confirms (i.e. constitutes evidence for) H1, and

 

2. Any evidence which confirms a hypothesis which is logically equivalent to H1, also confirms H1

 

 

... then trouble is brewing. H1 is logically equivalent to "all non-black objects are non-ravens"

 

And if you accept the two seemingly unproblematic conditions above, then the conclusion is inescapable: the hypothesis "all ravens are black" is not only confirmed by each instance of a black raven, but also each observation of a brown shoe, a yellow canary, and a pink Cadillac.

 

Evidence has never been so easy!

 

And as one wit quipped: "This opens up unthought of possibilities for indoor ornithology"

[moth]

But the evidence about the statement "all ravens are black" is inside the "figure" of the ravens who's color I've tested, so caddys and such are ground.
Maybe the two are equivalent when you have tested everything else besides ravens and found all the "ground".
If so, then maybe a black cadillac is a tiny bit of anti? evidence that all ravens are black.

[Reg Prescott]

But the evidence about the statement "all ravens are black" is inside the "figure" of the ravens who's color I've tested, so caddys and such are ground.

Maybe the two are equivalent when you have tested everything else besides ravens and found all the "ground".

If so, then maybe a black cadillac is a tiny bit of anti? evidence that all ravens are black.

 

Moth, I'm wondering if there's a typo in your final sentence. Did you mean to say: "then maybe a pink [for example] cadillac is a tiny bit of evidence that all ravens are black."?

 

If so, I believe Carl Hempel -- the paradox discoverer -- would agree with you. He, for one, was willing to bite the bullet, so to speak, and accept that a pink Cadillac (and green toothbrush, etc.) DOES constitute evidence, albeit a tiny bit, for the hypothesis all ravens are black, hugely counterintuitive though it might seem at first glance. It's a lot less counterintuitive if the number of objects under consideration is only ten, say.

 

If it's not a typo then I'm confused. Can you explain please?

Edited November 4, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[moth]

It was more about not checking which color the alledged cadillac was.

But we seem to understand each other.

[Reg Prescott]

It was more about not checking which color the alledged cadillac was.

But we seem to understand each other.

 

Ok, because if said Caddy is black, it does not fulfill the condition of confirming the logically equivalent hypothesis that all non-black objects are non-ravens.

[Ophiolite]

 

I didn't present an exhaustive dichotomy. I simply mentioned two possibilities that immediately leapt to mind.

And in restricting the possibilities you offered to those two, you created a false dichotomy. Presenting two possibilities that "immediately leapt to mind" strongly implies you consider these to be the most likely explanations.

 

As for attitude, perhaps your own might be a little different if you'd had to endure what I have in these forums.

My attitude in those circumstances is irrelevant. I am not the one attempting to persuade members of a truth they find unpalatable. Either you are serious about achieving that end, or you prefer to bask in outraged pique.

 

Re - calling people fools. I don't believe I've done any such thing (although clearly you and others have interpreted me this way).

You have certainly, implicitly and explicitly, assigned then characteristics that - in toto - would strongly suggest they are fools. There is no place for ego in the type of argument you are presenting. Unfortunately your ego dominates your presentation.

Edited November 4, 2015 by Ophiolite

[ajb]

Let me stick to physics as this is what I know. I am sure that the other sciences will follow the same pattern. You may have to modify 'theory' or replace it with 'hypothesis' or something similar.

 

A theory is a mathematical model in which one can make calculations of physical observables that can then (in principle) be compared with observation. A theory is 'good' if it agrees well with nature and 'bad' otherwise. In the definition of 'good' and 'bad' you have to take into account the domain of validity (you do not expect the theory to be 'good' for all range of parameters), and you also have to take into account experimental errors, systematic errors and the statistical nature of data analysis.

 

Evidence is then understood as observations and measurements that quantitatively agrees with the theory. The agreement with nature is almost always stated statistically. There will often be some debate in how strong the supporting evidence is based on the statistics of the evidence. To some extent we artificially decide what is 'good' and 'bad' based on our needs and the evidence.

 

To be truly scientific, the evidence should satisfy the criteria I stated.

 

Now, credible evidence will satisfy the other criteria I listed. But I would like to include it in the list as I take the word to have further meaning. In particular, the experimental set-up and the data analysis need to be examined carefully in any experiment. By credible I mean that the basic 'quality control' of the experiment and data analysis had been taken into account. Everything should be to a reasonable standard.

[John Cuthber]

 

Well, here's the problem, Moth. If you accept...

 

1. Each instance of a black raven confirms (i.e. constitutes evidence for) H1, and

 

2. Any evidence which confirms a hypothesis which is logically equivalent to H1, also confirms H1

 

 

... then trouble is brewing. H1 is logically equivalent to "all non-black objects are non-ravens"

 

And if you accept the two seemingly unproblematic conditions above, then the conclusion is inescapable: the hypothesis "all ravens are black" is not only confirmed by each instance of a black raven, but also each observation of a brown shoe, a yellow canary, and a pink Cadillac.

 

Evidence has never been so easy!

 

And as one wit quipped: "This opens up unthought of possibilities for indoor ornithology"

The obvious issue with that "logic" is that a pink car is also evidence for the suggestion that all crows are green.

And yet the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive.

It is not possible for both the statements " all crows are black" and "all crows are green" to be true.

Proof of one would be refutation of the other.

Yet there's this bizarre notion a that a lot of entities like pink cars that are neither green nor black non-crows is "proof" that all crows are black and that all crows are green.

 

That's plainly a fault.

So reductio ad absurdum- the pink cars tell you nothing about the blackness of crows (as common sense suggests).

[Reg Prescott]

Thanks to both Ajb and John Cuthber for your thoughtful replies. You've given me/us much to consider.

Before proceeding any further, just a few words which I hope might help us understand each other better. As I've said before, I'm not religious, and have no particular inclination to further their respective causes, although you might hear me protest when I feel they're being unfairly dealt with, as I believe they often are by those of a more scientific persuasion. As for science, I simply enjoy reading about it, especially its philosophical analysis. If I have any agenda at all, it's simply learning, and a discussion such as this one can be enormously helpful, given I don't often get the chance, not only in consolidating my own understanding of these issues, but also in exposing any confusions on my own part.

It's clear that questions of evidence are riddled with difficulty, so surely it's better that we rehearse these matters here, rather than wait till your next public lecture and have an audience member (one of these dreaded fundies perhaps) point out glaring contradictions in the definition of evidence you just advanced.

Better that this asshole come crawling out the woodwork than one of those assholes.

To business...

Ajb first. Thanks again for sharing your professional insight. You're still defending your criterion of "credibility" but I really don't think this is going to work, or to be more precise, I think you'll find the consequences intolerable.

Now, as I said earlier in the thread, if credibility is to mean credible to a certain group of people, and that group is simply people who find the evidence credible, then the circularity is obvious and vicious. So, in order to escape circularity we have to ask: which group? How about forming a committee of Moslem fundamentalists to arbitrate on potential evidence for evolutionary theory? Hmm, consider that a rhetorical question! Well, who then? How about a randomly selected cross section of the population? This might be a fitting time to reproduce a wonderful Winston Churchill quote that Ophiolite posted in another thread:

"The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter"

Let us also remind ourselves of your own (and Swansont's) insistence on the conjunctive nature of your proposed criteria - A and B and C and D - if any one is not satisfied, the candidate evidence must be rejected. Correct?

Now, supposing our democratic committee of distinguished evidence arbiters, after granting that your first three criteria are met, as well as the additional stipulations you added in your final paragraph directly above, decide for whatever reasons (they're religious, they're stupid, they're whatever), that the evidence is nonetheless incredible and must be rejected. Is this acceptable to you?

If not, it seems we're back to the right kind of people determining what is, and what is not, credible, are we not?

Second point to consider for now is this: it's often the case that exactly the same observations are taken as evidence for two or more rival hypotheses/theories (hereafter just theories). Evolution vs Design offers a prime example. We all know the standard stockpile of putative evidence -- the eye, the wing, and so forth -- taken by one group as evidence for the exquisite adaptation brought about by natural selection, and by the other as evidence for the exquisite workmanship of the designer. Given that the aforementioned observations (eye, wing, etc) are admissible as evidence for evolutionary theory, they presumably meet the required standards for scientific evidence (including your criterion of credibility!), and thus must also be admissible as evidence for the Designer theory; after all they are the very same observations. Is it not so? In this case how can it be maintained, on pain of double standard, that there is scientific evidence for one theory but no scientific evidence the other?

It would then appear, given the standards for evidence thus far proposed, that there IS at least some scientific evidence for the God theory, vociferous denials by all present notwithstanding.

Both theories are compatible with the evidence; why, then, do contemporary scientists choose natural selection over Design? It seems to me that considerations of explanation come into play here: Both theories are indeed compatible with the evidence but, on the orthodox scientific account, natural selection explains the evidence better than the Designer theory can, especially in cases where, unlike the eye and wing, the design appears to be less than exquisite. What do you think, ajm?

It might also be appropriate to point out here that, contra your comments above on mathematical models, statistics, and quantitative agreement -- with respect to physics, we should duly note -- Darwinian evolution, if I'm not mistaken, was wholly bereft of any mathematical armature, at least in its incipient stages. Whatever caused it to gain favour with the scientific community was apparently non-mathematical qualitative appraisal.

You said above : "To be truly scientific, the evidence should satisfy the criteria I stated." Evolutionary theory, at least when first proposed and indeed accepted, does not appear to meet your criteria.

@ John Cuthber. I love your response, and will be thinking about it through the day. My first thought is that Carl Hempel was a master logician and I'm anything but, so I'd be hesitant of dismissing his logic without some very careful analysis. Clearly, though, as everyone recognizes, the simple model I presented earlier for illustrative purposes is inadequate as a general model of scientific evidence. It might account for the development of basic laws of the form "all Xs are Y" (e.g. all copper conducts electricity) but obviously it can't accommodate all forms of scientific evidence, where in many cases we're dealing with unobservable entities, and thus can scarcely go around gathering instances.

Just one thing I'll say first though. No one is talking about proof here; we're discussing evidence, i.e., that which can confirm or support a theory without conclusively demonstrating its truth. Obviously a universal theory of the form all Xs are Y cannot be proven (in any logical sense at least) without examining all instances of X - surely an impossible task in the empirical domain of real science!

I agree with your comment that the two hypotheses -- all crows are black and all crows are green -- are mutually exclusive, and thus cannot both be true. As you correctly note, "proof of one would be refutation of the other". But I see no problem whatsoever in having evidence (not proof) which is compatible with two mutually contradictory theories. Consider an urn with ten marbles inside. We have examined five marbles and all of them are black. This evidence is perfectly compatible with the mutually exclusive hypotheses H1: all the marbles in this urn are black and H2: not all the marbles in this urn are black. Right?

Therefore, on Hempel's account at least, a pink car DOES constitute evidence -- albeit a teeny weeny bit -- for both hypotheses all crows are black and all crows are green.

What do you think?

More later...

Edited November 5, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[moth]

The obvious issue with that "logic" is that a pink car is also evidence for the suggestion that all crows are green.

And yet the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive.

It is not possible for both the statements " all crows are black" and "all crows are green" to be true.

Proof of one would be refutation of the other.

Yet there's this bizarre notion a that a lot of entities like pink cars that are neither green nor black non-crows is "proof" that all crows are black and that all crows are green.

 

That's plainly a fault.

So reductio ad absurdum- the pink cars tell you nothing about the blackness of crows (as common sense suggests).

 

If a pink cadillac is an example of something that is not a black raven, have you really learned nothing about black ravens?

Edited November 5, 2015 by moth

[Reg Prescott]

@ Moth

 

I just added a little more to my response above to John while you were posting. I'd like to hear if you think my reasoning is sound.

[moth]

I don't want to get in too far over my head, yesterday was the first time I've seen Hempel's raven paradox.
I think i agree with you, it seems like a not black non-raven could be part of a negative definition of a black or green raven, but it supports them both equally and not much.
Hopefully, John Cuthber or somebody will stop by and let us know where we lost the track.

[Reg Prescott]

Ok, Moth. Thanks. Now, at the risk of flogging a dead horse, more on credibility...

Ajb, supposing you were asked : Why do you believe evidence E?

And you answer : Because I have good reasons for believing E

We now ask : And what are these reasons, ajb?

You reply : Because E meets my criteria of repeatability, objectivity, and consistency. (A1)

A1 is a perfectly respectable answer. Whether or not your criteria are the right criteria or the best criteria is something that might need to be hashed out, but I say your answer is respectable insofar as it is non-circular; it does not make appeal to itself.

Now, let's add the dreaded criterion of credibility to the pot -- and stir (of course ) -- and see what happens...

A2 : I believe E because it satisfies my aforementioned criteria, and it is credible.

But what does "credible" mean except "believable"? A2 can thus be restated as:

A3 : I believe E because it satisfies my aforementioned criteria, and it is believable.

Compare, A4: I like Fluffy the cat because (among other things) she is likeable.

Now, we might grant that an answer of the form "I like Fluffy because she is likeable" is true, but it's trivially true. In other words, it's vacuous and entirely unhelpful.

I'm afraid your fourth criterion of credibility is in exactly the same position, ajb -- it's doing no work -- unless, as I described in my earlier post, you bite the bullet, break the chain of circularity, allow credibililty to mean credible to other people, thereby leaving yourself in the unenviable position of (possibly) having to accept (believe?) evidence that you don't believe!

I say we dump it LOL. Whaddya say?

Edited November 5, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[ajb]

So, in order to escape circularity we have to ask: which group?

I of course have in mind any evidence that would stand up to scientific scrutiny. So I would naturally suggest that the group should be a group of qualified scientists.

 

If I were to assemble a group of theologians, would they examine evidence or just base things on their faith and what their particular holy books say?

 

Both theories are compatible with the evidence...

In relation to evolution and creationism, the scientific community disagrees with you. There is no evidence that is of a scientific standard that supports creationism and intelligent design (as commonly understood). There is no way you can say that the evidence is consistent for both sets of ideas.

 

I'm afraid your fourth criterion of credibility is in exactly the same position, ajb -- it's doing no work -- unless, as I described in my earlier post, you bite the bullet, break the chain of circularity, allow credibililty to mean credible to other people, thereby leaving yourself in the unenviable position of (possibly) having to accept (believe?) evidence that you don't believe!

 

I say we dump it LOL. Whaddya say?

If we are discussing scientific evidence then the 'bar of credibility' is set by the scientific community. Of course, it should not be seen as totally independent of the other criteria I set, which we generally seem to agree on.

 

There should be little loss by dumping credibility as it is somewhat implied by the other criteria anyway.

 

If the experiment/observations were done to a scientific standard then they would generally be considered credible. This of course does not mean that the results are necessarily 'good', errors and mistakes can later come to light. The point is that the work should be of a standard that is worth further investigation. Most studies of UFOs, bigfoot etc fall short of scientific credibility.

Edited November 5, 2015 by ajb

[Reg Prescott]

I of course have in mind any evidence that would stand up to scientific scrutiny. So I would naturally suggest that the group should be a group of qualified scientists.

 

If I were to assemble a group of theologians, would they examine evidence or just base things on their faith and what their particular holy books say?

 

Well, now we're back to where we started. The right people will adjudicate what does, and what does not, constitute evidence. I said the following to John Cuthber on page 1:

A claim such as "We believe we have good evidence" is entirely uncontroversial. On the other hand, when yourself, or anyone else, advances a claim of the form...

We have evidence; they don't

... clearly you're going beyond the basic interpretation of the term. Evidence (let's call it evidence2) has now apparently transcended mere reasons for belief, and an implicit appeal is made to an objective standard that your own evidence satisfies and theirs doesn't. I'd like to know what that standard is. Surely this is not an unreasonable request?

Is the standard simply science itself? If scientists say it's evidence then it's evidence?

If not, will you please begin by specifying for us the precise nature of the relationship between evidence2 and theory, so that all of us can determine for ourselves who has it and who doesn't. Afterwards we can carry on from there.

 

Scientists often tell us "there is good evidence for X" and "there is no evidence for Y". I was wondering if there might be objective standards that all of us -- laymen, Creationists, and just ordinary riff-raff like myself -- could appeal to in order to determine these matters for ourselves without having to consult our local friendly scientific community.

But now you're effectively telling us, ajb, that at the end of the day, if scientists call it evidence, then it's evidence. And that's that! The evidential standard JUST IS the scientific community.

Once again, I hasten to emphasize I'm not necessarily suggesting there's anything wrong with this.

Just let's not pretend otherwise.

Edited November 5, 2015 by Reg Prescott

[ajb]

Well, now we're back to where we started. The right people will adjudicate what does, and what does not, constitute evidence.

With regards to scientific evidence, could it really be much different? The standard of evidence will always depend on the standards of those who you hope to convince.

 

 

Scientists often tell us "there is good evidence for X" and "there is no evidence for Y". I was wondering if there might be objective standards that all of us -- laymen, Creationists, and just ordinary riff-raff like myself -- could appeal to in order to determine these matters for ourselves without having to consult our local friendly scientific community.

The best thing to do would be to come familiar with some basics of statistics, probability and data presentation. That way you would have some idea about the claims made.

 

However, in general you may have to accept that scientists generally have a good idea of what they are talking about and some level of trust is needed. The same applies to your doctor, mechanic, plumber and electrician. (Mod rouges of course!)

 

But now you're effectively telling us, ajb, that at the end of the day, if scientists call it evidence, then it's evidence. And that's that! The evidential standard JUST IS the scientific community.

Well, I am not sure how one could want it any other way. Experts in the field decide the standards of evidence that they require for that field.

 

Once again, I hasten to emphasize I'm not necessarily suggesting there's anything wrong with this.

I would say that there is nothing wrong with this, nor is there any real alternative.